How Believable
Switch to Web-Based Surveys During COVID-19 Pandemic Left Out the Most Religious, Creating a False Impression of Rapid Religious Decline
Landon Schnabel, Sean Bock & Michael Hout
Sociology of Religion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Religion appears to have taken a nosedive during the pandemic, including previously persistent forms of intense religion such as strong affiliation and biblical literalism. However, this apparent secularization is the result of mode effects. The gold standard General Social Survey (GSS) switched to online rather than face-to-face interviews and the response rate plunged to 17%. Parallel analyses of GSS panel data demonstrate that this mode switch introduced substantial nonresponse bias. Illustratively, biblical literalism was almost 50% higher among those who declined to participate (36%) than those who participated in the online survey (25%). Rather than declining, intense religion persisted if not rose over time among those willing to participate in a push-to-web survey. The apparent decline was simply a result of disillusioned, distrusting, disinformed, disadvantaged, and disconnected people being much less likely to agree to participate. Intense religion and other social phenomena are underrepresented and thereby underestimated in online surveys with substantial nonresponse, including those using population sampling methods. The trend in survey research toward these types of surveys could be expected to give a false impression of secularization and other social change going forward -- including making society look less disillusioned, distrusting, disinformed, disadvantaged, and disconnected than it is.
When Do Voters Reward Overtly Religious Appeals?
Abraham Aldama & Gwyneth McClendon
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Under what conditions do politicians make overtly religious appeals in front of mixed secular-religious audiences? In the US context, other scholars have argued for the strategic usefulness of multi-vocal appeals: religious politicians can use coded language to win support from religious voters without losing support from secular ones. However, US politicians often use overtly religious language in their communications to mixed audiences, at the risk of losing support from secular voters. This pattern presents a puzzle that we address using a series of formal models and two large online survey experiments. We argue that when religious-secular cleavages are sensationalized, making religious voters see dangers in placating secular voters, religious voters are more likely to reward overtly religious messages, with no increased penalty for such messages from secular voters. Under these conditions, religious politicians become more likely to use overtly religious language in their political messaging.
Religious Worship Attendance in America: Evidence from Cellphone Data
Devin Pope
NBER Working Paper, April 2024
Abstract:
Religious worship is integral to the lives of millions of Americans. In this paper, I provide a descriptive analysis of religious worship attendance using geodata from smartphones for over 2 million Americans in 2019. I establish several key findings. First, 73% of people step into a religious place of worship at least once during the year on the primary day of worship (e.g. Sundays for most Christian churches). However, only 5% of Americans attend services "weekly", far fewer than the ~22% who report to do so in surveys. The number of occasional vs. frequent attenders varies substantially by religion. I estimate that approximately 45M Americans attend worship services in a typical week of the year, but with large changes around Holidays (e.g. Easter). I document how start times, duration of attendance, and average household income all differ meaningfully across religious traditions. The intensity of religious observance correlates with a host of other activities. For example, relative to non-attenders and infrequent attenders, frequent religious attenders are less likely to go to strip clubs, liquor stores, and casinos. While cell phone data has limitations, this paper provides a unique way of understanding worship attendance and its correlates.
Fear and Loathing: How Demographic Change Affects Support for Christian Nationalism
Brooklyn Walker & Donald Haider-Markel
Public Opinion Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Christian nationalism, the fusion of religious and national identities, has emerged as an important factor shaping public opinion on a range of issues. However, debates in the existing literature on the motivations behind support for Christian nationalism remain unresolved: Is Christian nationalism a response to secularization and/or a cover for discomfort with racial diversity and equality? Is Christian nationalism rooted in fear of social change, disgust about social change, or something else? We use an experiment embedded in a national survey of adults to isolate the effects of knowledge of both religious and racial demographic change among White Christians. Our analysis suggests that exposure to religious demographic change shifts support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians, but exposure to racial demographic change has limited impact. This effect is mediated by emotion -- religious demographic change increases fear and disgust, which then influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians. Although our treatment suggesting exposure to racial demographic change had null effects, we note that racial attitudes do independently influence support for Christian nationalism and perceptions of discrimination against Whites and Christians.
White by Another Name? Can Anti-Christian Bias Claims Serve as a Racial Dog Whistle?
Rosemary Al-Kire et al.
Psychological Science, April 2024, Pages 415-434
Abstract:
Four preregistered experiments (N = 4,307) explored whether anti-Christian bias claims can discreetly signal White allyship among Christian American adults. In Experiments 1 and 2, reading about anti-Christian bias led White, but not Black, Christians to perceive more anti-White bias. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate the connection between Christian and White can be leveraged by politicians in the form of a racial dog whistle. In Experiment 3, White Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as caring more about anti-White bias and more willing to fight for White people (relative to a control). This politician was also perceived as less offensive than a politician concerned about anti-White bias. In Experiment 4, Black Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as less offensive than one concerned about anti-White bias yet still unlikely to fight for Black people. Results suggest "anti-Christian bias" can provide a relatively palatable way to signal allegiance to White people.
Collaborative or Independent? Buddhist Monks' Perceptions of Nonconflict Between Religion and Science
Yulin Lu & Paul Joosse
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Few studies have explored religious professionals' interactions with scientific authority in work settings. Fewer still examine professionals outside Western contexts. We analyze the science-religion interface as it exists in Shaolin Temple -- an ancient Chan Buddhist temple with a worldwide reputation for Shaolin Kungfu. Drawing on a near-exhaustive survey within Shaolin monastery and 23 interviews with Shaolin monks, we discern and differentiate two modes of nonconflict operating in monks' psychic lives. One group understands Buddhism and science as comprising independent realms -- nonconflictual by virtue of their noninteractivity. Another views science and religion as being interpenetrative and nonconflictual in the sense of being mutually constitutive. These differing orientations, which reflect established categories of "transcendentalist" versus "immanentist" religion, further correlate with different facets of religiosity: Monks with high religious knowledge tend to view Buddhism and science as independent, while monks with high levels of piety tend to see them as collaborative or mutually constitutive.
Classicism and Modern Growth: The Shadow of the Sages
Chicheng Ma
Journal of Economic History, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper examines how the worship of ancient wisdom affects economic progress in historical China, where the learned class embraced classical wisdom for millennia but encountered the shock of Western industrial influence in the mid-nineteenth century. Using the number of sage temples to measure the strength of classical worship in 269 prefectures, I find that classical worship discouraged intellectuals from appreciating modern learning and thus inhibited industrialization between 1858 and 1927. By contrast, industrialization grew faster in regions less constrained by classicism. This finding implies the importance of cultural entrepreneurship, or the lack thereof, in shaping modern economic growth.