Running the Institution
Opportunities to govern: How to increase the supply of moderate and qualified candidates
Andrew Eggers et al.
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
The state of American politics would be improved, many argue, if more moderate and qualified people served in government. We investigate what draws such individuals to run, focusing on a dimension of politics that has received scant attention within the candidate-entry literature -- the ability of candidates, once elected, to exercise meaningful influence over policy. In a conjoint experiment, we find that the opportunity to wield greater authority differentially increases moderates' interest in seeking office, and that more qualified people express more interest in running for offices with greater authority, lower thresholds for passing legislation, and higher staff support. These findings have implications for political representation, government effectiveness, and the relationship between institutional reform and mass politics.
Ambition and Conflict in State Legislatures
Christian Fong & Michael Kistner
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many state legislators aspire to become members of Congress. We argue that this progressive ambition reduces bipartisanship in state legislatures. To test our theory, we identify elements of the political environment that make it more plausible for state legislators to win election to Congress and examine how these factors shape legislative behavior. Comparing across states, we find that there is more roll call polarization and less bipartisan cosponsorship in chambers with a low ratio of state legislative seats to the number of congressional seats. Comparing legislators within states, we find that legislators whose state legislative districts overlap with a winnable congressional district vote in more extreme ways and are less likely to collaborate on bills with members of the opposite party. These results highlight how national polarization can lead to partisan conflict in subnational arenas.
Do party leaders influence roll-call voting in Congress?
Anthony Fowler
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars typically assume that congressional party leaders whip their members and influence their voting behavior, but little evidence convincingly separates the effects of party leaders from the selection of members into parties. I find that a switch from a relatively moderate to a relatively extreme party leader causes rank-and-file members to cast more extreme roll-call votes (and vice versa). I further find that party leaders even influence the members who did not support their leadership bid, and rank-and-file members are less likely to cast partisan votes when there is no party leader. This study also sheds light on a historically anomalous period of Republican moderation, and it helps to explain the increase in congressional polarization over the past 50 years.
Executive Deference or Legislative Constraint? Senate Committees and the Exercise of Decentralized Authority over U.S. Executive Nominations
George Krause & Jason Byers
Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, July 2025, Pages 181-209
Abstract:
Despite the combination of strong parties and insecure majorities in U.S. legislative institutions, Senate committees play a vital role in confirmation politics. A theory of selective committee delay is proposed that predicts that ideologically-vulnerable Senate committees constitute a primary source of confirmation delay. Evidence supporting this logic is obtained from nearly 10,000 U.S. federal PAS executive nominations between the Reagan and Trump administrations. Unified (divided) partisan alignment between the Senate and president is associated with protracted (swifter) committee confirmation processes when committees' policy interests diverge from those of the presidents. These findings highlight how the confirmation process serves as both a decentralized and variable procedural constraint on the executive branch appointment process within a separation of powers framework. More broadly, presidential nominee selection choices must account for the relative ideological positions of Senate committees, and that chamber-oriented rule changes to the confirmation process are unlikely to affect confirmation delay.
Term limits and corruption: Evidence from U.S. states
Yacov Tsur
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2026
Abstract:
Term limits exert two opposing effects on political corruption: they increase the incidence (frequency) while reducing the magnitude (average cost) of corrupt acts. Higher incidence arises from weakened electoral accountability during lame-duck and penultimate terms. Lower magnitude results from shorter tenures that impede the formation of extensive corrupt networks. Using cross-state variation in U.S. gubernatorial term-limit regimes, the analysis reveals that penultimate-term effects can raise the incidence of corruption by 28 %, yet concurrent reductions in magnitude more than offset this increase. Building on the well-established negative association between economic growth and corruption, the analysis employs observed state-level growth as a proxy for the aggregate impact of corruption. The findings indicate that stricter term limits are associated with lower overall corruption, underscoring the potential role of term limits as an institutional safeguard against political corruption.
