Party Culture
Perceptions of Political Deviants in the US Democrat and Republican Parties
Danica Kulibert et al.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, February 2025, Pages 87-102
Abstract:
People who deviate from group norms pose problems for their ingroup, but not all forms of deviance are equivalent. Six experiments (N = 1,653) investigated lay understandings of subjective group dynamics by assessing people's beliefs about how others would perceive two types of deviants within U.S. political parties -- political moderates and extremes. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants thought Democrats and Republicans, respectively, would show less approval of a moderate ingroup political candidate than an extreme ingroup political candidate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants thought Democrats would show less approval of a moderate Democratic campaign volunteer than an extreme Democratic campaign volunteer. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated Experiments 1 and 2 in ideologically diverse samples. Experiment 6 extended these findings by demonstrating that people's expectation that Republicans will show less approval of moderate ingroup members than extreme ingroup members extends to rank-and-file party members. People intuitively understand subjective group dynamics and this understanding may have important consequences for political behavior and discourse.
Causes and Extent of Increasing Partisan Segregation in the U.S. -- Evidence from Migration Patterns of 212 Million Voters
Jacob Brown et al.
NBER Working Paper, January 2025
Abstract:
Using data on the residential location and migration for every voter in U.S. states recording partisan registration between 2008-2020, we find that residential segregation between Democrats and Republicans has increased year over year at all geographic levels, from neighborhoods to Congressional Districts. Individual demographic information reveals that segregation increases for voters of most demographic backgrounds, but that Democratic and Republican trending places have starkly different demographic profiles, thus contributing to the growing confluence of demographics, partisanship, and geography in the United States. We further decompose the change in segregation into different sources. Increases in segregation have not been driven primarily by migration but rather by generational change, as young voters enter the electorate, causing some places to become more homogeneously Democratic, and by existing voters leaving the Democratic party and causing other places to become more Republican.
Rural Populism and Tolerance for Political Violence
Jesse Callahan Bryant, Tom Mueller & Paul Berne Burow
Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, February 2025
Abstract:
This study shows that populist attitudes are associated with reduced tolerance for political violence in rural areas of the United States. Using a representative sample from rural counties in the American West, the authors advance conceptual frameworks in populism studies and address the challenges of measuring social phenomena in rural areas. Using structural equation modeling and a “bare bones” measure of populism, the authors test hypotheses on links between economic and sociocultural grievances, ideological conservatism, populist attitudes, and tolerance for political violence. The findings confirm associations among economic grievances, conservatism, and populist attitudes, while showing that populism attenuates the link between economic grievance and tolerance for political violence. Thus, this study reveals an unexpected ideological role of populist attitudes in diminishing support for political violence. This advances sociological understanding of how populism interacts with broader ideological systems in the United States and draws greater attention to how political concepts are operationalized empirically.
Conspiracy beliefs and democratic backsliding: Longitudinal effects of election conspiracy beliefs on criticism of democracy and support for authoritarianism during political contests
Emma Thomas et al.
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
There are widespread concerns that conspiracy theories undermine democracies. But do conspiracy beliefs increase criticism of democracy and/or support for authoritarianism? Or are antidemocratic people more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs? To answer these important questions, we collected longitudinal data during two concurrent democratic elections -- the 2020 US Presidential Election (N = 609) and the 2020 General Election in New Zealand (N = 603). Random intercept cross-lagged panel models tested whether conspiracy beliefs affect criticism of democracy in general, as well as support for authoritarianism, and both direct and representative democracy, specifically. There was little evidence that conspiracy beliefs temporally preceded changes in attitudes toward democracy or support for any specific form of government. Instead, people who supported authoritarianism more subsequently endorsed stronger conspiracy beliefs. The results suggested that, in the context of electoral contests (e.g., elections), antidemocratic people are more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs rather than conspiracy beliefs fostering antidemocratic views.
Self-censorship in the classroom
Daniel Stone & Sarah Greenberg
Bowdoin College Working Paper, November 2024
Abstract:
We present results from an extensive study (14 classes, 407 students) of the degree to which college students self-censor broad political views in classroom settings. We estimate the prevalence of self-censorship by comparing private and public reporting of views. We also study the accuracy of student beliefs about classmate self-censorship by eliciting beliefs about classmates' private views. We find that while students were close to equally likely to report being socially liberal, economically liberal, and leaning Democratic in private and public settings, of students who privately reported being socially conservative, Republican, and economically conservative outside of economics classes, approximately 38%, 45%, and 30% (respectively) did not reveal this publicly. Students in introductory classes were more likely to self-censor. The order of responses options was randomized and had a large effect on the degree of self-censorship of Republicanism. Student beliefs about the distributions of classmates' political views were mostly accurate but there was substantial underestimation of the percentages of economic conservatives and nonpartisans. Results from a follow-up survey suggest that social consequences for students who publicly stated that they were conservative were limited, but not non-existent.
