More Wrong
Repeatedly Encountered Descriptions of Wrongdoing Seem More True but Less Unethical: Evidence in a Naturalistic Setting
Raunak Pillai, Lisa Fazio & Daniel Effron
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
When news about moral transgressions goes viral on social media, the same person may repeatedly encounter identical reports about a wrongdoing. In a longitudinal experiment (N = 607 U.S. adults from Mechanical Turk), we found that these repeated encounters can affect moral judgments. As participants went about their lives, we text-messaged them news headlines describing corporate wrongdoings (e.g., a cosmetics company harming animals). After 15 days, they rated these wrongdoings as less unethical than new wrongdoings. Extending prior laboratory research, these findings reveal that repetition can have a lasting effect on moral judgments in naturalistic settings, that affect plays a key role, and that increasing the number of repetitions generally makes moral judgments more lenient. Repetition also made fictitious descriptions of wrongdoing seem truer, connecting this moral-repetition effect with past work on the illusory-truth effect. The more times we hear about a wrongdoing, the more we may believe it -- but the less we may care.
The psychology of negative-sum competition in strategic interactions
Christopher Hsee et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many real-life examples -- from interpersonal rivalries to international conflicts -- suggest that people actively engage in competitive behavior even when it is negative sum (benefiting the self at a greater cost to others). This often leads to loss spirals where everyone -- including the winner -- ends up losing. Our research seeks to understand the psychology of such negative-sum competition in a controlled setting. To do so, we introduce an experimental paradigm in which paired participants have the option to repeatedly perform a behavior that causes a relatively small gain for the self and a larger loss to the other. Although they have the freedom not to engage in the behavior, most participants actively do so and incur substantial losses. We propose that an important reason behind the phenomena is shallow thinking -- focusing on the immediate benefit to the self while overlooking the downstream consequences of how the behavior will influence their counterparts' actions. In support of the proposition, we find that participants are less likely to engage in negative-sum behavior, if they are advised to consider the downstream consequences of their actions, or if they are put in a less frenzied decision environment, which facilitates deeper thinking (acting in discrete vs. continuous time). We discuss how our results differ from prior findings and the implications of our research for mitigating negative-sum competition and loss spirals in real life.
Economic inequality reduces sense of control and increases the acceptability of self-interested unethical behavior
Christopher To, Dylan Wiwad & Maryam Kouchaki
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Societies worldwide are witnessing higher levels of economic inequality. While prior work has examined ethical judgments toward inequality itself (e.g., "is inequality unethical?"), less is known about how inequality shapes judgments of unethical behavior (e.g., "is unethical behavior more acceptable?"). In two correlational studies, we find that higher objective (Study 1; n = 127,953) and subjective (Study 2; n = 806) inequality is associated with greater acceptability of self-interested unethical behavior. In Studies 3a-6b (total N = 4,851; preregistered), we manipulated perceived inequality and test several mediating pathways. Results point toward the importance of sense of control as a mechanism: Under conditions of high inequality, individuals report a lower sense of control, which increases the acceptability of self-interested unethical behaviors. As a supplement, we also explore associations regarding why high inequality reduces sense of control (reduced perceptions of social mobility) and why sense of control is associated with greater acceptability of unethical behavior (greater situational attributions). Overall, our results suggest inequality changes ethical standards by reducing one's sense of control, providing evidence for another pathway through which inequality harms societies.
Sadness as Prosocial Poison: Tactics that Increase Help-Giving May Decrease Help-Seeking
Andrew Morningstar & Cait Lamberton
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, December 2022
Abstract:
A charity's mission is not only to raise money, but also disperse it to those in need. Given the general aversion to seeking help observed in past research, there is reason to believe this is a non-trivial challenge. This research considers whether one widely used and well-researched tactic to encourage help-giving -- the depiction of victims with sad faces in donation appeals -- may be making this challenge more difficult to address. This tactic's negative effect is most robustly mediated by potential help-seekers' perception that charities using sad depictions respect them less than charities not using such depictions. Consistent with this respect mechanism, if sad expressions are framed as socially desirable (e.g., by telling people that others view displays of sadness as a mark of courage and self-love, rather than weakness), this tactic's negative impact on help-seeking is reduced. These findings enrich our theoretical understanding of responses to sadness in a charitable context, and provide practical guidance for charities hoping to use marketing knowledge to elicit and deliver donations. In addition, findings suggest that if researchers desire to support charities' whole mission rather than merely fundraising, it is critical to consider carefully their research's potential effects on help-seekers.
