Official business
Ashley Watts et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent research and theorizing suggest that narcissism may predict both positive and negative leadership behaviors. We tested this hypothesis with data on the 42 U.S. presidents up to and including George W. Bush, using (a) expert-derived narcissism estimates, (b) independent historical surveys of presidential performance, and (c) largely or entirely objective indicators of presidential performance. Grandiose, but not vulnerable, narcissism was associated with superior overall greatness in an aggregate poll; it was also positively associated with public persuasiveness, crisis management, agenda setting, and allied behaviors, and with several objective indicators of performance, such as winning the popular vote and initiating legislation. Nevertheless, grandiose narcissism was also associated with several negative outcomes, including congressional impeachment resolutions and unethical behaviors. We found that presidents exhibit elevated levels of grandiose narcissism compared with the general population, and that presidents' grandiose narcissism has been rising over time. Our findings suggest that grandiose narcissism may be a double-edged sword in the leadership domain.
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Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?
Matthew Stephenson
Journal of Legal Studies, June 2013, Pages 331-368
Abstract:
It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less frequent (because sufficient concessions are sometimes infeasible). The formal analysis in this article shows this claim to be incomplete and sometimes incorrect. Although greater separation of powers makes legislation more difficult to enact, it also makes legislation, once enacted, more difficult to repeal. Attenuating the threat of repeal means that when one faction has sufficient power to push through extreme policies, it is more likely to do so than would be the case if legislative power were more concentrated. These two effects cut in opposite directions, and it is difficult to say, as a general matter, which will predominate. Indeed, increasing the fragmentation of legislative power may sometimes increase both the expected frequency and the expected extremism of legislative enactments.
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Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight
Joshua Clinton, David Lewis & Jennifer Selin
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.
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Personality and Political Culture in the American States
Jeffery Mondak & Damarys Canache
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Differences in political culture have been observed at the cross-national and subnational levels, and political culture corresponds with a wide array of important social and political phenomena. However, possible psychological correlates of political culture are less clear. Building on research in personality psychology and cross-cultural psychology, this study contemplates whether aggregate personality measures compiled in the American states correspond with patterns in political culture. Using measures of personality traits provided by more than 600,000 survey respondents, parallels with state-level measures of citizen ideology, political culture, and civic culture are examined. Possible mechanisms linking personality and political culture are discussed.
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Lindsay Owens & Karen Cook
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 2013, Pages 274-298
Abstract:
The effects of recessions on social and political attitudes are likely smaller than the effects on employment, income, and wealth, but relatively modest aggregate effects may be masking differences in attitudes between individuals who live in areas most and least affected by recessions. To investigate social and political attitudes in geographical context, we exploit a new data source that matches individuals to their county of residence to analyze whether changing economic conditions at the county level are associated with changing confidence in major social institutions and with changing levels of interpersonal trust. We find that individuals in particularly affected counties are more likely to decrease their support for organized labor and the federal government. County-level hardship does not appear to be associated with changes in interpersonal measures of trust, however, suggesting that two very different processes may be at play.
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Michael Gilbert & Benjamin Aiken
University of Virginia Working Paper, September 2013
Abstract:
Disclosure laws require individuals and organizations that spend money on political speech to make public their identities. The Supreme Court and many others laud disclosure for shining light on money in politics and combating quid pro quo corruption. But that support may be misplaced. While disclosure provides information to law enforcement and the general public, it also provides information to corrupt actors. Disclosure records can tell politicians which private actors support compliant candidates, and the records can help private actors determine which politicians reward their benefactors. Disclosure can thus bring conspirators together and reduce the uncertainty that inheres in illegal transactions. That means disclosure has cross-cutting effects. It can deter corruption by increasing the likelihood of exposure, but it can also raise the benefit of corruption by increasing the certainty that parties to corrupt deals will keep their promises. When the second effect trumps, disclosure increases corruption. This analysis has implications for scholarship and law, including the upcoming McCutcheon case. It suggests that policymakers and judges should be less optimistic about disclosure and open to alternative corruption-fighting measures.
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The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation
R. van Veldhuizen
Journal of Economic Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. The present paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, low-wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high-wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high-wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option. Additionally, the results suggest that a positive monitoring rate may be necessary for these effects to arise.
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Gerrymandering from the Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting
James Cottrill & Terri Peretti
Election Law Journal, September 2013, Pages 261-276
Abstract:
Widespread public mistrust of legislative redistricting begs the question: Can (presumably) neutral and independent courts produce more competitive districts that preserve the integrity of the democratic process? The regime politics perspective suggests not, portraying courts as partisan collaborators whose rulings help their regime allies in the other branches. Conversely, recent congressional elections research suggests that non-legislative approaches to redistricting (such as independent commissions) encourage experienced candidates to mount serious electoral challenges to incumbents. We extend this literature by focusing on the impact of judicial participation in the redistricting process. Using data for the 2000 apportionment cycle, we test whether judicial redistricting enhances the competitiveness of congressional elections, as some studies suggest, or if it instead serves to promote the interests of the party with which the judge is affiliated, as the regime politics literature would lead us to believe. Our findings suggest that judicial redistricting does enhance competition in congressional elections, but we fail to find evidence that it confers any partisan advantage.