Congressional Earmarks and Credit Claiming in a Partisan Era
James Curry & Steven Sylvester
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
In 2021, congressional Democrats brought back earmarks. Proponents of earmarks argue that they can help members of Congress in their quest for reelection by giving them crucial credit claiming fodder, and as a result can help build support for legislation by adding particularistic benefits to legislative packages. Earlier research provides some support for these arguments, but changes to American politics over the last few decades call into question whether past research on the electoral benefits of earmarks holds today. This paper presents the results of two original survey experiments that seek to test the electoral benefits of earmarks. Our results suggest that earmarks have only a limited impact on public attitudes toward lawmakers. In particular, credit claiming around earmarks only appears to improve the support among political independents, and some cross-partisan voters. However, taking an anti-earmark stance seems most helpful in winning the approval of self-identifying Republicans.
Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity, and Gender Solidarity
Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain & Catherine Wineinger
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We show that women in Congress are significantly more likely to donate to female candidates than similar men are. Donors follow up their money with other forms of assistance, such as serving as mentors and cosponsoring the recipient's legislation. We find that the beneficiaries of this largesse reciprocate by cosponsoring their benefactors' legislation. This implies that the well-observed pattern that women in Congress tend to cosponsor one another's legislation arises in part from reciprocal obligations women have to repay the women who helped them early in their careers. Gendered networks of collaboration begin to take form even before women are elected to the institution.
Does Military Service Matter? How Veteran Status Motivates Legislative Collaboration, Success, & Effectiveness in the U.S. Senate
Carlos Algara & Jared Stefani
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
In what respects does military service matter in the legislative behavior observed in the U.S. Senate? While scholars long posit that the personal backgrounds of political elites shape the legislative behavior of U.S. Senators, relatively little is known to what extent military service influences legislative collaboration and effectiveness. We argue that pre-legislative military service, an intensive personal and professional experience, socializes potential legislators to be effective lawmakers by providing them with critical leadership skills, and a sense of collaboration, needed to work constructively towards legislative ends. Drawing on original data capturing the military background of U.S. Senators from the 93rd to 115th Congresses (1973-2018), we find strong evidence that veteran Senators collaborate more on proposed legislation than non-veterans, particularly in bipartisan pairs across differing policy issues. Secondly, we find legislation with more veteran sponsors make it further in the legislative process from being reported out of committee to ultimately becoming law. Considering these findings, we test our theoretical mechanism and find evidence that military service is correlated with more effective and legislatively productive Senators. Taken together, we show that pre-senatorial careers in public service shape collaboration and effectiveness in the contemporary U.S. Senate.
Thin Populist Appeals and Democratic Backsliding Through Candidate Legitimization and Elite Delegitimization
Paul Lendway
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do thin populist appeals from elites increase support for democratic backsliding at the individual level and, if so, how? Using a set of four national survey experiments in the U.S. (N = 3,731), this paper tests prior arguments that populist appeals from elites increase mass support for democratic backsliding and the legitimacy mechanisms through which scholars have posited that this occurs. Study One replicates prior research finding that populist appeals from elites increase support for violating democratic principles. Study Two reproduces this result while also finding evidence for two mechanisms postulated in the literature: candidate legitimization and elite delegitimization. Based on these results, Studies Three and Four are pre-registered studies that assess if populist appeals from elites increase public support for democratic backsliding through the candidate legitimization and elite delegitimization mechanisms. The results suggest people-centrism increases candidate legitimacy and electability. However, anti-elitism increases elite delegitimization and support for violating democratic principles. Therefore, the unique components of populist appeals appear to work in unique yet complementary ways to increase public support for democratic backsliding.
Constitutional Amendment Proposals as Position-Taking Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives (1979-2020)
Alexander Cohen
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
It is almost impossible to change the United States Constitution, yet members of Congress (MCs) continue to introduce resolutions to do so. Why do they do this? I argue that the sponsorship of constitutional amendments in modern congressional politics is a unique form of low-cost position-taking. Examining the House of Representatives across four decades of constitutional stagnation, I analyze which members engage in amendment sponsorship, and when they do so. First, I find that more ideologically marginalized members are more likely to sponsor amendments. Second, I show that MCs sponsor amendments when they are more electorally vulnerable and institutionally weak. I also find that the role of ideology is asymmetric and time-variant. Among MCs who entered Congress prior to 1997, more conservative Democrats were more likely to become amendment sponsors. Today, sponsorship is more closely related to ideological extremity among both Democrats and Republicans.