Mobilized
Ain’t No Fortunate Son: The Political Calculus of Conscription
Douglas Atkinson & Kevin Fahey
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do the electoral incentives of political leaders influence who is compelled to serve in the military? We argue that conscription policy is designed by political actors who care about winning elections. In wartime, politicians face the twin threats of military and electoral defeat. Therefore, they will shield swing communities, who hold considerable sway over the outcome of elections, from some costs of military service. We leverage a novel database of 9.2 million U.S. service-members during World War II. We find that counties that narrowly voted for President Roosevelt and Democratic members of Congress had substantially fewer conscripts in the Army during 1942, 1943, and 1945. Substantively, 139,000 fewer soldiers -- six times the number of soldiers who landed at Normandy -- were enlisted from swing counties than expected. Our findings imply that democratic leaders do not want to lose re-election during wartime, and in doing so sacrifice democratic norms of fairness.
Alliance Reliability and Dispute Escalation
Jesse Johnson & Scott Wolford
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
States form defensive alliances hoping to deter adversaries and avoid war. However, scholars and policy analysts often worry that if an alliance fails to deter the promise of military support will encourage escalation, pushing disputants closer to war. We show that in many cases this concern is unwarranted. We use a game-theoretic model of alliance reliability and crisis bargaining to show that the same factors that indicate unreliability and provoke disputes also encourage alliance members to make concessions rather than risk war. We test this hypothesis using a sample of militarized disputes initiated against members of defensive alliances, where recent shifts in military capabilities represent changes in challengers’ estimates of alliance reliability. Less-reliable alliances are less likely than reliable allies to deter disputes, but they also decrease the probability of escalation relative to reliable alliances. Unreliable alliances need not encourage war; rather, they can discourage it.
The lesser evil? Experimental evidence on the strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos”
Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka & Ondrej Rosendorf
Conflict Management and Peace Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We present findings of a survey experiment on a sample of 2350 American and British citizens, in which we examined attitudes towards nuclear and chemical strikes. Our findings demonstrate that even though the public accurately judges nuclear weapons as more destructive and indiscriminate, it is still more averse to the use of chemical than nuclear weapons. Our follow up study has shown that individuals are significantly more likely to associate chemical weapons with “rogue states” and terrorists, and associate nuclear weapons with modern powers. The findings contribute to scholarship on the “taboos” surrounding the (non-)use of WMDs in world politics.
How Women Promote Peace: Gender Composition, Duration, and Frames in Conflict Resolution
Vivian Ta-Johnson, Eric Keels & Burcu Bayram
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
Research shows that the inclusion of women in negotiations and conflict resolution efforts contributes to peaceful solutions to disputes and armed conflict. Yet we know little about how women contribute to peacebuilding. What, specifically, are women doing to help produce more peaceful outcomes? We present evidence from an international bargaining experiment showing that women contribute to peace by seeking more equitable and symmetrical solutions, even if these provide lower material payoffs. Critically, however, women are willing to give up on asymmetric advantage only when they negotiate with other women. The gender composition of negotiation dyads also significantly influences the duration of negotiations. Statistical analysis of historical territorial disputes probes the external validity of these results, offering suggestive complementary evidence. The main policy implication of our findings is that bilateral disputes will be settled more efficiently and equitably when both sides are represented by women. Our findings should encourage scholars to develop dyadic, not monadic, models of how gender affects international negotiations.
The Domestic Sources of International Reputation
Michael Goldfien, Michael Joseph & Roseanne McManus
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders’ domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader’s international reputation. We theorize that certain domestic choices can inform expectations about future international crisis behavior based on the extent to which (1) the costs at stake are similar to those of an international crisis and (2) the domestic issue is salient relative to foreign policy. We use conjoint experiments and other evidence to show that many domestic choices have significant international reputational effects. There is some evidence that the reputational effect of certain domestic choices may equal that of fighting in a previous international crisis.
Targeting Quality or Quantity? The Divergent Effects of Targeting Upper Verses Lower-Tier Leaders of Militant Organizations
Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines & Daniel Milton
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Research on the efficacy of leadership decapitation has focused primarily on targeting the topmost leaders of groups. Yet, most organizations rely on multiple leaders with specific functional or geographical responsibilities, rather than a single symbolic leader. In this context, we pose the following question: how are the effects of leadership decapitation on a group’s short-term operational capacity conditioned by the type or rank of targeted leaders? We argue that due to the risks faced by militant organizations, upper-tier leaders will delegate operational duties to lower-tier leadership for security purposes. Because of the shift of the principal-agent dynamic to lower-tier leaders, targeting of lower ranked leaders versus topmost leaders is more likely to result in a loss of control over foot soldiers, and trigger negative effects such as a rise in indiscriminate violence. We conduct our study using the case of Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan, with weekly data on the group’s attacks, and multi-tier leadership losses between 2015–2019 across 72 districts.
Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counterproductive? Evidence from Eighteen Countries
Joshua Schwartz, Matthew Fuhrmann & Michael Horowitz
International Studies Quarterly, September 2022
Abstract:
Do armed drone programs decrease or increase terrorism? Existing studies on this question produce conflicting arguments and evidence. Drone optimists contend that armed drones reduce a country's vulnerability to terrorism, while pessimists claim that this military technology provokes higher levels of terrorism. Prior research focuses almost exclusively on one particular context: the short-term effect of the US drone program in Pakistan. However, armed drones have proliferated rapidly over the last decade and eighteen countries now possess this technology. We expand the scope of prior studies by leveraging new data to assess how obtaining armed drones and conducting drone strikes changed the degree to which all drone possessors experienced terrorism between 2001 and 2019. Employing a variety of estimation strategies, including two-way fixed effects, we find that armed drone programs are associated with significant reductions in terrorism. Our analysis, based on the full universe of cases over an eighteen-year period, provides further evidence that drones can be effective as a counterterrorism tool in some cases.
Lingua Franca as a Hidden Barrier to Conflict Resolution
Leigh Grant, Ifat Maoz & Boaz Keysar
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Longstanding intergroup conflict is one of the most perilous issues on the global stage, leading to violence, displacement, and loss of life. Finding strategies to bring parties to the negotiation table is therefore of utmost importance for conflict resolution. Here we address a common problem in intergroup conflict - the lack of a shared, native tongue - which is typically solved by using a lingua franca. Three experimental studies revealed that a peace-building proposal presented in a lingua franca is perceived as less favorable to one’s own side than a proposal presented in one’s native tongue. Specifically, our studies demonstrated that the use of a lingua franca elicits higher levels of hatred and lower levels of sympathy, thereby reducing the perceived favorability of the proposal. Broadly, these findings indicate that the seemingly innocuous choice of the language could have serious implications for conflict resolution as well as for international diplomacy.
Global food insecurity and famine from reduced crop, marine fishery and livestock production due to climate disruption from nuclear war soot injection
Lili Xia et al.
Nature Food, August 2022, Pages 586-596
Abstract:
Atmospheric soot loadings from nuclear weapon detonation would cause disruptions to the Earth’s climate, limiting terrestrial and aquatic food production. Here, we use climate, crop and fishery models to estimate the impacts arising from six scenarios of stratospheric soot injection, predicting the total food calories available in each nation post-war after stored food is consumed. In quantifying impacts away from target areas, we demonstrate that soot injections larger than 5 Tg would lead to mass food shortages, and livestock and aquatic food production would be unable to compensate for reduced crop output, in almost all countries. Adaptation measures such as food waste reduction would have limited impact on increasing available calories. We estimate more than 2 billion people could die from nuclear war between India and Pakistan, and more than 5 billion could die from a war between the United States and Russia -- underlining the importance of global cooperation in preventing nuclear war.
The Meddling American Voter? How Norms, Interests, and Great Power Rivalries Affect U.S. Public Support for Partisan Electoral Interventions Abroad
Dov Levin & Paul Musgrave
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries’ elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public’s views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.
Inconstant Care: Public Attitudes Towards Force Protection and Civilian Casualties in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel
Janina Dill, Scott Sagan & Benjamin Valentino
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
The choice between protecting friendly soldiers or foreign civilians is a critical strategic dilemma faced in modern war. Prevailing theories suggest that casualties among both groups depress war support in Western democratic societies. Yet we know little about how ordinary citizens balance force protection and civilian casualty avoidance, and whether public opinion differs across Western democracies. Using survey experiments, we test three micro-foundations for what we call individuals’ “harm-transfer preferences:” self-interest, perception of soldiers’ consent to risk-taking, and nationalism. We find that respondents’ perception of soldiers’ consent and respondents’ nationalism explain individual-level variation in harm-transfer preferences. Moreover, Israeli citizens are significantly more likely than American or British citizens to prefer protecting friendly forces over avoiding foreign civilian casualties. This is associated with higher levels of nationalism and the perceptions that soldiers do not consent to risking their lives in Israel compared to the United States and the United Kingdom.
Nonproliferation Information and Attitude Change: Evidence From South Korea
Sangyong Son & Jong Hee Park
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
What explains the foreign policy gap between elites and the general public on nuclear proliferation? We investigate specific contexts in which experts’ nonproliferation information changes public attitudes toward nuclear weapons development using a novel attitude change experiment. By randomly assigning seven categories of nonproliferation information to pro-armament survey participants, we examine how different types of nonproliferation information affect pro-armament respondents’ opinions and behavioral choices. The results of our experiment demonstrate the enlightening effect of economic sanctions information. After learning about the economic costs and consequences of nuclear weapons development, pro-armament respondents substantially changed their opinion as well as behaviors toward nuclear proliferation. In comparison to economic sanctions information, other types of nonproliferation information (e.g. conditional military punishment, normative sanctions, nuclear technology sanctions, elite or public opposition to proliferation) have limited effects on pro-armament subjects’ attitude changes. These findings are the first to identify the relative explanatory powers of previous explanations for nuclear nonproliferation at the individual level.