Power tripping
In the Mood for Democracy? Democratic Support as Thermostatic Opinion
Christopher Claassen
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Public support has long been thought crucial for the vitality and survival of democracy. Existing research has argued that democracy also creates its own demand: through early-years socialization and later-life learning, the presence of a democratic system coupled with the passage of time produces widespread public support for democracy. Using new panel measures of democratic mood varying over 135 countries and up to 30 years, this article finds little evidence for such a positive feedback effect of democracy on support. Instead, it demonstrates a negative thermostatic effect: increases in democracy depress democratic mood, while decreases cheer it. Moreover, it is increases in the liberal, counter-majoritarian aspects of democracy, not the majoritarian, electoral aspects that provoke this backlash from citizens. These novel results challenge existing research on support for democracy, but also reconcile this research with the literature on macro-opinion.
Punishment and disagreement in the state of nature
Jacob Barrett
Economics & Philosophy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Hobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.
Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints in Europe
Scott Abramson & Carles Boix
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
Institutional constraints on executive behavior are commonly understood to be crucial constitutional features that limit state expropriation, protect property rights, and promote economic development. Combining new data describing the presence of parliamentary constraints for the entire European continent with data on city sizes, we build upon theories of endogenous economic growth to demonstrate that paths of both economic and political development over the long span of European history from 1200 to 1900 are the consequence of a common process of urban agglomeration. In doing so, we provide evidence that both outcomes — the existence of constraining institutions and growth — are driven by initial conditions that fostered technical know-how embodied in urban-dwelling artisans who, in turn, were able to force institutional limits on rulers’ actions. Hence, instead of reflecting a true underlying cause of development, parliamentary constraints are themselves outcomes determined by an endogenous process of growth.
Rent seeking as an evolving process: The case of the Ancien Régime
Robert Ekelund & Mark Thornton
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
Rent-seeking behavior can thrive in democratic and other forms of government where the government is able to hand out exclusive privileges or positions. One of the most famous examples is the venal aristocratic Ancien Régime of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. This paper presents the Revolution as guided by private interests rather than as an uprising powered by aspirations of peasants for the provision of public goods. While taxation, income distribution, and multiple other causal factors played a role, opposition to rent seeking, from merchants, tradespeople, upper-income members of the Third Estate, and others negatively affected by French policies, was the tipping point leading to the Revolution in 1789. In constructing a public choice–based theory to make this argument, we bifurcate the mercantilism that characterized the French economy into seventeenth- and eighteenth-century types.
More donors, more democracy
Sebastian Ziaja
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
A country’s democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from more donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, or more generally ‘fragmented aid’, have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a ‘marketplace for idea support’ which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 130 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
Patterns of Regime Breakdown Since the French Revolution
Vilde Lunnan Djuve, Carl Henrik Knutsen & Tore Wig
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
We present a temporally fine-grained data set on regimes, defined as the formal and informal rules essential for selecting leaders. The data set comprises more than 2,000 regimes from 197 polities, 1789 to 2016. We highlight how the frequency of breakdowns and particular modes of breakdown have followed cyclical rather than monotonic patterns across modern history. The most common breakdown modes, overall, are coups and incumbent-guided regime transformations. Furthermore, we report robust evidence that low income, slow or negative growth, and intermediate levels of democracy predict a higher likelihood of regime breakdown. Yet, by running change-point analysis we establish that breakdown risk has cycled substantively across periods of modern history, and the aforementioned explanatory factors are more clearly related to breakdown during certain periods. When disaggregating different breakdown modes, low income is related to, for example, breakdown due to popular uprisings, whereas intermediate democracy levels clearly predict coup-induced breakdowns and incumbent-guided transitions.
