Someone Will Fix It
When lack of control leads to uncertainty: Explaining the effect of anomie on support for authoritarianism
Jasper Neerdaels et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Studies have shown that anomie, that is, the perception that a society's leadership and social fabric are breaking down, is a central predictor of individuals' support for authoritarianism. However, causal evidence for this relationship is missing. Moreover, previous studies are ambiguous regarding the mediating mechanism and lack empirical tests for the same. Against this background, we derive a set of integrative hypotheses: First, we argue that perceptions of anomie lead to a perceived lack of political control. The repeated failure to exert control in the political sphere leads to feelings of uncertainty about the functioning and meaning of the political world. This uncertainty heightens people's susceptibility to authoritarianism because, we argue, the latter promises a sense of order, meaning, and the guidance of a "strong leader." We support our hypothesis in a large-scale field study with a representative sample of the German population (N = 1,504) while statistically ruling out alternative explanations. Adding internal validity, we provide causal evidence for each path in our sequential mediation hypothesis in three preregistered, controlled experiments (conducted in the United States, total N = 846). Our insights may support policymakers in addressing the negative political consequences of anomie.
Killing as Capital: Perverse Effects of Truce Negotiations on Gang Violence in El Salvador
Cree Jones & Preston Lloyd
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, March 2025, Pages 90-113
Abstract:
In March 2012, the government of El Salvador brokered a truce between MS-13 and Barrio 18, the two largest and most notorious gangs in El Salvador. The truce was designed to decrease homicides in exchange for more lenient treatment of incarcerated gang leaders. Despite early, promising results, the truce was short-lived. From May 2013 to February 2015, the government walked back its concessions under the truce. Homicides increased steadily during the rescission period and exponentially in the wake of full revocation. Economic theory suggests negotiating with gangs may achieve short-term gains, but may also cause long-term losses, particularly when the government reneges: once negotiations are on the table, gangs may use killing to increase their political capital and induce the government to re-enter negotiations and make greater concessions. Using Salvadoran crime data, we deploy a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of the truce on homicides. We estimate the truce resulted in 1130 fewer homicides during its implementation and 551 fewer homicides during its piecemeal revocation. However, we also estimate 2250 more homicides occurred after full revocation, a perverse net effect of 569 more lives lost compared to what would have happened had the truce not been negotiated. These findings demonstrate negotiating with gangs may be an effective means to curb gang violence, but, if negotiations result in an unstable truce, they also introduce a perverse incentive structure that may result in long-term harms that exceed short-term gains.
The Importance of a Liberal Power's Attention to Democratic Elections Around the World: How the US Electoral Cycle Affects Elections Globally
Johannes Bubeck et al.
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We build on the concept of attention costs in international affairs: when the agenda of powerful states is crowded, other states can get away with behavior the powerful state would otherwise sanction. Our example focuses on the US as a liberal power promoting democratic elections. We use a game to demonstrate that greater attention costs by the 'supervising' liberal power result in more cheating by foreign incumbents. We utilize the US domestic election cycle to predict variation in attention costs. Because they need to focus on re-election, American policy-makers have less effort to devote to other policy objectives. We show that this is the case with a novel measure of attention to elections abroad. Finally, we construct an index of bias to show that Presidential elections in the US are associated with more biased elections abroad. We conclude by noting that international pressure may keep cheating incumbents in check.
The Power of Cabinet Appointments in Autocracies: Elite Cooptation and Anti-Regime Mass Uprisings
Berker Kavasoglu
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why are some autocratic regimes more prone to mass uprisings than others? This article argues that autocratic leaders can mitigate opposition mobilization by strategically appointing opposition leaders to cabinet positions. Drawing on yearly data from autocracies between 1966 and 2020, the article exploits temporal variations in the composition of cabinets and the onset of mass uprisings within autocratic regimes. The findings demonstrate that appointing opposition elites to cabinet positions significantly decreases the likelihood of anti-regime mass uprisings. The results are robust across alternative model specifications and estimation strategies addressing endogeneity concerns. By demonstrating why some autocracies with organized opposition avoid uprisings while others face repeated challenges, this study offers novel insights into how opposition cooptation stabilizes autocratic regimes.
When autocratization is reversed: Episodes of U-Turns since 1900
Marina Nord et al.
Democratization, forthcoming
Abstract:
The world is in a "wave of autocratization." Yet, recent events in Brazil, the Maldives, and Zambia demonstrate that autocratization can be halted and reversed. This article introduces "U-Turn" as a new type of regime transformation episode in which autocratization is closely followed by and linked to subsequent democratization. Drawing on earlier literature, it provides a general conceptualization and operationalization of this type of episode, complementing the existing Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) framework. The accompanying database provides descriptions for all 102 U-Turn episodes from 1900 to 2023, differentiating between three types: authoritarian manipulation, democratic reaction, and international intervention. The analysis presents a systematic empirical overview of patterns and developments of U-Turns. A key finding is that 52% of all autocratization episodes become U-Turns, which increases to 73% when focusing on the last 30 years. The vast majority of U-Turns (90%) lead to restored or even improved levels of democracy. The data on U-Turn episodes opens up new avenues for research on autocratization and democratization that were previously treated as isolated processes, particularly it could help us understand why some processes of autocratization trigger a successful pro-democratic backlash - a critical question during the starkest-ever wave of autocratization.
A Dynamic Model of Authoritarian Social Control
Roger Lagunoff
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Authoritarian regimes often use targeted social control -- unequal application of the law to limit expressive freedom and enforce social conformity. At the same time, their methods appear less draconian than in the past. In this model, an authority structures punishments and rewards to compel adherence to its preferred norm. The authority's commitment is time-limited and depends on imperfectly informative signals of a citizen's behaviour. Given two citizens with the same observed behaviour, the authority imposes harsher punishments on the poorer and/or ex ante dissident individual. Lighter punishments are imposed on the wealthier citizen to prevent "over-compliance". Wealth inequality increases over time. Some citizens become prosperous "lackeys" while others become destitute from confiscation. In stable regimes with high state capacity, the authority reduces punishments and/or increases rewards to allow citizens to accumulate wealth, leading to social conformity and balanced growth in the long run. In unstable regimes with low capacity, the citizenry splits into groups of wealthy lackeys and destitute proles.
Can Public Participation in Constitution-Making Curb Corruption?
Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew Young
Texas Tech University Working Paper, October 2024
Abstract:
We employ "doubly robust" event studies and matching methods to explore whether public participation in Constitution-making can curb political corruption moving forward. Measures of public participation are drawn from the Constitutionalism and Democracy Database (CDD) (Eisenstadt et al. 2015, 2017) while corruption measures come from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2023; Pemstein et al. 2023). We generally report statistically insignificant effects. When estimates of public participation on corruption are significant -- particularly for judicial corruption -- they evidence small effects.