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Misplaced trust: When trust in science fosters belief in pseudoscience and the benefits of critical evaluation
Thomas O'Brien, Ryan Palmer & Dolores Albarracin
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
At a time when pseudoscience threatens the survival of communities, understanding this vulnerability, and how to reduce it, is paramount. Four preregistered experiments (N = 532, N = 472, N = 605, N = 382) with online U.S. samples introduced false claims concerning a (fictional) virus created as a bioweapon, mirroring conspiracy theories about COVID-19, and carcinogenic effects of GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms). We identify two critical determinants of vulnerability to pseudoscience. First, participants who trust science are more likely to believe and disseminate false claims that contain scientific references than false claims that do not. Second, reminding participants of the value of critical evaluation reduces belief in false claims, whereas reminders of the value of trusting science do not. We conclude that trust in science, although desirable in many ways, makes people vulnerable to pseudoscience. These findings have implications for science broadly and the application of psychological science to curbing misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Paranoia and belief updating during the COVID-19 crisis
Praveen Suthaharan et al.
Nature Human Behaviour, forthcoming
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has made the world seem less predictable. Such crises can lead people to feel that others are a threat. Here, we show that the initial phase of the pandemic in 2020 increased individuals' paranoia and made their belief updating more erratic. A proactive lockdown made people's belief updating less capricious. However, state-mandated mask-wearing increased paranoia and induced more erratic behaviour. This was most evident in states where adherence to mask-wearing rules was poor but where rule following is typically more common. Computational analyses of participant behaviour suggested that people with higher paranoia expected the task to be more unstable. People who were more paranoid endorsed conspiracies about mask-wearing and potential vaccines and the QAnon conspiracy theories. These beliefs were associated with erratic task behaviour and changed priors. Taken together, we found that real-world uncertainty increases paranoia and influences laboratory task behaviour.
Financial self-control strategy use: Generating personal strategies reduces spending more than learning expert strategies
Johanna Peetz & Mariya Davydenko
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examined the spontaneous use and effectiveness of financial self-control strategies in individuals' everyday spending. In Study 1 (N = 377), participants who listed the strategies they personally already use at intake and several times throughout a month spent an average $228 less that month than participants in a control group. In contrast, participants who were provided with strategies that have been empirically tested and published or participants who were provided with strategies identified by a separate sample of lay individuals did not spend significantly less than control participants. In Study 2 (N = 308), we replicated this finding with a more immediate measure of actual spending (added up reports on the 31 days of the month). Participants who listed the strategies they personally already use at intake and several times throughout the month spent an average $236 less that month than participants in a control group. In contrast, participants who were provided with six established strategies spent an average $50 less that month than participants in a control group, which was not significant. In Study 3 (N = 339), we found that better fit of the strategies with participants' personality and better fit with the spending situation were linked to making fewer hypothetical spending decisions. In other words, personally generated self-control strategies might be more effective at promoting goal pursuit than provided strategies because they fit the person who generates them better.
Are We All Predictably Irrational? An Experimental Analysis
John Doces & Amy Wolaver
Political Behavior, September 2021, Pages 1205-1226
Abstract:
We examine the question of rationality, replicating two core experiments used to establish that people deviate from the rational actor model. Our analysis extends existing research to a developing country context. Based on our theoretical expectations, we test if respondents make decisions consistent with the rational actor framework. Experimental surveys were administered in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, two developing countries in West Africa, focusing on issues of risk aversion and framing. Findings indicate that respondents make decisions more consistent with the rational actor model than has been found in the developed world. Extending our analysis to test if the differences in responses are due to other demographic differences between the African samples and the United States, we replicated these experiments on a nationally representative analysis in the U.S., finding results primarily consistent with the seminal findings of irrationality. In the U.S. and Côte d'Ivoire, highly educated people make decisions that are less consistent with the rational model while low-income respondents make decisions more consistent with the rational model. The degree to which people are irrational thus is contextual, possibly western, and not nearly as universal as has been concluded.
Seemingly More Extreme: Larger Choice Sets Shift People Towards Objectively, but Not Subjectively, More Extreme Options
Marissa Sharif & Elizabeth Webb
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, May 2021
Abstract:
Extremeness aversion -- the tendency for consumers to prefer middling options in a choice set -- is an incredibly robust and well-studied phenomenon (Neumann, Böckenholt, and Sinha 2016; Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993). However, there is still an unanswered question as to how choice set size -- the number of options available to the consumer -- affects extremeness aversion. In nine studies (Ntotal = 9,671), we demonstrate that consumers choose objectively more extreme options in larger (vs. smaller) choice sets. This occurs because larger choice sets are more likely to have multiple (vs. just one) extreme options at each tier, leading consumer to perceive the objectively more extreme options as less extreme. We demonstrate this effect is robust across different types of large choice sets, hypothetical and incentive-compatible studies, and in a variety of decision contexts (e.g., purchasing an item vs. choosing an activity to complete). Further, we identify boundary conditions, revealing that the composition of a large choice set can attenuate the effect.
Hope Hurts: Attribution Bias in Yelp Reviews
Ying-Kai Huang
University of Pittsburgh Working Paper, August 2021
Abstract:
This paper incorporates applied econometrics, causal machine learning and theories of reference-dependent preferences to test whether consuming in a restaurant on special occasions, such as one's birthday, anniversary, graduation, etc., would raise one's expectations of the restaurant and would increase consumers' tendency to rate their consumption experiences lower. Furthermore, our study is closely linked to the emerging literature of attribution bias in economics and psychology and provides a scenario in which we can empirically test two leading theories of attribution bias. In our paper, we analyzed reviews from Yelp and combined the text analyses with regressions, matching techniques and causal machine learning. Through a series of models, we found evidence that consumers' ratings for restaurants are indeed lower when they go to restaurants on special occasions. This result can be explained by one theory of attribution bias according to which people have higher expectations about restaurants on special occasions and then misattribute their disappointment to the quality of the restaurants. From the connection between our empirical analysis and theories of attribution bias, this paper provides evidence of how attribution bias influences people's perceptions and behaviors.
"Others are more vulnerable to fake news than I Am": Third-person effect of COVID-19 fake news on social media users
Jeongwon Yang & Yu Tianye
Computers in Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Fake news have pervaded the social media landscape during the COVID-19 outbreak. To further explore what contributed to fake news susceptibility of social media users, the research 1) integrated a widely-adopted mass communication theory of third-person perception (TPP) with digital disinformation; 2) examined users' social media engagement and individual characteristics toward risk as antecedents of TPP; and lastly, 3) tested TPP of fake news under a context of COVID-19 outbreak, an uncertain situation flooded with baseless news and information. An online survey was conducted on 871 respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk. As a result, we found that in the context of COVID-19, social media engagement 1) directly increased TPP; and 2) indirectly increased TPP via self-efficacy and perceived knowledge. However, negative affect failed to mediate a positive relationship between communal engagement and TPP, as the respondents rated themselves more attentive to fake news than are others. Therefore, the fact that social media directly and indirectly provoked higher TPP implicates that a potential harm of social media is not confined to a rumor mill that propagates false stories, as widely recognized, but can further extend to an echo chamber to cultivate a slanted belief that he or she is fake-news-proof.