Uprising
How Exile Shapes Online Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela
Jane Esberg & Alexandra Siegel
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
How does exile affect online dissent? By internationalizing activists' networks and removing them from day-to-day life under the regime, we argue that exile fundamentally alters activists' political opportunities and strategic behavior. We test the effect of exile on activists' public discourse in the case of Venezuela, through an analysis of over 5 million tweets by 357 activists spanning seven years. Our results suggest that after going into exile activists increasingly emphasize foreign-led interventions to shape their home country politics, focus less on local grievances, and become more harshly critical of the regime. This is partly due to the changes in exiles' networks: after leaving, activists increase their interactions with foreign actors and tweet more in English. This work contributes to our understanding of the relationship between exile -- one of the most ubiquitous yet understudied forms of repression -- and dissent in the digital age.
The Merchant Guilds and the Political Economy of the Spanish Empire on the Eve of Independence
Fernando Arteaga
Journal of Historical Political Economy, Summer 2022, Pages 299-331
Abstract:
Under what conditions elite competition may disrupt political stability? I study the Spanish Empire on the eve of the wars of independence. I emphasize the role merchant elites played in maintaining the empire unified, and how their interests misaligned in the late eighteenth century creating incentives for political secession. An implicit political arrangement existed, where the Crown maximized tax revenue through its control of the transatlantic trade. It did so by coopting specific American elites located at key nodes (mainly in Lima and Mexico City), which themselves gained rents from their privileged trading positions. The political organization was stable while Spain held sea supremacy in the oceans. The advent of the British Navy after the 7 years war disrupted the Spanish trade networks, affecting the distribution of rents and the corresponding institutional equilibrium. The Spanish Crown tried to adapt by decentralizing its oceanic trade routes, and by coopting a larger set of regional elites within the empire. The tactic backfired: it gave major power to new de-attached local elites creating incentives for political fragmentation.
Franchise Expansion and Legislative Representation in the Early United States
Stephen Ansolabehere, Jaclyn Kaslovsky & Michael Olson
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, Summer 2022, Pages 243-271
Abstract:
What role did the size and scope of the elective franchise play in the political and economic development of the young United States? In this paper, we explore whether the relaxation of economic franchise restrictions in the first decades of the United States resulted in changes in legislative behavior. We focus on two measures that capture political conflict in this period of American history: ideal point estimates that measure the revealed ideology of members of Congress, and appropriations for rivers and harbors development. We find that the removal of property-holding requirements is associated with a shift in roll call voting and an increase in targeted appropriations on local river and harbor improvements. The results suggest that franchise expansion contributed to the political-economic development of the early American Republic and provide new evidence of an electoral connection in the early American Congress.
The Political Legacy of Forced Migration: Evidence from Post-WWII Germany
Anil Menon
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do refugees reshape long-term political behavior in receiving areas? I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expellees' political champions-the radical right-over time. This relationship is particularly manifested when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. Mechanism evidence, including novel data on expellee monuments and associations, suggests that a durable expellee identity helps account for these results. My analysis reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.
Financial Crises and Political Radicalization: How Failing Banks Paved Hitler's Path to Power
Sebastian Doerr et al.
Journal of Finance, December 2022, Pages 3339-3372
Abstract:
Do financial crises radicalize voters? We study Germany's 1931 banking crisis, collecting new data on bank branches and firm-bank connections. Exploiting cross-sectional variation in precrisis exposure to the bank at the center of the crisis, we show that Nazi votes surged in locations more affected by its failure. Radicalization in response to the shock was exacerbated in cities with a history of anti-Semitism. After the Nazis seized power, both pogroms and deportations were more frequent in places affected by the banking crisis. Our results suggest an important synergy between financial distress and cultural predispositions, with far-reaching consequences.
A wall of treatments: An integrative problem-solving approach to the prevention of stone-throwing in East Jerusalem
Badi Hasisi, Eran Itskovich & Mona Khoury-Kassabri
Criminology & Public Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is growing evidence that some proactive policing strategies have shown promising results in reducing crime. Most of these strategies are generally applied separately to address specific components of criminal behavior, while the involvement in the crime itself may be caused by different factors. This raises the question of whether an integrative approach that addresses these factors could be an appropriate approach to reduce involvement in the crime. Furthermore, most of these policing strategies have been applied toward regular crime; this leaves us with the question of whether these strategies would show similar results when political offenses are involved as well. Our study focuses on the political offense of stone-throwing in East Jerusalem, usually by Palestinian teenage boys. We applied an integrative approach in one of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, which included strategies such as focused deterrence, place-based policing, cognitive behavioral therapy, diversion to nonenforcement tracks, and interventions at the community level. We found a large and significant reduction in the targeted neighborhood compared to similar Palestinian neighborhoods. We have not found evidence of displacement, but rather evidence of significant diffusion of crime-control benefits.
When Deterrence Backfires: House Demolitions, Palestinian Radicalization, and Israeli Fatalities
Michael Freedman & Esteban Klor
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Conflict points around the world involve government forces fighting terrorist groups. In this type of warfare, there is a danger that counterterrorist efforts may backfire, providing ammunition for additional cycles of violence. We study this issue focusing on selective and indiscriminate house demolitions employed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We exploit the temporal and spatial variation of this policy to assess its impact on Palestinians' political views. We find that the civilian population does not react to punitive house demolitions, a selective form of counterterrorism. On the contrary, Palestinians are more likely to adopt more radical political opinions in response to precautionary house demolitions, an indiscriminate form of counterterrorism. We also show that political radicalization induced by indiscriminate counterterrorism leads to an increase in future terror attacks. Overall, our analysis provides explicit empirical support to the mechanism behind the positive correlation between indiscriminate counterterrorism and future levels of violence.
