Winging It
The Devil No More? Decreasing Negative Outparty Affect through Asymmetric Partisan Thinking
Wayde Marsh
Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 2023, Pages 170-186
Abstract:
Political scientists, party elites, and journalists agree that affective polarization and negative partisanship are serious problems in American politics, but is it possible to reverse this trend and decrease negative outparty affect? Using two original survey experiments that manipulate partisans to think of the Republican and Democratic parties in either expressive or instrumental terms, I find that providing policy information about the parties decreases Republicans’ negative affect toward Democrats, while providing party coalition information decreases Democrats’ negative affect toward Republicans. Neither type of information, however, causes a significant change in inparty affect. This paper provides evidence, therefore, that an asymmetric informational intervention can decrease negative outparty affect, with important implications for an affectively polarized America.
Tribalism and tribulations: The social costs of not sharing fake news
Asher Lawson, Shikhar Anand & Hemant Kakkar
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, March 2023, Pages 611-631
Abstract:
Fake news can foster political polarization, foment division between groups, and encourage malicious behavior. Misinformation has cast doubt on the integrity of democratic elections, downplayed the seriousness of COVID-19, and increased vaccine hesitancy. Given the leading role that online groups play in the dissemination of fake news, in this research we examined how group-level factors contribute to sharing misinformation. By unobtrusively tracking interactions among 51,537 Twitter user dyads longitudinally over two time periods (n = 103,074), we found that group members who did not conform to the behavior of other group members by sharing fake news were subjected to reduced social interaction over time. We augmented this unique, ecologically valid behavioral data with another digital field study (N = 178,411) and five experiments to disentangle some of the causal mechanisms driving the observed effects. We found that social costs were higher for not sharing fake news versus other content, that specific types of deviant group members faced the greatest social costs, and that social costs explained fake news sharing above and beyond partisan identity and subjective accuracy assessments. Overall, our work illuminates the role of conformity pressure as a critical antecedent of the spread of misinformation.
Political Bot Bias in the Perception of Online Discourse
Shane Schweitzer, Kyle Dobson & Adam Waytz
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Four nationally representative studies (N = 1,986; three preregistered) find evidence for a bias in how people perceive opposing viewpoints expressed through online discourse. These studies elucidate a political bot bias, where political partisans (vs. their out-party) are more likely to view counter-ideological (vs. ideologically consistent) tweets to be social media bots (vs. humans). Study 1 demonstrates that American Democrats and Republicans are more likely to attribute tweets to bots when those tweets express counter-ideological views. Study 2 demonstrated this bias with actual bot tweets generated by the Russian government and comparable human tweets. Study 3 demonstrated this bias manifests in the context of real recent elections and is associated with markers of political animosity. Study 4 experimentally demonstrates the consequences of bot attribution for perceptions of online political discourse. Our findings document a consistent bias that has implications for political discussion online and political polarization more broadly.
Surfing to the political extremes: Digital media, social media, and policy attitude polarization
Jason Gainous & Kevin Wagner
Social Science Quarterly, forthcoming
Methods: We use American National Election Studies and data reduction methods to model and measure the gathering of political information to compare the relationship between different forms of media consumption and policy attitude extremity.
Results: Our results indicate that, independently, the consumption of both “partisan” cable news and “non-partisan” political digital information have the same positive relationship to attitude extremity across four major issue domains (economy, federal spending, social issues, and foreign affairs) and that when combined into a single index, the relationship is stronger than their independent relationships. Finally, the results suggest that the combined effect is strongest among those who consume more liberal cable news.
Partisans’ receptivity to persuasive messaging is undiminished by countervailing party leader cues
Ben Tappin, Adam Berinsky & David Rand
Nature Human Behaviour, April 2023, Pages 568-582
Abstract:
It is widely assumed that party identification and loyalty can distort partisans’ information processing, diminishing their receptivity to counter-partisan arguments and evidence. Here we empirically evaluate this assumption. We test whether American partisans’ receptivity to arguments and evidence is diminished by countervailing cues from in-party leaders (Donald Trump or Joe Biden), using a survey experiment with 24 contemporary policy issues and 48 persuasive messages containing arguments and evidence (N = 4,531; 22,499 observations). We find that, while in-party leader cues influenced partisans’ attitudes, often more strongly than the persuasive messages, there was no evidence that the cues meaningfully diminished partisans’ receptivity to the messages -- despite them directly contradicting the messages. Rather, persuasive messages and countervailing leader cues were integrated as independent pieces of information. These results generalized across policy issues, demographic subgroups and cue environments, and challenge existing assumptions about the extent to which party identification and loyalty distort partisans’ information processing.
The Role of Basic Psychological Needs in Right-Wing Extremism Risk Among American Conservatives
Jeremy Rappel & David Vachon
Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming
Abstract:
Modern psychological theories of violent extremism stress the roles of social connections and personal meaning as motivators for individuals to participate in extremist groups. Personal meaning and social connections are both important aspects of Basic Psychological Needs Theory, a motivation framework commonly used in workplace and educational psychology. This study sought to assess the relationship between Basic Psychological Needs and extremism among (N = 361) self-identified American conservatives. Psychological Need fulfilment was strongly negatively associated with endorsement of extremism (range of rs = −.43 to −.68). In addition, Psychological Need fulfilment explained incremental variance in extremism scores after accounting for other psychological characteristics, including aggression, psychopathy, empathy, and Five-Factor Model personality traits. These findings suggest that Basic Psychological Needs may be a useful framework to expand our understanding of the etiology of extremism, and that prosocial alternatives for meeting these needs may reduce the risk of engaging in extremist behaviors.
