Owning them
Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning
Gordon Pennycook & David Rand
Cognition, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do people believe blatantly inaccurate news headlines (“fake news”)? Do we use our reasoning abilities to convince ourselves that statements that align with our ideology are true, or does reasoning allow us to effectively differentiate fake from real regardless of political ideology? Here we test these competing accounts in two studies (total N = 3446 Mechanical Turk workers) by using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as a measure of the propensity to engage in analytical reasoning. We find that CRT performance is negatively correlated with the perceived accuracy of fake news, and positively correlated with the ability to discern fake news from real news – even for headlines that align with individuals’ political ideology. Moreover, overall discernment was actually better for ideologically aligned headlines than for misaligned headlines. Finally, a headline-level analysis finds that CRT is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively implausible (primarily fake) headlines, and positively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively plausible (primarily real) headlines. In contrast, the correlation between CRT and perceived accuracy is unrelated to how closely the headline aligns with the participant’s ideology. Thus, we conclude that analytic thinking is used to assess the plausibility of headlines, regardless of whether the stories are consistent or inconsistent with one’s political ideology. Our findings therefore suggest that susceptibility to fake news is driven more by lazy thinking than it is by partisan bias per se – a finding that opens potential avenues for fighting fake news.
Partisanship in the Trump Era
Larry Bartels
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article provides a snapshot of the contemporary American party system focusing on similarities and differences in the attitudes of rank-and-file Republicans and Democrats. In contrast to much journalistic speculation, I find that Republicans are not particularly divided by Donald Trump’s “hard-edge nationalism” and “gut-level cultural appeals.” Indeed, they seem to be united and energized by cultural conservatism (as measured by survey items tapping support for building a wall on the Mexican border, respect for the American flag, concerns about discrimination against whites, and negative feelings toward Muslims, gays and lesbians, atheists, and immigrants, among others). Democrats, by comparison, are relatively divided on cultural questions but united and animated by support for an activist government. This significant difference in the correlates of partisan affect, especially between the most committed partisans, puts a new twist on conventional understandings of current partisan polarization.
Using reappraisal to regulate negative emotion after the 2016 U.S. Presidential election: Does emotion regulation trump political action?
Brett Ford et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political action (volunteering, protesting) is central to functioning democracies, and action is often motivated by negative emotion. However, theories of emotion regulation suggest that people often strive to decrease such negative emotions. Thus, effective emotion regulation (e.g., reappraisal) — while helping people feel better — could have the unintended consequence of hindering political action. We tested this hypothesis in Clinton voters after the 2016 U.S. election (Ntotal = 1552). Studies 1a (conducted November 2016) and 1b (conducted November 2016, with a follow-up in January 2017) assessed individuals’ recent use of reappraisal in managing emotions evoked by the election. Studies 2a and 2b (conducted March 2017) exposed individuals to Trump-focused news footage and assessed individuals’ reappraisal during the clip and subsequent emotional responses. Studies 3a and 3b (conducted June 2017) experimentally manipulated reappraisal and measured subsequent emotional responses to Trump-focused news footage. Each study assessed recent or intended political action. In Studies 1a and 1b, we found that reappraisal predicted lower political action; in Studies 2a and 2b we observed an indirect effect such that reappraisal predicted lower negative emotion which in turn accounted for lower intentions to engage in political action; and Studies 3a and 3b provided experimental evidence for this indirect effect. These results suggest that effective emotion regulation like reappraisal may be beneficial in the short-run by helping restore emotional well-being after upsetting political events but may also be costly in the long-run by reducing the potential for productive political action.
They See Dead People (Voting): Correcting Misperceptions about Voter Fraud in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Mirya Holman & Celeste Lay
Journal of Political Marketing, forthcoming
Abstract:
The 2016 US Presidential election was unique for many reasons, especially the widespread endorsement of falsehoods about the candidates and the electoral process. Using a unique experiment fielded the week prior to the election, we examine whether correcting information can overcome misperceptions about election fraud. We find that providing counter information is generally ineffective at remedying misperceptions and can, depending on the source, increase endorsements of misperceptions among Republicans. Although information from a fact-checking source is generally unconvincing, when given with evidence from an unlikely source – in our experiment, Breitbart News – both Republicans and Democrats decrease beliefs in voter fraud.
Major Life Events and the Age-Partisan Stability Association
William Hobbs
Political Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Stable partisanship in the United States is often attributed to attachments to political parties that become slowly and incrementally stronger with age. Here, I show that switches in partisan identification can happen quickly after major life transitions even in old age and that this pattern of party-switching can explain a surprisingly large fraction of the age-partisan stability association. Using voter registration information over 8 years for more than 20 million voters in California, in combination with American National Election Studies panel surveys, I measure how many individuals switch party affiliation when they move to new homes, switch when separating from a partner, and become less likely to switch after retirement. In both ANES and voter record analyses, accounting for residential mobility alone reduces the association between age and party-switching by 50% or more. The combined findings demonstrate that socially crystallized lives help drive steady partisanship in adulthood and suggest that continuity in day-to-day life could maintain partisan identity at 30 years old almost as much as it does at 60.
