Line in the sand
Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms
Branislav Slantchev
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Military expenditures are often funded by debt, and sovereign borrowers are more likely to renege on debt-service obligations if they lose a war than if they win one or if peace prevails. This makes expected debt service costlier in peace, which can affect both crisis bargaining and war termination. I analyze a complete-information model where players negotiate in the shadow of power, whose distribution depends on their mobilization levels, which can be funded partially by borrowing. I show that players can incur debts that are unsustainable in peace because the opponent is unwilling to grant the concessions necessary to service them without fighting. This explanation for war is not driven by commitment problems or informational asymmetries but by the debt-induced inefficiency of peace relative to war. War results from actions that eliminate the bargaining range rather than from inability to locate mutually acceptable deals in that range.
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Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora
Jeff Victoroff, Janice Adelman & Miriam Matthews
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
A robust literature on ingroup versus outgroup conflict suggests that perceived discrimination may be an important factor in intergroup aggression. Yet, to date, no studies have tested the hypothesis that the perception of being the victim of anti-Muslim discrimination might be associated with support for anti-Western political violence. We undertook an analysis of two Pew Global Attitudes Surveys: (1) a 2006 data set surveying 1,627 adult Muslim residents of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain and (2) a 2007 data surveying 1,050 adult Muslim residents of the United States. Our analyses support the conclusions that younger age and perceived discrimination are both associated with support of suicide bombing in these Muslim diaspora populations. Study 1 found that a bad experience of discrimination increased the odds of justifying suicide bombing among European Muslims by a factor of 3.4. Study 2 found that experienced discrimination was associated with justification of suicide bombing among American Muslims. If further investigations confirm that perceived discrimination is a risk factor for support for political violence, initiatives to reduce discrimination would theoretically reduce the risk of terrorism. We discuss the challenge of breaking the vicious cycle of intergroup prejudice and radicalization.
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Paul Boxer et al.
Child Development, forthcoming
Abstract:
Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological model proposes that events in higher order social ecosystems should influence human development through their impact on events in lower order social ecosystems. This proposition was tested with respect to ecological violence and the development of children's aggression via analyses of 3 waves of data (1 wave yearly for 3 years) from 3 age cohorts (starting ages: 8, 11, and 14) representing three populations in the Middle East: Palestinians (N = 600), Israeli Jews (N = 451), and Israeli Arabs (N = 450). Results supported a hypothesized model in which ethnopolitical violence increases community, family, and school violence and children's aggression. Findings are discussed with respect to ecological and observational learning perspectives on the development of aggressive behavior.
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Rezarta Bilali & Johanna Ray Vollhardt
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
A field experiment in Rwanda investigated the impact of a radio drama designed to increase perspective-taking with regard to the history of intergroup conflict. An audio-based priming technique was used to assess the causal impact of the radio drama. Rwandan participants (N = 842) listened to an audio-delivered questionnaire recorded either in the voice of a main character of the radio drama (experimental priming condition) or an unknown actor (control condition). Participants primed with the radio drama reported higher levels of historical perspective-taking, engaged less in competitive victimhood, and expressed less mistrust toward the out-group. Overall, the findings suggest that fictional radio dramas can be used to address opposing historical narratives in the aftermath of violent conflict. Additionally, the study demonstrates the usefulness of a priming paradigm to assess causal influence of mass media interventions.