“Born for a Storm”: Hard-Right Social Media and Civil Unrest
Daniel Karell et al.
American Sociological Review, April 2023, Pages 322-349
Abstract:
Does activity on hard-right social media lead to hard-right civil unrest? If so, why? We created a spatial panel dataset comprising hard-right social media use and incidents of unrest across the United States from January 2020 through January 2021. Using spatial regression analyses with core-based statistical area (CBSA) and month fixed effects, we find that greater CBSA-level hard-right social media activity in a given month is associated with an increase in subsequent unrest. The results of robustness checks, placebo tests, alternative analytical approaches, and sensitivity analyses support this finding. To examine why hard-right social media activity predicts unrest, we draw on an original dataset of users’ shared content and status in the online community. Analyses of these data suggest that hard-right social media shift users’ perceptions of norms, increasing the likelihood they will participate in contentious events they once considered taboo. Our study sheds new light on social media’s offline effects, as well as the consequences of increasingly common hard-right platforms.
Weaving It In: How Political Radio Reacts to Events
Clara Vandeweerdt
Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 2023, Pages 120-141
Abstract:
How do ideologically slanted media outlets react to politically relevant events? Previous research suggests that partisan media trumpet ideologically congenial events, such as opposing-party scandals, while ignoring bad news for their own side. Looking at reactions to newsworthy events on political radio -- an often-partisan medium that reaches more Americans than Twitter -- I find a different pattern. Based on recordings of hundreds of shows totaling two million broadcast hours, I demonstrate that regardless of their ideological leanings, political shows respond to events by dramatically increasing the attention they give to related policy issues. At the same time, liberal and conservative shows continue to frame those issues in very different ways. Instead of ignoring inconvenient events, partisan media “weave them in,” interpreting them in ways consistent with their ideological leanings. These media dynamics imply that nationally significant events can cause opinion polarization rather than convergence -- becoming a divisive rather than a shared experience.
Accuracy and social motivations shape judgements of (mis)information
Steve Rathje et al.
Nature Human Behaviour, forthcoming
Abstract:
The extent to which belief in (mis)information reflects lack of knowledge versus a lack of motivation to be accurate is unclear. Here, across four experiments (n = 3,364), we motivated US participants to be accurate by providing financial incentives for correct responses about the veracity of true and false political news headlines. Financial incentives improved accuracy and reduced partisan bias in judgements of headlines by about 30%, primarily by increasing the perceived accuracy of true news from the opposing party (d = 0.47). Incentivizing people to identify news that would be liked by their political allies, however, decreased accuracy. Replicating prior work, conservatives were less accurate at discerning true from false headlines than liberals, yet incentives closed the gap in accuracy between conservatives and liberals by 52%. A non-financial accuracy motivation intervention was also effective, suggesting that motivation-based interventions are scalable. Altogether, these results suggest that a substantial portion of people’s judgements of the accuracy of news reflects motivational factors.
Does Austerity Cause Polarization?
Evelyne Hübscher, Thomas Sattler & Markus Wagner
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In recent decades, governments in many Western democracies have shown a remarkable consensus in pursuing fiscal austerity measures during periods of strained public finances. In this article, we show that these decisions have consequences for political polarization. Our macro-level analysis of 166 elections since 1980 finds that austerity measures increase both electoral abstention and votes for non-mainstream parties, thereby boosting party system polarization. A detailed analysis of selected austerity episodes also shows that new, small and radical parties benefit most from austerity policies. Finally, survey experiments with a total of 8,800 respondents in Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK indicate that the effects of austerity on polarization are particularly pronounced when the mainstream right and left parties both stand for fiscal restraint. Austerity is a substantial cause of political polarization and hence political instability in industrialized democracies.
Nevertheless, It Persists: Political Self-Effects in the Context of Persistent Social Media
German Neubaum & Daniel Lane
Journal of Media Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social media have become important environments for people to express and explore their political views. Yet, relatively little is known about how affordances provided by social media platforms affect whether and how users express political opinions. This work argues that message persistence (i.e., the temporal extent to which messages can be accessed by users) is a central affordance of many social media, which affects not only users’ likelihood of political expression, but also so-called self-effects in terms of users feeling socially committed to their expressed views. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 994), we varied the level of message persistence in a social media platform and used behavioral measures of opinion expression. Contrary to expectations, high-persistence social media provoked more opinion expressions than low-persistence social media. Only minimal evidence was found of self-effects and the persistence of the social media environment did not influence self-related outcomes. Results are discussed in light of political expression literature and the role of self-effects in social media.
Affective Polarization and Misinformation Belief
Libby Jenke
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
While affective polarization has been shown to have serious social consequences, there is little evidence regarding its effects on political attitudes and behavior such as policy preferences, voting, or political information accrual. This paper provides evidence that affective polarization impacts misinformation belief, arguing that citizens with higher levels of affective polarization are more likely to believe in-party-congruent misinformation and less likely to believe out-party-congruent misinformation. The argument is supported by data from the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, which speaks to the generalizability of the relationship. Additionally, a survey experiment provides evidence that the relationship is causal. The results hold among Democrats and Republicans and are independent of the effects of partisan strength and ideological extremity. Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it, implying that education will not solve the issue. The results speak to the need for work on reducing affective polarization.