The powers that be
Daniel Stone
Journal of Public Economics, May 2013, Pages 94-104
Abstract:
I develop a model of the relation between the media environment and political obstructionism. I show that when voters are less informed by media, obstructionism becomes a more effective political signal for the minority party. The model thus implies that media change can cause gridlock via signaling; by contrast, the previous literature on causes of gridlock focuses on polarization and other factors. The model also makes several auxiliary predictions consistent with recent trends in U.S. politics.
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Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States
Filipe Campante & Quoc-Anh Do
NBER Working Paper, May 2013
Abstract:
We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that it might forestall political capture. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms over state politics: newspaper coverage, voter knowledge and information, and turnout. We also find evidence against the capture hypothesis: isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns. Finally, we show that isolation is linked with worse public good provision.
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David Broockman
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why are politicians more likely to advance the interests of those of their race? I present a field experiment demonstrating that black politicians are more intrinsically motivated to advance blacks' interests than are their counterparts. Guided by elite interviews, I emailed 6,928 U.S. state legislators from a putatively black alias asking for help signing up for state unemployment benefits. Crucially, I varied the legislators' political incentive to respond by randomizing whether the sender purported to live within or far from each legislator's district. While nonblack legislators were markedly less likely to respond when their political incentives to do so were diminished, black legislators typically continued to respond even when doing so promised little political reward. Black legislators thus appear substantially more intrinsically motivated to advance blacks' interests. As political decision making is often difficult for voters to observe, intrinsically motivated descriptive representatives play a crucial role in advancing minorities' political interests.
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Men, women, and the ballot: Gender imbalances and suffrage extensions in the United States
Sebastian Braun & Michael Kvasnicka
Explorations in Economic History, forthcoming
Abstract:
Women's suffrage led to one of the greatest enfranchisements in history. Voting rights, however, were not won by force or threats thereof, a fact leading political economy theories find hard to explain. Studying the timing of suffrage extensions in US states between 1869 and 1919, we find that a scarcity of women strongly promoted early transitions to women's suffrage. Such scarcity significantly reduced the political costs and risks for male grantors of the suffrage. It might also have made women's suffrage attractive as a means to attract more women.
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War and the political zeitgeist: Evidence from the history of female suffrage
Daniel Hicks
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite the upheaval associated with warfare, empirical evidence linking conflict with institutional development is limited. This paper examines the hypothesis that international wars accelerated democratization by fostering political inclusion. Employing survival analysis, I find that during the 20th century, nations engaging in external conflict were more than twice as likely to extend the franchise to women in the post-conflict period, even after controlling for other commonly cited determinants of suffrage adoption. I explore several potential mechanisms for this association and find evidence consistent with stories which connect war with increased national unity, ideological fervor, and international posturing. Finally, examining conflict-induced changes in sex ratios and female labor force participation suggests that the underlying determinants of suffrage expansion at the national and sub-national level differ.
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Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises
Laura Young
Presidential Studies Quarterly, June 2013, Pages 328-352
Abstract:
Scholars interested in the power of the presidency often overlook the importance of a crisis. The right kind of event, however, has characteristics that create a window of opportunity for a president to exert or expand his unilateral power. Failure to explore this relationship leaves a gap in our knowledge regarding presidential power, which this article addresses. The results show foreign policy crises provide the largest window for a president to increase his authority. Economic crises and most natural disasters have little to no impact on unilateral power. Epidemic outbreaks are the exception, though compared to a foreign policy crisis, the impact is relatively small. Finally, the findings suggest a president suffering from institutional constraints or lacking in skill and will has the ability to increase his power whenever a foreign policy crisis occurs.
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David Broockman & Christopher Skovron
University of California Working Paper, March 2013
Abstract:
We reexamine prospects for constituency control in American politics with original data describing nearly 2,000 state legislative candidates' perceptions of mass opinion in their districts and recent advances in public opinion estimation that allow us to determine actual district-level opinion with precision. Actual district opinion explains only a modest share of the variation in politicians' perceptions of their districts' views. Moreover, there is a striking conservative bias in politicians' perceptions, particularly among conservatives: conservative politicians systematically believe their constituents are more conservative than they actually are by over 20 percentage points, while liberal politicians also typically overestimate their constituents' conservatism by several percentage points. A follow-up survey demonstrates that politicians appear to learn nothing from democratic campaigns or elections that leads them to correct these shortcomings. Electoral selection has a limited impact on whether the chosen representative is congruent with the majority of her constituents. These findings suggest a substantial conservative bias in American political representation and bleak prospects for constituency control of politicians when voters' collective preferences are less than unambiguous.
