Mission creep
Is There a Trump Effect? An Experiment on Political Polarization and Audience Costs
Miles Evers, Aleksandr Fisher & Steven Schaaf
Perspectives on Politics, June 2019, Pages 433-452
Abstract:
Does President Trump face domestic costs for foreign policy inconsistency? Will co-partisans and opposition-partisans equally punish Donald Trump for issuing flippant international threats and backing down? While the president said he could “stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody” without losing voters, the literature consistently shows that individuals, regardless of partisanship, disapprove of leaders who jeopardize the country’s reputation for credibility and resolve. Given the atypical nature of the Trump presidency, and the severe partisan polarization surrounding it, we investigate whether the logic of audience costs still applies in the Trump era. Using a unique experiment fielded during the 2016 presidential transition, we show that Republicans and Democrats impose equal audience costs on President Trump. And by varying the leader’s identity, between Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and “The President,” we demonstrate that the public adheres to a non-partisan logic in punishing leaders who renege on threats. Yet we also find Presidents Trump and Obama can reduce the magnitude of audience costs by justifying backing down as being “in America’s interest.” Even Democrats, despite their doubts of Donald Trump’s credibility, accept such justifications. Our findings encourage further exploration of partisan cues, leader-level attributes, and leader-level reputations.
What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11
Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler
Journal of Economic Literature, June 2019, Pages 275-328
Abstract:
This overview examines critically the post-9/11 empirical literature on terrorism. Major contributions by both economists and political scientists are included. We focus on five main themes: the changing nature of terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, modern drivers or causes of terrorism, and the economic consequences of terrorism. In so doing, we investigate a host of questions that include: How do terrorist groups attract and retain members? What determines the survival of terrorist groups? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? What counterterrorism measures work best? In the latter regard, we find that many counterterrorism policies have unintended negative consequences owing to attack transference and terrorist backlash. This suggests the need for novel policies such as service provision to counter some terrorist groups' efforts to provide such services. Despite terrorists' concerted efforts to damage targeted countries' economies, the empirical literature shows that terrorism has had little or no effect on economic growth or GDP except in small terrorism-plagued countries. At the sectoral level, terrorism can adversely affect tourism and foreign direct investment, but these effects are rather transient and create transference of activities to other sectors, thus cushioning the consequences.
Secrecy among Friends: Covert Military Alliances and Portfolio Consistency
Raymond Kuo
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars think that friendly nations adopt secrecy to avoid domestic costs and facilitate cooperation. But this article uncovers a historical puzzle. Between 1870 and 1916, over 80 percent of alliance ties were partially or completely covert. Otherwise, hidden pacts are rare. Why was secrecy prevalent in this particular period and not others? This article presents a theory of “portfolio consistency.” Public agreements undermine the rank of hidden alliances. A partner willing to openly commit to another country but not to you signals the increased importance of this other relationship. States pressure their covert partners to avoid subsequent public pacts. This creates a network effect: the more secret partners a state has, the greater the incentives to maintain secrecy in later military agreements. Covert alliances have a cumulative effect. In seeking the flexibility of hidden partnerships, states can lock themselves into a rigid adherence to secrecy.
Negotiating with Terrorists: The Costs of Compliance
Kerim Peren Arin et al.
Southern Economic Journal, forthcoming
Abstract:
It is often argued that negotiating with terrorists will encourage terrorist attacks. To date, corroborating empirical evidence is scarce. Using ITERATE data, we investigate the impact of conceding to terrorist demands on terror activity. We restrict attention to hostage events with clear‐cut demands from terrorists. Our sample period runs from 1978 to 2005 and comprises 1435 events in 125 countries. Estimating a flexible and dynamic Structured Additive Regression model, we find that the percentage of successfully negotiated events has a nonlinear effect on future terror intensity consistent with our simple theoretical model. More specifically, although moderate rates of negotiation increase the number of future terror events, higher negotiation rates tend to have the opposite effect. The estimated threshold is around 20%.
