Turning to the Dark Side
Populist Psychology: Economics, Culture, and Emotions
Matthew Rhodes-Purdy, Rachel Navarre & Stephen Utych
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Historical trends seem to show that populism, defined here as movements that self-identify as representatives of a unified, good people confronting a corrupted or malevolent elite, tends to co-occur with major economic disruptions. However, research into this connection provides us with a puzzle: while populist surges often come in the wake of economic crises, cultural variables tend to be better predictors of support for populism in public opinion surveys. In this paper, we develop a theory (affective political economy) that can resolve this paradox by analyzing the influence of emotions on politics. Using survey experiments, we show that economic crises cause emotional reactions that activate cultural discontent. This, in turn, activates populist attitudes. This paper provides an elegant solution to a major impasse in the study of the demand side of populism and provides a useful way of analyzing how economics and culture may interact to cause political outcomes.
Economic Decline, Social Identity, and Authoritarian Values in the United States
Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Amalie Jensen & Kenneth Scheve
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why does the contemporary backlash against globalization in the United States have such a substantial authoritarian character? We argue that sustained economic decline has a negative effect on the social identity of historically dominant groups. These losses lead individuals to be more likely to want to enforce social norm conformity - that is, adopt more authoritarian values - as a way to preserve social status and this effect is greater the larger the size of other groups in the population. Central to our account is the expectation of an interactive effect of local economic and demographic conditions in forging value responses to economic decline. The article evaluates this argument using an original 2017 representative survey in the United States. We find that individuals living in relatively diverse regions facing more intense competition from Chinese imports have more authoritarian values. We further find that the greater effect of globalization-induced labor market decline in more diverse areas is also evident for vote choice in the 2016 Presidential election.
President Obama and the Emergence of Islamophobia in Mass Partisan Preferences
Michael Tesler
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article argues that the unusually large and persistent association between Islamophobia and opposition to President Obama helped make attitudes about Muslims a significant, independent predictor of Americans' broader partisan preferences. After detailing the theoretical basis for this argument, the article marshals repeated cross-sectional data, two panel surveys, and a nationally representative survey experiment, to test its hypotheses. The results from those analyses show the following: (1) attitudes about Muslims were a significantly stronger independent predictor of voter preferences for congress in 2010-2014 elections than they were in 2004-2008; (2) attitudes about Muslims were a significantly stronger independent predictor of mass partisanship during Obama's presidency than they were beforehand; and (3) experimentally connecting Obama to Democratic congressional candidates significantly increased the relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and Americans' preferences for Republican congressional candidates. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these results for American politics in the Trump era.
Is the Political Right More Credulous? Experimental Evidence against Asymmetric Motivations to Believe False Political Information
Timothy Ryan & Amanda Aziz
Journal of Politics, July 2021, Pages 1168-1172
Abstract:
Recent political events have galvanized interest in the promulgation of misinformation - particularly false rumors about political opponents. An array of studies provide reasons to think that harboring false political beliefs is a disproportionately conservative phenomenon, since citizens with affinity for the political right endorse more false information than people with affinity for the left. However, as we discuss below, past research is limited in its ability to distinguish supply-side explanations for this result (false information is spread more effectively by elites on the right) from demand-side explanations (citizens who sympathize with the right are more likely to believe false information upon receipt). We conduct an experiment on a representative sample of Americans designed specifically to reveal asymmetries in citizens' proclivity to endorse false damaging information about political opponents. In a contrast with previous results, we find no evidence that citizens on the political right are especially likely to endorse false political information.
Metadehumanization erodes democratic norms during the 2020 presidential election
Alexander Landry et al.
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present research directly replicates past work suggesting that metadehumanization, the perception that another group dehumanizes your own group, erodes Americans' support for democratic norms. In the days surrounding the 2020 US Presidential Election, American political partisans perceived that their political opponents dehumanized them more than was actually the case. Partisans' exaggerated metadehumanization inspired reciprocal dehumanization of the other side, which in turn predicted their support for subverting democratic norms to hurt the opposing party. Along with replicating past work demonstrating metadehumanization's corrosive effect on democratic integrity, we also contribute novel insights into this process. We found the most politically engaged partisans held the most exaggerated, and therefore most inaccurate, levels of metadehumanization. Moreover, despite the socially progressive and egalitarian outlook traditionally associated with liberalism, the most liberal Democrats actually expressed the greatest dehumanization of Republicans. This suggests that political ideology can at times be as much an expression of social identity as a reflection of deliberative policy considerations, and demonstrates the need to develop more constructive outlets for social identity maintenance.
