Moral Hazard
To defy or not to defy: An experimental study of the dynamics of disobedience and whistle-blowing
Piero Bocchiaro, Philip Zimbardo & Paul Van Lange
Social Influence, Winter 2012, Pages 35-50
Abstract:
This study introduces a new paradigm for investigating the dynamic processes of disobedience between individuals and unjust authority. Our experimental setting allowed participants (n = 149) to deal with an unethical request by the experimenter with options of (dis)obeying or "blowing the whistle". Results revealed that the majority (77%) complied while the minority was split between those refusing (14%) and those reporting the misconduct to higher authorities (9%). No significant differences were found in personal characteristics and dispositional variables distinguishing between obedient, disobedient, and whistleblower participants. An independent sample (n = 138), when asked to predict their behavior, gave exactly the opposite reaction to our experimental participants: Only 4% believed they would obey that authority.
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Low-Effort Thought Promotes Political Conservatism
Scott Eidelman et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
The authors test the hypothesis that low-effort thought promotes political conservatism. In Study 1, alcohol intoxication was measured among bar patrons; as blood alcohol level increased, so did political conservatism (controlling for sex, education, and political identification). In Study 2, participants under cognitive load reported more conservative attitudes than their no-load counterparts. In Study 3, time pressure increased participants' endorsement of conservative terms. In Study 4, participants considering political terms in a cursory manner endorsed conservative terms more than those asked to cogitate; an indicator of effortful thought (recognition memory) partially mediated the relationship between processing effort and conservatism. Together these data suggest that political conservatism may be a process consequence of low-effort thought; when effortful, deliberate thought is disengaged, endorsement of conservative ideology increases.
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Is It Light or Dark? Recalling Moral Behavior Changes Perception of Brightness
Pronobesh Banerjee, Promothesh Chatterjee & Jayati Sinha
Psychological Science, forthcoming
"[W]e explored whether recalling abstract concepts such as evil (as exemplified by unethical deeds) and goodness (as exemplified by ethical deeds) can indeed influence the sensory experience of the brightness of light. Specifically, we hypothesized that individuals who recall a time when they performed an ethical deed should perceive their immediate surroundings to be brighter than should individuals who recall a time when they performed an unethical deed. We tested our prediction in two studies. In addition, in Study 2, we tested a second prediction that follows from our first one: If people perceive less light after recalling an unethical behavior than after recalling an ethical behavior, participants who have recalled an unethical behavior should exhibit a greater preference for light-producing objects (but not for other objects) than should participants who have recalled an ethical behavior."
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Hamilton vs. Kant: Pitting adaptations for altruism against adaptations for moral judgment
Robert Kurzban, Peter DeScioli & Daniel Fein
Evolution and Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
Prominent evolutionary theories of morality maintain that the adaptations that underlie moral judgment and behavior function, at least in part, to deliver benefits (or prevent harm) to others. These explanations are based on the theories of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, and they predict that moral systems are designed to maximize Hamiltonian inclusive fitness. In sharp contrast, however, moral judgment often appears Kantian and rule-based. To reconcile this apparent discrepancy, some theorists have claimed that Kantian moral rules result from mechanisms that implement simple heuristics for maximizing welfare. To test this idea, we conducted a set of studies in which subjects (N=1290) decided whether they would kill one person to save five others, varying the relationship of the subject with the others involved (strangers, friends, brothers). Are participants more likely to observe the Kantian rule against killing in decisions about brothers and friends, rather than strangers? We found the reverse. Subjects reported greater willingness to kill a brother or friend than a stranger (in order to save five others of the same type). These results suggest that the rule-based structure of moral cognition is not explained by kin selection, reciprocity, or other altruism theories.
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Nora Walter et al.
Brain and Cognition, April 2012, Pages 268-273
Abstract:
Perspective-taking has become a main focus of studies on moral judgments. Recent fMRI studies have demonstrated that individual differences in brain activation predict moral decision making. In particular, pharmacological studies highlighted the crucial role for the neuropeptide oxytocin in social behavior and emotional perception. In the present study N = 154 participants were genotyped for a functional polymorphism (rs2268498) in the promoter region of the OXTR gene. We found a significant difference between carriers and non-carriers of the C-allele in exculpating agents for accidental harms (F(1,152) = 11.49, p = .001, η2 = .07) indicating that carriers of the C-allele rated accidentally committed harm as significantly more blameworthy than non-carriers. This is the first study providing evidence for a genetic contribution to moral judgments.
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Ibrahim Ismail et al.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, March 2012, Pages 735-750
Abstract:
The naturalistic fallacy is the erroneous belief that what is natural is morally acceptable. Two studies assessed whether people commit the naturalistic fallacy by testing whether genetic explanations for killing and male promiscuity, as compared to experiential explanations (i.e., learning/"nurture" explanations) increase acceptance of these behaviors. In Study 1, participants who read a genetic explanation for why people kill bugs viewed bug killing as more morally acceptable than participants who read an experiential explanation, although they did not reliably kill more bugs. In Study 2, men who read a genetic explanation for why men are more promiscuous than women reported decreased interest in long-term romantic commitment compared with men who read experiential explanations and women who read either explanation.