Israeli Demolition Orders and Palestinian Preferences for Dissent
Sophia Hatz
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
How does state repression affect civilians’ preferences for dissent? This essay examines administrative demolition orders issued against Palestinian structures in the West Bank. As administrative demolition is a penalty for illegal building and is not provoked by Palestinian violence and radicalization, the policy’s impact can be estimated while avoiding the challenge of reverse causality. Drawing on United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Demolition Order database and Palestinian opinion polls during 2001–12, the study finds that in the long run, the policy hardens preferences: as the number of demolition orders issued increases, Palestinians are more likely to oppose peace and support violence against Israelis. By demonstrating the provocative effect of collective threat, the study sheds light on a mechanism by which repression backfires. For the policy of administrative demolition, the findings suggest that while ostensibly exogenous to conflict dynamics, the practice has consequences for the peace process.
The role of MI6 in Egypt’s decision to go to war against Israel in May 1948
Meir Zamir
Intelligence and National Security, forthcoming
Abstract:
David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the State of Israel, repeatedly accused Britain of provoking the Arab states to invade Israel the day after its establishment in May 1948. To date, historians have not found proof of his accusations in British archives. However, evidence may be found in French archives, especially in Syrian and secret British documents obtained by the French secret services, originating from agents who had infiltrated the Syrian government in Damascus and the British Legation in Beirut. This article, based on French, Syrian, Israeli and British sources, argues that under the Labour government, Arabist MI6 officers in the Middle East, in collaboration with the British High Command in Cairo, pursued an alternative policy to that of the Foreign Office. They provoked Egypt’s King Faruq to go to war against Israel without the knowledge or approval of either Prime Minister Clement Attlee or Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, frequently misinforming and misleading them. This watershed research provides details of the goals and modus operandi of those involved in that clandestine plot.
Coping with Moral Threat: Moral Judgment amid War on Terror
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom et al.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Moral dilemmas amid war on terrorism include repeated harsh moral choices, which often pose threats to one’s moral image. Given that people strive to view themselves as moral, how do they cope with such morally compromising decisions? We suggest and test two strategies to cope with morally threatening decision-making under in-group moral responsibility amid war on terrorism: (a) trivialization of the moral dilemma and (b) resentment toward the target. Four experimental studies measured (study 1) and manipulated (studies 2–4) these hypothesized mechanisms, presenting a similar collateral damage dilemma to Israeli Jews in the context of the 2014 Gaza conflict (studies 1 and 2) and to Americans in the context of the US campaign against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (studies 3 and 4). Results demonstrate that both trivialization and resentment facilitate harsh moral choices under conditions of moral accountability. Studying the mechanism underlying moral decision-making in conflicts is key to understanding moral injury and the process of moral repair.
Building Trust: The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Public Opinion in Peru
Michael Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain & Alissandra Stoyan
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Since the 1950s, US military personnel have taken on an increasingly diverse set of responsibilities, including less traditional roles delivering disaster aid and engaging in public diplomacy. Focusing on a particular subset of deployments, humanitarian and civic-assistance deployments to Latin America, we examine the effect that a US military presence can have on public opinion in the host country. We focus on the microfoundations of popular support and use survey data and newly collected subnational data on deployments to examine the effect of these deployments on mass attitudes toward the US military and government in Peru. We find that these deployments do improve perceptions of the US military and government, and correlate with assessments of US influence that are more positive. Our findings bolster the conclusions of previous research that shows how aid can both improve public attitudes toward the donor country and address the foreign aid attribution problem.
Backing up, not backing down: Mitigating audience costs through policy substitution
Erik Lin-Greenberg
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can a leader reduce the audience costs imposed for backing down completely on a threat by opting instead to ‘back up’ to a less hawkish policy? Current research examines the political repercussions of making a threat and then taking no action at all. Real world leaders, however, often ‘back up’ and implement policies that involve some action – for instance, imposing sanctions after threatening military force, rather than backing down entirely. This article argues that audience costs can be mitigated through policy substitution: backing up to less hawkish policies – that reduce inconsistency between a leader’s words and deeds – may reduce audience costs. A series of original survey experiments finds support for the argument and demonstrates that the population treats inconsistency as a continuum. The findings have implications for domestic politics and crisis bargaining. Domestically, a leader who backs up faces lower audience costs and is seen as more competent than one who backs down. Yet those on the receiving end of threats are less likely to believe the future threats of a foreign leader who has previously backed up or backed down. Backing up therefore degrades the credibility of crisis signals by making it difficult for rivals to distinguish between credible threats and those that will be backed up.
