Regime Learning
Democracy as a competitive discovery process
Nick Cowen, Eric Schliesser & Aris Trantidis
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Actors within democracies and markets exhibit opportunistic behavior and frequently pervasive ignorance. But the debate on whether these social systems can handle these problems is polarized. Critics of markets point to corporate greed and consumer exploitation, placing faith in democracy as the antidote; while critics of democracy highlight rent-seeking, public ignorance and limited knowledge for decisionmakers, prioritizing markets over democracy. By contrast, we argue that there is a fundamental alignment between how competition in both politics and markets ameliorate these two challenges to facilitate social cooperation. Democracy works as a 'competitive discovery process' comparably, though not identically, to the way imperfect markets manage to produce goods and services for consumers. Competition in democratic politics and relatively competitive markets both compel and enable key players -- particularly large firms and political elites -- to be alert and responsive to diverse preferences in society, thereby harnessing opportunistic self-interest and ameliorating knowledge to produce some good outcomes for society as a whole. One important feature of our argument is that we treat the discovery process in democracy and markets as a mechanism of continuous identity formation. On the epistemic properties of democracy, our contribution lies in relaxing both the neoclassical assumption of perfect competition and the Hayekian ideal of open competition by focusing on the performance of imperfectly competitive dynamics.
Unconditional Loyalty: The Survival of Minority Autocracies
Salam Alsaadi
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Contrary to the conventional view that minority regimes are vulnerable to breakdown, many of these regimes exhibit remarkable durability. From 1900 to 2015, minority autocracies that exclude a single majority ethnic group (e.g., regimes in Bahrain, Syria, and Apartheid South Africa) remained in power twice as long as other autocracies. This article argues that this durability is rooted in their unique ethno-political configuration, which enables them to foster a largely unconditional loyalty due to the ruling minority's fear of being subjected to majoritarian rule. Such loyalty endows them with an exceptional capacity to withstand major challenges by fostering in-group demobilization and policing, pro-regime countermobilization, and coethnic elite loyalty. This article employs a multi-method approach, using a novel dataset of minority regimes and a case study of Bahrain based on original interviews. The findings highlight the conditions under which ethnic group loyalty can play a central role in autocratic survival.
Normative Acceptance of Power Abuse
Leonard Hoeft, Wladislaw Mill & Alexander Vostroknutov
Kyklos, forthcoming
Abstract:
While extensive research has shown how power corrupts those who wield it, less is known about its effects on the powerless. Victims of power abuse may either become dissatisfied with such norm violations by those in power or normalize such behavior, corrupting their own normative standards. In a laboratory experiment, we create communities where a single individual holds the power to punish others. We find that there is general agreement that it is socially inappropriate for those in power both to undercontribute and to enforce higher contributions from others. Yet we find that the powerless who are randomly exposed to this behavior believe it to be less socially inappropriate than those who are spared from it. These findings shed light on how power abuse can perpetuate itself and contribute to the persistence of corrupt institutions.
The Social Origins of Democracy and Authoritarianism Reconsidered: Prussia and Sweden in Comparison
Erik Bengtsson & Felix Kersting
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
In a large social science literature, unequal rural class structures ("landlordism") are associated with authoritarian political outcomes. This paper revisits the debate, focusing on the landlords' ideological domination of the lower classes and anti-democratic attitudes in estate-dominated areas. We contrast the authoritarian landlordism model with a perspective where inequality fosters leftist mobilization if landlords fail to assert hegemony. Analyzing Prussia and Sweden -- often seen as opposites in terms of their rural class structures -- we challenge the view of Sweden as egalitarian, showing its agrarian inequality was similar to Prussia's. Examining within-country correlations between land inequality and electoral support for Conservatives, Nazis, and voter turnout, we find no evidence supporting the authoritarian landlordism model. Instead, our results emphasize the role of popular mobilization in Sweden and landlords' weakening influence in Prussia.
The long campaign: Britain's fight to end the slave trade
Yi Jie Gwee & Hui Ren Tan
Explorations in Economic History, July 2025
Abstract:
For much of the 19th century, Britain fought to suppress the trans-Atlantic slave trade, sending ships from the Royal Navy to intercept slavers along the African coast. Digitizing archival data, we show that this suppression campaign started small but grew in strength over time, eventually involving more than 14 percent of the Navy's fleet. Exploiting the distance between slave voyages and British bases as well as when these bases were established, we find that the campaign raised the likelihood of capture among slavers but did not stop the slave trade as a whole. Instead, changes in the demand for slaves played a bigger role in ending the trade. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that Britain persisted with its costly naval campaign for ideological reasons.
