Making It Right
Justifying Dissent
Leonardo Bursztyn et al.
NBER Working Paper, February 2022
Abstract:
Dissent plays an important role in any society, but dissenters are often silenced through social sanctions. Beyond their persuasive effects, rationales providing arguments supporting dissenters' causes can increase the public expression of dissent by providing a “social cover” for voicing otherwise-stigmatized positions. Motivated by a simple theoretical framework, we experimentally show that liberals are more willing to post a Tweet opposing the movement to defund the police, are seen as less prejudiced, and face lower social sanctions when their Tweet implies they had first read scientific evidence supporting their position. Analogous experiments with conservatives demonstrate that the same mechanisms facilitate anti-immigrant expression. Our findings highlight both the power of rationales and their limitations in enabling dissent and shed light on phenomena such as social movements, political correctness, propaganda, and anti-minority behavior.
Reflecting on identity change facilitates confession of past misdeeds
Beth Anne Helgason & Jonathan Zev Berman
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Across four studies (N = 3,351), we demonstrate that reflecting on identity change increases confession and decreases justification of past misdeeds. Moreover, publicly communicating one’s identity change to others increases confession above and beyond privately reflecting on identity change. By severing their connection with their past self, individuals can admit to a past misdeed (“I did it”) while reducing their fear that doing so will implicate their present moral character (“But that’s not who I am anymore”).
The habituation fallacy: Disaster victims who are repeatedly victimized are assumed to suffer less, and they are helped less
Hanna Zagefka
European Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper tests the effects of lay beliefs that disaster victims who have been victimized by other events in the past will cope better with a new adverse event than first-time victims. It is shown that believing that disaster victims can get habituated to suffering reduces helping intentions towards victims of repeated adversity, because repeatedly victimized victims are perceived to be less traumatized by a new adverse event. In other words, those who buy into habituation beliefs will impute less trauma and suffering to repeated victims compared to first-time victims, and they will therefore feel less inclined to help those repeatedly victimized victims. This was demonstrated in a series of six studies, two of which were preregistered (total N = 1,010). Studies 1, 2 and 3 showed that beliefs that disaster victims become habituated to pain do indeed exist among lay people. Such beliefs are factually inaccurate, because repeated exposure to severe adversity makes it harder, not easier, for disaster victims to cope with a new negative event. Therefore, we call this belief the ‘habituation fallacy’. Studies 2, 3 and 4 demonstrated an indirect negative effect of a belief in the ‘habituation fallacy’ on ‘helping intentions’, via lesser ‘trauma’ ascribed to victims who had previously been victimized. Studies 5 and 6 demonstrated that a belief in the ‘habituation fallacy’ causally affects trauma ascribed to, and helping intentions towards, repeatedly victimized victims, but not first-time victims. The habituation fallacy can potentially explain reluctance to donate to humanitarian causes in those geographical areas that frequently fall prey to disasters.
Gender differences in altruism and the price of altruism: Evidence from restaurant tips
Matt Parrett
Applied Economics Letters, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper examines gender differences in altruism using restaurant tipping data. More specifically,e investigate how male and female customer percentage tips vary as the price of altruism (bill size) varies and find that females tip more than males when altruism is cheap, males tip more than females when altruism is expensive, and that females are more responsive to the price of altruism.
A Small Price to Pay: National Narcissism Predicts Readiness to Sacrifice In-Group Members to Defend the In-Group’s Image
Bjarki Gronfeldt et al
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Collective narcissism is a belief in one’s in-group greatness that is underappreciated by others. Across three studies conducted in the context of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, we found that collective narcissism, measured with respect to the national group, was related to support of policies that protect the national image at the expense of in-group members’ health. In Study 1, British national narcissism was related to opposing cooperation with the European Union (EU) on medical equipment. In Study 2, American national narcissism predicted opposition to COVID-19 testing to downplay the number of cases. In Study 3, American national narcissism was related to support for releasing an untested COVID-19 vaccine, to beat other countries to the punch. These relationships were mediated by concern about the country’s reputation. Our studies shed light on collective narcissism as a group-based ego-enhancement strategy in which a strong image of the group is prioritized over members’ well-being.
How development and culture shape intuitions about prosocial obligations
Julia Marshall et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do children, like most adults, believe that only kin and close others are obligated to help one another? In two studies (total N = 1140), we examined whether children (∼5- to ∼10-yos) and adults across five different societies consider social relationship when ascribing prosocial obligations. Contrary to the view that such discriminations are a natural default in human reasoning, younger children in the United States (Studies 1 and 2) and across cultures (Study 2) generally judged everyone — parents, friends, and strangers — as obligated to help someone in need. Older children and adults, on the other hand, tended to exhibit more discriminant judgments. They considered parents more obligated to help than friends followed by strangers — although this effect was stronger in some cultures than others. Our findings suggest that children’s initial sense of prosocial obligation in social–relational contexts starts out broad and generally becomes more selective over the course of development.