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Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives
Richard Van Weelden
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
I study elections between citizen-candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office, but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re-election. In each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences. The elected candidate chooses the policy to implement, and how much rent-seeking to engage in, when in office. As the voter decides both which candidate to elect and, subsequently, whether the candidate is retained, this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability. I show that, in the best stationary equilibrium, when utility functions are concave over policy, non-median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter. In this equilibrium, there are two candidates who are elected at some history, and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge. This divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent-seeking, increasing voter welfare.
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Presidential and Media Leadership of Public Opinion on Iraq
Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha & Christopher Linebarger
Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
Much research disputes the president's ability to lead public opinion and shows media to have influenced public opinion concerning the war in Iraq. We argue that although news tone is likely to have affected public support for the war, presidential rhetoric could be influential for two reasons. First, heightened presidential attention to the war increases the public's accessibility to the president's perspective on the war. Second, a survey question that cues the respondent to consider the president explicitly in their evaluation of the Iraq war is likely to encourage responsiveness to presidential rhetoric. To assess these arguments, we simultaneously examine the impact that presidential tone and media tone have on public support for the war in Iraq by analyzing an original dataset of presidential speeches, news coverage, and public support for the war and the president's handling of it from 2002 to 2008. Our findings reveal that although media tone drives public support for the war in Iraq, presidential tone influences the public's view of President Bush's handling of it.
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Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia
Alessandra Bonfiglioli & Gino Gancia
Economic Journal, May 2013, Pages 373-400
Abstract:
We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty. When politicians' ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable, elections improve political accountability and selection. However, incumbents underinvest in costly policies with future returns to signal high ability and increase re-election probability. Surprisingly, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may increase social welfare. We also address the socially optimal political rewards and the desirability of a one-term limit. Our predictions are consistent with several stylised facts and with a new empirical observation: aggregate uncertainty is positively correlated with fiscal discipline.
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Amel Ahmed
Studies in Comparative International Development, June 2013, Pages 141-171
Abstract:
The origins of electoral systems in early democracies have received a great deal of attention in recent years, as scholars seek to explain why at the time of suffrage expansion some countries adopted proportional representation (PR) while others chose single-member plurality (SMP). This paper offers a systematic explanation of the choice of electoral systems based on the "existential threat" posed by rising workers' parties after suffrage expansion, that is, the extent to which these parties threatened the institutions of capitalism and liberal democracy. Original historical research offers important correctives to the dominant scholarly narrative, revealing that PR and SMP were both novel systems at the time, devised to replace the "mixed" systems that prevailed in the predemocratic period. Both, moreover, were seen as elite safeguards that, through different mechanisms, would protect right parties from the impact of suffrage expansion. Mid-range analysis of 18 historical cases reveals that the choice ultimately turned on the different strategic advantages and time horizons associated with the two systems as well as the existential threat presented by new workers' parties.
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Identifying and Understanding Perceived Inequities in Local Politics
Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although there is widespread concern about bias in American democracy, convincing tests of differential responsiveness are rare. We use a unique data set that surveys the views of a large cross-section of urban residents to provide greater insight into this question. We demonstrate clear differences in perceived responsiveness across demographic and political groups with racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and liberals expressing less satisfaction with local outcomes. Our analysis suggests that these differences are unlikely to be due to underlying differences in individual attitudes but instead appear to stem from real differences in local conditions and perceived governmental responsiveness.
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Term Limits and Legislative-Executive Conflict in the American States
Travis Baker & David Hedge
Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 2013, Pages 237-258
Abstract:
State governments have experienced considerable institutional change in the last several decades. None appeared at first glance to be as far-reaching as the legislative term limits that were adopted by over 20 states in the 1990s. The evidence to date suggests that term limits have indeed changed the character of many of the states' legislatures, if not always as predicted by their advocates. We report data on veto dynamics over the period 1989-2008 to determine how term limits have impacted legislative-executive relations. Our data both challenge and support what has become the conventional wisdom, i.e., that term limits will weaken legislatures relative to their governors. States with more stringent term limits experienced fewer gubernatorial vetoes but proved more likely to override those vetoes when they were issued. Taken together the evidence suggests that the relationship between governors and legislatures in the wake of term limits is more complex and variable than scholars and others had previously thought.
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Optimal Districting with Endogenous Party Platforms
Emanuele Bracco
Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Representation is one of the most important criteria by which to judge electoral systems. In this paper, I focus on one aspect of representative democracy: the formation of electoral district boundaries. It is well known that majoritarian systems give rise to highly biased seat-vote curves, causing representation to be less than ideal. What should, therefore, be the optimal constituency design when the objective is to maximize voters' welfare? I show that when parties take account of districting while setting platforms, then the district design problem reduces to a very simple rule: do nothing when voters are risk neutral, and - when voters are risk averse - choose a bias that is against the largest partisan group. Calibrating the model on data of U.S. State legislative elections during the 1990s, I show that the welfare gain due to optimal districting is very small.
