Taking sides
Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics
John Bullock et al.
NBER Working Paper, May 2013
Abstract:
Partisanship seems to affect factual beliefs about politics. For example, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say that the deficit rose during the Clinton administration; Democrats are more likely to say that inflation rose under Reagan. We investigate whether such patterns reflect differing beliefs among partisans or instead reflect a desire to praise one party or criticize another. We develop a model of partisan survey response and report two experiments that are based on the model. The experiments show that small payments for correct and "don't know" responses sharply diminish the gap between Democrats and Republicans in responses to "partisan" factual questions. The results suggest that the apparent differences in factual beliefs between members of different parties may be more illusory than real.
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Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem
Jens Großer & Thomas Palfrey
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study a citizen-candidate-entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively "extreme" citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more "moderate" types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates. We show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office. Moreover, when the number of citizens goes to infinity, only the very most extreme citizens, with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space, become candidates. Finally, our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates' types that is revealed via parties.
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You May Think You're Right ... Young Adults Are More Liberal Than They Realize
Ethan Zell & Michael Bernstein
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do people have biased perceptions of their political orientation? Based on the link between political conservatism and in-group loyalty, we predicted that people would underestimate their liberalism and that this effect would be more pronounced among political conservatives. Young adults indicated their self-perceived political orientation and completed an objective measure of political orientation, which placed them along a liberal-conservative continuum by comparing their attitudes on 12 core issues (e.g., gay marriage, welfare) to population norms. Participants showed a significant bias toward perceiving themselves as more conservative than they actually were, and this effect was more pronounced among independents and conservatives than liberals. Further, biased self-perceptions of political orientation predicted voting behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election after controlling for objective political orientation scores. Discussion highlights theoretical implications for self-knowledge research and practical implications for American politics more broadly.
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Who Heeds the Call of the Party in Congress?
William Minozzi & Craig Volden
Journal of Politics, July 2013, Pages 787-802
Abstract:
When party leaders seek support, who heeds the call and who remains unswayed? The canonical error-free spatial model of voting predicts the targeting of fence-sitting moderates. In contrast, we advance a random-utility-based model of party calls, wherein legislators who benefit the most from a common party position respond to the call of party leaders. This model predicts that extremists will heed the call of the party more than moderates, even upon controlling for baseline rates of voting with the party. To test this prediction, we develop a new method to identify "party-influenced votes," to generate estimates of "party-free ideal points," and to examine rates of responsiveness to political parties across members in the House of Representatives between 1973 and 2006. We find that, contrary to common portrayals of party influence, those most responsive to their parties are not the chamber moderates. Rather, responsiveness is greatest for ideological extremists in both the majority and minority parties, declining significantly among more moderate members. This finding sets the stage for new theoretical and empirical work on the role of parties in Congress.
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Of two minds: The interactive effect of construal level and identity on political polarization
Jamie Luguri & Jaime Napier
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, November 2013, Pages 972-977
Abstract:
Construal level theory posits that that when people are thinking abstractly (vs. concretely) they rely more on their core and consistent attitudes and values. However, past research has been mixed on whether abstract thinking causes liberals and conservatives to become more or less polarized. In the current research, we examine how identity salience moderates the effect of construal level on political polarization. Results from two studies suggest that identity salience (political vs. national) plays a key role in predicting how construal level affects attitude polarization. When people's political identity was made salient, liberals and conservatives were more polarized about political issues when thinking abstractly (vs. concretely). Conversely, when national identity was salient, liberals and conservatives were less polarized when in an abstract (vs. concrete) mindset. Broadly, this research highlights the importance identity salience has in understanding the role abstract (vs. concrete) thinking has on people's attitudes and values.
