Pushing the button
Why concessions should not be made to terrorist kidnappers
Patrick Brandt, Justin George & Todd Sandler
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper examines the dynamic implications of making concessions to terrorist kidnappers. We apply a Bayesian Poisson changepoint model to kidnapping incidents associated with three cohorts of countries that differ in their frequency of granting concessions. Depending on the cohort of countries during 2001-2013, terrorist negotiation successes encouraged 64% to 87% more kidnappings. Our findings also hold for 1978-2013, during which these negotiation successes encouraged 26% to 57% more kidnappings. Deterrent aspects of terrorist casualties are also quantified; the dominance of religious fundamentalist terrorists meant that such casualties generally did not curb kidnappings.
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The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya
Courtney Hillebrecht
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was designed to try the worst war criminals for crimes against humanity, genocide and other instances of mass human suffering. By providing a permanent, international mechanism to hold perpetrators of mass human rights abuse accountable, the ICC is also meant to be a deterrent - to prevent potential genocidaires from committing systematic human rights abuses in the first place. But what if the effect is actually quite the opposite? While advocates of international justice have made conjectures about the effect of the ICC on stopping human rights abuses, the existing scholarship does not empirically test assumptions about the relationship between international criminal justice and violence. This article outlines the causal mechanisms by which the ICC could affect on-going violence and tests these assumptions using event count models of the relationship between the ICC and the level of violence against civilians in Libya during the 2011 crisis. These analyses suggest that the ICC's involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of mass atrocities committed. The results also call for a broad and sustained research agenda on the effect of international accountability efforts on on-going violence.
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What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?
Efraim Benmelech & Esteban Klor
NBER Working Paper, April 2016
Abstract:
This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the link between economic, political, and social conditions and the global phenomenon of ISIS foreign fighters. We find that poor economic conditions do not drive participation in ISIS. In contrast, the number of ISIS foreign fighters is positively correlated with a country's GDP per capita and Human Development Index (HDI). In fact, many foreign fighters originate from countries with high levels of economic development, low income inequality, and highly developed political institutions. Other factors that explain the number of ISIS foreign fighters are the size of a country's Muslim population and its ethnic homogeneity. Although we cannot directly determine why people join ISIS, our results suggest that the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS is driven not by economic or political conditions but rather by ideology and the difficulty of assimilation into homogeneous Western countries.
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Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion
Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson
International Security, Spring 2016, Pages 7-44
Abstract:
Did the United States promise the Soviet Union during the 1990 negotiations on German reunification that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe? Since the end of the Cold War, an array of Soviet/Russian policymakers have charged that NATO expansion violates a U.S. pledge advanced in 1990; in contrast, Western scholars and political leaders dispute that the United States made any such commitment. Recently declassified U.S. government documents provide evidence supporting the Soviet/Russian position. Although no non-expansion pledge was ever codified, U.S. policymakers presented their Soviet counterparts with implicit and informal assurances in 1990 strongly suggesting that NATO would not expand in post-Cold War Europe if the Soviet Union consented to German reunification. The documents also show, however, that the United States used the reunification negotiations to exploit Soviet weaknesses by depicting a mutually acceptable post-Cold War security environment, while actually seeking a system dominated by the United States and opening the door to NATO's eastward expansion. The results of this analysis carry implications for international relations theory, diplomatic history, and current U.S.-Russian relations.
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John Friedman, Jennifer Lerner & Richard Zeckhauser
Harvard Working Paper, April 2016
Abstract:
National security is one of many fields where public officials offer imprecise probability assessments when evaluating high-stakes decisions. This practice is often justified with arguments about how quantifying subjective judgments would bias analysts and decision makers toward overconfident action. We translate these arguments into testable hypotheses, and evaluate their validity through survey experiments involving national security professionals. Results reveal that when decision makers receive numerals (as opposed to words) for probability assessments, they are less likely to support risky actions and more receptive to gathering additional information, disconfirming the idea of a bias toward action. Yet when respondents generate probabilities themselves, using numbers (as opposed to words) magnifies overconfidence, especially among low-performing assessors. These results hone directions for research among both proponents and skeptics of quantifying probability estimates in national security and other fields. Given that uncertainty surrounds virtually all intelligence reports, military plans, and national security decisions, understanding how national security officials form and interpret probability assessments has wide-ranging implications for theory and practice.