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Erik Engstrom, Jesse Hammond & John Scott
American Political Science Review, May 2013, Pages 225-240
Abstract:
The location of a government's capital can profoundly influence the nature and quality of political representation. Yet scholars know very little about what drives the siting of political capitals. In this article, we examine the location and relocation of political capitals in the United States, including the choice of Washington, DC, as the nation's capital and the location and relocation of capitals in the 48 contiguous American states. We argue that the location of capitals in the United States followed a systematic pattern in accord with the theory of representative government developed in the new nation, especially as articulated by Madison. Based on an empirical analysis of historical census and political boundaries data from 1790 to the present, we find that decision makers consistently tended to locate - and especially relocate - the seat of government as near as possible to the population centroid of the relevant political jurisdiction, consistent with the principle of equal representation of citizens. Our analysis contributes to the study of institutional design and change, especially in the area of American political development, as well as to a burgeoning literature on the effects of geographical factors on political outcomes.
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Theodore Rave
Harvard Law Review, January 2013, Pages 671-739
Abstract:
When incumbent legislators draw the districts from which they are elected, the conflicts of interest are glaring: incumbents can and do gerrymander district lines to entrench themselves. Despite recognizing that such incumbent self-dealing works a democratic harm, the Supreme Court has not figured out what to do with political gerrymandering claims, which inherently require first-order decisions about the allocation of raw political power - decisions that courts are institutionally ill suited to make. But the same type of agency problem arises all the time in corporate law. And though we do not think courts are any better at making business decisions than political ones, or trust elections alone to align the interests of corporate directors with their shareholders, courts nevertheless play an important role in checking self-dealing by corporate agents. They do so through an enforceable fiduciary duty of loyalty. Courts apply a strict standard of review when corporate agents act under a conflict of interest, typically invalidating the transactions unless the taint of self-dealing is cleansed by approval through a neutral process (such as ratification by disinterested directors or shareholders), in which case courts apply the much more deferential "business judgment rule." Drawing from constitutional history and political theory, this Article argues that political representatives should be treated as fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty, which they breach when they manipulate election laws to their own advantage. Courts can thus check incumbent self-dealing in gerrymandering by taking a cue from corporate law strategies for getting around their institutional incompetence. As in corporate law, courts should strictly scrutinize incumbent decisions that are tainted by conflicts of interest (such as when a legislature draws its own districts). But when the taint is cleansed by a neutral process (such as an independent districting commission), courts should apply a much more deferential standard of review. The threat of searching review would likely create as a powerful incentive for legislators to adopt neutral processes for redistricting, allowing a reviewing court to focus not on the substantive political outcomes, but on ensuring that the processes are free from incumbent influence - a role for which courts are institutionally well suited.
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Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?
Matthew Stephenson
Yale Law Journal, January 2013, Pages 940-979
Abstract:
It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to confirm the President's nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary, that when the President nominates an individual to a principal executive branch position, the Senate's failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be construed as providing the Senate's tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text, structure, or history. The Essay further argues that, at least under some circumstances, reading the Constitution to construe Senate inaction as implied consent to an appointment would have desirable consequences in light of deteriorating norms of Senate collegiality and of prompt action on presidential nominations.
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Entelechy and Irony in Political Time: The Preemptive Rhetoric of Nixon and Obama
Michael Steudeman
Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Spring 2013, Pages 59-96
Abstract:
This essay makes two key arguments. The first is that preemptive politics often rely on strategies of rhetorical irony to cultivate perceptions of reasonableness, humility, and dialectical transcendence. As such, I expand the rhetorical conception of Stephen Skowronek's "political time" thesis to reveal its dimensions as a Burkean "ironic development." The second argument is that Barack Obama's rhetorical strategy more directly fits the typology of preemptive presidents than that of reconstructive presidents, making him far more comparable in "political time" with Richard Nixon than with Ronald Reagan. I proceed to analyze the two presidential candidates' rhetoric in their first winning campaigns for the presidency to discern the extent of these parallels and reveal the applicability of an ironist political style in preemptive electoral situations. The essay concludes by examining the trajectory of liberalism in political time and the implications of this analysis for preemptive "wild cards" in presidential rhetoric.
