Messy divorce
Measuring moral politics: How strict and nurturant family values explain individual differences in conservatism, liberalism, and the political middle
Matthew Feinberg et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Individuals’ political stances tend to place them into the conservative “right,” the liberal “left,” or the moderate “middle.” What might explain this pattern of division? Moral Politics Theory (Lakoff, 1996) holds that political attitudes arise from moral worldviews that are conceptually anchored in contrasting family models — the strict-father and nurturant-parent models — while the political middle is morally “biconceptual,” endorsing both models simultaneously. The present research examined these postulations empirically. Studies 1 and 2 tested the conceptual and predictive validity of the theorized models by developing an instrument assessing strict and nurturant parenting beliefs (the Moral Politics Scale [MPT]), and examining its power to predict political stances on issues seemingly unrelated to parenting attitudes (e.g., abortion, taxes, and same-sex marriage). Studies 3a and 3b explored construct validity while testing whether the family models translate into more general moral worldviews, which then serve as a foundation of political attitudes. Studies 4a through 4c tested generalizability, examining the relationship between the family models and political stances across different countries, data-collection modalities, and a representative American sample. Finally, Studies 5–7 explored biconceptualism and the tendency for these individuals to shift political attitudes as a consequence of situational factors, particularly moral framing, such that strict-father frames lead to increased support for conservative stances while nurturant-parent frames lead to increased support for liberal stances. Overall, we found support for each of MPT’s assertions, suggesting that an important aspect of the conceptual and experiential basis of people’s political attitudes lies in the strict-father and nurturant-parent family models.
Persuading the Enemy: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment Design
Justin de Benedictis-Kessner et al.
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does media choice cause polarization, or merely reflect it? We investigate a critical aspect of this puzzle: How partisan media contribute to attitude polarization among different groups of media consumers. We implement a new experimental design, called the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment (PICA) design, that incorporates both free choice and forced exposure. We estimate jointly the degree of polarization caused by selective exposure and the persuasive effect of partisan media. Our design also enables us to conduct sensitivity analyses accounting for discrepancies between stated preferences and actual choice, a potential source of bias ignored in previous studies using similar designs. We find that partisan media can polarize both its regular consumers and inadvertent audiences who would otherwise not consume it, but ideologically opposing media potentially also can ameliorate the existing polarization between consumers. Taken together, these results deepen our understanding of when and how media polarize individuals.
Evidence of Conflict Extension in Partisans’ Evaluations of People and Inanimate Objects
Kevin Banda, Thomas Carsey & Serge Severenchuk
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Prior research shows that partisan bias affects evaluations of people in nonpolitical settings, but it is unclear to what extent this bias informs evaluations of objects other than people in similar contexts. This is an important limitation given the frequency with which brands, locations, and products are associated with parties and political figures. We examine whether partisan bias influences evaluations of inanimate objects in the same way that it does evaluations of people. The results of four survey experiments show that partisans evaluate objects linked to the opposing party less favorably than otherwise identical nonpartisan objects. Moreover, the influence of partisan bias on evaluations of people is comparable in magnitude to the influence of bias on evaluations of various inanimate objects. We interpret these findings through the lens of conflict extension theory by suggesting that conflict between partisans has extended from policy-based to social identity-based conflict even in nonpolitical settings.
Can anyone be objective about Donald Trump? Assessing the personality of political figures
Alessandro Nai & Jürgen Maier
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, forthcoming
Abstract:
Are expert observers and the public at large able to provide an objective assessment of the personality of political figures? We provide special attention to the (curious) personality of Donald Trump and triangulate data from seven sources: two mass surveys with US citizens, three expert surveys (in the USA, Germany, and the Netherlands), and two surveys with undergraduate students in the Netherlands. This triangulation allows us to highlight that in the US public opinions about Trump are extremely polarized even beyond partisanship; for instance, agreeable voters tend to have a better opinion of Trump if they are Democrats, whereas disagreeable individuals tend to have a better opinion of Trump if they are Republicans. Experts, on the other hand, are not as dramatically driven by their ideological preferences as some might fear, and they globally seem to agree on his extreme profile. Non-experts (Dutch students) are equally able to draw a consistent profile of Trump, more or less regardless of their personal preferences, as are experts – something that US voters seem incapable of, especially if leaning towards the right. Finally, experts and students also assess consistently the personality of selected other political figures beyond Trump – Angela Merkel, and two leading figures in Dutch politics.
The Illusion of Consensus: A Failure to Distinguish Between True and False Consensus
Sami Yousif, Rosie Aboody & Frank Keil
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
When evaluating information, we cannot always rely on what has been presented as truth: Different sources might disagree with each other, and sometimes there may be no underlying truth. Accordingly, we must use other cues to evaluate information — perhaps the most salient of which is consensus. But what counts as consensus? Do we attend only to surface-level indications of consensus, or do we also probe deeper and consider why sources agree? Four experiments demonstrated that individuals evaluate consensus only superficially: Participants were equally confident in conclusions drawn from a true consensus (derived from independent primary sources) and a false consensus (derived from only one primary source). This phenomenon was robust, occurring even immediately after participants explicitly stated that a true consensus was more believable than a false consensus. This illusion of consensus reveals a powerful means by which misinformation may spread.
