To Each Other
Risk and the evolution of human exchange
Hillard Kaplan et al.
Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 7 August 2012, Pages 2930-2935
Abstract:
Compared with other species, exchange among non-kin is a hallmark of human sociality in both the breadth of individuals and total resources involved. One hypothesis is that extensive exchange evolved to buffer the risks associated with hominid dietary specialization on calorie dense, large packages, especially from hunting. ‘Lucky' individuals share food with ‘unlucky' individuals with the expectation of reciprocity when roles are reversed. Cross-cultural data provide prima facie evidence of pair-wise reciprocity and an almost universal association of high-variance (HV) resources with greater exchange. However, such evidence is not definitive; an alternative hypothesis is that food sharing is really ‘tolerated theft', in which individuals possessing more food allow others to steal from them, owing to the threat of violence from hungry individuals. Pair-wise correlations may reflect proximity providing greater opportunities for mutual theft of food. We report a laboratory experiment of foraging and food consumption in a virtual world, designed to test the risk-reduction hypothesis by determining whether people form reciprocal relationships in response to variance of resource acquisition, even when there is no external enforcement of any transfer agreements that might emerge. Individuals can forage in a high-mean, HV patch or a low-mean, low-variance (LV) patch. The key feature of the experimental design is that individuals can transfer resources to others. We find that sharing hardly occurs after LV foraging, but among HV foragers sharing increases dramatically over time. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that people are pre-disposed to evaluate gains from exchange and respond to unsynchronized variance in resource availability through endogenous reciprocal trading relationships.
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The Counterintuitive Effects of Thank-you Gifts on Charitable Giving
George Newman & Jeremy Shen
Journal of Economic Psychology, October 2012, Pages 973-983
Abstract:
Six experiments examined the effects of thank-you gifts on charitable giving. Results indicate that although people expect that the offer of thank-you gifts will increase donations, such offers actually reduce charitable donations. This effect was obtained across a wide variety of charities and gifts types, regardless of whether the donations were hypothetical or real, the gift was desirable or undesirable, the charity was familiar or unfamiliar, or the gift was more or less valuable. Moreover, such patterns cannot solely be explained in terms of inferences about the charity's quality (e.g., either their efficacy or current wealth), the undesirability of the gift itself, or simple anchoring effects. These results are discussed within a broader theoretical framework concerning the effects of extrinsic incentives on altruistic behavior.
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Enticing for me but unfair to her: Can targeted pricing evoke socially conscious behavior?
Yu Wang & Aradhna Krishna
Journal of Consumer Psychology, July 2012, Pages 433-442
Abstract:
Prior research shows that consumers stop purchasing from firms that treat them badly. In this research we show that consumers also resist firms that treat other consumers badly while favoring them. In three experiments, we demonstrate such social consciousness in the context of targeted pricing, where firms offer lower prices to new (versus old) customers. A significant proportion of consumers in our experiments give up money to resist the price-discriminating firm, especially when the discrimination is more salient or is not justified. Further, perceived unfairness mediates the relationship between the salience and justification of the pricing practice and consumer resistance.
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Hanna Zagefka, Masi Noor & Rupert Brown
Applied Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
We tested whether knowing more about an area where a humanitarian disaster happened would increase willingness to donate to its victims. Knowledge was proposed to have a positive impact on donation proclivity, mediated by greater identification with the victims: The more potential donors know about the victims and their environment, the more are they able to identify with the victims. Identification, in turn, was proposed to positively impact on willingness to donate. Results confirmed these predictions in one correlational study (N= 111), one experimental study (N= 200), and one quasi-experimental study (N= 100), focusing on the Asian Tsunami of 2004 and the Chinese earthquake of 2008. Theoretical and applied implications of the research findings are discussed.
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Daniel Feiler, Leigh Tost & Adam Grant
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do people give more when benefits to others and oneself are emphasized? We propose that mixing egoistic and altruistic reasons reduces the likelihood of giving by increasing individuals' awareness that a persuasion attempt is occurring, which elicits psychological reactance. In Experiment 1, university alumni were less likely to give money to their alma mater when an electronic donation request emphasized both egoistic and altruistic reasons, compared to either reason alone. In Experiment 2, undergraduates reported lower giving intentions when a donation request emphasized an altruistic and an egoistic reason, compared to either altruistic or egoistic reasons alone. In Experiment 3, undergraduates reported lower intentions to give to the Make-A-Wish Foundation when the donation request featured both egoistic and altruistic reasons; this effect was mediated in two stages by increased persuasion awareness and heightened psychological reactance. This research sheds light on when messages that purport to align self-interest and other-interest can backfire.
