Edge Lords
Endogenous Popularity: How Perceptions of Support Affect the Popularity of Authoritarian Regimes
Noah Buckley et al.
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Being popular makes it easier for dictators to govern. A growing body of scholarship therefore focuses on the factors that influence authoritarian popularity. However, it is possible that the perception of popularity itself affects incumbent approval in autocracies. We use framing experiments embedded in four surveys in Russia to examine this phenomenon. These experiments reveal that manipulating information -- and thereby perceptions -- about Russian President Vladimir Putin's popularity can significantly affect respondents' support for him. Additional analyses, which rely on a novel combination of framing and list experiments, indicate that these changes in support are not due to preference falsification, but are in fact genuine. This study has implications for research on support for authoritarian leaders and defection cascades in nondemocratic regimes.
Can arms breed peace? The consequence of arms imports from the US on civil wars
Xiaoyu He & Yixin Mei
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
While little evidence sheds light on the positive role of arms, it is still arguably possible for arms imports to reduce conflicts. In this study, we examine whether and how arms imports from the US affect internal conflicts in 135 non-OECD countries. Leveraging a two-way interacted instrumental variable, we exploit a time-series variation of arms supply that arises from the political component of the US Congress and a cross-country variation of arms demand measured as the propensity of purchasing arms. Our analysis reveals that importing US arms exerts a significantly negative impact on the incidence of civil war, particularly in recipients with extreme climate conditions, scarce natural resources, or less diversified socio-demographic structures. We further provide explanations for such a positive role of arms imports by examining the existence of a deterrent effect, the enhancement of public confidence, and the strengthening of state capacity.
Religion, rulers, and conflict
Metin Coşgel, Thomas Miceli & Sadullah Yıldırım
Journal of Economic Growth, September 2023, Pages 439-480
Abstract:
We offer new data and a new analytical approach to examine the roots of today's civil conflicts that lie deeply in religious and political history. Religion's effect on today's conflicts come not from contemporary fractionalization or polarization, but from the deep-rooted effects of historical fragmentation coupled with rulers who could manipulate divisions by favoring co-religionists. To test the resulting hypotheses, we use a new dataset that includes annual information regarding the religious and political histories of today's societies since the year 1000. We run regression analysis at both country and ethnic group levels. The results show that the likelihood of contemporary new conflicts is higher in societies that historically experienced religious fragmentation with rulers who shared religion with one of the groups and could thus favor coreligionists over others. Economic inequality and political grievances served as channels of transmission.
Magna Carta
Desiree Desierto, Jacob Hall & Mark Koyama
George Mason University Working Paper, July 2023
Abstract:
Magna Carta, a pivotal moment in the emergence of constitutional government, institutionalised constraints on royal power. We depict it as an optimal agreement between two coalitions capable of violence: the king's loyal coalition of barons and the rebel barons. This type of agreement is more likely to emerge when the king extracts large rents, when the distribution of rents among barons is egalitarian, and when barons can move large resources away from the king. Under these conditions, even the baron that already enjoys the largest rents would be willing to lead a rebellion, and rebels have large resources that they can use to defeat the loyalists. We test the predictions of our model with a newly collected data on the universe of barons and their lands in England in 1215.
Historical roots of political extremism: The effects of Nazi occupation of Italy
Nicola Fontana, Tommaso Nannicini & Guido Tabellini
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study the impact of the Italian Civil War and Nazi occupation of Italy in 1943-45 on postwar political outcomes. The Communist Party, which was more active in the resistance movement, gained votes in areas where the Nazi occupation was both longer and harsher, mainly at the expense of centrist parties. This effect persists until the late 1980s. These results suggest that civil war and widespread political violence reshape political identities in favor of the political groups that emerge as winners. This benefits extremist groups and hurts moderates since the former have a comparative advantage in organizing violent conflict.
Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites' Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War
Peter White
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
A critical element in civil wars is military fragmentation. Yet, we have a limited understanding of why military elites fight in civil wars and on what side. In this article I develop a theory of the economic and professional motivations of military elites. I test this theory using the case of West Point graduates in the American Civil War. I argue that in addition to home state, economic and professional interests were a major influence on West Pointers. Graduates with connections to Southern cash crops were less likely to fight for the Union and more likely to fight for the Confederacy. Higher ranking graduates were more likely to fight for both sides, as they were better positioned to compete for promotion. I test this argument using a new dataset of more than 1000 West Point graduates' wartime allegiances and antebellum careers and find strong evidence in support of my expectations.
Autocracies and policy accumulation: The case of Singapore
Christian Aschenbrenner, Christoph Knill & Yves Steinebach
Journal of Public Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
The tendency of vote-seeking politicians to produce ever-more policies in response to the citizens' demands has been identified as a central driver of the process of "policy accumulation." If we accept this premise, policy accumulation should be a central feature of modern democracies but overall be less pronounced in autocracies. Due to its highly ambivalent nature, policy accumulation and its implications may thus constitute an important but so far neglected facets of the new system competition between democracies and autocracies. In this article, we test this argument in the context of the authoritarian regime of Singapore. Singapore is one of the very few autocracies that display elements of political competition and has a level of socio-economic development that is comparable to advanced democracies. Singapore thus constitutes a least-likely case for low levels of policy accumulation. By studying changes in Singapore's environmental policy over a period of more than four decades (1976 to 2020) and by contrasting the patterns observed with the policy developments in 21 OECD democracies, we find that autocratic regimes do indeed tend to accumulate less than democratic regimes. More precisely, we find that Singapore (1) has only produced about one-fourth of the environmental policy measures of an "average" democracy and (2) is constantly the country with the lowest level of policy accumulation in our sample. These findings hold even when controlling for alternative explanations, such as the effectiveness of the administration and the government's ability to opt for stricter and more hierarchical forms of intervention.
Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world
João Martins, Linda Veiga & Bruno Fernandes
Economics & Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.