Can Protests Expand the Scope of Conflict? Evidence from City Records and Online Activity
Nicolas Dumas
MIT Working Paper, June 2018
Abstract:
Pluralism scholars and activists have long theorized that protests can “expand the scope of conflict” by increasing public attention to an issue, but data necessary for a formal causal test has only recently become available. To test this claim, I merge an original dataset of over 400 local protests in three US cities with daily, geo-referenced Google Search data. I show that protests can have a short-term but significant effect on the public’s willingness to actively seek out information related to the protest. To place the effect size in context, I analyze the subset of protests on topics that Pres. Trump also tweeted about. I find that a local protest garners about 60% the amount of public attention as a tweet by the President does on that same topic. Across different cities and different topics, protests can be a powerful tool for activists seeking to engage a larger audience.
The Polarizing Effect of the March for Science on Attitudes toward Scientists
Matthew Motta
PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Americans’ attitudes toward scientists have become more negative in recent years. Although researchers have considered several individual-level factors that might explain this change, little attention has been given to the political actions of scientists themselves. This article considers how March for Science rallies that took place across the United States in late April 2017 influenced Americans’ attitudes toward scientists and the research they produce. An online panel study surveying respondents three days before and two days after the March found that liberals’ and conservatives’ attitudes toward scientists polarized following the March. Liberals’ attitudes toward scientists became more positive whereas conservatives’ attitudes became more negative. However, the March appears to have had little effect on the public’s attitudes about scientific research. In addition to answering questions about the March’s political impact, this research calls attention to the possibility that the political actions of scientists can shape public opinion about them.
The Effect of Education on Political Knowledge: Evidence From Monozygotic Twins
Aaron Weinschenk & Christopher Dawes
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Political scientists have long been interested in the determinants of political knowledge. In many studies, education is the strongest predictor of political knowledge. However, some studies have found that education has no effect on knowledge once confounding variables are taken into account. In addition, some recent work suggests that education remains the strongest predictor of knowledge even after accounting for confounders like personality traits and intelligence. We provide new evidence on the effect of education on political knowledge by utilizing the co-twin control design. By looking at the relationship between education and knowledge within monozygotic twin pairs, we are able to circumvent sources of confounding of the relationship due to genetic factors and early-life family environment because monozygotic twins share both. We find that the relationship between education and political knowledge is highly confounded by genes and/or familial environment. The results from a naive model that does not take into account unobserved family factors indicate that education has a positive and statistically significant effect on political knowledge. However, in a twin fixed-effects model that accounts for confounding due to genetic factors and familial socialization, we find that the effect of education on political knowledge drops substantially and is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Dark Parties: Citizens United, Independent-Expenditure Networks and the Evolution of Political Parties
Stan Oklobdzija
University of California Working Paper, July 2018
Abstract:
Following the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC, independent expenditures have grown dramatically both in terms of raw dollars and as a percentage of spending in elections. A large and growing portion comes from political nonprofits — so called “dark money” groups — named as such because the terms of their incorporation allows them to partially obscure the sources of their income. I develop a new dataset of about 2,350,000 tax documents released by the IRS and use it to test a new theory of spending in Congressional elections. I posit that the pathways for anonymous giving that emerged from the Citizens United decision allowed ideologically motivated interest groups to form new financial networks and aggressively challenge more established factions of political parties in ways previously unfeasible. Testing this theory, I find strong support that these groups back more extremist candidates — especially in party primaries — than either formal party organizations or access-oriented interest groups. These results give evidence to recent suggestions by some scholars that asymmetric polarization may be in part caused by changes in campaign finance law that empowered these ideologically motivated groups while hobbling efforts of more moderate party factions.
Reliably Republican? Shifts in U.S. Veterans’ Political Party Affiliation from 1974 to 2016
Steven Foy & Salvatore Restifo
Sociological Spectrum, forthcoming
Abstract:
Assumptions of veteran affiliation with the Republican Party are widespread, but the extent to which veteran status constitutes a social cleavage patterning political alignment remains understudied. Using General Social Survey data from 1974 to 1994 and from 2010 to 2016, we assess (1) the consistency with which veterans identify as Republican and (2) whether veterans’ Republican affiliation are patterned on selection effects (particularly via demographic factors preceding their entry into military service) or socialization effects (via factors emerging from their entry into military service). Our findings suggest a greater historical likelihood of Democratic affiliation undercut by an emerging trend toward Republican identification. This trend appears largely driven by selection; neither veteran status alone nor length of service are significantly associated with political affiliation, but postconscription era veterans are more likely to identify as Republican than as Democratic.