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Life in the Bubble: Examining the forwarding of political videos
Bradley Okdie, Daniel Rempala & Kilian Garvey
Computers in Human Behavior, November 2013, Pages 2425-2430
Abstract:
We examined whether participants' political beliefs significantly predicted likelihood of forwarding political videos and the characteristics of the targets of these forwards. Participants viewed one of four political advertisements that varied in terms of the candidate's political party (Democrat or Republican) and the emotion that the advertisement evoked (Positive or Negative). Democrats were more likely to forward advertisements when they experienced positive emotional arousal, and the targets of the forwards were not especially similar to Democrat participants in terms of political orientation or personality. Conversely, Republicans were more likely to forward advertisements when they experienced negative emotional arousal, and the targets of the forwards were highly similar to the Republican participants in terms of political orientation and personality. This is consistent with previous research (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) indicating that conservatism is associated with greater negative affect sensitivity and insularity in communication.
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Michele Roccato, Alessio Vieno & Silvia Russo
European Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Using a multilevel, longitudinal model, we tested the mugging thesis, which states that ‘a conservative is a liberal who has been mugged', in a national sample of Italians (N = 457, nested in 54 counties) surveyed four times between October 2002 and January 2007. We predicted participants' increase in conservatism as a function of the cross-level interactions between criminal victimisation on the one hand and the unemployment and the crime rates for their areas of residence on the other. Conservatism increased among victimised participants living in areas characterised by high unemployment rates, but not among those living in areas with low unemployment rates. The cross-level interaction between victimisation and crime rate did not influence our dependent variable. The strengths, implications and limitations of this research are discussed.
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Proposition 14 and California's Minor Parties: A Case Study of Electoral Reform and Party Response
Keith Smith
California Journal of Politics and Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
In 2010, California voters enacted Proposition 14, the Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act, which changed California's electoral system from single-member, plurality district elections to a top two (majority) runoff system. Although literature in comparative politics and formal theory suggests this change should help third parties in California, almost 80% fewer minor-party candidates filed for office in 2012 than in 2010. Indeed, 2012 saw the smallest number of minor-party candidates in California since 1966. Employing a mixed-methods approach, this paper examines different explanations for the decline in minor-party candidacies. Although most observers argue that Proposition 14 directly discouraged minor-party candidates from filing for office (because they likely would not make the runoff ballot), I argue that the decline results from three other factors: (1) a long-run decline in the California Libertarian Party, (2) a legislature-driven increase in the filing fee required from minor-party candidates, and, most importantly, (3) party elites foregoing candidate recruitment in 2012.
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Doron Shultziner
Political Analysis, Summer 2013, Pages 350-367
Abstract:
This article offers a new explanation for the results of twin studies in political science that supposedly disclose a genetic basis for political traits. I argue that identical twins tend to be more alike than nonidentical twins because the former are more similarly affected by the same environmental conditions, but the content of those greater trait similarities is nevertheless completely malleable and determined by particular environments. The twin studies method thus can neither prove nor refute the argument for a genetic basis of political traits such as liberal and conservative preferences or voting turnout. The meaning of heritability estimates results in twin studies are discussed, as well as the definition and function of the environment in the political science twin studies. The premature attempts to associate political traits with specific genes despite countertrends in genetics are also examined. I conclude by proposing that the alternative explanation of this article may explain certain puzzles in behavioral genetics, particularly why social and political traits have higher heritability estimates than common physical and medical traits. I map the main point of disagreements with the methodology and the interpretation of its results, and delineate the main operative implications for future research.
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A Generational Model of Political Learning
Larry Bartels & Simon Jackman
Electoral Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
We propose a mathematical framework for modeling opinion change using large-scale longitudinal data sets. Our framework encompasses two varieties of Bayesian learning theory as well as Mannheim's theory of generational responses to political events. The basic assumptions underlying the model are (1) that historical periods are characterized by shocks to existing political opinions, and (2) that individuals of different ages may attach different weights to those political shocks. Political generations emerge endogenously from these basic assumptions: the political views of identifiable birth cohorts differ, and evolve distinctively through time, due to the interaction of age-specific weights with period-specific shocks. We employ this model to examine generational changes in party identification using survey data from the 1952-2008 American National Election Studies.