The myth of the extra mile: Psychological processes and neural mechanisms underlying overcompensation effects
Tessa Haesevoets et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Trust violations regularly occur under the form of distributive fairness violations. In response to such violations, the transgressor can signal his or her willingness to go the “extra mile” by compensating the victim beyond the inflicted damage, which is generally referred to as overcompensation. We conducted two behavioral studies (Studies 1 and 2) and one fMRI experiment (Study 3) to investigate the psychological processes and supporting neural systems that underlie the effectiveness of overcompensation as a strategy to enhance trust in interpersonal relationships. Towards this end, we investigated how people on the receiving end of the compensation experience being overcompensated. Our studies, first of all, revealed that after being overcompensated people did not report higher levels of trust in the transgressor than after being equally compensated, a finding that runs counter the “extra mile” logic. As expected, our behavioral findings additionally showed that, compared to equal compensation, overcompensation evoked more conflicting thoughts and more sense-making processes in the mind of the receiver. Converging evidence for these findings was provided by our neuroimaging results, which revealed higher activations in the conflict-monitoring and the mentalizing network of the brain after overcompensation compared to equal compensation. Finally, the results of our behavioral studies suggest that conflicting thoughts and sense-making serially mediate the effect that overcompensation has on trust perceptions. Together, these findings shed new light on why overcompensation can backfire and even lead to a further decline of trust. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings and formulate suggestions for future research.
The Good-on-Paper Effect: How the Decision Context Influences Virtuous Behavior
Maferima Touré-Tillery & Lili Wang
Marketing Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In a series of 10 studies, we find that people are more likely to make virtuous decisions on paper than on a digital device because they perceive choices on paper as more real (i.e., tangible, actual, and belonging to the physical rather than the virtual world) and hence as more self-diagnostic (i.e., representative of who they are). We first show people express more interest in donating and volunteering (Studies 1a and 1b), are more likely to donate (Study 2), and put more effort into helping a charitable cause (Study 3) when these choices occur on paper (versus tablet)—a pattern of decision making we label the good-on-paper effect. Study 4 extends these findings to book choices (highbrow versus lowbrow) and to a device interaction that closely mimics writing on paper (i.e., tablet with digital pen). In the context of volunteering decisions, we then provide evidence for the sequential mediating roles of perceptions of realness and self-diagnosticity in the good-on-paper effect (Study 5 and Studies 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that chronic (Study 7) and situational (Study 8) perceptions of self-diagnosticity moderate this effect in the contexts of environmental protection and food choices (healthy versus indulgent), respectively. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.
Believing in nothing and believing in everything: The underlying cognitive paradox of anti-COVID-19 vaccine attitudes
Devora Newman, Stephan Lewandowsky & Ruth Mayo
Personality and Individual Differences, forthcoming
Abstract:
A major reason why some people oppose the COVID-19 vaccine is the influence of misinformation. This study suggests that the cognitive paradox of simultaneously believing known facts less and new, “alternative facts” more is the outcome of a distrust mindset, characterized by spontaneous consideration of alternatives, including misinformation. We captured this paradox and its correlates in a scale that measures individuals' ability to distinguish between the truth value of well-established facts (“Earth rotates eastward around its own axis, completing a full rotation once in about 24 h”) and baseless “alternative facts” (“Earth can change its rotation direction and flip its axis, and we will never notice it”). Assuming that an anti-COVID-19 vaccine attitude arises from a chronically distrusting mindset, we sampled participants on Prolific who were pre-screened for their COVID-19 vaccine attitude based on earlier responses. We found that people who rejected COVID-19 vaccines believed well-established facts less, and “alternative facts” more, compared to supporters of the vaccine. Less discernment between truths and falsehoods was correlated with less intellectual humility, more distrust and greater reliance on one's intuition. This observed thought pattern offers insights into theoretical understanding of the antecedents of belief in “alternative facts” and conspiracy theories.
Making utilitarian choices but giving deontological advice
Evan Polman & Rachel Ruttan
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
The traditional focus in the moral decision-making literature has been on understanding when and why people choose a utilitarian option versus a deontological option. However, we suggest that when deciding between these two options, people prefer a third option: to seek out others’ advice — which raises the question, what advice do people give others who are faced with a moral dilemma? In a meta-analysis of responses to 50 unique moral dilemmas, furnished by undergraduates, online panelists, and passers-by, we compared 8,696 self-choice responses (from participants who decided what option they choose) with 8,548 advisor responses (from participants who recommended what option others should choose). We found that when advising others, participants favored deontological options more, recommending these options over the more utilitarian options that participants chose for themselves (d = .112). Our research shows that when people seek advice from others, the two cents they receive are a deontological sense.
To Forgive or to Show Integrity: Forgiveness Decreases Integrity but Increases Benevolence
Rebecca Schaumberg, Scott Wiltermuth & Gabrielle Adams
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper, December 2021
Abstract:
Seven studies (N = 2,677) illustrate that victims face a tradeoff between being perceived as benevolent or as having high integrity when deciding whether to forgive transgressors. Participants judged forgiving victims to be lower in integrity than non-forgiving victims but higher in benevolence. This finding emerged regardless of whether the victim was an individual or an institution, endured small or great harm, or denounced the transgression as wrong. We theorized that forgiveness reduces victims’ integrity because it signals a prioritization of interpersonal concerns over affirming a core moral value. As predicted, forgiving victims suffered little loss to their integrity when they forgave a non-moral transgression or when an institution punished the transgressor. We find these perceptions produce downstream reputational consequences for victims, affecting how people think victims will perform different work-related tasks. Overall, these findings challenge common wisdom about the forgiveness-morality relationship and highlight a critical dilemma that victims face.
Willpower as moral ability
Phyliss Jia Gai & Amit Bhattacharjee
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Self-control refers to the ability to choose options with greater long-term benefits over more immediately tempting options. For personal choices that do not affect others, self-control is often conceptualized as morally irrelevant. However, four focal experiments and five supplemental experiments demonstrate that self-control success in apparently nonmoral domains enhances evaluations of moral character, but self-control failure is not regarded as evidence of moral corruption. This asymmetry supports our moral-ability hypothesis: self-control is regarded as the ability to bring about intended outcomes, which is believed necessary for moral goodness but not moral badness.