The right stuff
When and Why We See Victims as Responsible: The Impact of Ideology on Attitudes Toward Victims
Laura Niemi & Liane Young
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do victims sometimes receive sympathy for their suffering and at other times scorn and blame? Here we show a powerful role for moral values in attitudes toward victims. We measured moral values associated with unconditionally prohibiting harm (“individualizing values”) versus moral values associated with prohibiting behavior that destabilizes groups and relationships (“binding values”: loyalty, obedience to authority, and purity). Increased endorsement of binding values predicted increased ratings of victims as contaminated (Studies 1-4); increased blame and responsibility attributed to victims, increased perceptions of victims’ (versus perpetrators’) behaviors as contributing to the outcome, and decreased focus on perpetrators (Studies 2-3). Patterns persisted controlling for politics, just world beliefs, and right-wing authoritarianism. Experimentally manipulating linguistic focus off of victims and onto perpetrators reduced victim blame. Both binding values and focus modulated victim blame through victim responsibility attributions. Findings indicate the important role of ideology in attitudes toward victims via effects on responsibility attribution.
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Media coverage of “wise” interventions can reduce concern for the disadvantaged
Elif Ikizer & Hart Blanton
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, June 2016, Pages 135-147
Abstract:
Recent articulation of the “wise” approach to psychological intervention has drawn attention to the way small, seemingly trivial social psychological interventions can exert powerful, long-term effects. These interventions have been used to address such wide-ranging social issues as the racial achievement gap, environmental conservation, and the promotion of safer sex. Although there certainly are good reasons to seek easier as opposed to harder solutions to social problems, we examine a potentially undesirable effect that can result from common media portrayals of wise interventions. By emphasizing the ease with which interventions help address complex social problems, media reports might decrease sympathy for the individuals assisted by such efforts. Three studies provide evidence for this, showing that media coverage of wise interventions designed to address academic and health disparities increased endorsement of the view that the disadvantaged can solve their problems on their own, and the tendency to blame such individuals for their circumstances. Effects were strongest for interventions targeted at members of a historically disadvantaged group (African Americans as opposed to college students) and when the coverage was read by conservatives as opposed to liberals. Attempts to undermine this effect by introducing cautious language had mixed success.
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Up-regulation of neural indicators of empathic concern in an offender population
Nathan Arbuckle & Matthew Shane
Social Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Empathic concern has traditionally been conceived of as a spontaneous reaction to others experiencing pain or distress. As such, the potential role of more deliberate control over empathic responses has frequently been overlooked. The present fMRI study evaluated the role of such deliberate control in empathic concern by examining the extent to which a sample of offenders recruited through probation/parole could voluntarily modulate their neural activity to another person in pain. Offenders were asked to either passively view pictures of other people in painful or non-painful situations, or to actively modulate their level of concern for the person in pain. During passive viewing of painful versus non-painful pictures, offenders showed minimal neural activity in regions previously linked to empathy for pain (e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral insula). However, when instructed to try to increase their concern for the person in pain, offenders demonstrated significant increases within these regions. These findings are consistent with recent theories of empathy as motivational in nature, and suggest that limitations in empathic concern may include a motivational component.
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Evolution and Kantian morality
Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull
Games and Economic Behavior, July 2016, Pages 56–67
Abstract:
What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.
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How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?
Zachary Horne & Derek Powell
PLoS ONE, July 2016
Abstract:
Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people’s judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection between people’s emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexamined the role of emotion in people’s judgments about moral dilemmas using a validated self-report measure of emotion. We measured participants’ specific emotional responses to moral dilemmas and, although we found that moral dilemmas evoked strong emotional responses, we found that these responses were only weakly correlated with participants’ moral judgments. We argue that the purportedly strong connection between emotion and judgments of moral dilemmas may have been overestimated.