Democracy and Mass Skepticism of Science
Junyan Jiang & Kin-Man Wan
Columbia University Working Paper, June 2021
Abstract:
Ever since the Age of Enlightenment, democracy and science have been seen as two aspects of modernity that mutually reinforce each other. This article highlights a tension between the two by arguing that certain aspects of contemporary democracy may aggravate the anti-intellectual tendency of the mass public and potentially hinder scientific progress. Analyzing a new global survey of public opinion on science with empirical strategies that exploit cross-country and cross-cohort variations in experience with democracy, we show that less educated citizens in democracies are considerably less trustful of science than their counterparts in non-democracies. Further analyses suggest that, instead of being the result of stronger religiosity or lower science literacy, the increase in skepticism in democracies is mainly driven by a shift in the mode of legitimation, which reduces states' ability and willingness to act as key public advocates for science. These findings help shed light on the institutional sources of "science-bashing" behaviors in many long-standing democracies.
After the Storm: Racial Differences in Allegiance to America's Democracy
James Gibson
Washington University in St. Louis Working Paper, May 2021
Abstract:
Many observers of American politics despair over the possible consequences for the health of America's democratic political culture of the 2020 presidential election, the January insurrection, and the Trump impeachment and acquittal. The specific fear is that popular support for American democratic institutions has been eroded and compromised. Based on a nationally representative survey with a large oversample of African Americans, I address the hypotheses that a) support for democratic institutions is not widespread, b) that significant inter-group differences in support exist, c) that awareness and assessment of these events are connected to democratic support, and d) that support for these institutions is grounded in more elemental and obdurate democratic values. After finding that African Americans extend significantly less support to America's democratic institutions, I consider whether reverence for these institutions was undermined by the election and its aftermath. My findings cautiously suggest that the election/insurrection events may not have changed many American minds, Black or White; instead, it appears that those already low in support for democratic values were the ones most receptive to elite canards regarding the legitimacy of the election and its outcome. On all aspects of this analysis, I find strong inter-racial differences.
The Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity
Nicholas Dias & Yphtach Lelkes
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Democrats and Republicans clearly dislike one another. Yet, scholars debate whether policy disagreement or partisan identity, per se, drives interparty animus. Past studies suggest the relationship between partisanship and interpersonal affect is spurious, driven by inferred policy preferences. We argue, instead, that policy preferences signal partisan identity when the parties' stances on an issue are well-known. Using a nationally representative survey and four preregistered experiments, we disentangle the effects of policy disagreement and partisan identity on interpersonal affect. Our findings suggest that partisan identity is the principal mechanism of affective polarization, and that policy preferences factor into affective polarization largely by signaling partisan identity. However, our results also affirm that policy disagreement in itself drives interpersonal affect. This provides evidence that partisanship reflects an emotional attachment to a political party, not merely a running tally of rational considerations.
Misinformation: Strategic Sharing, Homophily, and Endogenous Echo Chambers
Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar & James Siderius
NBER Working Paper, June 2021
Abstract:
We present a model of online content sharing where agents sequentially observe an article and must decide whether to share it with others. The article may contain misinformation, but at a cost, agents can fact-check it to determine whether its content is entirely accurate. While agents derive value from future shares, they simultaneously fear getting caught sharing misinformation. With little homophily in the "sharing network", misinformation is often quickly identified and brought to an end. However, when homophily is strong, so that agents anticipate that only those with similar beliefs will view the article, misinformation spreads more rapidly because of echo chambers. We show that a social media platform that wishes to maximize content engagement will propagate extreme articles amongst the most extremist users, while not showing these articles to ideologically opposed users. This creates an endogenous echo chamber - filter bubble - that makes misinformation spread virally. We use this framework to understand how regulation can encourage more fact-checking by online users and mitigate the consequences of filter bubbles.
Elite Cues and Popular Apolitical Issues: Evidence from Daylight Savings Time
Alexander Agadjanian
University of California Working Paper, May 2021
Abstract:
Although much is known about the nature of elite influence on public opinion, its limits remain unclear. One area where elite cues might be less powerful is on popular apolitical issues that are part of everyday life. The current study investigates this question through a useful example: making daylight savings time (DST) permanent. This idea, where opinions likely already developed based on personal experiences outside politics, is broadly supported but non-politicized. In 2019, it received public support on Twitter by a prominent party leader -- then-president Donald Trump. Using his real endorsement tweet as a treatment, two survey experiments show Trump moves Republicans to favor and Democrats to oppose making DST permanent. But effects are weak in terms of size and significance -- especially when compared to party leader effects in other contexts -- perhaps revealing limits on elite influence in a popular apolitical realm. In this context, the study also provides suggestive evidence that expressive responding does not plague elite cue effects.
