Rocket men
Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics
Jonathan Renshon, Allan Dafoe & Paul Huth
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The study of reputation is one of the foundational topics of modern international relations. However, fundamental questions remain, including the question of to whom reputations adhere: states, leaders, or both? We offer a theory of influence-specific reputations (ISR) that unifies competing accounts of reputation formation. We theorize that reputations will adhere more to actors who are more influential in the relevant decision-making process. We employ two survey experiments, one abstract and one richly detailed involving a U.S.-Iran conflict, to evaluate ISR. We find evidence of large country-specific reputations and moderately sized leader-specific reputations. Consistent with the theory of influence-specific reputations, leader-specific reputations are more important when leaders are more influential.
The Clinton Administration's Development and Implementation of Rendition (1993–2001)
James Boys
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
A firestorm of protest greeted revelations of the rendition program when it was made public during the George W. Bush administration. The operational and political basis for the rendition initiative, however, had been established years before George W. Bush became president and was viewed as 'a new art form' by the Clinton administration. Despite significant efforts to distinguish between the two administrations, the evolution of the rendition initiative during the 1990s reveals far greater continuity than has been widely acknowledged. This paper examines the manner in which the Clinton administration utilized rendition in its own war on terror, years before George W. Bush came to power, with little public scrutiny or outrage.
Attack When the World Is Not Watching? U.S. News and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Ruben Durante & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Politicians may strategically time unpopular measures to coincide with newsworthy events that distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We find that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur when U.S. news on the following day are dominated by important predictable events. Strategic timing applies to attacks that bear risk of civilian casualties and are not too costly to postpone. Content analysis suggests that Israel’s strategy aims at minimizing next-day coverage, which is especially charged with negative emotional content. Palestinian attacks do not appear to be timed to U.S. news.
Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition
Kai Quek & Alastair Iain Johnston
International Security, Winter 2017/18, Pages 7-36
Abstract:
Many analysts argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken out. Evidence suggests, however, that Chinese leaders may prefer having more flexibility rather than less in a crisis. Using original data generated by a survey experiment conducted in China in 2015, this article examines several strategies that Chinese leaders could use to reduce public pressure so as to make concessions in a crisis easier. These strategies include pledging to use economic sanctions instead of force; invoking China's “peaceful identity”; citing the costs of conflict to China's development; accepting United Nations mediation; and backing down in the face of U.S. military threats. In all cases except one, approval for the leader increases over a baseline level of support for making concessions. The exception is if the leader backs down in the face of U.S. military threats. Here, approval drops below the baseline level of support, especially for nationalists and hawks. The findings suggest that if one assumes that Chinese leaders are constrained by public opinion, a U.S. cost-imposition strategy to compel China to back down in crises may have the opposite effect — tying Chinese leaders' hands even tighter.
Are Americans really okay with torture? The effects of message framing on public opinion
Joan Blauwkamp, Charles Rowling & William Pettit Media,
War & Conflict, forthcoming
Abstract:
In December 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report on CIA detention and interrogation practices from 2002–2009. Several survey organizations then released polls that appeared to show a majority of Americans supportive of the CIA program, prompting such news headlines as ‘Polls Show a Majority of Americans Support Torture’ and ‘Let’s Not Kid Ourselves: Most Americans are Fine with Torture’. The authors of this article were skeptical of these conclusions. They therefore conducted a survey experiment in which they explored whether slight variations in how this issue is framed – e.g. referencing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, linking the policy to the George W Bush administration, identifying the specific tactics used on detainees or emphasizing the broader consequences for American interests abroad – impact public support for torture. They found that respondents can be primed to express slim support or substantial opposition to the policy based on which of these considerations are called to mind.
Muslim Youth Unemployment and Expat Jihadism – Bored to Death?
Moamen Gouda & Marcus Marktanner
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
Empirical studies analyzing the push factors of expat jihadism are scarce and typically give contradictory results. We hypothesize that youth unemployment, as opposed to overall unemployment, is a significant determinant of foreign fighters flow to join Islamic State (IS). Moreover, we also consider the interaction between youth unemployment and the Muslim population share as another meaningful variables affecting expat jihadism. Controlling for several variables including gross domestic product per capita; Gini; geographical proximity; the share of manufactures and services as a percentage of GDP; Polity score; and fractionalization, we provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that Muslim youth unemployment is a driver of expat jihadism not only for Muslim-majority countries, but globally.
Identity, Ideology, and Information: The Sources of Iraqi Public Support for the Islamic State
Karl Kaltenthaler, Daniel Silverman & Munqith Dagher
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper adds to the literature on popular support for Islamist militant organizations, focusing on Iraqi attitudes toward the Islamic State. We argue that the messaging or information that individuals consume about militant groups is an underappreciated factor in shaping their popularity, with both direct and indirect effects on their appeal. We test our arguments with regression analysis on public opinion data collected in Iraq in April 2015. The analyses largely support our contentions, showing that exposure to news coverage of ISIL substantially reduces support for the group, even among alienated Sunnis or ideological Islamists.
The (Non)Impact of the 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks on Political Attitudes
Bruno Castanho Silva
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous research has consistently found widespread attitudinal impacts of terrorist attacks. Using data from the European Social Survey, which was conducting interviews in 11 countries when the Charlie Hebdo attacks happened in January 2015, I compare respondents from before and after the shootings to test whether the event shifted public opinion on several topics. There is no evidence of average impacts across a range of issues, from xenophobia to ideological self-placement and immigration policy preferences. Data collected when the Paris November 2015 shootings happened also present no evidence of public opinion change on immigration and refugee policy matters in France, but there appears to be an effect in other countries — which varies according to contextual vulnerability. Results suggest that views on immigration and immigrants have, to a certain extent, stabilized in Europe and are less susceptible to shifts from dramatic events.
Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and coercion
Amy Zegart
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Drones are considered poor coercion tools: They cannot operate in contested airspace and they offer low-cost fights instead of more credible, costly signals. However, this article finds that technological advances will soon enable drones to function in hostile environments. Moreover, drones offer three unique coercion advantages that theorists did not foresee: sustainability in long duration conflicts, certainty of precision punishment which can change the psychology of adversaries, and changes in the relative costs of war. A unique survey of 259 foreign military officers finds that costly signals are less credible than assumed and that drones demonstrate resolve in new ways.
Rational Overreaction to Terrorism
William Spaniel
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Some terrorist organizations provoke their targets into deploying massive countermeasures, allowing terrorists to mobilize a greater share of their audience. Why would a government pursue such a costly strategy if it only strengthens the opponent? I develop a signaling model of terrorism, counterterrorism, and recruitment. If a target government is unsure whether the terrorists’ audience is sympathetic to the cause, weaker groups sometimes bluff strength by attacking. To check this bluff, governments sometimes respond to attacks with large-scale operations, even though they know they might be overreacting. Comparative statics reveal that overreaction regret is most likely when the target is wealthy and large operations are more effective. Thus, a selection effect creates the false impression that provocation is most effective against geopolitically privileged targets.
Veiled Intervention: Anti-Semitism, Allegory, And Captain America
Mike Milford
Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Winter 2017, Pages 605-634
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom states that leftover frustrations from World War I necessitated an incremental rhetorical strategy for interventionists in the buildup to World War II. However, such considerations often miss another factor that bolstered American isolationism: anti-Semitism. In the interwar period, America saw a sharp uptick in anti-Semitic organizations that preached a vehement isolationist message. Because of this environment, interventionist rhetors, particularly Jewish rhetors, were denied access to traditional rhetorical resources. In response, one group turned to one of the few outlets available: comic books. Through allegory, a rhetorical form that combines an entertaining surface narrative with a strong but hidden ideological argument, these rhetors were able to reach broad audiences with interventionist messages from behind the veil of comic book adventures. This essay examines the ways in which one of those comic book characters, Captain America, was purposefully constructed to be an allegorical argument for intervention. Through a careful interplay of visuals and narrative themes, his creators made a compelling case for America's involvement in the war.
Security First?: The Traveling U.S. Secretary of State in a Second Presidential Term
James Lebovic
Presidential Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
With the aid of a new data set, this study tracks the travels of the U.S. secretary of state in the Cold War and post–Cold War periods. Drawing from realist arguments, it maintains that U.S. diplomacy eventually bows to U.S. strategic interests, whatever the aspirations and beliefs that U.S. presidents bring to office. The findings, which show a second-term shift in the secretarial travel schedule favoring countries of security importance to the United States, lend support to realist arguments that states prioritize interests. They also reveal, however, that administrations have acted with significant latitude, especially in a presidential first term.
Do Refugees Spread Conflict?
Yang-Yang Zhou & Andrew Shaver
Princeton Working Paper, January 2018
Abstract:
As the number of forcibly displaced individuals around the world continues to reach record highs, understanding how their presence affects conflict is a major outstanding academic and policy question. Using new geo-coded data on refugee sites and civil conflict data at the subnational level from 1989 to 2008, we find no support for claims that refugees increase the likelihood of civil conflict where they settle. Moreover, we find that provinces hosting refugee sites experience substantively large decreases in their likelihood of civil conflict, when there are no other provinces hosting refugee sites within the same country for a given year. We confirm these findings when examining heterogeneous effects of formal refugee camps and informal settlements. To exclude the possibility of selection on unobserved confounders, we use placebo tests to show that there are no effects of future refugee sites on conflict outcomes.
The Rotten Carrot: US-Turkish Bargaining Failure over Iraq in 2003 and the Pitfalls of Social Embeddedness
Marina Henke
Security Studies, Winter 2018, Pages 120-147
Abstract:
Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.
Economic Sanctions and the Politics of IMF Lending
Dursun Peksen & Byungwon Woo
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes.
US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology
Anna Minasyan
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
The Unites States (US) openly promotes its economic ideology of free-markets through foreign aid. It also regards foreign education in the US as a way of spreading its own ideas and values among the elite in developing countries. US educated aid recipient country leaders may thus receive more US aid, if they share both the cultural values and economic ideology of the US. I test this hypothesis using a panel fixed-effects regression model for 896 leaders and 143 countries over the period from 1981 to 2010. I address self- and donor-selection biases by including leader fixed effects in the regression analysis, in addition to the country and year fixed effects. In result, I find that, on average, the US allocates 30 percent more bilateral aid to US educated leaders with right-leaning political beliefs compared to those with left-leaning political beliefs. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that these findings are driven by right-leaning US leadership.
Images of Equality and Freedom: The Representation of Chinese American Men, America Today Magazine, and the Cultural Cold War in Asia
Chiou-Ling Yeh
Journal of American Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article analyzes America Today, a United States Information Service publication circulated to Southeast Asian Chinese between 1949 and 1952. Although the federal government had no intention of lifting immigration restrictions, the magazine promoted the idea that the United States provided humanitarian assistance and abundant opportunities to Chinese immigrants as well as their American-born Chinese counterparts to achieve upward mobility, form a conjugal family, and enjoy patriarchal authority. The stories demonstrated an attempt to inspire Chinese male readers in Southeast Asia to support the United States and the “free world,” rather than Communism and the People's Republic of China.
Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War
Benjamin Appel & Alyssa Prorok
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900–2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.