Cognitive Shortcuts and Public Support for Intervention
Jason Brownlee
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars of public opinion on military intervention agree that survey respondents make judgments from limited information. Yet researchers still question whether ordinary Americans reflect elite attitudes or instead reach their own “pretty prudent” conclusions from the stated principal policy objective (PPO). This article adjudicates the debate while incorporating lessons from the study of bounded rationality. Evidence comes from an original data set of aggregate US public opinion, covering 1,080 nationally representative survey items about launching operations, across thirty-five countries, during 1981 to 2016. Tests show that PPO matters: pursuing “internal policy change” is less popular than restraining international aggression. However, language reflecting White House cues and one prominent cognitive shortcut (the “availability heuristic”) statistically and substantively outperforms PPO at predicting intervention support. The results indicate that when ordinary Americans are polled about using force against salient foes (Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), elements of bounded rationality can overtake the prudence expressed toward less vivid problems.
Foreign policy begins at home: The local origin of support for US democracy promotion
William Christiansen, Tobias Heinrich & Timothy Peterson
International Interactions, forthcoming
Abstract:
Citizens hold opinions about what kinds of foreign policy their government should pursue. Because foreign policy often has geographically specific domestic consequences, we expect opinions to vary with the locality of its impact. In this article, we examine whether individual support for US foreign policy to promote democracy abroad depends on exactly where the policy’s domestic impact will occur. We expect individuals to favor policies that bestow local benefits while opposing those that impose local costs. Accordingly, we argue that support for proposed democracy aid grants will be higher when such aid benefits local firms and organizations. Conversely, we expect that opposition to proposed economic sanctions in the form of development aid cuts will be higher when the associated domestic costs stemming from lost jobs fall locally. Using the results from an original survey experiment, we find evidence that a positive local impact of aid increases support for and reduces opposition to democracy promotion, while a negative local impact of sanctions reduces indifference and increases opposition to punitive policy in the case of democratic backsliding.
Impact of Health Aid Investments on Public Opinion of the United States: Analysis of Global Attitude Surveys From 45 Countries, 2002–2016
Aleksandra Jakubowski et al.
American Journal of Public Health, July 2019, Pages 1034-1041
Methods: We linked health aid data from the United States to nationally representative opinion poll surveys from 45 countries conducted between 2002 and 2016. We exploited the abrupt and substantial increase in health aid when the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) were launched to assess unique changes in opinions of the United States following program onset. We also ascertained increased exposure to health aid from the United States by systematically searching for mentions of US health aid programs in popular press.
Results: Favorability ratings of the United States increased within countries in proportion to health aid and were significantly higher after implementation of PEPFAR and PMI. Higher US health aid was associated with more references to that aid in the popular press.
A Gendered Imperative: Does Sexual Violence Attract UN Attention in Civil Wars?
Michelle Benson & Theodora-Ismene Gizelis
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is increasing awareness that sexual violence is distinct from other aspects of civilian victimization in civil wars. Few studies have examined the independent impact of such violence on responses to civil wars as compared to “traditional” forms of violence. This article explores whether reports of high levels of rape and sexual violence increase the probability of United Nations (UN) attention to conflicts and calls to action. In so doing, we combine original data on UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions with data on sexual violence in armed conflict and estimate the impact of sexual violence on UN attention to all civil wars from 1990 to 2009. We show that the effects of sexual violence on the number and level of UNSC resolutions are significant even when controlling for other important determinants of UN action. These findings have important implications for understanding how the UN has expanded its view on protecting civilians.
International politics by other means: External sources of civil war
Mark Toukan
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
The literature on civil wars has recently turned towards their international context but lacks an account for how conflict beyond a state’s borders contributes to civil war onset. I argue that interstate rivalries can increase the risk of civil war in other states when rivals come to associate the foreign-policy orientation of other states with their own security. I present three pathways through which rivals increase the risk of civil war in other states. First, competition between rivals creates a ratchet effect by which the prospect of one’s involvement in a conflict makes it more likely that the other becomes involved. This dynamic makes support easier to secure and lowers the expected costs of war for governments and opposition groups. Second, rivals encourage domestic polarization as parties attempt to capture their influence, making domestic conflicts more intractable. Third, uncertainty over the potential for intervention by rivals increases the risk of miscalculation. I test the implications of the theory with novel spatial measures of interstate conflict and rivalry. Using logistic regressions and random forests, I find that being in the neighborhood of interstate rivals can increase a state’s risk of civil war.