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Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes
Journal of Economic Literature, June 2012, Pages 368-425
Abstract:
Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals' altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences. The opposite also occurs - crowding in - though it appears less commonly. In the fifty experiments that we survey, these effects are common, so that incentives and social preferences may be either substitutes (crowding out) or complements (crowding in). We provide evidence for four mechanisms that may account for these incentive effects on preferences: namely that incentives may (i) provide information about the person who implemented the incentive, (ii) frame the decision situation so as to suggest appropriate behavior, (iii) compromise a control averse individual's sense of autonomy, and (iv) affect the process by which people learn new preferences. An implication is that the evaluation of public policy must be restricted to allocations that are supportable as Nash equilibria when account is taken of these crowding effects. We show that well designed fines, subsidies, and the like minimize crowding out and may even do the opposite, making incentives and social preferences complements rather than substitutes.
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Cooperation and the evolution of intelligence
Luke McNally, Sam Brown & Andrew Jackson
Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 7 August 2012, Pages 3027-3034
Abstract:
The high levels of intelligence seen in humans, other primates, certain cetaceans and birds remain a major puzzle for evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psychologists. It has long been held that social interactions provide the selection pressures necessary for the evolution of advanced cognitive abilities (the ‘social intelligence hypothesis'), and in recent years decision-making in the context of cooperative social interactions has been conjectured to be of particular importance. Here we use an artificial neural network model to show that selection for efficient decision-making in cooperative dilemmas can give rise to selection pressures for greater cognitive abilities, and that intelligent strategies can themselves select for greater intelligence, leading to a Machiavellian arms race. Our results provide mechanistic support for the social intelligence hypothesis, highlight the potential importance of cooperative behaviour in the evolution of intelligence and may help us to explain the distribution of cooperation with intelligence across taxa.
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Sacrifice: Psychodynamic, Cultural and Clinical Aspects
Salman Akhtar & Archana Varma
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, June 2012, Pages 95-117
Abstract:
Noting that the topic of sacrifice has remained largely unaddressed in psychoanalytic literature, the authors offer a discussion of it. Their elucidation of sacrifice opens with the definition and etymology of the word and moves on to the place of sacrifice in various religious traditions. They then summarize Freud's views on the topic and suggest that the subsequent analytic contributions have gone in three directions: the first extends and modifies Freud's proposal of triadic-hostile origins of sacrifice, the second locates such origins in dyadic and loving relations, and the third seeks to synthesize the foregoing trends. The authors then delineate the triad of altruism, masochism, and narcissism that underlie sacrifice. They propose that a spectrum of phenomena, ranging from healthy to pathological, is subsumed under the rubric of sacrifice. They also discuss the significance of such ideas to the conduct of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.
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Direct and Indirect Reputation Formation in Nonhuman Great Apes and Human Children
Esther Herrmann et al.
Journal of Comparative Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Humans make decisions about when and with whom to cooperate based on their reputations. People either learn about others by direct interaction or by observing third-party interactions or gossip. An important question is whether other animal species, especially our closest living relatives, the nonhuman great apes, also form reputations of others. In Study 1, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and 2.5-year-old human children experienced a nice experimenter who tried to give food/toys to the subject and a mean experimenter who interrupted the food/toy giving. In studies 2 and 3, nonhuman great apes and human children could only passively observe a similar interaction, in which a nice experimenter and a mean experimenter interacted with a third party. Orangutans and 2.5-year-old human children preferred to approach the nice experimenter rather than the mean one after having directly experienced their respective behaviors. Orangutans, chimpanzees, and 2.5-year-old human children also took into account experimenter actions toward third parties in forming reputations. These studies show that the human ability to form direct and indirect reputation judgment is already present in young children and shared with at least some of the other great apes.
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Robert Bandy & Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm
Journal of Adolescence, August 2012, Pages 1023-1034
Abstract:
This study investigated whether family structure transition and low income are risk factors in the development of prosocial behavior. Models of young adults' prosocial behavior - charitable giving and volunteering - were estimated as functions of their family structure and income during the stages of childhood. Participants were a representative sample of 1011 American young adults. In the full sample, family structure transition during adolescence was negatively associated with subsequent charitable giving in young adulthood. Low income during adolescence was negatively associated with both giving and volunteering in young adulthood. European-American young men also exhibited a negative association between family structure transition during adolescence and subsequent volunteering. The results did not seem to describe African-American young adults. Keeping this qualification in mind, the results suggest that adolescence is a sensitive stage in the development of charitable giving and volunteering.
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The bedside manner of homo economicus: How and why priming an economic schema reduces compassion
Andrew Molinsky, Adam Grant & Joshua Margolis
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, forthcoming
Abstract:
We investigate how, why and when activating economic schemas reduces the compassion that individuals extend to others in need when delivering bad news. Across three experiments, we show that unobtrusively priming economic schemas decreases the compassion that individuals express to others in need, that this effect is mediated by dampened feelings of empathy and heightened perceptions of unprofessionalism, and that it is circumscribed to bad news that has economic implications. We discuss implications for theory and research on schemas, procedural justice, emotion expression, and prosocial behavior.
