No Clue
The unexpected power of positivity: Predictions versus decisions about advisor selection
Julia Hur, Rachel Ruttan & Catherine Shea
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
In almost any profession, selecting a good advisor is crucial for success. The current research examines the discrepancy between predicted versus actual advisor selection decisions. We found that individuals make consistent predictions that they would rely primarily on competence-based characteristics (e.g., expertise, experience) when selecting an advisor (Studies 1, 2, and 4). This predicted preference remained even when all potential advisors had relatively similar levels of expertise (Study 4). Using data from the reality competition The Voice, we examined whether this prediction translates into actual, high-stakes decision-making (Study 3). The results showed that, contrary to predictions, individuals were more likely to select advisors who expressed high amounts of positivity toward them. We then extended our investigation by testing predicted versus actual advisor selections in a single experiment, again finding evidence that people failed to anticipate the influence that expressed positivity would exert on their selection of an advisor (Study 5). Finally, we examined the performance consequences of this pattern of advisor selection, demonstrating that reliance on expressed positivity over expertise when selecting an advisor can inhibit advisees' performance improvements (Study 6).
The effects of communicating uncertainty on public trust in facts and numbers
Anne Marthe van der Bles et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming
Abstract:
Uncertainty is inherent to our knowledge about the state of the world yet often not communicated alongside scientific facts and numbers. In the "posttruth" era where facts are increasingly contested, a common assumption is that communicating uncertainty will reduce public trust. However, a lack of systematic research makes it difficult to evaluate such claims. We conducted five experiments - including one preregistered replication with a national sample and one field experiment on the BBC News website (total n = 5,780) - to examine whether communicating epistemic uncertainty about facts across different topics (e.g., global warming, immigration), formats (verbal vs. numeric), and magnitudes (high vs. low) influences public trust. Results show that whereas people do perceive greater uncertainty when it is communicated, we observed only a small decrease in trust in numbers and trustworthiness of the source, and mostly for verbal uncertainty communication. These results could help reassure all communicators of facts and science that they can be more open and transparent about the limits of human knowledge.
Training Fast and Frugal Heuristics in Military Decision Making
Adrian Banks, David Gamblin & Heather Hutchinson
Applied Cognitive Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt, and are as effective as analytic decision methods.
Small steps to accuracy: Incremental belief updaters are better forecasters
Pavel Atanasov et al.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, September 2020, Pages 19-35
Abstract:
Laboratory research has shown that both underreaction and overreaction to new information pose threats to forecasting accuracy. This article explores how real-world forecasters who vary in skill attempt to balance these threats. We distinguish among three aspects of updating: frequency, magnitude, and confirmation propensity. Drawing on data from a four-year forecasting tournament that elicited over 400,000 probabilistic predictions on almost 500 geopolitical questions, we found that the most accurate forecasters made frequent, small updates, while low-skill forecasters were prone to confirm initial judgments or make infrequent, large revisions. High-frequency updaters scored higher on crystallized intelligence and open-mindedness, accessed more information, and improved over time. Small-increment updaters had higher fluid intelligence scores, and derived their advantage from initial forecasts. Update magnitude mediated the causal effect of training on accuracy. Frequent, small revisions provided reliable and valid signals of skill. These updating patterns can help organizations identify talent for managing uncertain prospects.
Measuring Information Preferences
Emily Ho, David Hagmann & George Loewenstein
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Advances in medical testing and widespread access to the internet have made it easier than ever to obtain information. Yet, when it comes to some of the most important decisions in life, people often choose to remain ignorant for a variety of psychological and economic reasons. We design and validate an information preferences scale to measure an individual's desire to obtain or avoid information that may be unpleasant but could improve future decisions. The scale measures information preferences in three domains that are psychologically and materially consequential: consumer finance, personal characteristics, and health. In three studies incorporating responses from over 2,300 individuals, we present tests of the scale's reliability and validity. We show that the scale predicts a real decision to obtain (or avoid) information in each of the domains as well as decisions from out-of-sample, unrelated domains. Across settings, many respondents prefer to remain in a state of active ignorance even when information is freely available. Moreover, we find that information preferences are a stable trait but that an individual's preference for information can differ across domains.
Artificial Intelligence and Persuasion: A Construal-Level Account
Tae Woo Kim & Adam Duhachek
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although more individuals are relying on information provided by nonhuman agents, such as artificial intelligence and robots, little research has examined how persuasion attempts made by nonhuman agents might differ from persuasion attempts made by human agents. Drawing on construal-level theory, we posited that individuals would perceive artificial agents at a low level of construal because of the agents' lack of autonomous goals and intentions, which directs individuals' focus toward how these agents implement actions to serve humans rather than why they do so. Across multiple studies (total N = 1,668), we showed that these construal-based differences affect compliance with persuasive messages made by artificial agents. These messages are more appropriate and effective when the message represents low-level as opposed to high-level construal features. These effects were moderated by the extent to which an artificial agent could independently learn from its environment, given that learning defies people's lay theories about artificial agents.
