Rise or Fall
Machine-learning analysis of leadership formation in China to parse the roles of loyalty and institutional norms
Jonghyuk Lee & Victor Shih
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 7 November 2023
Abstract:
A thriving cottage industry has long tried to predict the selection outcomes of the Chinese leadership using qualitative judgments based on historical trends and elite interviews. This study contributes to the discourse by adopting machine-learning techniques to quantitatively and systematically evaluate the promotion prospects of Chinese high-ranking officials. By incorporating over 250 individual features of approximately 20,000 high-ranking positions from 1982 to 2020, this paper calculated predicted probabilities of promotion for the 19th Politburo members of the Communist Party of China. The rankings of the promotion probabilities can be used not only to identify candidates who would have traditionally advanced within the party's promotion norms but also to gauge Xi Jinping's personal favoritism toward specific individuals. Based on different specifications for positions and periods, we developed measurements to quantify candidates' levels of perceived loyalty and promotion eligibility. The empirical results demonstrated that the newly formed 20th Politburo Standing Committee was predominantly composed of loyalists who would not have risen to such positions under conventional promotion standards. We further found that, even within his circle of known allies, Xi Jinping did not opt for candidates with strong credentials. The findings of this study underscore the increasing emphasis on loyalty and the diminishing role of institutional norms in China's high-ranking selections.
Institutional Survival under Extreme State Repression and Subsequent Revival
Hongwei Xu & Litao Zhao
Sociological Science, October 2023
Abstract:
This study examines institutional survival under conditions of extreme state repression. We argue that institutional values under these conditions become dormant in small "safe" social spaces such as families and small close-knit social groups. As state repression becomes increasingly violent, the suppressed groups within those spaces become more resilient in preserving "deviant" values and mitigating the negative long-term impact of state violence on institutional revival. We examine the extent to which pre-1949 entrepreneurial families served as institutional carriers for private entrepreneurship in the Mao era (1949-1978) of China, especially in the context of the political violence of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and shaped individuals' entry into private entrepreneurship in the post-1978 reform era. We find that entrepreneurial transmission was suppressed at the family level by communist repression. Where more severe political violence occurred, pre-1949 entrepreneurial families could better mitigate the deterrent effect on institutional revival of the number of deaths that occurred locally during the Cultural Revolution. Stigmatized pre-1949 entrepreneurial families -- those with "bad" class origins -- mitigated the effects better than their nonstigmatized counterparts. We test to control for public sector job opportunities at the individual and municipal levels and find that these opportunities are unlikely to drive our results.
Meritocracy as Authoritarian Co-Optation: Political Selection and Upward Mobility in China
Hanzhang Liu
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why does an authoritarian regime adopt meritocracy in its political selection? I argue that meritocracy can be used to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by providing them with an opportunity of socioeconomic advancement instead of income redistribution, as long as the selection process is viewed as inclusive and rule-based. Focusing on the civil service examination in contemporary China, I examine how this meritocratic selection has shaped the relationship between college graduates and the Chinese regime. Exploiting a spatial-cohort variation in applicant eligibility, I find that the exam boosts college graduates' perceived upward mobility, which in turn weakens their demand for redistribution even in the face of growing inequality. These findings point to an alternative mode of authoritarian co-optation and highlight the role of upward mobility in regime stability.
Institutional stickiness and Afghanistan's unending revolution
Tariq Basir, Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
Analysis of revolutions typically focuses on de jure constitutions and how their elite- or mass-led character influences their consequences. De facto constitutions are political and economic rules that people use to govern themselves which may or may not be recognized in the evolving de jure constitution. We argue that the nature of change resulting from revolutions depends on whether the emergent constitutional order recognizes the autonomy of de facto constitutions. We theorize neglect, disregard, and hostility toward de facto constitutions contributes to cycles of constitutional instability. We use this theory to explain Afghanistan's unending revolution. Neither elite-led nor mass-led revolutions in Afghanistan produced a lasting constitutional order because they share a disregard for the de facto constitution.