Social Changes in Impressionable Years and Adult Political Attitudes: Evidence from Jewish Expulsions in Nazi Germany
Mevlude Akbulut‐Yuksel, Dozie Okoye & Mutlu Yuksel
Economic Inquiry, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study provides evidence that individuals who grew up during the 1930's Jewish expulsions are less likely to show interest and participate in politics. The estimates imply that, at the mean, individuals in their impressionable ages at the time of the expulsions are about 13% less likely to be interested in politics and 26% less likely to participate in politics. These results are not found for individuals who were older at the time of the expulsions nor for those growing up during world War (WWII). Results are robust to fixed region and birth‐year characteristics, various definitions of impressionable ages, and composition bias induced by differential migration and mortality rates across regions and cohorts. The estimates are also not driven by other regional differences in 1930's political participation, party support, Catholic share, exposure and destruction during WWII, urbanization, and other regional characteristics. We provide evidence that the adverse effects on political attitudes we find are explained by a model of political participation emphasizing the role of civic skills and socioeconomic status acquired at younger ages. Exposure to the expulsions when young is associated with lower adult volunteerism, trust, church attendance, and socioeconomic status.
Do banking crises improve democracy?
Beni Kouevi-Gath, Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Laurent Weill
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study the relationship between banking crises and the level of democracy. We use an event-study method on a sample of up to 129 countries over the period 1975–2010 featuring 94 systemic banking crises. We find that banking crises are followed by an improvement in democracy and report evidence suggesting that the relation may be causal. The bulk of the improvement takes place between 3 and 10 years after the banking crisis. The impact of a banking crisis is greater in non-democratic countries and when the banking crisis is severe. We explain this finding by the fact that banking crises create windows of opportunity to contest autocratic regimes.
Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina
Adam Scharpf & Christian Gläßel
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low‐performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low‐achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.
The Path of the Boomerang: Human Rights Campaigns, Third-Party Pressure, and Human Rights
Michelle Giacobbe Allendoerfer, Amanda Murdie & Ryan Welch
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
How can information campaigns of nongovernmental human rights organizations (HROs) to “name and shame” human rights violators improve human rights conditions? Is the effect direct — does HRO targeting induce violating states to change their behavior? Or is the effect indirect — does pressure by third parties mediate the relationship between HRO actions and changes in human rights practices? The boomerang and spiral models suggest HRO activity provokes third parties, such as other states and international organizations, to pressure violating states. This pressure, in turn, drives violating states to improve human rights conditions. On the other hand, recent empirical work finds third-party pressure can further degrade human rights conditions. In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of how these individual factors — HRO activities and pressure from third parties — work together in the larger chain of causal events influencing human rights conditions. Using a causal mediation model, we examine whether HRO campaigning improves human rights directly or if the effect is mediated by costs imposed by powerful actors through sanctions and military interventions. We find that, although HRO activities have an overall positive effect on human rights conditions, the negative effects of third-party pressure somewhat diminish the positive effects.
The Dilemma of Dissent: Split Judicial Decisions and Compliance With Judgments From the International Human Rights Judiciary
Daniel Naurin & Øyvind Stiansen
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
The mutual dependence between courts and their compliance constituencies is a fundamental feature of judicial power. Actors whose rights and interests are reinforced by court decisions may use these as legal ammunitions while contributing to ensuring that court decisions are effectively implemented. We argue that judgments that contain dissenting opinions are less powerful in this regard, compared with unanimous decisions. The reason is that dissent reduces the perceived legal authority of the judgment. Using data from the international human rights judiciaries in Europe and the Americas, we provide evidence of a negative relationship between judicial dissent and compliance. Our findings have important implications for questions relating to the institutional design of courts, for courts’ ability to manage compliance problems, and for understanding the conditions for effective international judicial protection of human rights.
International institutional design and human rights: The case of the Inter-American Human Rights System
Jillienne Haglund
Conflict Management and Peace Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Most studies examining the effectiveness of international human rights law treat international human rights institutions as equally (un)influential on state behavior. I argue that institutional design explains variation in state response to international human rights law. Using the institutions in the Inter-American Human Rights System (Court and Commission), I argue that judgments from the highly legalized body (Court) are associated with human rights improvements, while decisions from the less legalized body (Commission) are associated with a greater likelihood of formal complaints. Using the Ill-Treatment and Torture data and original data on Commission decisions, I find support for these expectations.