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Judicial Restraint and the New War Powers
Jasmine Farrier
Presidential Studies Quarterly, June 2016, Pages 387-410
Abstract:
Over the past four decades, members of Congress have filed 10 lawsuits challenging military actions abroad that were ordered or sustained by presidents without prior legislative consent. In dismissing these cases, federal courts told the plaintiffs to use their legislative tools to show disapproval of the actions already in progress. Under this logic, the House and Senate must have a veto-proof supermajority to end an existing military engagement before a case can be heard on the merits. These precedents contrast with previous war powers cases initiated by private litigants, which focused on prior simple majority legislative authority for presidential action.
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Does Social Media Influence Conflict? Evidence from the 2012 Gaza Conflict
Thomas Zeitzoff
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
How does international public support via social media influence conflict dynamics? To answer this question, I construct a unique, extremely disaggregated data set drawn from social media sources to examine the behavior of Israel and Hamas during the 2012 Gaza Conflict. The data set contains conflict actions and international audience behavior at the hourly level for the full 179 hours of the conflict. Notably, I also include popular support for each side from international audiences on social media. I employ a Bayesian structural vector autoregression to measure how Israel's and Hamas's actions respond to shifts in international public support. The main finding is that shifts in public support reduce conflict intensity, particularly for Israel. This effect is greater than the effect of the key international actors - United States, Egypt, and United Nations. The results provide an important insight into how information technology is changing the role of international audiences in conflict.
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Mengyao Li et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Five experiments investigated the war contagion phenomenon in the context of international relations, hypothesizing that reminders of past inter- (but not intra-) state war will increase support for future, unrelated interstate violence. After being reminded of the Korean War as an interstate rather than intrastate conflict, South Koreans showed stronger support for violent responses to new, unrelated interstate tensions (Study 1). Replicating this war contagion effect among Americans, we demonstrated that it was mediated by heightened perceived threat from, and negative images of, a fictitious country unrelated to the past war (Study 2), and moderated by national glorification (Study 3). Study 4, using another international conflict in the U.S. history, provided further conceptual replication. Finally, Study 5 included a baseline in addition to the inter- versus intrastate manipulation, yielding further support for the generalized effect of past interstate war reminders on preferences for aggressive approaches to new interstate tensions.
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David Randahl
Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article uses a large-n dataset to investigate the effect of terrorist attacks with American victims on the popularity of the U.S. president. The study uses two broad theoretical frameworks to analyze this effect, the score-keeping framework and the rally-effect framework. The findings of the study show that, when excluding the effect from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, actual terrorist attacks have no generalizable short-term impact on the popularity of the U.S. president. This indicates that even though the topics of national security, terrorism, and the president's ability to handle these issues are important in the political debate in the United States, actual terrorism has little or no short-term impact on presidential approval ratings.
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Kantian Dynamics Revisited: Time Varying Analyses of Dyadic IGO-Conflict Relationships
Christopher Anderson, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Emily Schilling
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
The literature on international organizations (IGOs) and interstate conflict in world politics produces a series of contradictory theoretical arguments and empirical findings about how IGOs help to prevent conflict and promote peace between member states. Empirical studies find a range of inconsistent results ranging from pacifying effects of shared IGO memberships on dyadic militarized disputes to conflict inducing effects of shared IGO memberships to null relationships. Theoretically, we consider how IGOs promote the rule of peace preservation through the mechanisms of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy and we describe how these mechanisms help explain the time varying relationships between shared IGOs memberships and militarized conflict since WWII. Analyses of time varying parameter models of dyad-year data from 1948 to 2000 suggest that shared IGO memberships reduce the likelihood of militarized conflict in some historical periods (Cold War), but increase the chances for dyadic conflict in other periods (post-Cold War). The design of IGOs is relevant as well, with security-based, highly institutionalized IGOs best suited to prevent militarized conflict between member states. The results suggest that evolutionary dynamics in the Kantian peace vary across legs of the Kantian tripod and that we cannot understand the Kantian peace without considering dynamic relationships over time.
