Paying for Everything
Disasters Everywhere: The Costs of Business Cycles Reconsidered
Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick & Alan Taylor
NBER Working Paper, April 2020
Abstract:
Business cycles are costlier and stabilization policies more beneficial than widely thought. This paper shows that all business cycles are asymmetric and resemble mini “disasters”. By this we mean that growth is pervasively fat-tailed and non-Gaussian. Using long-run historical data, we show empirically that this is true for all advanced economies since 1870. Focusing on the peacetime sample, we develop a tractable local projection framework to estimate consumption growth paths for normal and financial-crisis recessions. Using random coefficient local projections we get an easy and transparent mapping from the estimates to the calibrated simulation model. Simulations show that substantial welfare costs arise not just from the large rare disasters, but also from the smaller but more frequent mini-disasters in every cycle. In postwar America, households would sacrifice more than 10 percent of consumption to avoid such cyclical fluctuations.
Real Estate Taxes and Home Value: Winners and Losers of TCJA
Wenli Li & Edison Yu
Federal Reserve Working Paper, April 2020
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the impact of changes in the federal tax treatment of local property taxes stemming from the implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in January 2018 on local housing markets. Using county-level house price information and IRS tax data, we find that capping the federal tax deduction of real estate taxes at $10,000 has caused the growth rate of home value to decline by an annualized 0.8 percentage point, or 15 percent, in areas where real estate taxes as shares of taxable income exceeded the national median. Additionally, these areas with a high real estate tax burden suffered from reductions in market liquidity after the reform. Fewer houses were transacted either in absolute numbers or as shares of total listings, houses stayed on the market longer before being sold, and more houses were listed with price cuts. Importantly, we find that the housing market slowdown was accompanied by declines in local construction employment growth as well as multi-family building permits. Furthermore, on net more people moved out of these areas after the reform. Finally, we show that the act has already had political consequences. In the 2018 midterm Senate elections, more voters voted for Democratic candidates in areas with high real estate tax burden than they did for Republican candidates.
Competition and Federal Contractor Performance
Benjamin Brunjes
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, April 2020, Pages 202–219
Abstract:
Contracts are increasingly used in government as a way to insert competition into public agencies and policy implementation. Competition among contractors is theorized to drive down costs, encourage innovation, and boost accountability. However, there have been few studies on whether competition actually leads to improved performance among contractors. This analysis examines nearly 25,000 federal contracts to determine how competition is related to performance. Findings indicate that competitively sourced contracts are more likely to suffer from performance problems. However, relationships between contractor and agency correlate with fewer performance problems. This suggests that competition may not be leading to the benefits that many might expect. Instead, relationships and shared experiences, along with other factors, may matter more when seeking to improve contractor performance.
Big G
Lydia Cox et al.
NBER Working Paper, April 2020
Abstract:
Big G typically refers to aggregate government spending on a homogeneous good. In this paper, we open up this construct by analyzing the entire universe of procurement contracts of the US government and establish five facts. First, government spending is granular, that is, it is concentrated in relatively few firms and sectors. Second, relative to private expenditures its composition is biased. Third, procurement contracts are short-lived. Fourth, idiosyncratic variation dominates the fluctuation of spending. Last, government spending is concentrated in sectors with relatively sticky prices. Accounting for these facts within a stylized New Keynesian model offers new insights into the fiscal transmission mechanism: fiscal shocks hardly impact inflation, little crowding out of private expenditure exists, and the multiplier tends to be larger compared to a one-sector benchmark aligning the model with the empirical evidence.
Secular Stagnation or Technological Lull?
Valerie Ramey
Journal of Policy Modeling, forthcoming
Abstract:
The slow recovery of the economy from the Great Recession and the lingering low real interest rates have led to fears of “secular stagnation” and calls for government aggregate demand stimulus to lift the growth rate of the economy. I present evidence that the current state of the U.S. economy does not satisfy the conditions for secular stagnation, as originally defined by Alvin Hansen (1939). Instead, the U.S. is experiencing a period of low productivity growth. I suggest that long intervals of sluggish productivity growth may be natural in an economy whose growth is driven by technological revolutions that are large, infrequent, and randomly-timed. If this is the case, then the best description of the recent experience of the U.S. economy is a technological lull. In this situation, traditional government aggregate demand stimulus policies are not the appropriate response. Instead policies that can increase the rate of innovation and its diffusion may be more appropriate.
The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?
Daniel Hansen
European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many have argued that financial markets are crucial in ensuring that governments maintain sustainable fiscal balances - the so called ‘market discipline hypothesis'. A recent version of this theory holds that both fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are necessary to enable markets to discipline overspending governments. I argue, however, that while these fiscal institutions are effective at improving governments fiscal balances, financial markets are likely not the causal mechanism which discipline governments’ fiscal policies. Instead, I propose that fiscal rules and transparency promote better budget balances because domestic political actors use fiscal institutions to constrain executive policymaking. I test these competing hypotheses of why these fiscal institutions are effective – financial markets vs political competition – and find that country budget balances are increased not as a consequence of financial markets, but when the level of political competition and civil society engagement is sufficiently high. These results are robust to accounting for the possible selection bias of who adopts fiscal institutions.
Corporate Taxes and Retail Prices
Scott Baker, Stephen Teng Sun & Constantine Yannelis
NBER Working Paper, April 2020
Abstract:
We study the impact of corporate taxes on barcode-level product prices using linked survey and administrative data. Our empirical strategy exploits the dichotomy between the location of production and the location of sales, providing estimates free from confounding demand shocks. We find significant effects of corporate taxes on prices with a net-of-tax elasticity of 0.17. The effects are larger for lower-price items and products purchased by low-income households and weaker for high-leverage firms. Approximately 31% of corporate tax incidence falls on consumers, suggesting that models used by policymakers significantly underestimate the incidence of corporate taxes on consumers.
