Sovereigns
Tilly Goes to Church: The Religious and Medieval Roots of European State Fragmentation
Anna Grzymala-Busse
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
The starting point for many analyses of European state development is the historical fragmentation of territorial authority. The dominant bellicist explanation for state formation argues that this fragmentation was an unintended consequence of imperial collapse, and that warfare in the early modern era overcame fragmentation by winnowing out small polities and consolidating strong states. Using new data on papal conflict and religious institutions, I show instead that political fragmentation was the outcome of deliberate choices, that it is closely associated with papal conflict, and that political fragmentation persisted for longer than the bellicist explanations would predict. The medieval Catholic Church deliberately and effectively splintered political power in Europe by forming temporal alliances, funding proxy wars, launching crusades, and advancing ideology to ensure its autonomy and power. The roots of European state formation are thus more religious, older, and intentional than often assumed.
Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies
Gabriele Gratton & Barton Lee
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long -- including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.
Endogenous Political Legitimacy: The Tudor Roots of England’s Constitutional Governance
Avner Greif & Jared Rubin
Stanford Working Paper, January 2023
Abstract:
This paper highlights the importance of endogenous changes in the foundations of legitimacy for political regimes. Specifically, it highlights the central role of legitimacy changes in the rise of constitutional monarchy in England. It first highlights the limitations of the consensus view regarding this transition, which claims that Parliament’s military power enabled it to force constitutional monarchy on the Crown after 1688. It then turns to define legitimacy and briefly elaborates a theoretical framework enabling a historical study of this unobservable variable. The third and primary section substantiates that the low-legitimacy, post-Reformation Tudor monarchs of the 16th century promoted Parliament to enhance their legitimacy, thereby changing the legislative process from the Crown-and-Parliament to the Crown-in-Parliament that still prevails in England.
State history and political instability: The disadvantage of early state development
Trung Vu
Kyklos, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article hypothesizes and empirically establishes that statehood experience, accumulated over a period of up to six millennia, lies at the deep roots of the spatial distribution of political instability across non-European countries. Using the state history index measured between 3,500 BCE and 2000 CE, I consistently obtain precise estimates that long-standing states outside Europe, relative to their newly established counterparts, are characterized by greater political uncertainty. I postulate that a very long duration of state experience impeded the transplantation of inclusive political institutions by European colonizers, which would eventually become central to shaping countries' ability to establish politically stable regimes outside Europe. The core findings place emphasis on the long-term legacy of early state development for contemporary political instability.
When Strength Becomes Weakness: Precolonial State Development, Monopoly on Violence, and Civil War
Casper Sakstrup
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does the legacy of precolonial statehood affect contemporary levels of civil conflict outside Europe? I argue that places with higher levels of precolonial state development were more likely to end up as weak modern-day states because precolonial state structures and authority structures established by European colonizers came to exist in parallel. This created opportunities and motivation for civil conflict still present in many countries today. I illustrate the argument in the cases of India, Burma, and Ethiopia and test it statistically in a global sample covering 109 countries outside Europe. The results strongly support the theory. Countries with higher levels of state development 3500 BCE–1500 CE have weaker state monopolies on violence and markedly higher levels of intrastate armed conflict in modern times (1946–2018). The findings remain robust across numerous alternative specifications, including using the timing of the Neolithic Revolution as an instrument.
Short and long run democracy diffusion
Thorsten Janus
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does democracy diffuse across borders? If so, how long does it take? Can diffusion cause path dependence, such that if a region is initially democratic (or autocratic), it becomes increasingly so? In this paper I estimate short and long run regional democratic diffusion and account for feedback to and from other countries within the region. Although it is difficult to establish causality, I estimate that when regional democracy in year (t-1) increases, domestic democracy receives or “catches” 40–42% of the increase in the next 5 years, 55–61% in 10 years, and 68–85% in the long run prior to accounting for feedback. When I account for feedback, the average region converges to a unique long-run democracy level regardless of how democratic it is initially. I also provide region-specific and contiguous neighbor estimates, use the model to explain democratization waves, and estimate the alternative V-DEM dataset. In the V-DEM data, democracy diffuses much faster, although the long-run diffusion effects are comparable.
The Global Resonance of Human Rights: What Google Trends Can Tell Us
Geoff Dancy & Christopher Fariss
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Where is the human rights discourse most resonant? We use aggregated cross-national Google search data to test two divergent accounts of why human rights appeal to some populations but not others. The top-down model predicts that nationwide interest in human rights is attributable mainly to external factors such as foreign direct investment, transnational NGO campaigns, or international legalization, whereas the bottom-up model highlights the importance of internal factors such as economic growth and persistent repression. We find more evidence for the latter model: not only is interest in human rights more concentrated in the Global South, but the discourse is also most resonant where people face regular state violence. In drawing these inferences, this article confronts high-level debates over whether human rights will remain relevant in the future, and whether the discourse still animates counter-hegemonic modes of resistance. The answer to both questions, our research suggests, is “yes.”
Message or Messenger? Source and Labeling Effects in Authoritarian Response to Protest
Daniel Arnon, Pearce Edwards & Handi Li
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Authoritarian regimes in the 21st century have increasingly turned to using information control rather than kinetic force to respond to threats to their rule. This paper studies an often overlooked type of information control: strategic labeling and public statements by regime sources in response to protests. Labeling protesters as violent criminals may increase support for repression by signaling that protests are illegitimate and deviant. Regime sources, compared to more independent sources, could increase support for repression even more when paired with such an accusatory label. Accommodative labels should have opposing effects -- decreasing support for repression. The argument is tested with a survey experiment in China which labels environmental protests. Accusatory labels increase support for repression of protests. Regime sources, meanwhile, have no advantage over non-governmental sources in shifting opinion. The findings suggest that negative labels de-legitimize protesters and legitimize repression while the sources matter less in this contentious authoritarian context.
War and Nationalism: How WW1 Battle Deaths Fueled Civilians’ Support for the Nazi Party
Alexander De Juan et al.
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can wars breed nationalism? We argue that civilians’ indirect exposure to war fatalities can trigger psychological processes that increase identification with their nation and ultimately strengthen support for nationalist parties. We test this argument in the context of the rise of the Nazi Party after World War 1 (WW1). To measure localized war exposure, we machine-coded information on 7.5 million German soldiers who were wounded or died in WW1. Our empirical strategy leverages battlefield dynamics that cause plausibly exogenous variation in the county-level casualty fatality rate -- the share of dead soldiers among all casualties. We find that throughout the interwar period, electoral support for right-wing nationalist parties, including the Nazi Party, was 2.6 percentage points higher in counties with above-median casualty fatality rates. Consistent with our proposed mechanism, we find that this effect was driven by civilians rather than veterans and areas with a preexisting tradition of collective war commemoration.
Spoils of War: The Political Legacy of the German hyperinflation
Gregori Galofré-Vilà
Explorations in Economic History, April 2023
Abstract:
I study the link between monetary policy and electoral outcomes by linking new data on the 1923 German hyperinflation and the vote share of the main parties of Weimar Republic from 1924 to 1933. Exploiting cross-sectional variation in prices in over 280 cities, I find that inflation predicts the vote share of the Volksrechtspartei, an association-turned-party of inflation victims, and positively correlates with the Communists in the 1932 elections. Hyperinflation also leads to a decline in turnout, with a loss of confidence in the German institutions. However, contrary to received wisdom, areas more affected by inflation did not see a higher vote share for the Nazi party. Results are robust to a range of specifications, including models in differences, panel data with fixed effects, Coarsened Exact Matching estimation, Conley standard errors, and an instrumental variable strategy.