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Adam Joyce
Studies in American Political Development, forthcoming
Abstract:
The U.S. Army's recent embrace of counterinsurgency warfare and nation building complicates theories of military politics. For decades, critics declared the army too risk averse, too parochial, and too insulated to change, often thwarting civilian demands for greater flexibility. How should we understand these recent, unexpected changes? In this article I synthesize insights from historical institutionalism and American political development to derive a micropolitical perspective on institutional change. This approach advances two components as necessary before an institution transforms. First, mid-level agents shift the unofficial discourses through which they understand and describe the institution's core missions and capabilities. These slow and often subtle changes create a mismatch between the mid-level actors and the institution's paradigm. This erosion of institutional order provides an opportunity to reformers. The second component of transformation is the work of these reformers to forge coalitions with elites inside and outside government and press institutional leaders for change. In the rest of the article, I demonstrate the efficacy of the micropolitical approach by investigating how the army developed its AirLand Battle doctrine after the Vietnam War. My analysis of recently declassified correspondence, oral-history interviews, and the writings of officers and experts shows how mid-level officers and external reformers were able to shift the discourses of army leaders and develop an institutional paradigm that endured for decades. Indeed, AirLand Battle influenced the Weinberger criteria for deploying American troops, and it shaped U.S. conduct during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This suggests a research program that could demonstrate why and how the U.S. Army's way of war changed during the 2000s, as well as how durable this transformation will be.
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Ursula Daxecker
Journal of Peace Research, July 2012, Pages 503-516
Abstract:
This article investigates the relationship between international election observation, election fraud, and post-election violence. While international electoral missions could in principle mitigate the potential for violence by deterring election fraud, the ability of international observers to detect manipulation may in fact induce violent uprisings. Serious irregularities documented by international observers provide credible information on election quality, which draws attention to election outcomes and alleviates coordination problems faced by opposition parties and society. When elections are manipulated to deny citizens an opportunity for peaceful contestation and international observers publicize such manipulation, violent interactions between incumbents, opposition parties, and citizens can ensue. Consequently, the author expects that fraudulent elections monitored by international organizations will have an increased potential for subsequent violence. This expectation is evaluated empirically in an analysis of post-election conflict events for African elections in the 1997-2009 period. Using original data on electoral manipulation and reputable international election observation missions, findings show that the presence of election fraud and international observers increases the likelihood of post-election violence. Matching methods are employed to account for the possibility that international observers' decisions to monitor elections are endogenous to the occurrence of violence in the electoral process. Results for matched samples confirm the findings in the unmatched sample. A variety of robustness tests show that the results are not influenced by the operationalization of independent variables and influential observations.
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Emotions expressed in speeches by leaders of ideologically motivated groups predict aggression
David Matsumoto, Hyisung Hwang & Mark Frank
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, forthcoming
Abstract:
Anger, contempt, and disgust are emotions associated with violations of ethics and morality, and recent theoretical work has suggested that they are important drivers of group-based aggression and violence. We test this hypothesis by examining the emotions expressed by leaders of ideologically motivated groups when speaking about outgroups they oppose. We analyzed the content of their speeches at three points in time before an identified act of aggression or resistance. We provide initial evidence that leaders' expressions of anger, contempt, and disgust increase immediately before acts of violence, but not those of resistance, and suggest that these emotions are instrumental in inciting groups to commit violence.
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Terrorist success in hostage-taking missions: 1978-2010
Charlinda Santifort & Todd Sandler
Public Choice, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article investigates the determinants of logistical and negotiation successes in hostage-taking incidents using an expanded dataset that runs from 1978 to 2010. Unlike an earlier study, the current study has a rich set of negotiation variables in addition to political, geographical, and organizational variables associated with the perpetrators or targets of the attacks. The 33 years of data permit a split into two subperiods: 1978-1987 and 1988-2010, before and after the rise of religious fundamentalist terrorist groups. Logistical success depends on resource and target vulnerability proxies, while negotiation success hinges on bargaining variables. Among many novel findings, democracy significantly hampers logistical success throughout the entire period. Kidnappings, tropical climates, and high elevations foster logistical success. Religious fundamentalist terrorists' logistical advantage during 1978-1987 was lost during 1988-2010. Abducting protected persons, making demands on the host country, and staging incidents in a democracy limit negotiation success for the terrorists. If terrorists moderate or replace one or more demands, the likelihood of negotiation success for the terrorists goes up.
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Ethnic Profiling In Airport Screening: Lessons From Israel, 1968-2010
Badi Hasisi, Yoram Margalioth & Liav Orgad
American Law and Economics Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We interviewed a random sample of 918 passengers - 308 Israeli Jews, 306 Palestinians who are Israeli citizens (Israeli Arabs), and 304 non-Israelis - post check-in, at Ben-Gurion Airport, in an effort to learn about the individual and social cost incurred by the Israeli Arabs going through the security process. The article discusses what we learned from the survey and draws some policy implications. This is the first time such a survey was administered.