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The Gleam of the Double-Edged Sword: The Benefits of Subgroups for Organizational Ethics
Margaret Ormiston & Elaine Wong
Psychological Science, forthcoming
"Although subgroups are omnipresent in organizations, little is known about the benefit of subgroups for organizational-level outcomes. Our work speaks to this research gap and is the first to empirically demonstrate that subgroup fragmentation within leadership teams is positively related to organizational outcomes such as organizational ethics. Further, decentralization moderates this relationship; in our study, subgroups benefited organizational ethics only in decentralized organizations. Given these positive effects of information-based subgroups, future research should explore how other types of subgroups (e.g., ethnicity-based subgroups) influence organizational outcomes."
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Be Aware to Care: Public Self-Awareness Leads to a Reversal of the Bystander Effect
Marco van Bommel et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The classic bystander effect stipulates that people help others more when they are alone than when other bystanders are present. We reason that, sometimes, the presence of bystanders can increase helping, notably in situations where public self-awareness is increased through the use of accountability cues (e.g., a camera). We conducted two experiments in which we tested this line of reasoning. In both experiments, participants read messages soliciting support in an online forum. We varied the number of people that were present in that forum to create a bystander and an alone condition. In Study 1, we introduced an accountability cue by making participants' screen-names more salient, and in Study 2, we used a webcam. Both studies indicate that, as expected, the bystander effect can be reversed by means of cues that raise public self-awareness in social settings.
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The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: Distancing Response to Ethical Dissonance
Rachel Barkan et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Six studies demonstrate the "pot calling the kettle black" phenomenon whereby people are guilty of the very fault they identify in others. Recalling an undeniable ethical failure, people experience ethical dissonance between their moral values and their behavioral misconduct. Our findings indicate that to reduce ethical dissonance, individuals use a double-distancing mechanism. Using an overcompensating ethical code, they judge others more harshly and present themselves as more virtuous and ethical (Studies 1, 2, 3). We show this mechanism is exclusive for ethical dissonance and is not triggered by salience of ethicality (Study 4), general sense of personal failure, or ethically neutral cognitive dissonance (Study 5). Finally, it is characterized by some boundary conditions (Study 6). We discuss the theoretical contribution of this work to research on moral regulation and ethical behavior.
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Marina Kouzakova et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article presents two studies demonstrating the implications of having different values (vs. interests) in a situation where people take opposite positions. Study 1 examined how people respond to a range of conflict issues that were framed either as referring to conflicting values or as referring to conflicting interests. Study 2 used a more immersive methodology, in which participants were led to consider either their values or interests in taking up a particular position, after which they were presented with a confederate who took up the opposite position. Results of both studies converge to demonstrate that framing a particular conflict issue in terms of values causes people to experience more self-involvement and to perceive less common ground. This result can be seen as a potential explanation of why value conflicts tend to escalate more easily than conflicts of interests and also offers scope for interventions directed at value conflict resolution.
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Anticipatory stress interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Katrin Starcke, Anne-Catrin Ludwig & Matthias Brand
Judgment and Decision Making, January 2012, Pages 61-68
Abstract:
A recent study indicates that acute stress affects moral decision making (Youssef et al., in press). The current study examines whether results can be replicated using a different kind of stressor and a different kind of stress measurement. We induced stress in 25 participants with a cover-story of an anticipated speech. Another group of 25 participants was tested in a control condition. Stress levels and stress responses were assessed with questionnaires and heart rate. All participants performed a moral decision-making task describing moral dilemmas. These dilemmas were either personal or impersonal and each offered a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian option. Acutely stressed participants, compared to control participants, made fewer utilitarian judgments and needed longer for making a decision. Individual physiological stress response was related to fewer utilitarian judgments. Results are in line with those previously found although different instruments were used.
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Drawing the line somewhere: An experimental study of moral compromise
Alan Lewis et al.
Journal of Economic Psychology, August 2012, Pages 718-725
Abstract:
In a study by Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, and De Dreu (2011) it was convincingly demonstrated that psychologically, the distinction between right and wrong is not discrete, rather it is a continuous distribution of relative ‘rightness' and ‘wrongness'. Using the ‘die-under-the-cup' paradigm participants over-reported high numbers on the roll of a die when there were financial incentives to do so and no chance of detection for lying. Participants generally did not maximize income, instead making moral compromises. In an adaptation of this procedure in a single die experiment 9% of participants lied that they had rolled a ‘6' when they had not compared to 2.5% in the Shalvi et.al. study suggesting that when the incentive is donation to charity this encourages more dishonesty than direct personal gain. In a follow-up questionnaire study where sequences of three rolls were presented, lying increased where counterfactuals became available as predicted by Shalvi et.al. A novel finding is reported where ‘justified' lying is more common when comparative gains are higher. An investigation of individual differences revealed that economics students were much more likely to lie than psychology students. Relevance to research on tax evasion, corporate social responsibility and the ‘credit crunch' is discussed.
