Restricted Areas
Repression Technology: Internet Accessibility and State Violence
Anita Gohdes
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article offers a first subnational analysis of the relationship between states' dynamic control of Internet access and their use of violent repression. I argue that where governments provide Internet access, surveillance of digital information exchange can provide intelligence that enables the use of more targeted forms of repression, in particular in areas not fully controlled by the regime. Increasing restrictions on Internet accessibility can impede opposition organization, but they limit access to information on precise targets, resulting in an increase in untargeted repression. I present new data on killings in the Syrian conflict that distinguish between targeted and untargeted events, using supervised text classification. I find that higher levels of Internet accessibility are associated with increases in targeted repression, whereas areas with limited access experience more indiscriminate campaigns of violence. The results offer important implications on how governments incorporate the selective access to communication technology into their strategies of coercion.
The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding
Anna Meyerrose
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations (IOs) have engaged in unprecedented levels of democracy promotion, and research overwhelmingly links them to positive democratic outcomes. However, this increased emphasis on democracy has more recently been accompanied by rampant illiberalism and a sharp rise in cases of democratic backsliding in new democracies. What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled international support for democracy? Backsliding occurs when democratic institutions are weakened or eroded by elected officials, resulting in an illiberal or diminished form of democracy. I argue that IOs that support democracy unintentionally make backsliding more likely by neglecting to promote democratic institutions other than executives and elections, increasing executive power, and limiting states’ domestic policy options, which stunts institutional development. I find membership in IOs associated with democracy promotion makes backsliding more likely, decreases checks on executive power, and limits domestic policy options and party development in new democracies.
Legacies of the Third Reich: Concentration Camps and Out-group Intolerance
Jonathan Homola, Miguel Pereira & Margit Tavits
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We explore the long-term political consequences of the Third Reich and show that current political intolerance, xenophobia, and voting for radical right-wing parties are associated with proximity to former Nazi concentration camps in Germany. This relationship is not explained by contemporary attitudes, the location of the camps, geographic sorting, the economic impact of the camps, or their current use. We argue that cognitive dissonance led those more directly exposed to Nazi institutions to conform with the belief system of the regime. These attitudes were then transmitted across generations. The evidence provided here contributes both to our understanding of the legacies of historical institutions and the sources of political intolerance.
Traditional Leaders and the 2014-2015 Ebola Epidemic
Peter Van der Windt & Maarten Voors
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We assess the role of traditional authorities during an acute health crisis, the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone. We exploit plausible exogenous variation in the political competition for local chieftaincy positions and find evidence that traditional leaders helped shape the course of the epidemic. Locations with more “powerful” chiefs experienced substantially fewer recorded Ebola cases. We argue that this result is consistent with a view of traditional authorities as ‘stationary bandits’, where leaders are locally embedded and thus benefited directly from controlling the spread of the disease. Subsequently, control measures were most effectively implemented by more powerful chiefs.
Holding on? Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of economic declines
Richard Bluhm & Kaj Thomsson
Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We analyze the duration of large economic declines and provide a theory of delayed recovery. We show theoretically that uncertain post-recovery incomes lead to a commitment problem which limits the possibility of cooperation in ethnically heterogeneous countries. Strong constraints on the executive solve this problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with cooperative behavior. We test the model using standard data on linguistic heterogeneity and detailed data on ethnic power configurations. Our findings support the central theoretical prediction: countries with more constrained political executives experience shorter economic declines. The effect is large in ethnically heterogeneous countries but virtually non-existent in homogeneous societies. Our main results are robust to a variety of perturbations regarding the estimation method, the estimation sample, measures of heterogeneity, and measures of institutions.
How Propaganda Manipulates Emotion to Fuel Nationalism: Experimental Evidence from China
Daniel Mattingly & Elaine Yao
Yale Working Paper, January 2020
Abstract:
Influential studies depict propaganda as a heavy-handed tool with limited persuasive power. By contrast, we argue that propaganda can effectively manipulate emotions and cause durable changes in nationalist attitudes. We conduct a series of experiments in which we expose over 6,800 respondents in China to propaganda videos drawn from state-run newscasts, television dramas, and state-backed social media accounts, each containing nationalist messages favored by the Chinese Communist Party. Exposure to nationalist propaganda increases anger as well as anti-foreign sentiment and behavior, with heightened anti-foreign attitudes persisting up to a week, even after anger has cooled. However, we find that nationalist propaganda has no effect on perceptions of Chinese government performance or self-reported willingness to protest against the state. Our findings suggest that nationalist propaganda can manipulate emotions and anti-foreign sentiment, but does not necessarily divert attention from domestic political grievances.