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Can Britain Defend the Falklands?
Mark Bell
Defence Studies, Summer 2012, Pages 283-301
"Thirty years after the 1982 Falklands war, Britain's capacity to defend the Falkland Islands from Argentina has been repeatedly challenged by former military leaders and analysts. Concern has been driven by three factors: significant British defence cuts, the discovery of substantial hydrocarbon reserves in the waters around the Falklands, and increasingly bellicose Argentine rhetoric and actions. This paper uses campaign analysis tools to evaluate Argentina's capacity to successfully attack the Falklands and the British capacity to defend against such an attack. In contrast to recent analyses, I argue that Argentina's ability to successfully attack the Falklands is limited."
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Does Democratization Pacify the State? The Cases of Germany and Iraq
Benjamin Miller
International Studies Quarterly, September 2012, Pages 455-469
Abstract:
Does democratization pacify states - and thus their respective regions - or does it make them more war-prone? This is both a theoretical issue within the literature on democracy and peace, and an empirical issue, as in some regions democratization led to peace and in others it resulted in violence. To answer the posed question, this study probes the "state-to-nation balance" model as it makes the preliminary argument that democratization is not the underlying cause of either large-scale violence or peacemaking. Democratization, thus, is at best an intervening variable and in some cases has no major effects on war and peace. Rather, it is the state-to-nation balance model that better explains the war- and peace-proneness of states and regions. For an exploratory probe of this argument, the study examines Germany and Iraq - two key powers in their respective regions - and the changes they have gone through since World War I until today. The paper shows that when democratization takes place within a state-to-nation balance, it tends to have stabilizing effects and warms the peace. In contrast, within a state-to-nation imbalance, it is probable that democratization will have destabilizing effects.
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Trading Communities, the Networked Structure of International Relations, and the Kantian Peace
Yonatan Lupu & Vincent Traag
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
The authors argue that theories regarding the relationship between trade conflict could benefit greatly from accounting for the networked structure of international trade. Indirect trade relations reduce the probability of conflict by creating (1) opportunity costs of conflict beyond those reflected by direct trade ties and (2) negative externalities for the potential combatants' trading partners, giving them an incentive to prevent the conflict. Trade flows create groups of states with relatively dense trade ties, which we call trading communities. Within these groups, the interruptions to trade caused by conflict create relatively large costs. As a result, joint members of trading communities are less likely to go to war, however little they directly trade with each other. The authors systematically measure and define trading communities across various levels of aggregation using the network analytic tool of modularity maximization.
The authors find significant support for their hypothesis, indicating that interdependence theory can be extended to extra-dyadic relations.
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Thomas Christensen
Journal of Strategic Studies, July/August 2012, Pages 447-487
Abstract:
Will China's development of a new generation of nuclear weapons impact US-China security relations in important ways? One's answer depends on how one views the following: whether or not Chinese leaders believe that they are only now acquiring a secure second strike capability; the scope of coercive power that secure second strike capability provides to conventionally inferior actors; the meaning of China's ‘No First Use' Doctrine; and the prospects for escalation control in future crises. Applying Cold War theories and tapping Chinese doctrinal writings this article concludes that China's nuclear modernization program might prove more consequential than is commonly believed.
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The Consistency of Policy with Opinion in the Russian Federation, 1992-2006
Cale Horne
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, Summer 2012, Pages 215-244
Abstract:
This article draws upon hundreds of surveys of Russian public opinion conducted from 1992 to 2006 to assess the responsiveness of the Russian state to citizens' policy preferences. Patterned after studies of US opinion, this study finds levels of opinion-policy consistency in Russia to be surprisingly high. Opinion-policy consistency is assessed over time and across policy domains, with extended discussions of how opinion affects (and fails to affect) policy, using the "shock therapy" policies of the early 1990s and the first and second Chechen conflicts as examples.