What Goes Down When Advice Goes Up: Younger Advisers Underestimate Their Impact
Ting Zhang & Michael North
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Common wisdom suggests that older is wiser. Consequently, people rarely give advice to older individuals - even when they are relatively more expert - leading to missed learning opportunities. Across six studies (N = 3,445), we explore the psychology of advisers when they are younger (reverse advising), the same age (peer advising), or older (traditional advising) than their advisees. Study 1 shows that advisers avoid reverse-advising interactions because they perceive that their relative youth makes them less effective. However, when compared to advisees' actual perceptions, reverse advisers are misguided, as they underestimate their effectiveness when giving general life advice (Study 2a-2b) as well as tactical advice (Studies 3-4). This misperception is in part driven by advisers' beliefs about their own competence and others' receptivity. Finally, we demonstrate an intervention that mitigates advisers' misguided beliefs (Study 5). Contrary to advisers' own perceptions and popular belief, these findings illustrate that being relatively young can also mean being an impactful adviser.
Distinguishing deliberate from systematic thinking
Adi Amit et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Deliberate thinking and systematic thinking are often conflated when contrasted with intuitive thinking. We argue that, in fact, nonintuitive thinking is multidimensional, and that deliberate and systematic thinking are distinct nonintuitive processes. We establish their distinct meanings in 6 studies using 3 research paradigms. Our first paradigm (Studies 1 and 2) takes an individual differences approach. Adopting a meta-analytic design with the addition of new data, we find that deliberate thinking and systematic thinking are differentially associated with personality traits (openness to experience with deliberate thinking; conscientiousness with systematic thinking) and with personal values (self-direction vs. conformity with deliberate thinking; security vs. stimulation with systematic thinking). Our second paradigm (Studies 3 and 4) employs a decision-making task (choosing between different problem types and levels of difficulty) to test for deliberate and systematic thinking in isolation from each other. We show that systematic thinking (in oneself and others) predicts a selection of rule-based over context-based problems, while deliberate thinking predicts a selection of difficult over simple problems. Our third paradigm (Studies 5 and 6) takes a cultural perspective. We show that although deliberate thinking is universally perceived as signifying competence, the contribution of systematic thinking to perceptions of competence is culturally dependent, differing for participants under a collectivistic versus individualistic mindset. Together our findings highlight the need to distinguish between deliberate and systematic thinking and underscore the need for studies of intuitive versus nonintuitive thinking to take a multidimensional perspective.
Forethought and intelligence: How conscientiousness, future planning, and general mental ability predict net worth
Jonathan Shaffer
Personality and Individual Differences, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study examined a model in which conscientiousness is related to net worth through its relationship with future planning, and in which general mental ability (GMA) moderates the effects of future planning on net worth. Data for this study were drawn from 1,135 participants in the National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States. Results from an analysis of conditional indirect effects suggest that conscientiousness shared a positive, indirect association with net worth through its relationship with future planning that was realized only for individuals higher in GMA. In contrast, conscientiousness had no indirect association with net worth for those low in GMA. This study helps add to the understanding of how noncognitive (personality) and cognitive (ability) traits affect individual-level economic outcomes and offers an explanation for both how and when conscientiousness influences net worth. These findings may be particularly important given efforts to design interventions that help improve individual financial outcomes.
Does information about toughness decrease fighting? Experimental evidence
Aron Szekely & Diego Gambetta
PLoS ONE, February 2020
Abstract:
Will fights erupt when resources are scarce and the rules regulating their distribution are absent or ignored? We conjecture that the answer depends on whether credible information about individuals' toughness is available. When people send credible signs and signals of their toughness disputes may be solved without violence. We use a laboratory experiment in which subjects create information about their toughness and decide whether to take others' resources and resist in case others' attempt to take theirs. Subjects perform a potentially painful but safe physical exercise to create information and to determine who wins and loses fights. This, realistically, ranks subjects according to their toughness and implicates toughness, a quality important in real conflict, in fighting. We find that, consistent with theory, information reduces fighting. This suggests that, in addition to the theories traditionally used to explain prisoner behavior, the availability of credible information about toughness influences prison conflict.
Percolating ideas: The effects of caffeine on creative thinking and problem solving
Darya Zabelina & Paul Silvia
Consciousness and Cognition, forthcoming
Abstract:
Caffeine is the most widely consumed psychotropic drug in the world, with numerous studies documenting the effects of caffeine on people's alertness, vigilance, mood, concentration, and attentional focus. The effects of caffeine on creative thinking, however, remain unknown. In a randomized placebo-controlled between-subject double-blind design the present study investigated the effect of moderate caffeine consumption on creative problem solving (i.e., convergent thinking) and creative idea generation (i.e., divergent thinking). We found that participants who consumed 200 mg of caffeine (approximately one 12 oz cup of coffee, n = 44), compared to those in the placebo condition (n = 44), showed significantly enhanced problem-solving abilities. Caffeine had no significant effects on creative generation or on working memory. The effects remained after controlling for participants' caffeine expectancies, whether they believed they consumed caffeine or a placebo, and changes in mood. Possible mechanisms and future directions are discussed.