Scale and Scope
Ideology and Support for Federalism in Theory -- And in Practice
James Glaser, Jeffrey Berry & Deborah Schildkraut
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Fall 2023, Pages 511-535
Abstract:
Conservatives are more likely than liberals to support the concept of federalism. In this article, we look at this support in the context of particular issues. Using multiple national surveys, including an original module on the 2020 Congressional Election Study, we find that conservatives are more likely to prefer a devolution of power to state and local jurisdictions, even if doing so might make it harder to achieve conservative policy aims, whereas liberals are more instrumental, more likely to prioritize policy aims and to support whichever level of government seems most likely to achieve them. We then examine reasons why conservatives might display a stronger adherence to the federalist structure of the American government. We find that the idea of “states’ rights” continues to loom large for self-identified conservatives, as does a generalized level of trust toward political units described as small versus large.
We Fly Congress: Market Actions as Corporate Political Activity in the U.S. Airline Industry
Min-Seok Pang, Russell Funk & Daniel Hirschman
Organization Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The literature on corporate political activity (CPA) generally views nonmarket actions aimed at influencing political actors (e.g., lobbying or campaign contributions) as related but separate activities from market actions. This study demonstrates how firms’ core market actions (e.g., market entry or geographic expansion) can function as CPA. We theorize two mechanisms through which firms leverage market actions as CPA: “pork” (i.e., ones that primarily benefit a politician’s constituents) and “perk” (i.e., ones that directly benefit the politician). We document these mechanisms through an empirical analysis of data from the U.S. airline industry in 1990–2019. Specifically, we find that airlines increase the supply of flights from the airports in the home district of the chair of the Transportation Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives (pork). We also find that the airlines increase the supply of nonstop flights to Washington, DC. from the Chair’s district (perk). We use counterfactual estimation methods and exogenous turnovers in committee leadership to provide causal evidence. Moreover, the observed increase in flight supplies is negatively associated with formal policy changes in Congress, and with text mining techniques, we find that this effect is stronger for bills related to aviation safety and security. We contribute to the literature on CPA by demonstrating a blurred boundary between market and nonmarket actions, which helps explain firms’ competitive actions that cannot be explained by market considerations alone.
The Expertise Paradox: How Policy Expertise Can Hinder Responsiveness
Miguel Pereira & Patrik Öhberg
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We argue that policy expertise constrains the ability of politicians to act on voter preferences. Representatives with more knowledge and experience in a given domain have more confidence in their own issue-specific positions. Enhanced confidence, in turn, may lead politicians to discount opinions they disagree with, producing a distorted image of the electorate. Two experiments with Swedish politicians support this argument. First, officials are more likely to dismiss appeals from voters in their areas of expertise and less likely to accept that opposing views may represent the majority opinion. Consistent with the proposed mechanism, in a second experiment we show that inducing perceptions of expertise increases self-confidence. The results suggest that representatives with more specialized knowledge in a given area may be less capable of acting as delegates in that domain. The study provides a novel explanation for variations in policy responsiveness.
From classical to progressive liberalism: Ideological development and the origins of the administrative state
David Robert Foster & Joseph Warren
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Early support for expert policymaking through administrative agencies was rooted in concerns over political power. In a context of formal universal male suffrage, late 19th-century liberals (typically well-educated, urban professionals) opposed policies to regulate business out of fear of working-class radicalism. Yet by the 1910s, liberals supported economic regulation -- through administrative agencies. We use a formal model to show how potential policy feedback effects made an anti-business coalition between liberals and populists unachievable, and how, by diminishing feedback effects, agencies facilitated a successful coalition to regulate business. Because administrative agencies guaranteed a central policymaking role for credentialed urban professionals, liberals could support farmers and industrial workers against big business while no longer fearing the rising power of their coalition partners. In this way, the strategic dilemma created by a changing distribution of power among social groups explains the development of broad political support for bureaucratic agencies.