Rethinking Detroit
Raymond Owens, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg & Pierre-Daniel Sarte
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2020, Pages 258-305
Abstract:
This paper studies the urban structure of Detroit — one that is clearly not optimal for its size — which features a business district immediately surrounded by largely vacant neighborhoods. A model is presented where residential externalities lead to multiple equilibria at the neighborhood level. Specifically, neighborhood development requires the coordination of developers and residents, without which it may remain vacant even with sound fundamentals. Given this mechanism, existing strategic visions to revitalize Detroit are evaluated within a quantitative spatial model that can rationalize Detroit's current allocations. Alternative plans that rely on "development guarantees" are also considered and shown to yield better outcomes.
The Effects of State and Local Economic Incentives on Business Start-Ups in the United States: County-Level Evidence
Mark Partridge et al.
Economic Development Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Even as economic incentives are increasingly used by policy makers to spur state and local economic development, their use is controversial among the public and academics. The authors examine whether state and local incentives lead to higher rates of business start-ups in metropolitan counties. Existing research indicates that start-ups are important for supporting (net) job creation, long-term growth, innovation, and development. The authors find that incentives have a statistically significant, negative relationship with start-up rates in total and for some industries including export-based and others that often receive incentives. The findings support critics who contend that incentives crowd out other economic activity, potentially reducing long-term growth. The authors also find that greater intersectoral job flows are positively linked to total start-ups, consistent with claims of those who advocate for policies that enhance labor market flexibility through reducing barriers to job mobility.
Market Potential and Fiscal Incentives Influence Firms’ Location Decisions: Evidence From U.S. Counties
Martin Meurers & Johannes Moenius
Economic Development Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
How important are market potential and fiscal incentives for firms’ location decisions? We estimate the influence of subsidies and tax breaks on the decisions of firms to relocate or to remain in a certain U.S. county using a structural economic geography model developed in Meurers and Moenius (2018). In a panel data set from 1990 to 2016 for almost 3,000 U.S. counties, we find a strong and robust impact of economic geography on firms’ location decisions: The closer a county is to market demand and to the supply of inputs, the more firms locate there. As the model predicts, public investment attracts firms while the local tax burden disincentivizes economic activity, although to a lesser extent. Furthermore, in counties that are closer to economic centers, firms respond less to public investment and tax changes than firms in counties far away from centers. These data, therefore, confirm the predictions of the model regarding the potential effectiveness of regional development policies, in particular for investment tax credits, job creation, and training.
The Impact of State-Level Research and Development Tax Credits on the Quantity and Quality of Entrepreneurship
Catherine Fazio, Jorge Guzman & Scott Stern
Economic Development Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
U.S. states often cite the acceleration of start-up activity as a rationale for the research and development (R&D) tax credit. While a strong empirical base links the R&D tax credit to increased innovation, prior work provides no causal evidence that the credit effects the rate of formation and growth potential of new businesses. This article combines data from the Startup Cartography Project with the Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes to implement a difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of state R&D tax credits on the quantity and quality-adjusted quantity of entrepreneurship. The authors find that the R&D tax credit is associated with a significant long-term impact on both. In contrast, the authors observe that state investment tax credits have no impact on the quantity of entrepreneurship and lead to a marked decline in the rate of formation of growth-oriented start-ups over time. The results indicate the potential of state R&D tax credits to stimulate entrepreneurship.
Incentivized for Leveling the Playing Field: Do State Economic Incentives Compensate for High Taxes?
Shaoming Cheng, Hai (David) Guo & Cathy Yang Liu
Economic Development Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
State tax and nontax incentives have been widespread in the United States, though their efficacy in job creation and economic development has been repeatedly questioned in the literature by scholars and policy makers. Why, then, do states persistently pursue these incentive policies? Using the newly developed Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes, we adopt a dynamic spatial Durbin panel model to account for both temporal and spatial dependence and to shed light on this question. Empirical evidence suggests a statistically significant and positive relationship between tax credits and tax burdens (i.e., elevated tax breaks are used to offset higher tax differentials). States therefore may seek to create a level playing field in business attraction and retention by overcoming tax disadvantages. Besides, high-serial dependence is present in the use of various tax credits, suggesting a high self-perpetuating tendency that tax breaks, once introduced, are likely to be persistent over time. States are also found to be engaged both in spatial competition or imitation among geographically proximate states, and in strategic benchmarking among states that are geographically distant but economically alike.
Do Public-Private-Partnership-Enabling Laws Increase Private Investment in Transportation Infrastructure?
Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel & Richard Geddes
Journal of Law and Economics, February 2020, Pages 43-70
Abstract:
The use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is an important development in infrastructure delivery. These contracts between a public-sector owner and a private provider bundle delivery services and provide a middle ground between traditional delivery and privatization. As of 2016, 35 states had enacted PPP-enabling laws that address such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and the need for prior legislative contract approval. We provide the first comprehensive empirical assessment of the laws’ impact on the utilization of private investment. We analyze the effect of a state having a PPP-enabling law and a law’s average impact. We also assess the impact of PPP-enabling-law provisions. We find that provisions that empower PPPs, such as exemptions from property taxes, exemptions from extant procurement laws, and confidentiality protections, attract private investment.