One of us? How leaders can use subtle identity performances to build trust among ingroups and outgroups
Benjamin Jones et al.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, forthcoming
Abstract:
Leaders often face the dilemma of earning trust among different subgroups. How can leaders “reach across the aisle” to build trust among outgroup members without alienating their own ingroup in the process? We suggest one solution is for leaders to couple their efforts to appeal to the outgroup with subtle identity performances, behavioral cues that ingroup members understand as prototypical, but that are effectively invisible to outgroup members who are not familiar with ingroup symbols and norms. We conducted an experiment in which we manipulated the leader’s group membership (ingroup or outgroup) and favoritism (ingroup favoritism, outgroup favoritism, or outgroup favoritism with a subtle identity performance). Results show that leaders can maximize their perceived prototypicality, fairness, and trust among the ingroup and outgroup if outgroup favoritism is coupled with a subtle identity performance for the ingroup.
Entertainment Use and Political Ideology: Linking Worldviews to Media Content
Jacob Long & William Eveland
Communication Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study integrates and builds upon research on moral psychology, entertainment media selection, and political communication that has established a link between political ideology and moral sentiments. An automated content analysis of the lyrics of 37,309 songs across 10 genres assessed the extent of appeals to five different moral domains defined by moral foundations theory. The results of the content analysis are integrated with nationally representative survey data (N = 1,000) by linking lyrical content with self-reported preference for and exposure to musical genres. We then correlate the content of preferred genres with self-reported moral sentiments and political ideology. We find the moral content of music lyrics in the genres used by respondents is associated with their moral preferences and political ideology.
More than Mimicry? The Role of Anger in Uncivil Reactions to Elite Political Incivility
Bryan Gervais
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Autumn 2017, Pages 384–405
Abstract:
Public opinion scholars contend that mass discourse tends to mirror elite discourse owing to the cognitive accessibility of recently encountered messages. I argue that elite incivility can generate anger and that this affective reaction in part drives use of incivility in political expressions. To test this, I conduct an online experiment in which subjects were exposed to statements said to be made by party elites, with the partisan tie and the presence of incivility both manipulated. In both this study and a smaller replication experiment, incivility targeting one’s in-group generated anger but like-minded incivility did not. Moreover, exposure to disagreeable incivility increased incivility use among subjects in open-ended comments, with anger playing a mediating role between reception and uncivil response.
Leadership with Trustworthy Associates
Torun Dewan & Francesco Squintani
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Group members value informed decisions and hold ideological preferences. A leader takes a decision on their behalf. Good leadership depends on characteristics of moderation and judgment. The latter emerges (endogenously) via advice communicated by “trustworthy associates.” Trustworthy advice requires ideological proximity to the leader. A group may choose a relatively extreme leader with a large number of such associates. Paradoxically, this can happen though it is in the group’s collective interest to choose a moderate leader. To assess whether these insights persist when political groups compete, we embed our analysis in a model of elections. Each of two parties chooses a leader who implements her preferred policy if elected. We find that a party may choose an extreme leader who defeats a moderate candidate chosen by the opposing party. Our results highlight the importance of party cohesion and the relations between a leader and her party. These can be more important to electoral success than proximity of a leader’s position to the median voter.
Perceptions of elites and (asymmetric) sorting
Nicholas Davis
Research & Politics, May 2018
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that citizens who recognize party polarization exhibit well-sorted preferences. Curiously, however, this extant research has not grappled sufficiently with how pervasive perceptual biases might moderate the relationship between perceptions of elites and sorting. In this manuscript, I show that perceived out-group dissimilarity affects sorting, albeit in an asymmetric manner: perceived out-group dissimilarity corresponds to greater sorting for persons with right-leaning identities compared to those with left-leaning ones. I then analyze the 1992–1996 ANES Panel Study and find that these patterns mostly hold, with one caveat: sorting also shapes perceptions of out-group dissimilarity. These findings offer preliminary evidence of the existence of a feedback loop between perceptions of elites and sorting.
Are All ‘Birthers’ Conspiracy Theorists? On the Relationship Between Conspiratorial Thinking and Political Orientations
Adam Enders, Steven Smallpage & Robert Lupton
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
While research on conspiracy theories and those who believe them has recently undergone a renaissance, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the measurement of conspiratorial beliefs and orientations, and the consequences of a conspiratorial mindset for expressly political attitudes and behaviors. We first demonstrate, using data from the 2012 American National Election Study, that beliefs in a variety of specific conspiracy theories are simultaneously, but differentially, the product of both a general tendency toward conspiratorial thinking and left/right political orientations. Next, we employ unique data including a general measure of conspiratorial thinking to explore the predictors of specific conspiracy beliefs. We find that partisan and ideological self-identifications are more important than any other variable in predicting ‘birther’ beliefs, while conspiratorial thinking is most important in predicting conspiracy beliefs about the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.