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Nicolas Guéguen, Angélique Martin & Sébastien Meineri
Social Influence, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous research has found that the statement "Even a penny will help" incorporated in charity donation requests increases compliance. The present study analyzed the effectiveness of this technique using a novel solicitation and where the participant had no possibility to comply immediately with the request. Confederates asked customers in a hypermarket (e.g., Costco, Sam's Club) for a toy donation in aid of children. They wore a t-shirt on which the statement "Even a single marble will make him/her happy ..." was either present or not. Results show that more people gave a toy when this statement appeared on the t-shirt.
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Exposure to altruism quotes and tipping behavior in a restaurant
Céline Jacob et al.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, forthcoming
Abstract:
Some studies have shown that exposure to fortuitous information can influence individuals' behavior. In this study, customers in two restaurants were exposed, or not, to an altruism-related quote written on their bill. A significant increase in tipping behavior was found from both male and female patrons who had been exposed to the altruism quotes. Activation spreading theory was used to explain these results.
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Homophily Through Nonreciprocity: Results of an Experiment
David Schaefer
Social Forces, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study outlines a new explanation for homophily in social networks that is neither intended nor imposed by constraints on partner choices. Rather, homophily is an endogenous product of the emergent exchange process, in which actors seek high-value partners who reciprocate their gestures. Whereas all actors initially direct exchange toward higher value partners, the gestures of lower value actors are more likely to go unreciprocated. This imbalance drives lower value actors to seek new partners, who end up being others who are also lower value. The consequence is homophily on value despite no such preference. I draw upon social exchange theory to articulate how this process unfolds in a newly forming network. A laboratory experiment tests hypotheses about how exchange patterns change over time. Findings reveal that shifts in participants' behavior over time were consistent with a concern for reciprocity, resulting in increasing levels of homophily in the network.
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Normative conflict & feuds: The limits of self-enforcement
Nikos Nikiforakis, Charles Noussair & Tom Wilkening
Journal of Public Economics, October 2012, Pages 797-807
Abstract:
A normative conflict arises when multiple plausible rules exist, specifying how one ought to behave in a given situation. In such cases, enforcing one normative rule can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. We find that punishment is much more likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud when there is a normative conflict, than it is in a setting in which no such conflict exists. While the possibility of a feud sustains cooperation, the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gains from increased cooperation.
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Ostracism and prosocial behavior: A social dilemma perspective
Daniel Balliet & Lance Ferris
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, forthcoming
Abstract:
Prior research has yielded mixed findings regarding the relation of ostracism to prosocial behavior, with studies indicating ostracism leads people to become less prosocial, more prosocial, or that prosocial behavior is unaffected by workplace ostracism. By conceptualizing prosocial behavior at work as a social dilemma, we hypothesized that whether or not individuals reduce prosocial behaviors following ostracism can be understood by how individuals manage the conflict between the immediate temptation to treat others poorly and the long-term benefits of not giving into such temptations. Across three studies - a scenario (Study 1), experimental (Study 2), and field study on employed adults (Study 3) - we find support for the hypothesis that individuals who are less (versus more) oriented towards future outcomes engage in less prosocial behaviors with others who have ostracized them during prior interactions. We discuss both the practical and theoretical implications of these findings.
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Cooperation due to cultural norms, not individual reputation
William Baum et al.
Behavioural Processes, forthcoming
Abstract:
Increased cooperation in groups that are allowed to communicate (engage in "cheap talk") has been attributed to reputation-building and to cultural norms or culturally normal behavior. We tested these two theories by exposing groups of undergraduates to a public-goods social dilemma. Five groups were permitted to communicate via anonymous written messages that were read aloud. The groups with messaging contributed substantially more to the common good than the groups without messaging. Because the messages were anonymous, their efficacy cannot be explained by effects on reputation. Instead, the results point to the participants' histories of giving and receiving exhortations to cooperate - i.e., to culturally normal behavior (cultural norms).
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Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
Tore Ellingsen et al.
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
In an otherwise neutrally described Prisonersʼ dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of her action. The social framing effect also vanishes when the game is played sequentially. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Community label triggers a desire to cooperate, but consistent with the hypothesis that social frames are coordination devices. More generally, our evidence indicates that social frames enter peopleʼs beliefs rather than their preferences.