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The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions
Marcus Holmes
International Organization, October 2013, Pages 829-861
Abstract:
Face-to-face diplomacy has long been the lynchpin of international politics, yet it has largely been dismissed as irrelevant in theories of cooperation and conflict - as "cheap talk" because leaders have incentives to dissemble. However, diplomats and leaders have argued for years that there is often no substitute for personally meeting a counterpart to hash out an agreement. This article argues that face-to-face diplomacy provides a signaling mechanism that increases the likelihood of cooperation. Face-to-face meetings allow individuals to transmit information and empathize with each other, thereby reducing uncertainty, even when they have strong incentives to distrust the other. The human brain has discrete architecture and processes devoted to parsing others' intentions via cues in face-to-face interaction. These processes enable actors to directly access the intentions of others with a higher degree of certainty than economic and game-theoretic models of bargaining predict.
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The Political and Civic Implications of Chicago's Unsuccessful Bid to Host the 2016 Olympic Games
Larry Bennett et al.
Journal of Sport and Social Issues, November 2013, Pages 364-383
Abstract:
Between 2006 and 2009, Chicago's political and civic leadership developed a bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) ultimately selected Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 Games, with Chicago finishing fourth among the finalist cities in the October, 2009, IOC voting. This article is based on 20 key informant interviews with members and staff of the Chicago 2016 Committee, neighborhood activists and organizational staff in projected Olympic "venue" neighborhoods, and three "unaffiliated" civic leaders. The aim of the interviews was to determine - in light of the failed 2016 Olympic bid - if Chicago's leadership had effected a process of what urban regime theorists term "social learning," collective retrospection that can lead to the pursuit of more successful future civic ventures. The evidence provided by these interviews suggests that not only has there been little civic retrospection by Chicago's leadership, but also that processes put in place to promote the Chicago bid to international and local constituencies actually inhibited the ability of local elites to learn from past action.
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The Thermostatic Model of Responsiveness in the American States
Julianna Pacheco
State Politics & Policy Quarterly, September 2013, Pages 306-332
Abstract:
Does the thermostatic model exist in the states? Using a unique data set on state spending preferences on education and welfare, I find evidence of dynamic policy representation and dynamic public responsiveness, but with important qualifications. As state support for spending on education or welfare increases, state expenditures increase, but only for states that are highly professional and, presumably, able to accurately gauge the preferences of residents. In other states, legislators are responding to national policy sentiment instead of specific state opinion. I find no evidence that initiative states are more responsive to state opinion. Empirical evidence for dynamic public responsiveness is more consistent across model specifications. As state expenditures on education or welfare increase, state preferences for additional spending decrease, even after controlling for federal expenditures. Finally, I find that policy representation and public responsiveness in the states are conditional on issue saliency. The results provide a more nuanced understanding about the degree of dynamic representation and responsiveness in the states and the thermostatic model more generally.
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Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal
Justin Grimmer & Eleanor Neff Powell
Journal of Politics, October 2013, Pages 907-920
Abstract:
We show how preferred committee assignments act as an electoral subsidy for members of Congress - empowering representatives' legislative careers. When holding preferred assignments, legislators are free to focus on legislative activity in Washington, DC. But when the subsidy is removed, legislators are forced to direct attention to the district. To test our theory of legislative subsidy, we exploit committee exile - the involuntary removal of committee members after a party loses a sizable number of seats. Legislators are selected for exile using members' rank on the committee, causing exiled and remaining legislators to appear strikingly similar. Using exile, we show that it has only limited electoral consequences, but this is partly due to compensatory efforts. Exiled legislators shift attention away from Washington and towards the district: they raise and spend more money for reelection, author less legislation, are absent for more days of voting, and vote with their party less often.
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Public meetings as sources of citizen input: Comparing attendees with citizens at large
Anne Williamson
Social Science Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although public meetings are the most frequently used method for obtaining citizen input into public decision-making, there is little systematic evidence comparing attendees with citizens at large. This paper addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing results from a series of public meetings and a random-sample telephone survey. The public meetings and telephone survey were conducted in Hillsborough County, Florida to obtain citizen input for the purpose of establishing spending priorities for more than $39 million in federal block grant funds. Findings include representation at public meetings on a number of factors, including race, Hispanic ethnicity, and low-income status. Attendees favor redistributive activities more often than citizens at large; however, both attendees and the general public agree on the importance of funding activities serving certain vulnerable populations, including seniors, persons with disabilities, and victims of domestic violence.