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Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining
Todd Sechser
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
When do states defend their reputations? States sometimes pay high costs to protect their reputations, but other times willingly tarnish them. What accounts for the difference? This article investigates reputation building in the context of coercive diplomacy. In coercive bargaining, giving in to a challenge can harm one's reputation. I argue, however, that states value their reputations less - and therefore are more willing to capitulate to coercive threats - when they do not expect future challenges. Using a data set of more than 200 coercive threats, empirical tests find support for this logic. Coercers that are constrained in their ability to initiate future challenges exhibit higher rates of coercive success in the status quo. The results shed light on the causes of reputation-building behavior and add an important element to our understanding of the dynamics of coercive diplomacy.
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Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability
Gary Uzonyi & Toby Rider
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.
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Shuki Cohen et al.
Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming
Abstract:
We describe a novel hybrid method of content analysis that combines the speed of computerized text analysis with the contextual sensitivity of human raters, and apply it to speeches that were given by major leaders of Al-Qaeda (AQ) - both in its "core" Afghanistan/Pakistan region and its affiliate group in Iraq. The proposed "Ideology Extraction using Linguistic Extremization" (IELEX) categorization method has acceptable levels of inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities. The method uncovered subtle (and potentially non-conscious) differences in the emphases that Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri put on the various components of their ideological justification for terrorism. We show how these differences were independently recognized as the crux of the rift in AQ, based on documents that were confiscated in Abbottabad following Usama Bin Laden's assassination. Additionally, several of the ideological discrepancies that we detected between AQ "core" and its Iraqi affiliate correspond to schisms that presumably led to the splintering of AQ Iraq and the rise of ISIS. We discuss IELEX's capability to quantify a variety of grievance-based terrorist ideologies, along with its use towards more focused and efficient counter-terrorism and counter-messaging policies.
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Recollection Bias and its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism-Risk Assessments
Kip Viscusi & Richard Zeckhauser
Harvard Working Paper, January 2016
Abstract:
Recollection bias is the phenomenon whereby people, after observing a highly unexpected event, hold current risk beliefs about a similar event that are no higher than their recollection of their prior beliefs. This article explores recollection bias in relation to individuals' perceptions of the risks of terrorism attacks. Over 60% of respondents in a national U.S. sample of over 900 adults believe that the risks of a future terrorist attack by either an airplane or in a public setting are no higher than they believed respectively before the 9/11 attack and the Boston Marathon bombing. Only one-fifth of respondents are free of any type of recollection bias. Recollection bias is negatively correlated with absolute levels of risk belief. Recollection bias - basically the belief that perceived risks have not increased - dampens support for a variety of anti-terrorism measures, controlling for the level of risk beliefs and demographic factors. Public attitudes influence policy. Thus, educating the public about risk is critical.
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Going Global: Islamist Competition in Contemporary Civil Wars
Aisha Ahmad
Security Studies, Spring 2016, Pages 353-384
Abstract:
The global landscape of modern jihad is highly diverse and wrought with conflict between rival Islamist factions. Within this inter-Islamist competition, some factions prove to be more robust and durable than others. This research proposes that the adoption of a global identity allows an Islamist group to better recruit and expand their domestic political power across ethnic and tribal divisions without being constrained by local politics. Islamists that rely on an ethnic or tribal identity are more prone to group fragmentation, whereas global Islamists are better able to retain group cohesion by purging their ranks of dissenters. To examine these two processes, I present original field research and primary source analysis to examine Islamist in-fighting in Somalia from 2006-2014 and then expand my analysis to Iraq and Syria, Pakistan, and Mali.