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Images of Eyes Enhance Investments in a Real-Life Public Good
Damien Francey & Ralph Bergmüller
PLoS ONE, May 2012
Abstract:
A key issue in cooperation research is to determine the conditions under which individuals invest in a public good. Here, we tested whether cues of being watched increase investments in an anonymous public good situation in real life. We examined whether individuals would invest more by removing experimentally placed garbage (paper and plastic bottles) from bus stop benches in Geneva in the presence of images of eyes compared to controls (images of flowers). We provided separate bins for each of both types of garbage to investigate whether individuals would deposit more items into the appropriate bin in the presence of eyes. The treatment had no effect on the likelihood that individuals present at the bus stop would remove garbage. However, those individuals that engaged in garbage clearing, and were thus likely affected by the treatment, invested more time to do so in the presence of eyes. Images of eyes had a direct effect on behaviour, rather than merely enhancing attention towards a symbolic sign requesting removal of garbage. These findings show that simple images of eyes can trigger reputational effects that significantly enhance on non-monetary investments in anonymous public goods under real life conditions. We discuss our results in the light of previous findings and suggest that human social behaviour may often be shaped by relatively simple and potentially unconscious mechanisms instead of very complex cognitive capacities.
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When do leaders sacrifice?: The effects of sense of power and belongingness on leader self-sacrifice
Niek Hoogervorst et al.
Leadership Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Past research on leader self-sacrifice has focused entirely on the effects of this leader behavior on followers and its implications for organizations. The present research focused on antecedents of leader self-sacrifice. We argued that self-sacrifice is positively influenced by leaders' sense of belongingness to the group they supervise. Furthermore, leaders' subjectively sensed power can serve as a moderator of this effect. We expected this because a high sense of power is known to facilitate goal pursuit. Given that organizational goals often prescribe serving the interests of the organization, leaders' sense of belongingness should promote self-sacrifice particularly among leaders low in subjective power; leaders high in subjective power should display self-sacrifice regardless of their sense of belongingness. Two field studies supported these predictions. A final experiment supported a critical assumption underlying our argument in showing that the sense of power × sense of belongingness interaction is restricted to situations that prescribe cooperative goals. When situations prescribe competitive goals, this interaction was absent.
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Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
William Press & Freeman Dyson
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 26 June 2012, Pages 10409-10413
Abstract:
The two-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is a model for both sentient and evolutionary behaviors, especially including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally assumed that there exists no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player can enforce a unilateral claim to an unfair share of rewards. Here, we show that such strategies unexpectedly do exist. In particular, a player X who is witting of these strategies can (i) deterministically set her opponent Y's score, independently of his strategy or response, or (ii) enforce an extortionate linear relation between her and his scores. Against such a player, an evolutionary player's best response is to accede to the extortion. Only a player with a theory of mind about his opponent can do better, in which case Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is an Ultimatum Game.
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Is Altruism Bad for Cooperation?
Sung-Ha Hwang & Samuel Bowles
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of fellow citizens. Economists, however, have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self-interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst additive. But this need not be the case. Behavioral experiments find that if reciprocity-minded subjects feel hostility towards free riders and enjoy inflicting harm on them, the incentives provided by the anticipated punishment support near efficient levels of contributions to a public good. Cooperation may also be supported if altruistic individuals internalize the group benefits that their contributions produce. But the effects of these two supports for high levels of cooperation may be less than additive. Using a utility function embodying both reciprocity and altruism we show that unconditional altruism attenuates the punishment motive and thus may reduce the level of punishment inflicted on defectors, resulting in lower levels of contribution. Increases in altruism may also reduce the level of benefits from the public project net of contribution costs and punishment costs. The range over which altruism inhibits cooperation and reduces material payoffs is greater, the stronger is the reciprocity motive among group members.
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Are tax-financed contributions to a public good completely crowded-out? Experimental evidence
Timothy Gronberg et al.
Journal of Public Economics, August 2012, Pages 596-603
Abstract:
We report the results of a laboratory experiment on crowd-out in a voluntary contribution mechanism public goods game. In our setting, a standard argument states that a tax should not be effective in raising contributions, because agents respond by reducing voluntary contributions by the amount of the tax. Our experimental design focuses in on this intuition by abstracting away from several potential confounds. We use a specification for the payoff function in which there is a dominant strategy for own-earnings maximizing agents, located interior to and in the upper half of the strategy space. The dominant strategy ensures that changes in contributions are attributable to the tax directly, rather than second-order effects due to responses to out-of-equilibrium play by other agents. The dominant strategy is made more transparent by the use of a novel graphical decision interface. We find that individuals robustly choose at or above the own-earnings dominant strategy level. Even with the controls of the design, crowd-out is incomplete, but the degree of crowd-out is higher than in previous studies. Analysis of individual-level decisions provides evidence of different player types. Behavior of subjects not choosing the dominant or Pareto-efficient contributions is well-organized by a model of warm-glow giving with a logit decision error.