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What's at Stake? A Veto-Player Theory of Voter Turnout
Ryan Carlin & Gregory Love
Electoral Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Turnout is theorized to reflect elections' policy stakes. All else equal, a highly constrained policymaking context is expected to lower the potential policy stakes of a given election. This study tests if such contexts, which are characterized by multiple veto players, reduce electoral participation. According to time-series cross-sectional autoregressive dynamic lag models of turnout in 311 elections in 21 advanced industrialized democracies, additional veto players decrease turnout in both the short and long run. Moreover, the results suggest veto players conceptually fine-tune and empirically contribute to existing models of cross-national turnout. Hence this study has crucial implications for the students of electoral participation and scholars interested in the democratic outcomes of institutional design.
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Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection
Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini
Journal of the European Economic Association, April 2013, Pages 369-398
Abstract:
The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians' pay may change their mind. Second, if the re-election prospects of incumbents depend on their in-office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi-experimental setup. In Italy, the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase: 5,000 inhabitants. Exploiting the existence of a two-term limit, we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our results show that a higher wage attracts more-educated candidates, and that better-paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency. Importantly, most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than by the incentive to be re-elected.
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Political Homophily and Collaboration in Regional Planning Networks
Elisabeth Gerber, Adam Douglas Henry & Mark Lubell
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study the extent of political homophily - the tendency to form connections with others who are politically similar - in local governments' decisions to participate in an important form of intergovernmental collaboration: regional planning networks. Using data from a recent survey of California planners and government officials, we develop and test hypotheses about the factors that lead local governments to collaborate within regional planning networks. We find that local governments whose constituents are similar politically, in terms of partisanship and voting behavior, are more likely to collaborate with one another in regional planning efforts than those whose constituents are politically diverse. We conclude that political homophily reduces the transaction costs associated with institutional collective action, even in settings where we expect political considerations to be minimal.
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Eliciting Information from a Large Population
Kohei Kawamura
Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences. The population distribution of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated, based on answers from the respondents. The decision maker cannot identify the true distribution of preferences even if the sample size becomes arbitrarily large, since the respondents have incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences especially as the sample size becomes larger and each respondent has weaker influence on the decision. The quality of communication with each respondent may improve as the sample size becomes smaller, and thus we identify the trade-off between the quality and quantity of communication. We show that the decision maker may prefer to sample a smaller number of individuals when the prior is weaker.
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Precontextualization and the rhetoric of futurity: Foretelling Colin Powell's UN address on NBC News
John Oddo
Discourse & Communication, February 2013, Pages 25-53
Abstract:
This article examines precontextualization: the rhetorical act of previewing and contextualizing a future discursive event. I examine how an NBC News broadcast selected verbal-visual representations of the past in order to enact a context for an upcoming discourse moment: Colin Powell's 2003 United Nations (UN) address. The article draws on appraisal analysis (Martin and White, 2005), multimodal video analysis (Baldry and Thibault, 2005) and scholarship on the rhetoric of futurity (e.g. Dunmire, 2011). I show that the NBC journalists who precontextualized Powell's address on the night before its delivery presented viewers with a supportive context for understanding Powell's argument. By representing Saddam Hussein as deceptive and even deserving of future violence, the journalists essentially pre-confirmed arguments that Powell employed the next day. More importantly, because the news representations were presented as factual, they allowed viewers little space to consider alternative viewpoints - and little reason to question or resist the seemingly inexorable push for war.
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To Whom Do People Think Representatives Should Respond: Their District or the Country?
David Doherty
Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 2013, Pages 237-255
Abstract:
Representatives face clear incentives to respond to district preferences. I report findings from a series of experiments that examine whether the public understands these incentives and rewards representatives who respond to them. The findings show that although many people say they want legislators to prioritize national preferences, when evaluating instances of legislators' behavior they recognize the institutionally prescribed incentives representatives face and reward legislators who prioritize their districts. I also find that, to the extent that people hold their own legislators to unique standards, these differences are not the product of an expectation that one's own representative prioritize the district while others prioritize the country. Instead, the differences suggest that people understand that their own legislator is accountable to them, personally, whereas other representatives are not. The findings offer novel insight into the standards people hold representatives to and challenge the notion that people want legislators to reject institutional incentives.
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Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S. Senate
Steven Smith, Ian Ostrander & Christopher Pope
Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 2013, Pages 205-236
Abstract:
While the metaphor of House parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the Senate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the Senate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agenda control or special party influence? Using an analysis of individual Senators' behavior on thousands of votes and an assessment of interest group scores, we find that motions to table do not elicit higher party influence or provide much political cover. A desire to speed up the legislative process, rather than to insulate members from electoral scrutiny, seems to motivate the use of motions to table.