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of Budget Expertise on State Fiscal Responsibility
Colin Emrich
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, October 2023, Pages 606–615
Abstract:
Do governmental institutions constrain state actors? I investigate this question by examining the relationship between the design of state legislative fiscal offices and the health of state budgets. These budgetary bodies serve a supporting role for legislatures, designed to advance sound fiscal policy and sustainable public finance. With an original data set encompassing all state legislative budgetary bodies from 1963 to 2014, I estimate the causal effects of nonpartisan fiscal offices on budget surpluses with a generalized difference-in-differences estimator. My results show that the presence of these fiscal offices within legislatures does not affect a state’s fiscal well-being. This result holds even when legislative fiscal offices are relatively empowered in the budget process, raising doubts about how state lawmakers use nonpartisan budgetary information in funding the government.
Corporate Political Activism and Information Transfers
Dane Christensen et al.
Accounting Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Prior research suggests that: (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process, but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intra-industry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intra-industry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment.
Hot town, corruption in the city: Assessing the impact of form of government on corruption using propensity scores
Whitney Afonso & Kimberly Nelson
Public Administration Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
This research explores the relationship between form of government and corruption using national municipal level data (1990–2020) using competing theoretical models; the principal–agent model and the professionalism–performance model. The principal–agent model suggests that the additional scrutiny provided by the electoral process will lead to a lower risk of corruption under the mayor–council form of government. The professionalism–performance model suggests that the professional training and incentives in place in the council–manager form will lead to a lower risk of corruption. However, it is difficult to examine the impact of the form of government on the incidence of corruption because there may be underlying community characteristics, such as population and poverty levels, that drive both the selection of form and corruption. Using propensity score matching and other propensity score methods to reduce the impact of confounding factors, this analysis finds robust evidence that the council–manager form reduces the risk of corruption, supporting the professionalism–performance model.
(Not so) powerful allies? Decision makers’ reactions to advantaged group allies in collective action
Lea Hartwich et al.
European Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do allies in collective action have a positive impact on political efficacy? Theoretical considerations and common sense might lead us to expect that advantaged group allies will be beneficial to the success of social movements. However, across five experimental studies, with samples from the United States and Germany (three pre-registered, total N = 696, 48% women, Mage = 38), we find that such involvement does not significantly affect authorities’ reactions to the demands of disadvantaged groups. Decision makers were given information about proposals supported either by only disadvantaged group members or by disadvantaged group members and advantaged group allies. Their support, budget allocations, voting intentions and perceptions of movements and proposals did not differ as a function of this information. However, collective actions including allies did reduce perceptions of intergroup conflict. These results were replicated across different contexts with student and local politicians and with participants acting as parliamentarians in fictional scenarios.
Political ideology of nonprofit organizations
Baran Han, Benjamin Ho & Zizhe Xia
Social Science Quarterly, forthcoming
Objective: This article provides a novel measure of nonprofit political ideology using semantic text analysis of public Internal Revenue Service filings. It explores the relationship between electoral competition and private donations.
Methods: Mission statements of over 150,000 U.S. nonprofits are matched to Congressional speeches to classify ideology on a political spectrum. The measure is validated against established ideology scores. Donation data are analyzed to examine if donors strategically countervail expected policy changes after elections.
Results: The proposed measure shows a significant correlation with other ideology metrics. Donations are found to move in sync with ideological shifts of the government rather than to countervail expected policy changes after elections.
Does Collective Citizen Input Impact Government Service Provision? Evidence from SeeClickFix Requests
Kaylyn Jackson Schiff
Public Administration Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does collective citizen input impact government priorities and performance in service provision? As cities increasingly offer interactive issue reporting options through online platforms and mobile apps, I investigate whether comments and follows on requests drive faster issue resolution. I theorize that this input signals issue validity, severity, or scrutiny, assisting city administrators in prioritizing and responding to requests. Leveraging a novel dataset of requests from 100 cities, I find that comments and follows double the probability of request closure and that collaborative requests are resolved up to five days faster on average than non-collaborative requests. By comparing two cities that use the same platform but that differ in the observability of citizen collaboration, I isolate a distinct and significant influence of collective citizen input on government responsiveness. The findings speak to how technological advances enable information-sharing from citizens that can shape service delivery rules and outcomes.