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Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War
Burcu Savun & Daniel Tirone
International Organization, July 2012, Pages 363-393
Abstract:
The recent civil war literature suggests that negative economic shocks in low-income countries increase the risk of civil war. Foreign aid can be an effective conflict-prevention tool in times of severe economic conditions. Aid cushions government spending from the downward pressures of economic shocks, providing recipient governments with resources they can use to make rebellion a less attractive option for aggrieved domestic groups. Using Official Development Assistance (ODA) data covering 1990 through 2004, we find that foreign aid appears to be a useful tool for preventing civil wars in the wake of negative economic shocks, and as such aid should be assessed by donors with these conflict-suppressing aspects in mind.
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Analysing the Determinants of Terrorism in Turkey Using Geographically Weighted Regression
Jülide Yildirim & Nadir Öcal
Defence and Peace Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper investigates the determinants of provincial terrorism in Turkey taking spatial dimension into account for the time period 1990-2006. Following a traditional global regression analysis, spatial variations in the relationships are examined with geographically weighted regression (GWR) to obtain locally different parameter estimates. Empirical results indicate that increases in income and schooling ratio tend to reduce the provincial average level of terrorism, whereas an increase in unemployment enhances it. Moreover, GWR results indicate that the provincial effects of per capita income and education are more pronounced for the Eastern and South Eastern provinces compared to the Western provinces.
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Jeff Colgan
Conflict Management and Peace Science, September 2012, Pages 444-467
Abstract:
Domestic political upheaval has profound consequences, both for the country in which it takes place and for international politics. It is therefore striking that there is no standard cross-national time-series dataset that focuses specifically on the concept of revolution. This article aims to address that gap by introducing a new dataset on revolutionary governments and leaders, 1945-2004. Revolutionary leaders tend to be younger, to have longer tenure in office, and to be more prone to international conflicts than non-revolutionary leaders. This new dataset facilitates quantitative analyses of a variety of questions about both the causes and consequences of revolutionary governments.
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Galen Jackson
Security Studies, Summer 2012, Pages 455-489
Abstract:
According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.
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America's military interventionism: A social evolutionary interpretation
Shiping Tang & Joey Long
European Journal of International Relations, September 2012, Pages 509-538
Abstract:
By synthesizing material forces with ideational forces more organically via a social evolutionary approach, we advance a deeper understanding about post-World War II American military interventionism. We argue that post-World War II American military interventionism - that is, the American elites' and public's support for America's military intervention abroad - cannot be understood with ideational or psychological forces alone. Rather, two crucial material variables, namely, geography and aggregate power amplified by superior technological prowess, are indispensable for understanding the propensity for the United States to intervene militarily abroad. These two factors have powerfully shielded the American elites and public from the horrendous devastation of war. As a result, compared to their counterparts in other major states, American citizens and elites have tended to be less repelled by the prospect of war. The outcome is that since World War II the United States has been far more active in military intervention overseas than other major states.
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Classical Confucianism, Punitive Expeditions, and Humanitarian Intervention
Sumner Twiss & Jonathan Chan
Journal of Military Ethics, Summer 2012, Pages 81-96
Abstract:
Building on the authors' previous work regarding the classical Confucian position on the legitimate use of military force as represented by Mencius and Xunzi, this paper probes their understanding of punitive expeditions undertaken against tyrants in particular - aims, justification, preconditions, and limits. It compares this understanding with contemporary Western models of humanitarian intervention, and argues that the Confucian punitive expedition aligns most closely with the emerging ‘responsibility to protect' model in Western discussions, although it also differs from the latter in certain respects. For example, the Confucian expedition explicitly forwards as legitimate aims regime change and the punishment of tyrants, in addition to rescue of an abused population and assistance in rebuilding a decent society. The Confucian understanding also appears to set a lower threshold standard (well short of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or large-scale massacre) for what counts as severe tyranny warranting intervention, and it explicitly speaks of an obligation (beyond mere permissibility) to intervene when that threshold is exceeded. In its concluding section, the paper discusses some possible contemporary implications of the classical Confucian understanding of a punitive expedition against tyrants.