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The Effects of Victim Anonymity on Unethical Behavior
Kai Chi Yam & Scott Reynolds
Journal of Business Ethics, June 2016, Pages 13-22
Abstract:
We theorize that victim anonymity is an important factor in ethical decision making, such that actors engage in more self-interested and unethical behaviors toward anonymous victims than they do toward identifiable victims. Three experiments provided empirical support for this argument. In Study 1, participants withheld more life-saving products from anonymous than from identifiable victims. In Study 2, participants allocated a sum of payment more unfairly when interacting with an anonymous than with an identifiable partner. Finally, in Study 3, participants cheated more from an anonymous than from an identifiable person. Anticipated guilt fully mediated these effects in all three studies. Taken together, our research suggests that anonymous victims may be more likely to incur unethical treatment, which could explain many unethical business behaviors.
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Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game
Uta Schier, Axel Ockenfels & Wilhelm Hofmann
Journal of Economic Psychology, October 2016, Pages 107–115
Abstract:
Using data from a large representative US sample (N=1,519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.
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Why Do People Tend to Infer “Ought” From “Is”? The Role of Biases in Explanation
Christina Tworek & Andrei Cimpian
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
People tend to judge what is typical as also good and appropriate — as what ought to be. What accounts for the prevalence of these judgments, given that their validity is at best uncertain? We hypothesized that the tendency to reason from “is” to “ought” is due in part to a systematic bias in people’s (nonmoral) explanations, whereby regularities (e.g., giving roses on Valentine’s Day) are explained predominantly via inherent or intrinsic facts (e.g., roses are beautiful). In turn, these inherence-biased explanations lead to value-laden downstream conclusions (e.g., it is good to give roses). Consistent with this proposal, results from five studies (N = 629 children and adults) suggested that, from an early age, the bias toward inherence in explanations fosters inferences that imbue observed reality with value. Given that explanations fundamentally determine how people understand the world, the bias toward inherence in these judgments is likely to exert substantial influence over sociomoral understanding.
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Tone Ognedal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, September 2016, Pages 100–115
Abstract:
Being honest can be a competitive disadvantage. In markets with the opportunity to violate laws and regulations, producers who are willing to cheat may crowd out more efficient producers who are honest, and buyers who are willing to cheat may crowd out honest buyers with higher willingness to pay. This mechanism makes morality (honesty) a bad substitute for sanctions in markets. Honesty reduces cheating, but the output may be less efficiently produced and less efficiently allocated among buyers. I also show that the effect of honesty depends crucially on the fraction of honest traders among both buyers and sellers. While it does not matter whether a buyer or a seller pays the sanction, it does matter who is honest.
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Elizabeth Seto & Joshua Hicks
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Undermining the belief in free will influences thoughts and behavior, yet little research has explored its implications for the self and identity. The current studies examined whether lowering free will beliefs reduces perceived true self-knowledge. First, a new free will manipulation was validated. Next, in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to high belief or low belief in free will conditions and completed measures of true self-knowledge. In Study 2, participants completed the same free will manipulation and a moral decision-making task. We then assessed participants’ perceived sense of authenticity during the task. Results illustrated that attenuating free will beliefs led to less self-knowledge, such that participants reported feeling more alienated from their true selves and experienced lowered perceptions of authenticity while making moral decisions. The interplay between free will and the true self are discussed.
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Morality or competence? The importance of affirming the appropriate dimension of self-integrity
Donna Jessop et al.
British Journal of Health Psychology, forthcoming
Methods: Participants were presented with a morality affirmation, competence affirmation, or no affirmation control prior to reading a message about the risks of (1) not engaging in daily dental flossing (Study 1) and (2) red meat consumption (Study 2). Participants subsequently completed a number of measures assessing acceptance of the message.
Results: In line with predictions, findings from both studies demonstrated that the morality affirmation precipitated greater acceptance of personally relevant health risk information compared to the competence affirmation, as reflected in more positive attitudes (Studies 1 and 2) and intentions (Study 1). Study 2's findings further suggested that the superior efficacy of the morality affirmation in health-related contexts could not simply be attributed to a general tendency for this affirmation to outperform the competence affirmation.
Conclusions: The nature of the value affirmed may be a critical factor in determining the success of self-affirmation manipulations in health-related domains.