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Beliefs About the Malleability of Immoral Groups Facilitate Collective Action
Smadar Cohen-Chen et al.
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although negative out-group beliefs typically foster individuals' motivation for collective action, we propose that such beliefs may diminish this motivation when people believe that this out-group cannot change in its very essence. Specifically, we tested the idea that believing in the malleability of immoral out-groups (i.e., targets of collective action) should increase collective action tendencies through group efficacy beliefs. Study 1 revealed that the more strongly participants believed that immoral out-groups could change as a function of contextual influences, the stronger their collective action tendencies were due to increased group efficacy. In Study 2, we experimentally replicated these findings using a manipulation of individuals' beliefs about immoral out-groups being potentially malleable (vs. fixed). We discuss implications of our findings with an eye on the literature on collective action and implicit beliefs and on the promotion of civic engagement more broadly.
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Race, Ideology, and the Tea Party: A Longitudinal Study
Eric Knowles et al.
PLoS ONE, June 2013
Abstract:
The Tea Party movement, which rose to prominence in the United States after the election of President Barack Obama, provides an ideal context in which to examine the roles of racial concerns and ideology in politics. A three-wave longitudinal study tracked changes in White Americans' self-identification with the Tea Party, racial concerns (prejudice and racial identification), and ideologies (libertarianism and social conservatism) over nine months. Latent Growth Modeling (LGM) was used to evaluate potential causal relationships between Tea Party identification and these factors. Across time points, racial prejudice was indirectly associated with movement identification through Whites' assertions of national decline. Although initial levels of White identity did not predict change in Tea Party identification, initial levels of Tea Party identification predicted increases in White identity over the study period. Across the three assessments, support for the Tea Party fell among libertarians, but rose among social conservatives. Results are discussed in terms of legitimation theories of prejudice, the "racializing" power of political judgments, and the ideological dynamics of the Tea Party.
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John McTague & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz
Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 2013, Pages 405-430
Abstract:
Partisan polarization in the Senate is in part a product of the increased sorting of evangelical Christians into the Republican caucus. The relationship between senators' religious identities, party affiliation, and ideology has changed since the 1970s. Whereas congressional party caucuses in the past were more diverse in their religious composition, evangelical Christian senators have sorted themselves into the party that most closely resembles the values of their religious identities, leading to greater overall polarization.
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Candidate positioning and responsiveness to constituent opinion in the U.S. House of Representatives
Michael Peress
Public Choice, July 2013, Pages 77-94
Abstract:
In this paper, I develop a survey-based measure of district ideology for the House of Representatives. I use this index to document and study ways in which patterns of candidate positioning depart from perfect representation. These findings help distinguish between competing theories of candidate positioning. My findings present evidence against theories that attribute divergence to the preferences of voters and the locations of primary constituencies. My findings are potentially consistent with the policy-motivation and resource theories, which attribute divergence to the polarization of political elites.
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The Uncertainty Paradox: Perceived Threat Moderates the Effect of Uncertainty on Political Tolerance
Ingrid Johnsen Haas & William Cunningham
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
People respond to dissimilar political beliefs in a variety of ways, ranging from openness and acceptance to closed-mindedness and intolerance. While there is reason to believe that uncertainty may influence political tolerance, the direction of this influence remains unclear. We propose that threat moderates the effect of uncertainty on tolerance; when safe, uncertainty leads to greater tolerance, yet when threatened, uncertainty leads to reduced tolerance. Using independent manipulations of threat and uncertainty, we provide support for this hypothesis. This research demonstrates that, although feelings of threat and uncertainty can be independent, it is also important to understand their interaction.