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Gerald Schneider, Margit Bussmann & Constantin Ruhe
International Interactions, Summer 2012, Pages 443-461
Abstract:
Many observers contend that wartime civilian victimization is an instrument of political leaders to achieve a particular goal. This article examines whether retaliation for similar acts by the other side, the developments on the battlefield, or the behavior of international actors accounts for the ups and downs of this so-called one-sided violence. Using information from the Konstanz One-Sided Violence Event Dataset and other sources, we evaluate the empirical relevance of these complementary models statistically. Time series analyses of the weekly number of killed and harmed Muslims (Bosniacs) and Serbs during the Bosnian civil war support the military and the massacre logic. We show that the Serbian side decreased one-sided violence following a territorial conquest, but that its one-sided violence was not a reciprocal response to the Bosniac targeting of civilians. Conversely, the Bosniac side resorted to violence during times of increasing Serbian atrocities and when the fighting was particularly intense. The analysis reveals that most international interventions did not reduce the carnage, but that the Serbs responded to Russian moves.
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Milan Svolik
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why does the military intervene in the politics of some countries but remain under firm civilian control in others? The paper argues that the origins of military intervention in politics lie in a fundamental moral hazard problem associated with authoritarian repression. Dictators must deter those who are excluded from power from challenging them. When underlying, polity-wide conflict results in threats to the regime that take the particular form of mass, organized, and potentially violent opposition, the military is the only force capable of defeating them. The military exploits this pivotal position by demanding greater institutional autonomy as well as a say in policy, and it threatens to intervene if the civilian leadership departs from a subsequent compromise on these issues. A game-theoretic analysis of such contracting on violence implies that the likelihood of military intervention in politics should be greatest at intermediate levels of mass threats. Original, large-N data on military intervention support these claims.
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An Alternative Approach to the Harm of Genocide
Christopher Macleod
Politics, October 2012, Pages 197-206
Abstract:
It is a widely shared belief that genocide - the ‘crime of crimes' - is more morally significant than ‘mere' large-scale mass murder. Various attempts have been made to capture that separate evil of genocide: some have attempted to locate it in damage done to individuals, while others have focused upon the harm done to collectives. In this article, I offer a third, neglected, option. Genocide damages humankind: it is here that the difference is to be found. I show that this understanding has a venerable legal history, and argue that it has the significant benefits of legitimising intervention and justifying universal jurisdiction.
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Counterpiracy in Historical Context: Paradox, Policy, and Rhetoric
Martin Murphy
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, August 2012, Pages 507-522
Abstract:
This article identifies the salient lessons from three specific periods - the Graeco-Roman, Atlantic piracy and its extension into the Indian Ocean during the early Seventeenth Century, and piracy off China during the Ch'ing dynasty - that can most usefully inform the counter-piracy effort off Somalia. It makes the point that piracy's sinuous character has always given rise to conceptual and definitional difficulties; but that while law has had an important voice in piracy matters since Roman times it has never been the only voice. It suggests that modern pirate hunters, by treating piracy as akin to a domestic criminal activity, have shackled the effectiveness of violent suppression which their historical predecessors found so useful, while at the same time undervaluing the fundamental roles of politics and economics in piracy formation and the continuous struggle to make the seas safe for legitimate commerce.
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Anna Getmansky
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
What effect, if any, does democracy have on outcomes of counterinsurgency wars? Previous studies have provided inconclusive answers mainly because of the challenges involved in testing the question empirically: First, insurgencies are not accidental and the anticipated outcomes also affect whether they break out in the first place. Second, regimes are non-random and their determinants can also affect insurgency incidence and its outcomes. Moreover, different aspects of democracy can have opposite effects on the government's chances of winning. I address these challenges by conducting a critical test to distinguish between different causal mechanisms. I find that domestic institutions that are associated with public goods provision make insurgency onsets less likely. I also show that once we control for this selection effect, domestic political institutions do not influence insurgency outcomes.