Economic Downturns, Inequality, and Democratic Improvements
Michael Dorsch & Paul Maarek
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.
Examining the state repression‐terrorism nexus: Dynamic relationships among repressive counterterrorism actions, terrorist targets, and deadly terrorist violence in Israel
Henda Hsu & David McDowall
Criminology & Public Policy, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study assesses the impact of state repressive counterterrorism actions on terrorists’ targeting and lethality of the terrorism landscape in Israel. Using systematic data on government responses to terrorism and an empirical model that addresses reciprocal relationships, we analyze dynamical interactions between types of government repression with attacks against civilian or government targets, and deadly terrorist violence. Contrary to public policy pronouncements of forcefully fighting terrorism to eradicate terrorist threats, our results suggest that repressive counterterrorism actions by the state increase terror and deadly violence. Importantly, the results indicate that these unintended escalatory or backlash effects are dependent on the scope of government repression, the type of terrorist targets, and the lethality of terrorism.
When the State Retreats: Work Units, Marital Regulation, and Rising Divorce Rates in China
Yifeng Wan
Johns Hopkins University Working Paper, November 2019
Abstract:
The high and rising divorce rate in China is not easily reconciled with traditional theories that emphasize the role of modernization in changing family life. By reformulating the state social engineering theory, this paper argues that the retreat of the state from private life has contributed to China's rising divorce rates in the past four decades. A divorce reform that simplified divorce procedures and the declining significance of the work unit are two mechanisms through which the retreating state may influence divorce rates. Results from province-level panel data set suggest that smaller share of employment in state and collective work units is associated with higher divorce rates. The diminishing function of institutional control accounts for the effect of the work unit on rising divorce rates.
Rich or alive? Political (in)stability, political leader selection and economic growth
Shu Yu & Richard Jong-A-Pin
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We develop a model that studies the incentives of the ruling elite regarding the selection of the political leader. We show that it is optimal for the ruling elite to choose leaders with more military experience in a politically unstable regime while more educated leaders are preferred in politically stable regimes. Using a dataset that includes 1569 national leaders from 177 countries over the period 1946-2011, we find empirical evidence that political stability contributes to the selection of more educated leaders, while the reverse holds for leaders with high military ranks. The empirical findings are robust to different subsamples, various proxies for educational and military attainment, and different measures for political stability. Our results suggest that leader selection is another reason why political instability is harmful for economic growth.
Extractive Resource Policy and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Mining Reform in the Philippines
Benjamin Crost & Joseph Felter
Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We estimate how a shift towards a more extractive resource policy, brought about by a regulatory reform of the mining sector, affected civil conflict in the Philippines. Our empirical strategy uses a difference-in-differences approach that compares provinces with and without mineral deposits before and after the reform. We find that the reform led to a large increase in conflict violence, most likely due to increased competition over control of resource-rich areas. The estimated welfare cost of this increase in violence is several orders of magnitude larger than the country’s total revenue from taxes on mineral production.
Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Rebel Group Fragmentation
Robert Ulrich Nagel & Austin Doctor
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
To what extent does sexual violence influence rebel group fragmentation? A substantial body of research explores wartime rape as a cohesion-building mechanism following forced recruitment. However, the relationship between sexual violence and broader organizational structural integrity has not been systematically tested. Our study on the effects of sexual violence on rebel group fragmentation provides this test. We argue that sexual violence increases cohesion at the battalion level but increases the risk of fragmentation of the broader organization because lieutenants are more likely to split from organizations if they are confident that their subordinate battalions are cohesive and will follow them. We test this argument on a global sample of 105 rebel organizations active between 1989 and 2014. The results provide robust support for the argument showing sexual violence increases the probability of fragmentation by a factor of six. This presents a crucial contribution to our understanding of sexual violence and rebel group fragmentation.