The moral consequences of teleological beliefs about the human species
Casey Lewry, Deborah Kelemen & Tania Lombrozo
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Adults in prior work often endorse explanations appealing to purposes (e.g., "pencils exist so people can write with them"), even when these "teleological" explanations are scientifically unwarranted (e.g., "water exists so life can survive on Earth"). We explore teleological endorsement in a novel domain -- human purpose -- and its relationship to moral judgments. Across studies conducted online with a sample of U.S.-recruited adults, we ask: (a) Do participants believe the human species exists for a purpose? (b) Do these beliefs predict moral condemnation of individuals who fail to fulfill this purpose? And (c) what explains the link between teleological beliefs and moral condemnation? Study 1 found that participants frequently endorsed teleological claims about humans existence (e.g., humans exist to procreate), and these beliefs correlated with moral condemnation of purpose violations (e.g., condemning those who do not procreate). Study 2 found evidence of a bidirectional causal relationship: Stipulating a species' purpose results in moral condemnation of purpose violations, and stipulating that an action is immoral increases endorsement that the species exists for that purpose. Study 3 found evidence that when participants believe a species exists to perform some action, they infer this action is good for the species, and this in turn supports moral condemnation of individuals who choose not to perform the action. Study 4 found evidence that believing an action is good for the species partially mediates the relationship between human purpose beliefs and moral condemnation. These findings shed light on how our descriptive understanding can shape our prescriptive judgments.
No Increased Tendencies for Money-Incentivized Cheating After 24-hr Total Sleep Deprivation
Aiqing Ling, Kep Kee Loh & Irma Kurniawan
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are we more likely to cheat when our cognitive resources are depleted? Current psychological and neuroeconomic theories offer opposing accounts of dishonest behaviors under low cognitive control conditions: while the former predicts increased cheating tendencies, the latter predicts otherwise. In this study, following 24-hr total sleep deprivation, participants engaged in a die-rolling experiment where they could easily misreport their dice throws (i.e., cheat) to receive higher monetary gains. Our results showed that while there was no greater tendency to cheat in a sleep-deprived state, either in favor of self or others, compared to a rested state, cheating was still observed. This indicated that the relationship between dishonesty and cognitive control is more nuanced than what prevailing theories suggest. We discuss this null effect in relation to recent literature about cognitive control and dishonesty and provide alternative explanations for our findings.
Expressing Dual Concern in Criticism for Wrongdoing: The Persuasive Power of Criticizing with Care
Lauren Howe et al.
Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming
Abstract:
To call attention to and motivate action on ethical issues in business or society, messengers often criticize groups for wrongdoing and ask these groups to change their behavior. When criticizing target groups, messengers frequently identify and express concern about harm caused to a victim group, and in the process address a target group by criticizing them for causing this harm and imploring them to change. However, we find that when messengers criticize a target group for causing harm to a victim group in this way -- expressing singular concern for the victim group -- members of the target group infer, often incorrectly, that the messenger views the target group as less moral and unworthy of concern. This inferred lack of moral concern reduces criticism acceptance and prompts backlash from the target group. To address this problem, we introduce dual concern messaging -- messages that simultaneously communicate that a target group causes harm to a victim group and express concern for the target group. A series of several experiments demonstrate that dual concern messages reduce inferences that a critical messenger lacks moral concern for the criticized target group, increase the persuasiveness of the criticism among members of the target group, and reduce backlash from consumers against a corporate messenger. When pursuing justice for victims of a target group, dual concern messages that communicate concern for the victim group as well as the target group are more effective in fostering openness toward criticism, rather than defensiveness, in a target group, thus setting the stage for change.