Quiet revolutions in early-modern England
Peter Grajzl & Peter Murrell
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
Revolutions are invariably viewed as the violent replacement of an existing political order. However, many social innovations that result in fundamental institutional and cultural shifts do not occur via force nor have clear beginning and ending dates. Focusing on early-modern England, we provide the first-ever quantitative inquiry into such quiet revolutions. Using existing topic model estimates that leverage caselaw and print-culture corpora, we construct annual time series of attention to 100 legal and 110 cultural ideas between the mid-sixteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries. We estimate the timing of structural breaks in these series. Quiet revolutions begin when there are concurrent upturns in attention to several related topics. Early-modern England featured several quiet, but profound, revolutionary episodes. The financial revolution began by 1660. The Protectorate saw a revolution in land law. A revolution in caselaw relating to families was underway by the early eighteenth century. Elizabethan times saw an increased emphasis on basic skills and showed signs of a Puritan revolution affecting both theology and ideas on institutions. In the decade before the Civil War, a quiet revolution of dissent preceded the turmoil that led to a king's beheading.
Why cronies don't cry? IMF programs, Chinese lending, and leader survival
Andreas Kern, Bernhard Reinsberg & Patrick Shea
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many countries in the Global South have increased their exposure to Chinese debt in recent years. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the US interest rate hike, many countries have struggled to meet their debt repayment obligations. As a result, they have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. We argue that the involvement of the Fund wipes out much of the political benefits of China loans for executive leaders of borrowing countries. IMF conditionality requires countries to increase fiscal transparency, which threatens the viability of kickback schemes and increases the likelihood that corrupt leaders will be called out on their misdealing. As a result, we expect corrupt leaders with China debt to leave office earlier when they try to address debt defaults with IMF loans than when they avoid them. Using survival analysis on a dataset of 115 developing countries between 2000 to 2015, we find that leaders indebted to China that go under an IMF program leave office earlier compared to when they do not go under an IMF program. In line with our argument, this effect is strongest in more corrupt regimes. Our argument and analysis contribute to understanding international finance's political economy, specifically how mixing creditors can be politically risky for leaders.
Brothers in Arms No Longer: Who Do Regime Change Coup-entry Dictators Purge?
Edward Goldring & Austin Matthews
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Research shows that dictators purge (military) elites following coups, while other work shows the utility of analyzing individual-level elite purges to understand the inner workings of autocracies. We therefore ask: Who do regime change coup-entry dictators purge? We argue that who dictators purge depends on costs and benefits relating to two factors. First, purging elites with coercive capacity entails higher costs due to the assistance they provide dictators in navigating outsider threats. Second, dictators benefit from purging elites who helped them seize power; the demonstrable willingness of these elites to overthrow an incumbent threatens the dictator and his ability to consolidate power. We find support for our argument from original quantitative data on 289 elites in 32 autocratic ruling institutions between 1948 and 2000. Our findings have important implications for the study of the large proportion of autocracies born of regime change coups, particularly topics on survival and state violence.
Demand for Statehood: The Case of Native Military Recruitment in World War II
Joowon Yi
International Studies Quarterly, December 2023
Abstract:
This paper examines how the demand for independence appeared in the era of Decolonization. I argue that nationalist movements were more likely to emerge in places where the colonial authorities recruited the native population in World War II. The theory highlights the role of war veterans in creating the demand for independence and in facilitating it through organized collective action. Drawing on original World War II native recruitment data, an analysis of nationalist movements in sub-national units from 1945 to 1984 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings in this study help us better understand the rise of nationalist movements in the twentieth century and the political effects of military service.
Traditional Institutions in Africa: Past and Present
Clara Neupert-Wentz & Carl Müller-Crepon
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
To what degree and why are traditional institutions persistent? Following up the literature on the long-term effects of precolonial institutions in Africa, we investigate whether and where today's traditional institutions mirror their precolonial predecessors. We do so by linking data on contemporary traditional institutions of African ethnic groups with Murdock's historical Ethnographic Atlas. We find a robust association between past and present levels of institutional complexity, differentiating between institutions' political centralization and functional differentiation. However, this persistence originates almost exclusively from former British colonies governed with more reliance on precolonial institutions than other colonies, in particular French ones. These findings contribute to research on the development and effects of traditional institutions, highlighting the need to account for varying persistence of traditional institutions.