Can followers detect political leaders who cheat? Testing an evolutionary position
Yi Yang, Meng Liang & Bingying Wang
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
Researchers applying evolutionary theory to political psychology discover that in democracies, most citizens struggle to select political leaders based on their ideologies. Rather, they tend to concentrate on procedural fairness during public decision-making when evaluating their leaders. We re-examine such evolutionary propositions in China using eight Wason selection experiments. In autocracies, where accountability systems are weak or absent, little is known about how citizens judge politicians' ideologies and their cheating behaviors. Our findings show that Chinese citizens are incapable of identifying political leaders' ideological orientations; instead, they rely on a cheater-detection mechanism, evaluating leaders based on their adherence to procedural fairness. These results contribute to our understanding of democratic competence and the cognitive mechanisms of political judgment in autocratic contexts.
Do Culturally Embedded Political Leaders Help or Hinder Economic Development?
Xiaojun Yan & La Li
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous research presents conflicting views on whether cultural similarities between state officials and the societies they govern promote or hinder economic growth. We posit that cultural embeddedness can facilitate local growth by reducing the transaction costs for alleviating the credible commitment problem, thereby efficiently diminishing the uncertainty for production and investment. Using linguistic similarity as a proxy for cultural embeddedness, we find that the Chinese municipalities governed by political leaders whose cultural background is similar to that of the local society exhibit significantly stronger economic growth. Further, the appointment of a new political leader typically dampens business performance due to local enterprises' inclination to avoid risks, but this effect is absent when the incoming leaders are culturally embedded. We also demonstrate that in the institutional setting of modern states, cultural connection serves as a "weak tie" that efficiently facilitate state-society communication of credible commitment, but are inadequate to foster corruption.
Rent Seekers in the Interest of Society? Civil Organizations and Regional Innovation in China
Ailun Xiong, Hans Westlund & Hongyi Li
Kyklos, forthcoming
Abstract:
What contributes to innovation quantity and quality in a given geographic space? This paper provides a novel perspective by exploring the effect of civil organizations. A straightforward framework is constructed to understand the institutional context of government behaviors in China. Using regional data from 2010 to 2022, this paper discovers that civil organizations positively correlated with innovation output. Notably, Olson organizations prove to be more predictive of patent output compared to Putnam organizations. Moreover, significant impacts are observed in the domain of low-quality patents, such as utility models and design patents. Additionally, Olson organizations exhibit a positive impact on green innovation. With firm-level data, this paper finds limited evidence supporting the role of local exchange of ideas and knowledge. The promoting effect of civil organizations on innovation appears to stem from the "favor exchange mechanism" rather than the "knowledge sharing mechanism."
Dovish Hawks: How Leaders' Combat Experience Influences the End of Civil Conflicts in Peace Agreements
Juliana Tappe Ortiz
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Who are the leaders who end civil wars through peace agreements? I theorize that the prior combat experience of a state leader is an important life experience with direct relevance for how leaders evaluate conflict outcomes. Combat experience increases sensitivity to human losses and gives the state leader a hawkish reputation, increasing internal support, boosting their risk-tolerance, and convincing the rebel leader to take the leader seriously. Using a nested research design, I show that civil wars are more likely to terminate in peace agreements when the leader in charge knows the battlefield. I supplement the quantitative analysis of all state leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015 with a qualitative pathway case of Indonesia's President Yudhoyono. These findings expand upon insights on leaders' attributes indicating that prior combat experience has different effects on potential conflict outcomes in intrastate than in international wars.
Conflict relocation and blood diamond policy shifts
Andrew Saab
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is substantial evidence that various aspects of violent civil conflict are tied to natural resources, of which diamonds are perhaps the most notorious. While the presence of resources themselves have been given substantial attention, existing works have overlooked a key issue: substitute resources. This article focuses on the geographic distribution of violent conflict relative to natural resource sites as a provider of information on the geostrategic organization and extraction behaviors of insurgents. Using the rise of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a multilateral regime aimed at regulating the illicit diamond trade, and accounting for the presence of potential substitute resources, empirical evidence indicates that the regulations disrupted and delocalized conflicts away from diamond sites. Moreover, the geography of violent conflict shifted and relocated toward substitute resources such as tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold. These findings suggest that such policy efforts may have adverse unintended consequences on the structure of violent conflict and the expansion of other black markets as a byproduct of regulation-induced changes in extraction incentives.