The Effect of Prediction Error on Belief Update Across the Political Spectrum
Madalina Vlasceanu, Michael Morais & Alin Coman
Psychological Science, June 2021, Pages 916-933
Abstract:
Making predictions is an adaptive feature of the cognitive system, as prediction errors are used to adjust the knowledge they stemmed from. Here, we investigated the effect of prediction errors on belief update in an ideological context. In Study 1, 704 Cloud Research participants first evaluated a set of beliefs and then either made predictions about evidence associated with the beliefs and received feedback or were just presented with the evidence. Finally, they reevaluated the initial beliefs. Study 2, which involved a U.S. Census-matched sample of 1,073 Cloud Research participants, was a replication of Study 1. We found that the size of prediction errors linearly predicts belief update and that making large errors leads to more belief update than does not engaging in prediction. Importantly, the effects held for both Democrats and Republicans across all belief types (Democratic, Republican, neutral). We discuss these findings in the context of the misinformation epidemic.
Comparing Campaign Finance and Vote-Based Measures of Ideology
Michael Barber
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this research note I show that campaign finance-based measures of ideology (CFScores) and vote-based measures of ideology (NOMINATE) have become entirely uncorrelated among Democratic legislators in the US Congress. This is not the case for Republican members of Congress, nor for state legislators of either party. I show this by comparing Bonica's CFScores with NOMINATE scores from 1980 to 2018 and with state legislator ideology scores (NPAT) from 1996 to 2012. The decline in correlation begins in the early 2000s and approaches zero in 2014, where it has remained since 2014. These previously undocumented results illustrate a dramatic change among Democrats in Congress in the relationship between fundraising and voting - two activities that consume a significant portion of legislators' time and attention. Furthermore, scholars of representation need to be aware that different latent measures of ideology can lead to different conclusions about the relationship between legislators and their constituents.
Overconfidence in news judgments is associated with false news susceptibility
Benjamin Lyons et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 8 June 2021
Abstract:
We examine the role of overconfidence in news judgment using two large nationally representative survey samples. First, we show that three in four Americans overestimate their relative ability to distinguish between legitimate and false news headlines; respondents place themselves 22 percentiles higher than warranted on average. This overconfidence is, in turn, correlated with consequential differences in real-world beliefs and behavior. We show that overconfident individuals are more likely to visit untrustworthy websites in behavioral data; to fail to successfully distinguish between true and false claims about current events in survey questions; and to report greater willingness to like or share false content on social media, especially when it is politically congenial. In all, these results paint a worrying picture: The individuals who are least equipped to identify false news content are also the least aware of their own limitations and, therefore, more susceptible to believing it and spreading it further.
A Witch's Brew of Grievances: The Potential Effects of COVID-19 on Radicalization to Violent Extremism
Garth Davies, Edith Wu & Richard Frank
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
Historically, pandemics had inevitably produced demonization and scapegoating, and the COVID-19 pandemic has been no exception. Some individuals and groups have attempted to weaponize and exploit the pandemic, to use it as a means of spreading their extremist ideologies and to radicalize others to their causes. Segmented regression analyses of seven online extremist forums revealed that posting behavior on violent right-wing extremist and incel forums increased significantly following the declaration of the pandemic. The same was not true of left-wing or jihadist forums. These unequal effects likely reflect the particular grievance-based and online nature of right-wing and incel extremism.
The Economic Costs of Democratic Backsliding? Backsliding and State Location Preferences of U.S. Job-seekers
Michael Nelson & Christopher Witko
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political checks on democratic backsliding can be ineffective. But, there may be economic costs for backsliding regimes if talented individuals seeking job opportunities prefer to not live in backsliding areas. Of course, factors other than the quality of democracy may be more important to job seekers, limiting the efficacy of this economic check. We test these possibilities in an area characterized as experiencing backsliding - the U.S. states - using a conjoint experiment. We provide hypothetical job opportunities to a sample of U.S. adults in the labor market and another sample of students at a large, selective public university. We find that jobs located in states experiencing democratic backsliding are viewed less favorably. Moreover, some types of backsliding affect willingness to "accept" a hypothetical job, especially among Democrats in the non-student sample.
Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Fake News: How Social Media Conditions Individuals to Be Less Critical of Political Misinformation
Samuel Rhodes
Political Communication, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social media platforms have been found to be the primary gateway through which individuals are exposed to fake news. The algorithmic filter bubbles and echo chambers that have popularized these platforms may also increase exposure to fake news. Because of this, scholars have suggested disrupting the stream of congruent information that filter bubbles and echo chambers produce, as this may reduce the impact and circulation of misinformation. To test this, a survey experiment was conducted via Amazon MTurk. Participants read 10 short stories that were either all fake or half real and half fake. These treatment conditions were made up of stories agreeable to the perspective of Democrats, Republicans, or a mix of both. The results show that participants assigned to conditions that were agreeable to their political world view found fake stories more believable compared to participants who received a heterogeneous mix of news stories complementary to both world views. However, this "break up" effect appears confined to Democratic participants; findings indicate that Republicans assigned to filter bubble treatment conditions believed fake news stories at approximately the same rate as their fellow partisans receiving a heterogeneous mix of news items. This suggests that a potential "break up" may only influence more progressive users.