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Weak > Strong: The Ironic Effect of Argument Strength on Supportive Advocacy
Omair Akhtar, David Paunesku & Zakary Tormala
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
When people seek support for a cause, they typically present the strongest case they can muster. The present research suggests that under some conditions, the opposite strategy may be superior - in particular, presenting weak rather than strong arguments might stimulate greater advocacy and action. Across four studies, we show that when individuals already agree with a cause (i.e., it is pro-attitudinal), receiving weak arguments in its favor can prompt them into advocating more on its behalf. Perceived argumentation efficacy mediates this effect such that people exposed to weak arguments are more likely to think they have something valuable to contribute. Moreover, consistent with the notion that it is driven by feelings of increased efficacy, the effect is more likely to emerge when initial argumentation efficacy and attitude certainty are moderate or low. Individuals with high argumentation efficacy and high certainty generally advocate more, regardless of the strength of arguments received.
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Kelly Garrett, Erik Nisbet & Emily Lynch
Journal of Communication, forthcoming
Abstract:
Media-based fact checking contributes to more accurate political knowledge, but its corrective effects are limited. We argue that biographical information included in a corrective message, which is often unrelated to the inaccurate claim itself, can activate misperception-congruent naïve theories, increasing confidence in a misperception's plausibility and inducing skepticism toward denials. Resistance to corrections occurs regardless of initial belief accuracy, but the effect is strongest among those who find the contextual information objectionable or threatening. We test these claims using an online survey-embedded experiment (N = 750) conducted in the wake of the controversy over the proposed Islamic cultural center in New York City near the site of the 9/11 attacks, and find support for our predictions. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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The Declining Representativeness of the British Party System, and Why It Matters
Heinz Brandenburg & Robert Johns
Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
In a recent article, Michael Laver has explained ‘Why Vote-Seeking Parties May Make Voters Miserable'. His model shows that, while ideological convergence may boost congruence between governments and the median voter, it can reduce congruence between the party system and the electorate as a whole. Specifically, convergence can increase the mean distance between voters and their nearest party. In this article we show that this captures the reality of today's British party system. Policy scale placements in British Election Studies from 1987 to 2010 confirm that the pronounced convergence during the past decade has left the Conservatives and Labour closer together than would be optimal in terms of minimising the policy distance between the average voter and the nearest major party. We go on to demonstrate that this comes at a cost. Respondents who perceive themselves as further away from one of the major parties in the system tend to score lower on satisfaction with democracy. In short, vote-seeking parties have left the British party system less representative of the ideological diversity in the electorate, and thus made at least some British voters miserable.
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‘To the left, to the right': Representing Conservative women's interests
Rosie Campbell & Sarah Childs
Party Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
The study of Conservative women is expanding to compensate for the historic over-emphasis of gender and politics research on left-wing women. We add to this burgeoning literature and assess the extent to which the modern gender gap in political attitudes - where women have moved to the left of men - is evident among supporters of the British Conservative Party. We find that, like women party members, women Conservative supporters are noticeably to the left of men, but only on economic issues. This sex gap cannot simply be accounted for by women's employment in the public sphere, lesser interest in politics or because they are more morally conservative than male Conservatives. These findings are likely to have serious implications for intra-party discipline, the support for the Conservative Party at the next British general election and, if replicated elsewhere, speak to what it means to ‘represent' the interests of right-wing women.
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Speaking (Un-)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as a Generalised Political Attitude
Roland Imhoff & Martin Bruder
European Journal of Personality, forthcoming
Abstract:
Conspiracy theories explain complex world events with reference to secret plots hatched by powerful groups. Belief in such theories is largely determined by a general propensity towards conspirational thinking. Such a conspiracy mentality can be understood as a generalised political attitude, distinct from established generalised political attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Study 1a, N = 497) that is temporally relatively stable (Study 1b and 1c, total N = 196). Three further studies (combined N = 854) show that in contrast to RWA and SDO, conspiracy mentality is related to prejudice against high-power groups that are perceived as less likeable and more threatening than low-power groups, whereas SDO and RWA are associated with an opposite reaction to perceptions of power. Study 5 (N = 1852) investigates the relationship of conspiracy mentality with political behavioural intentions in a specific catastrophic scenario (i.e. the damage to the Fukushima nuclear reactor after the 2011 tsunami in Japan) revealing a hitherto neglected role of conspiracy mentality in motivating social action aimed at changing the status quo.