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Unjustified side effects were strongly intended: Taboo tradeoffs and the side-effect effect
Andrew Vonasch & Roy Baumeister
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The side-effect effect is the seemingly irrational tendency for people to say harmful side effects were more intentional than helpful side effects of the same action. But the tendency may not be irrational. According to the Tradeoffs Justification Model, judgments of a person's intentions to cause harm depend on how that person decided to act, and on whether the reasons for acting justified causing the harmful consequences. Across three experiments (N = 660), unjustified harms were viewed as more intentional than justified harms. If the person had a choice of what to do and knowingly caused harm for no good reason, people judged that the person must have actually desired and intended to cause the harm. However, if the person had a strong, compelling reason (e.g., to ransom his daughter from kidnappers) that the observer deemed to have justified causing the harm, then observers thought the harm was weakly intended at most. Taboo harms that violated sacred moral values were especially likely to be seen as intentional because most reasons do not adequately justify violating a sacred value.
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Jonas Kunst & Sigrid Hohle
Appetite, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many people enjoy eating meat but dislike causing pain to animals. Dissociating meat from its animal origins may be a powerful way to avoid cognitive dissonance resulting from this ‘meat paradox’. Here, we provide the first comprehensive test of this hypothesis, highlighting underlying psychological mechanisms. Processed meat made participants less empathetic towards the slaughtered animal than unprocessed meat (Study 1). When beheaded, a whole roasted pork evoked less empathy (Study 2a) and disgust (Study 2b) than when the head was present. These affective responses, in turn, made participants more willing to eat the roast and less willing to consider an alternative vegetarian dish. Conversely, presenting a living animal in a meat advertisement increased empathy and reduced willingness to eat meat (Study 3). Next, describing industrial meat production as “harvesting” versus “killing” or “slaughtering” indirectly reduced empathy (Study 4). Last, replacing “meat/pork” with “cow/pig” in a restaurant menu increased empathy and disgust, which both equally reduced willingness to eat meat and increased willingness to choose an alternative vegetarian dish (Study 5). In all experiments, effects were strongly mediated by dissociation and interacted with participants' general dissociation tendencies in Study 3 and 5, so that effects were particularly pronounced among participants who generally spend efforts disassociating meat from animals in their daily lives. Together, this line of research demonstrates the large role various culturally-entrenched processes of dissociation play for meat consumption.
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The Tipping Point of Moral Change: When Do Good and Bad Acts Make Good and Bad Actors?
Nadav Klein & Ed O'Brien
Social Cognition, April 2016, Pages 149-166
Abstract:
Moral and immoral behaviors often come in small doses. A person might donate just a few dollars to charity or cheat on just one exam question. Small actions create ambiguity about when they might reflect a permanent change in an actor's moral character versus simply a passing trend. At what sum of good or bad behaviors do observers believe that others have transformed for better or worse, when their actions begin to reflect “them”? Five experiments reveal that this moral tipping point is asymmetric. People require more evidence to perceive improvement than decline; it is apparently easier to become a sinner than a saint, despite exhibiting equivalent evidence for change. This asymmetry emerges more strongly when targets commit new actions (e.g., begin treating others well or poorly) than when targets cease existing actions (stop treating others well or poorly). This asymmetry in moral judgment fosters inequitable thresholds for reward and punishment.
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Justin Landy, Jared Piazza & Geoffrey Goodwin
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Morality, sociability, and competence are distinct dimensions in person perception. We argue that a person’s morality informs us about their likely intentions, whereas their competence and sociability inform us about the likelihood that they will fulfill those intentions. Accordingly, we hypothesized that whereas morality would be considered unconditionally positive, sociability and competence would be highly positive only in moral others, and would be less positive in immoral others. Using exploratory factor analyses, Studies 1a and 1b distinguished evaluations of morality and sociability. Studies 2 to 5 then showed that sociability and competence are evaluated positively contingent on morality — Study 2 demonstrated this phenomenon, while the remaining studies explained it (Study 3), generalized it (Studies 3-5), and ruled out an alternative explanation for it (Study 5). Study 6 showed that the positivity of morality traits is independent of other morality traits. These results support a functionalist account of these dimensions of person perception.