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Why Do We Punish Groups? High Entitativity Promotes Moral Suspicion
Anna-Kaisa Newheiser, Takuya Sawaoka & John Dovidio
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
People typically take a moral deservingness perspective when deciding on appropriate punishment for intentional wrongdoings committed by individuals. Considerably less is known about how people reason about wrongdoings committed by groups, even though there are fundamental differences in how people perceive individuals versus groups. The present research examined perceived entitativity, the degree to which a group is perceived to be a unified, single agent, as a potential determinant of moral reasoning about transgressions committed by groups. We found that participants recommended more severe punishments for high-entitativity (vs. low-entitativity) perpetrator groups, particularly in the presence of morally mitigating circumstances that typically lessen punitiveness. This effect was mediated by perceptions of greater moral accountability in high-entitativity groups. Thus, justice is not equal for all groups. Implications for retributive justice and the criminal justice system are discussed.
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How the Moralization of Issues Grants Social Legitimacy to Act on One's Attitudes
Daniel Effron & Dale Miller
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Actions that do not have as their goal the advancement or protection of one's material interests are often seen as illegitimate. Four studies suggested that moral values can legitimate action in the absence of material interest. The more participants linked sociopolitical issues to moral values, the more comfortable they felt advocating on behalf of those issues and the less confused they were by others' advocacy (Studies 1 and 2). Crime victims were perceived as being more entitled to claim special privileges when the crime had violated their personal moral values (Studies 3 and 4). These effects were strongest when the legitimacy to act could not already be derived from one's material interests, suggesting that moral values and material interest can represent interchangeable justifications for behavior. No support was found for the possibility that attitude strength explained these effects. The power of moralization to disinhibit action is discussed.
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Psychopathy Increases Perceived Moral Permissibility of Accidents
Liane Young et al.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Psychopaths are notorious for their antisocial and immoral behavior, yet experimental studies have typically failed to identify deficits in their capacities for explicit moral judgment. We tested 20 criminal psychopaths and 25 criminal nonpsychopaths on a moral judgment task featuring hypothetical scenarios that systematically varied an actor's intention and the action's outcome. Participants were instructed to evaluate four classes of actions: accidental harms, attempted harms, intentional harms, and neutral acts. Psychopaths showed a selective difference, compared with nonpsychopaths, in judging accidents, where one person harmed another unintentionally. Specifically, psychopaths judged these actions to be more morally permissible. We suggest that this pattern reflects psychopaths' failure to appreciate the emotional aspect of the victim's experience of harm. These findings provide direct evidence of abnormal moral judgment in psychopathy.
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Frank Krueger et al.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
The neuropeptide oxytocin functions as a hormone and neurotransmitter and facilitates complex social cognition and approach behavior. Given that empathy is an essential ingredient for third-party decision-making in institutions of justice, we investigated whether exogenous oxytocin modulates empathy of an unaffected third-party towards offenders and victims of criminal offenses. Healthy male participants received intranasal oxytocin or placebo in a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, between-subjects design. Participants were given a set of legal vignettes that described an event during which an offender engaged in criminal offenses against victims. As an unaffected third-party, participants were asked to rate those criminal offenses on the degree to which the offender deserved punishment and how much harm was inflicted on the victim. Exogenous oxytocin selectively increased third-party decision-makers perceptions of harm for victims but not the desire to punish offenders of criminal offenses. We argue that oxytocin promoted empathic concern for the victim, which in turn increased the tendency for prosocial approach behavior regarding the interpersonal relationship between an unaffected third-party and a fictional victim in the criminal scenarios. Future research should explore the context- and person-dependent nature of exogenous oxytocin in individuals with antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, in whom deficits in empathy feature prominently.
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Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans
Isabelle Blanchette & Michelle Campbell
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, February 2012, Pages 157-164
Abstract:
Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.
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The Cost of Callousness: Regulating Compassion Influences the Moral Self-Concept
Daryl Cameron & Keith Payne
Psychological Science, March 2012, Pages 225-229
Abstract:
It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person's moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion-inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion - but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions - showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person's moral self-concept.
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Corrado Corradi-Dell'Acqua et al.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Rejections of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game are commonly assumed to reflect negative emotional arousal mediated by the anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex (Sanfey et al., 2003; Koenigs & Tranel, 2007). We aimed to disentangle those neural mechanisms associated with direct personal involvement ("I have been treated unfairly") from those associated with fairness considerations, such as the wish to discourage unfair behavior or social norm violations ("this person has been treated unfairly"). For this purpose, we used fMRI and asked participants to play the Ultimatum Game (UG) as responders either for themselves (Myself) or on behalf of another person (third-party, Civai et al., 2010). Unfair offers were equally often rejected in both conditions. Neuroimaging data revealed a dissociation between the medial prefrontal cortex, specifically associated with rejections in the Myself condition, thus confirming its role in self-related emotional responses, and the left anterior insula, associated with rejections in both Myself and Third-Party conditions, suggesting a role in promoting fair behavior also towards third-parties. Our data extend the current understanding of the neural substrate of social decision making, by disentangling the structures sensitive to direct emotional involvement of the self from those implicated in pure fairness considerations.