Revolutionary Violence and Counterrevolution
Killian Clarke
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
What type of revolutions are most vulnerable to counterrevolutions? I argue that violent revolutions are less likely than nonviolent ones to be reversed because they produce regimes with strong and loyal armies that are able to defeat counterrevolutionary threats. I leverage an original dataset of counterrevolutions from 1900 to 2015, which allows us for the first time to document counterrevolutionary emergence and success worldwide. These data reveal that revolutions involving more violence are less at risk of counterrevolution and that this relationship exists primarily because violence lowers the likelihood of counterrevolutionary success-but not counterrevolutionary emergence. I demonstrate mechanisms by comparing Cuba's nonviolent 1933 uprising (which succumbed to a counterrevolution) and its 1959 revolutionary insurgency (which defeated multiple counterrevolutions). Though nonviolence may be superior to violence when it comes to toppling autocrats, it is less effective in bringing about lasting change and guaranteeing that these autocrats never return.
Non-violent resistance movements and substantive democracy
Jalal Fetrati
Democratization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Is the depth of democracy in newly established democratic regimes influenced by their mode of transition? Previous research has focused on violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns' effects on the durability and formal dimensions of democracy. In this article, I examine whether democracies resulting from nonviolent resistance movements are more successful in deepening democracy than those emerging from violent conflicts or elite-led top-down liberalizations. Combining difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation and kernel matching, I analyse all democratic transitions that occurred between 1900 and 2020, using V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices for measuring formal and substantive dimensions of democracy, including (1) electoral democracy, (2) liberal democracy, (3) participatory democracy, (4) deliberative democracy, and (5) egalitarian democracy. I find a significant difference in the depth of democracy between democratic regimes forged from nonviolent resistance (NVR) campaigns and those born from violent revolutions and elite-led top-down liberalizations. This effect is statistically significant for up to ten years following the transition. I argue that the engagement and improvement of civil society before and during the transition is a key factor that explains why NVR-induced democracies are more successful in deepening the ideals of democracy and less susceptible to democratic backsliding.
Complements or Substitutes? How Institutional Arrangements Bind Traditional Authorities and the State in Africa
Soeren Henn
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
How does the central state affect public goods provision by local actors? I study the effect of state capacity on local governance in sub-Saharan Africa, which I argue depends on whether traditional authorities are integrated in the country's constitution. I use distance to administrative headquarters as a measure of state capacity and estimate a regression discontinuity design around administrative boundaries. If traditional authorities are not integrated, then the state and traditional authorities compete with each other, working as substitutes. That is, a stronger state undermines the power of traditional authorities. If traditional authorities are integrated, then the two work as complements. A stronger state then increases the power of traditional authorities. I show that these relationships are crucial to understanding the influence of state capacity on local economic development.
On the Origins and Persistent Effects of the World's First Meritocratic Institution
James Kai-sing Kung
Comparative Economic Studies, December 2022, Pages 563-581
Abstract:
Meritocracy embraces the value of social mobility based on ability and effort, and, conversely, despises entrenched elites. I demonstrate that the civil service examination system of Song dynasty China (c. 960-1279CE) was the world's earliest meritocratic bureaucracy. First, the examination, known as keju in Chinese, was open to all males regardless of age and family background, including those from the families of merchants and artisans, who in the preceding (Tang) dynasty were forbidden to take the exam. Second, unlike the Tang dynasty, political selection in Song was entirely based on exam success; candidates were no longer allowed to "signal" to the examiners their portfolio of work before the exam, which previously formed an important part of the selection process. Third, to ensure social mobility the highest qualification of jinshi was not heritable. Fourth, to ensure a level playing field mass education was provided by the merchants in the form of private academies. The genesis of this meritocratic institution was however "accidental." It came about as a consequence of the combination of (1) the rise of a merchant class whose foremost interest was to fight for their children's inclusion in the imperial Chinese bureaucracy; (2) the Song emperor's preference to reduce the military's influence; and (3) the need for more officials to manage the growing number of market towns that flourished in the wake of commercialization. All of these ensured a vast expansion of the civil service examination. Finally, I show that this meritocratic institution had persistent effects. Using data on the Ming-Qing dynasties as example, I find that historical prefectures with the highest jinshi density still have higher years of schooling today.
Tariff Revenues Matter for Democratization: Theory and Evidence From the First Wave of Globalization
Carlos Felipe Balcazar & Rafael Ch
NYU Working Paper, September 2022
Abstract:
Do tariff revenues affect democratization? We argue that tariff revenues have two effects: i) A rapacity effect because the fiscal windfalls generate incentives to control government, and ii) A redistributive effect because tariffs impact the returns to the factors of production, changing the distribution of power between politically-relevant groups. If ruling elites benefit from redistribution, this discourages a challenge to their rule. If elites lose from redistribution, they may share power to avoid expropriation. We test these claims during the First Wave of Globalization, when ruling elites were often landed. We find causal evidence that tariff revenues reduce democratization in land-abundant economies because ruling elites strengthen via the redistributive effect, as the return to land increases, and the windfalls bolster the rapacity effect. In capital-abundant economies the return to land falls, thus the redistributive effect offsets the rapacity effect. Congruently, we find a positive but statistically-insignificant effect for tariff revenues.