Political ideology and health risk perceptions of food
Benjamin Boeuf
Social Science & Medicine, forthcoming
Method and results: Two experiments (N1 = 699; N2 = 702) conducted in the U.S. show that health claims framed with political appeals that do not match consumers' values (incongruent appeals) result in higher health risk perceptions by decreasing the feeling of fluency. When referring to patriotism and traditional values, health claims are less effective and result in higher health risk perceptions for liberals. Similarly, references to social justice and sense of community increase health risk perceptions for conservatives.
Overclaiming Knowledge Predicts Anti-establishment Voting
Jan-Willem van Prooijen & André Krouwel
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
People often vote against the political establishment, as underscored by “Brexit” and the Trump election. The current contribution proposes that overclaiming one’s own knowledge predicts anti-establishment voting. We tested this idea in the context of a Dutch referendum on a European Union treaty with a clear pro- versus anti-establishment voting option. In a first wave (6 weeks before the referendum), Dutch citizens indicated their self-perceived understanding of the treaty, after which we tested their actual knowledge. We also measured participants’ general tendency to overclaim knowledge by assessing their familiarity with nonexisting stimuli. In a second wave shortly after the referendum, we asked participants what they had voted. Results revealed that increased self-perceived understanding yet decreased actual knowledge of the treaty, and general knowledge overclaiming, predicted an anti-establishment vote. Furthermore, these effects were most pronounced among right-wing extremists. We conclude that knowledge overclaiming predicts anti-establishment voting, particularly at the radical right.
One-Party States and Legislator Extremism in the US House, 1876–2012
Neil O’Brian
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do party strongholds exacerbate partisan extremism? Using over 140 years of election data and roll call votes I find that, on average, members of Congress elected in states where their party overwhelmingly dominates tend to moderate from their national party’s ideology when compared to members elected in more competitive settings. I argue that heavily one-party states have often been engendered by widespread agreement over locally salient issues, group affect, or imbalanced party organization, not because the electorate consistently agrees with one national party. Consequently, representatives have incentive to run under the dominant party label but must respond to diverse electoral pressures that align to both national parties. While scholars prominently observe one-partyism in the Democratic South, I observe that the plains and rural west, particularly between 1896 and 1932, can be characterized as one-party Republican, too. Perhaps surprisingly, state party strength since the 1990s, in a historical perspective, is quite balanced.
Facilitating Hope Among the Hopeless: The Role of Ideology and Moral Content in Shaping Reactions to Internal Criticism in the Context of Intractable Conflict
Julia Elad‐Strenger, Eran Halperin & Tamar Saguy
Social Science Quarterly, forthcoming
Methods: In two experiments, Jewish Israelis were exposed to a Palestinian criticizing Palestinians for violations of either “binding” or “individualizing” moral values.
Results: Exposure to Palestinian internal criticism increased rightists' hope regarding the conflict and decreased their support for exclusion of Palestinians, particularly when the criticism targeted “binding” (vs. “individualizing”) moral values. Exposure to both types of criticism decreased leftists’ hope regarding the conflict.
The Political Weaponization of Gun Owners: The National Rifle Association’s Cultivation, Dissemination, and Use of a Group Social Identity
Matthew Lacombe
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
There is substantial evidence indicating that the NRA’s (National Rifle Association) political influence is closely tied to the deep political engagement of the minority of Americans who oppose strict gun control laws. This explanation of the NRA’s influence, however, raises its own questions; namely, why are gun owners so devoted to their cause, and why is the NRA so effective at mobilizing them? I marshal a wide range of evidence covering nearly nine decades to demonstrate that an important cause of the political activity of gun owners is the NRA’s long-term cultivation and dissemination of a distinct, politicized gun owner social identity, which the NRA uses to mobilize mass political action on its behalf. My findings shed new light on the ability of interest groups to develop and use resources that help them influence policy by altering the political behavior of members of the mass public.
Conformity to the descriptive norms of people with opposing political or social beliefs
Campbell Pryor, Amy Perfors & Piers Howe
PLoS ONE, July 2019
Abstract:
The descriptive norm effect refers to findings that individuals will tend to prefer behaving certain ways when they know that other people behave similarly. An open question is whether individuals will still conform to other people’s behaviour when they do not identify with these other people, such as a Democrat being biased towards following a popular behaviour amongst Republicans. Self-categorization theory makes the intuitive prediction that people will actively avoid conforming to the norms of groups with which they do not identify. We tested this by informing participants that a particular action was more popular amongst people they identified with and additionally informed some participants that this action was unpopular amongst people they did not identify with. Specifically, we presented descriptive norms of people who supported different political parties or had opposing stances on important social issues. Counter to self-categorization theory’s prediction, we found that informing participants that an action was unpopular amongst people they did not identify with led participants’ preferences to shift away from that action. These results suggest that a general desire to conform with others may outpower the common ingroup vs outgroup mentality.
Asymmetric issue evolution in the American gun rights debate
Mark Conley
Social Science Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Issue Evolution is a rare form of voter realignment where a single issue drives massive partisan shifts. These types of realignment occurred regarding race relations in post-war America, and regarding reproductive rights beginning in the mid-1980s. The current American gun rights debate meets the requisite conditions for issue evolution: longevity, salience, and ease of acquisition. Opposition to gun rights requires organization, attention, and political activity, whereas visible support for gun rights can be as simple as owning a firearm; the expression of advocacy for this issue is inherently asymmetric. This paper presents seven decades of persistent national polling (N = 79,608) alongside Congressional voting records that portray steady partisan divergence and asymmetric support slowly shifting towards gun rights, away from gun control. The gradual process by which new voters have joined the Republican Party on the merits of gun rights foreshadows an enduring association between gun rights and the Republican Party.