Turf War
Between the Dockyard and the Deep Blue Sea -- Retention and Personnel Economics in the Royal Navy
Darrell Glaser & Ahmed Rahman
Labour Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper tackles various issues in personnel economics using the career profiles of British naval officers during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Specifically we ask how pay, promotions, positions, and peers affect worker retention. Random variation in task assignments and job promotions allows us to explore factors that causally impact retention of personnel. We develop a number of key insights: (i) increases in pay raises retention; (ii) promotions influence retention more than money alone; (iii) many experiences in the Navy involve "firm-specific" human capital; (iv) modern/technical positions can threaten retention; and (v) job exits can be contagious. These results collectively indicate that rigid but technologically progressive organizations may face higher losses of human capital. Unless they enhance promotion opportunities and reorganize certain tasks, skilled personnel will leave.
Domestic Discontent and Battlefield Desertion: Evidence from the Southern Bread Riots
Connor Huff, Emily Myers & Livia Schubiger
University of Oxford Working Paper, June 2023
Abstract:
How does domestic discontent affect combatants' battlefield behavior? Previous research demonstrates how unit characteristics and battlefield dynamics affect individual soldiers' commitment to fight, yet has paid little attention to the influence of events on the homefront. We argue that visible signals of domestic discontent -- in the form of protests and riots -- can undermine soldiers' battlefield resolve. Weakening resolve increases the likelihood soldiers stop fighting. We assess the argument focusing on the case of the Southern bread riots in Confederate Georgia. Using newly compiled data on over 80,000 combatants and a difference-in-differences design, we show that Confederate soldiers from counties that experienced riots deserted at higher rates. The paper shows how visible displays of a conflict's domestic costs can play a crucial role in shaping soldiers' battlefield behavior.
Can Black Tulips stop Russia again?
Dinissa Duvanova, Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy & Olha Zadorozhna
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do the human costs of Russia's war in Ukraine undermine the popular support for the Russian government? Although there is little evidence that the poor performance of the Russian military forces in Ukraine erodes domestic support for the government, region-specific war casualties may help fuel anti-war sentiment. The paper hypothesizes that publicly announced military deaths and obituaries published in the local news and social media groups can incite anti-war sentiment because they bring the human cost of the war into peoples' homes. To evaluate this hypothesis, we use a hand-collected dataset of obituaries, published on the most popular social network in Russia, and analyze statistical connections between the announcements of war casualties and instances of various forms of political protests. The data support the casualties-protest connection, but find that obituaries of military servicemembers with non-Russian-sounding names are uncorrelated with protests even in their home regions, while the opposite is true for similar announcements with Slavic names. We speculate that the observed differences might reflect the intentional government policy of capitalizing on ethno-nationalist sentiment that has been cultivated for the support of Putin's regime.
Unemployment, Central Bank Independence, and Diversionary Conflict
Zhiyuan Wang
International Interactions, June 2023, Pages 612-638
Abstract:
According to the diversionary use of force literature, unemployment as an indicator of poor economy should increase the likelihood of diversionary conflict. I argue, however, leaders do not engage in such conflict unconditionally simply when unemployment is rising. Whether worsening unemployment leads to diversionary conflict depends on the availability of policies that can alleviate the condition. Only when such policy availability is low, will diversionary conflict become more likely as unemployment deteriorates. When ameliorating policies are available, unemployment should reduce the likelihood of diversionary conflict. Focusing on central bank independence (CBI) as a primary institution that shapes the availability of policies that tackle unemployment, I expect that high CBI encourages the use of diversionary conflict as unemployment surges. An augmented zero-inflated negative binomial analysis of an updated militarized dispute dataset for the period 1975-2013 lends strong and robust support to this theoretical postulate. The causal mechanism is also empirically validated.
When Beijing Chose Seoul over Pyongyang: China-South Korea Diplomatic Normalization Revisited
Daekwon Son
China Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
On 24 August 1992, China finally normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea, notwithstanding North Korea's protestations. What made Beijing jettison its traditional friendship with Pyongyang and recognize Seoul? What did China want from Sino-South Korea normalization? By extensively unearthing hitherto unknown archival evidence, this paper argues that it was China's security concern about being besieged by pro-Soviet powers, rather than an ideological affinity with North Korea, that delayed Sino-South Korea rapprochement. In the same vein, the study posits that it was the gradual Sino-Soviet reconciliation from 1985 onwards that enabled Beijing to reconcile with Seoul. Furthermore, it argues that in the face of the sudden dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Beijing hastily sought to secure a cordon sanitaire and foreclose the possibility of the formation of a US-Japan-South Korea anti-China united front by normalizing relations with Seoul.
A theory of jihadist beheadings
Marek Brzezinski
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do some jihadist organizations engage in beheadings while others do not? Although beheadings have become a signature tactic of the contemporary global jihadist movement, I show that most jihadist groups perpetrate few or no beheadings and only a minority have adopted beheading as a consistent part of their repertoire of violence. Such variation exists even among ideologically similar 'Salafi-jihadist' groups, suggesting that ideology alone cannot explain why such violence occurs. Instead, I argue that the use of beheadings is shaped by a combination of local strategic context and transnational ties. Beheadings are strategically useful to jihadist groups engaged in insurgency as a means of deterring civilian collaboration with the enemy, demoralizing enemy combatants and attracting foreign recruits. But the use of beheading is also costly for such groups, notably because of its tendency to alienate potential civilian supporters. Whether or not particular jihadist groups use beheadings depends largely on whether they can afford to ignore these costs. Jihadist insurgents who control significant territory are less sensitive to civilian attitudes because of their ability to obtain support through coercion and are therefore more likely to perpetrate beheadings. The use of beheadings is also shaped by transnational ties: organizations that seek formal affiliation with transnational jihadist networks are more likely to calculate that the benefits of using extreme violence to attract transnational support outweigh its costs. I test this theory using an original dataset of over 1,500 beheading events perpetrated by jihadist organizations between 1998 and 2019.