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Presidential Influence of the News Media: The Case of the Press Conference
Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha
Political Communication, Fall 2013, Pages 548-564
Abstract:
Can presidents influence news coverage through their press conferences? Scant research has explored this question leaving two possible answers. On the one hand, presidential news management efforts, combined with norms of journalistic professionalism and the cost of producing news, suggest that the nightly news will cover presidential press conferences. On the other hand, the costs of delivering press conferences espoused by some scholars insinuate that press conferences will have little impact on news coverage. To determine whether the press conference influences news coverage, I use plagiarism detection software to assess the propensity of television news to incorporate the president's rhetoric into stories that cover the president's press conferences. I find that news reports on the press conference rely heavily on the president's words, indicating that it is an important event for presidential influence of the news media and perhaps eventually the public.
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The Effects of Direct Elections When Voters are Unwise: Evidence from Tax Assessors
Michael Sances
MIT Working Paper, August 2013
Abstract:
In this paper, I show that direct elections can harm public policy by increasing responsiveness to unwise voters. To estimate this effect, I study property tax assessors in New York towns. Using a difference-in-differences design that leverages a large number of switches from election to appointment, I show that direct elections result in less accurate and less equitable property valuations. I then test whether increased responsiveness to voters is the causal mechanism. Using both qualitative evidence and an original survey of town officials, I find that voters strongly oppose policies that would equalize tax burdens. Finally, I present survey evidence showing voter preferences have no rational basis, but are instead rooted in a simple analytical miscalculation. These findings show that increasing democracy may give voters what they want, but also remind us that more responsiveness can be problematic when voters are unwise.
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How Do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from Cantonal Parliaments, 1890-2000
Patricia Funk & Christina Gathmann
Journal of the European Economic Association, October 2013, Pages 1178-1203
Abstract:
Using a new data set on Swiss cantons since 1890, we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy. In line with economic theory, we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods (like education and welfare benefits) but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods (like roads). We find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government. An analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout, left-wing representation, and political fragmentation. These changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending, but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures.
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Nour Kteily et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this research, we investigated how group power influences the way members of groups in asymmetrical conflict approach intergroup negotiations. Drawing on theories of negotiations and of intergroup power, we predicted that group power would interact with features of the proposed negotiating agenda to influence willingness to come to the table. Based on the negotiation literature, we focused on 2 types of sequential negotiation agendas: 1 beginning with the discussion of consequential issues before less consequential issues (consequential first) and 1 leaving the discussion of consequential issues until after less consequential issues are discussed (consequential later). Because they are motivated to advance changes to their disadvantaged status quo, we expected low-power group members to favor consequential first over consequential later invitations to negotiate. High-power group members, motivated to protect their advantage, were expected to show the reverse preference. Converging evidence from 5 experiments involving real-world and experimental groups supported these predictions. Across studies, participants received an invitation to negotiate from the other group involving either a consequential first or consequential later agenda. Low-power group members preferred consequential first invitations because these implied less stalling of change to the status quo, and high-power group members preferred consequential later invitations because these invitations seemed to pose less threat to their position. Theoretical and practical implications for negotiations research and conflict resolution are discussed.
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Term Limits and Electoral Accountability
Michael Smart & Daniel Sturm
Journal of Public Economics, November 2013, Pages 93-102
Abstract:
Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters' ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such "truthful" behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We characterize under what circumstances two-term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters.
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The growth of TV news, the demise of the journalism profession
Carey Higgins-Dobney & Gerald Sussman
Media, Culture & Society, October 2013, Pages 847-863
Abstract:
In response to the dearth of critical literature on the transformation of local news ownership structure and the impacts of technological reorganization of news production on the television profession and local communities, we analyze the consolidation of local news and the paradox of expanded news hours in times of shrinking staffs and less-trusting audiences. Focused on Portland, Oregon, characterized as one of America's most civically active cities and a top-25 market, we interviewed many key workers from among the city's four television newsrooms. Despite having union representation, once discrete news production professionals and functions have been radically integrated, resulting in a multitasked news staff forced to provide fast-turnaround for multiple platforms, while seriously weakening investigative reporting, the quality of news production, and the utility of local news for the community.
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An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S. Congressional Hearings
Kyle Albert
Sociological Forum, September 2013, Pages 574-596
Abstract:
Using both a new data set of labor union appearances in congressional hearings and archival data on union organizational resources, this article analyzes factors that determine whether a labor union will be represented in congressional hearing testimony in a given year. Consistent with the expectations of resource mobilization theory, organizational resources are important predictors of participation in congressional hearings. For example, membership is an important predictor of testimony in hearings, as is the number of lobbyists on staff and the character of a union's primary industry. However, membership in the AFL-CIO federation is negatively related to hearing participation, and some of the benefits of having a large membership base may be diminishing over time. Implications for the study of interest group politics and organizational political strategies are discussed.