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What Does Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within Dabiq Magazine
Brandon Colas
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)'s flagship English-language magazine, Dabiq, is a puzzle. The magazine is not, despite appearances, primarily designed for direct recruiting efforts or inciting violence against the West. In fact, the primary audiences of Dabiq are English-speaking second generation Muslims or converts, Western policymakers, and a third group of current or would-be members of ISIS who are not integrating with the organization itself. The third audience - those members who are failing to function within the organization - is strange to include in an English-language magazine. Why publish organizational weaknesses, in English? One possibility for this puzzle is that the fundamentalist hermeneutics of ISIS is reflected in their own media efforts. One of the assumptions that ISIS holds about their sacred texts is that each text carries a single meaning that reflects the author's original intent. There might be multiple applications of that intent, but each text can only have one intent, and therefore one meaning. Following this logic, a message meant for one person is unlikely to be of utility for another, and so this may be why ISIS exposes their weaknesses as part of the process of correcting their own members.
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The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia
Nina Silove
International Security, Spring 2016, Pages 45-88
Abstract:
American critics of the Barack Obama administration's 2011 "pivot to Asia" policy claim that, despite the lofty rhetoric, the United States has pursued an anemic strategy in Asia. Chinese critics of the pivot to Asia assert that it is a bellicose strategy aimed at containing China's rise. These two conflicting criticisms are addressed in a detailed historical narrative that traces the development and implementation of U.S. strategy, based on declassified documents, some of which have never before been made public, and extensive in-depth interviews with senior policymakers. Neither American nor Chinese critics of the pivot to Asia are correct. If this policy is properly dated and measured, the United States undertook a substantive military, diplomatic, and later economic reorientation toward Asia. That reorientation started in the mid-2000s, well before the pivot announcement. The aim of the reorientation was not to contain China's rise. Rather, the United States sought to manage China's growth through a blend of internal and external balancing combined with expanded engagement with China. These means were intended to work symbiotically to expand the combined power of the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, and to dissuade China from bidding for hegemony. The ultimate effect of the reorientation strategy - if successful - would be to preserve the existing power balance in the region, in which the United States has held the superior position.
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China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese Media Expansion on African Public Opinion
Catie Snow Bailard
International Journal of Press/Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
In 2006, Chinese officials revealed an extensive plan to increase the nation's soft power in Africa through a number of initiatives to increase the presence and relevance of Chinese media in Africa. However, the question remains: Has China been successful in enhancing its soft power via its news media expansion in the African region? Although it is easy to find sweeping proclamations regarding the popularity of Chinese media throughout Africa, there have been limited efforts to systematically measure the effect of these media on African public opinion toward China. This study seeks to fill this void. Using Pew Global Attitudes Project data, I explore correlations between attitudes toward China and the extent of the Chinese media presence across six African nations in 2013. In addition, to better test for a causal effect of the post-2006 expansion, I employ a second analysis in which I compare these relationships in 2007 with these same relationships in 2013. By comparing changes in these relationships over time, this analysis provides tentative empirical support that the sweeping efforts undertaken to expand the reach and relevance of Chinese media in Africa have moved African public opinion in the desired direction.
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Crimes Committed by U.S. Soldiers in Europe, 1945-1946
Thomas Kehoe & James Kehoe
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Summer 2016, Pages 53-84
Abstract:
Accounts from victims and observers, including new research in the U.S. National Archives and the Bavarian National Archives, suggest that American soldiers committed crimes against persons - especially rape and various forms of assault - and against property in Europe after World War II more often than statistics about charges and prosecutions at the time indicated. More importantly, previously unexamined statistical summaries of crimes committed by American troops, as recorded by the U.S. Provost Marshal, provide unprecedented quantitative information about these crimes in the European Theater of Operations (eto) during the first postwar year, May 1945 to June 1946. The absolute number of crimes decreased as the number of troops declined, but the rate of crime (number per 10,000 troops) increased during the same period.