Why Anxious People Lean to the Left on Economic Policy: Personality, Social Exclusion, and Redistribution
Adam Panish & Andrew Delton
British Journal of Political Science, February 2025
Abstract:
Liberals experience more distress than conservatives. Why? We offer a novel explanation, the social support hypothesis. Maintaining social support and avoiding exclusion are basic human motivations, but people differ in their sensitivity to the threat of social exclusion. Among people high in the personality trait neuroticism, exclusion easily triggers feelings of vulnerability and neediness. The social support hypothesis translates this to politics. Concerned with their own vulnerability, we find that neurotic people prefer policies of care -- social welfare and redistribution -- but not other left-wing policies. Specifically, it is anxiety -- the facet of neuroticism tapping sensitivity to social threats -- that drives this link. And it is only for people experiencing exclusion that anxiety predicts support for social welfare. Our results come from two experiments and four representative surveys across two continents. They help to resolve the puzzle of liberal distress while providing a new template for research on personality and politics.
Short-term exposure to filter-bubble recommendation systems has limited polarization effects: Naturalistic experiments on YouTube
Naijia Liu et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 25 February 2025
Abstract:
An enormous body of literature argues that recommendation algorithms drive political polarization by creating “filter bubbles” and “rabbit holes.” Using four experiments with nearly 9,000 participants, we show that manipulating algorithmic recommendations to create these conditions has limited effects on opinions. Our experiments employ a custom-built video platform with a naturalistic, YouTube-like interface presenting real YouTube videos and recommendations. We experimentally manipulate YouTube’s actual recommendation algorithm to simulate filter bubbles and rabbit holes by presenting ideologically balanced and slanted choices. Our design allows us to intervene in a feedback loop that has confounded the study of algorithmic polarization -- the complex interplay between supply of recommendations and user demand for content -- to examine downstream effects on policy attitudes. We use over 130,000 experimentally manipulated recommendations and 31,000 platform interactions to estimate how recommendation algorithms alter users’ media consumption decisions and, indirectly, their political attitudes. Our results cast doubt on widely circulating theories of algorithmic polarization by showing that even heavy-handed (although short-term) perturbations of real-world recommendations have limited causal effects on policy attitudes. Given our inability to detect consistent evidence for algorithmic effects, we argue the burden of proof for claims about algorithm-induced polarization has shifted. Our methodology, which captures and modifies the output of real-world recommendation algorithms, offers a path forward for future investigations of black-box artificial intelligence systems. Our findings reveal practical limits to effect sizes that are feasibly detectable in academic experiments.
From viewers to voters: Tracing Fox News’ impact on American democracy
Elliott Ash et al.
Journal of Public Economics, December 2024
Abstract:
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the effect of Fox News Channel (FNC) on the mass public’s political preferences and voting behavior in the United States from 2000 to 2020. We show that FNC has shifted the ideology and partisan identity of Americans rightward. This shift has helped Republican candidates in elections across levels of U.S. government over the past decade. Our estimates suggests that an increase of 0.05 rating points in Fox News viewership, induced by exogenous changes in channel placement, has increased Republican vote shares by at least 0.5 percentage points in recent presidential, Senate, House, and gubernatorial elections. Our findings have broad implications for political behavior, elections, and the political process in the United States.
Making the other side mad: How out-group distaste benefits less competent candidates
Joshua Strayhorn
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
I present a formal model of candidate evaluation in a context where voters within some group or political party learn information about to what extent various in-group candidates (such as a slate of primary candidates) are disliked by an out-group or opposing party. Thus, a voter's candidate evaluation is based in part on how they process information about which of their own candidates provoke particularly strong distaste from the out-group. I show that exposure to information about out-group distaste can cause voters to make misleading inferences about candidate characteristics, causing them to sometimes systematically prefer lower competence candidates. These effects are stronger for certain kinds of low-information voters, and for more ideologically motivated voters. The model can thus explain under what conditions voters will support politicians who particularly aggrieve the opposition. This can also create secondary incentives for politicians to signal incompetence.
Parallel Worlds? The Partisan Effects of COVID-19 on Real Estate
Christopher Azevedo & David Johnson
Eastern Economic Journal, January 2025, Pages 112-143
Abstract:
Differences in how Republicans and Democrats responded to COVID-19 resulted in differences in the functioning of housing markets. Democrats adjusted behavior more than Republicans in response to the pandemic. Democrats engaged in more social distancing, were less likely to have people into their homes, and were less willing to visit strangers’ homes. This resulted in supply effects that caused higher housing prices, fewer listings, and fewer days on the market for counties with lower support for former president Donald Trump in the 2020 election. We find no impact of state-imposed shutdowns or population density when political partisanship is accounted for.
Partisanship in Tax Planning
Stephanie Sikes & Rong (Irene) Zhong
University of Illinois Working Paper, July 2024
Abstract:
U.S. firms are becoming increasingly partisan. This study examines whether and how the political alignment between a firm's management team and the incumbent president shapes the firm's tax planning strategies. Using detailed campaign contribution data for individual executives in S&P 500 firms, we find that executives politically aligned with the president are less aggressive in avoiding taxes, leading to lower tax risks. Next, we show that the impact of partisanship is more pronounced during the period of intensified political polarization. Further evidence reveals that reduced tax avoidance is driven by "ideological-induced optimism": political alignment reduces managers' perceived future political risks, especially in politically dependent firms, Republican-leaning firms, or firms lacking accumulated political capital via lobbying. Our results are robust using different tax avoidance measures. Overall, our findings suggest that partisanship is an important yet, until now, overlooked determinant of corporate tax strategies.