War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run
Didac Queralt
International Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this article I revisit the relationship between war and state making in modern times by focusing on two prominent types of war finance: taxes and foreign loans. Financing war with tax money enhances the capacity to assess wealth and monitor compliance, namely fiscal capacity. Tax-financed war facilitates the adoption of power-sharing institutions, which transform taxation into a non-zero-sum game, carrying on the effect of war in the long run. Financing war with external capital does not contribute to long-term fiscal capacity if borrowers interrupt debt service and, as part of the default settlement, war debt is condoned or exchanged for nontax revenue. The empirical evidence draws from war around the world as early as 1816. Results suggest that globalization of capital markets in the nineteenth century undermined the association between war, state making, and political reform.
Historical Traumas and the Roots of Political Distrust: Political Inference from the Great Chinese Famine
Yuyu Chen & David Yang
Harvard Working Paper, October 2019
Abstract:
Political trust is the foundation of authoritarian regimes’ legitimacy, and it is often sustained by propaganda. When does propaganda reach its limit, and what are the consequences when propaganda is falsified? We study the causal effect of the Great Chinese Famine (1958-1961) on survivors’ political distrust. Policy failures led to the Famine, but the propaganda blamed drought for the disaster. Information that directly contradicted the propaganda — experiences of severe Famine in the absence of abnormal drought conditions — was quasi-randomly available to some citizens, but not others. Using a nationally representative survey, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to compare individuals who were exposed to different intensities of the Famine across regions with different levels of drought during the Famine. The Famine survivors inferred the government’s liability from starvation experiences and the drought conditions, and they were more likely to dismiss the propaganda and blame the government for the Famine if they observed regular weather conditions during the Famine. As a result, these individuals expressed significantly less trust in the government. Costs of falsified propaganda are substantial, since the dampened political trust has turned into a stable political ideology. The distrust persists even half a century after the Famine, has been transmitted to the subsequent generation, and has spilled over to a broad range of political attitudes unrelated to the Famine.
The Political Pollution Cycle
Shiran Victoria Shen
University of Virginia Working Paper, July 2019
Abstract:
Incentives shape political behavior. This paper shows that even after controlling for institutional factors and macro trends, local policy implementation in autocracies like China can change over time in potentially predictive ways. Studying the critical case of air pollution control policies, I advance a theory of what I call the “political pollution cycle” to fathom the effect of political incentives on local policy implementation over time. I theorize that local leaders cater to the policy prioritization of the center and, in the process, foster systematic regional patterns of air quality over time. Using remote sensing, box modeling, observational data, and qualitative field research, I find that top prefectural leaders in China ordered laxer regulation of pollution towards the end of their tenure so that the delivery of social stability and economic achievements boded well for their career advancement. Such regulatory forbearance came unintentionally with tremendous human costs.
Democracy and Credit
Manthos Delis, Iftekhar Hasan & Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
Two bandits or more? The case of Viking Age England
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
The Olsonian distinction between roving and stationary bandits outlines the rationale behind the transition from anarchy to the emergence of the predatory state. This two-bandit model may, however, be expanded to include more bandit types. In the case of Viking Age England, local English kings were unable to monopolize violence and defend their realms against competing Viking raiders. As the Vikings’ time horizon grew, so did the accumulated value of more formal taxation, and bandit types evolved in four steps. The first step is the Olsonian roving bandit, who executed Viking hit-and-run attacks and plunders during the second half of the tenth century. The second step is the gafol bandit; gafol is payment for leaving, paid to, among others, Swein Forkbeard. The third step is the heregeld bandit; heregeld is a tax to support an army for hire; most notably Thorkell the Tall’s. The fourth step is the Olsonian stationary bandit, i.e. the strongest military leader among the Vikings, Cnut the Great, settled down as the new king. Overall, the Olsonian two-bandit model can be expanded to a four-bandit staircase model, in which the new gafol and heregeld bandit types explain the steps from anarchy and short-run raiding to long-run formal taxation in a predatory state.