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Rethinking the Extraverted Sales Ideal: The Ambivert Advantage
Adam Grant
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite the widespread assumption that extraverts are the most productive salespeople, research has shown weak and conflicting relationships between extraversion and sales performance. In light of these puzzling results, I propose that the relationship between extraversion and sales performance is not linear but curvilinear: Ambiverts achieve greater sales productivity than extraverts or introverts do. Because they naturally engage in a flexible pattern of talking and listening, ambiverts are likely to express sufficient assertiveness and enthusiasm to persuade and close a sale but are more inclined to listen to customers' interests and less vulnerable to appearing too excited or overconfident. A study of 340 outbound-call-center representatives supported the predicted inverted-U-shaped relationship between extraversion and sales revenue. This research presents a fresh perspective on the personality traits that facilitate successful influence and offers novel insights for people in choosing jobs and for organizations in hiring and training employees.
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Hajo Adam & Aiwa Shirako
Journal of Applied Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The influence of culture on the social effects of emotions in negotiations has recently gained the attention of researchers, but to date this research has focused exclusively on the cultural background of the perceiver of the emotion expression. The current research offers the first investigation of how the cultural background of the expresser influences negotiation outcomes. On the basis of the stereotype that East Asians are emotionally inexpressive and European Americans are emotionally expressive, we predicted that anger will have a stronger signaling value when East Asians rather than European American negotiators express it. Specifically, we predicted that angry East Asian negotiators will be perceived as tougher and more threatening and therefore elicit great cooperation from counterparts compared with angry European American negotiators. Results from 4 negotiation studies supported our predictions. In Study 1, angry East Asian negotiators elicited greater cooperation than angry European American and Hispanic negotiators. In Study 2, angry East Asian negotiators elicited greater cooperation than angry European American ones, but emotionally neutral East Asian and European American negotiators elicited the same level of cooperation. Study 3 showed that this effect holds for both East Asian and European American perceivers and that it is mediated by angry East Asian negotiators being perceived as tougher and more threatening than angry European American negotiators. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that the effect emerges only when negotiators hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive. We discuss implications for our understanding of culture, emotions, and negotiations.
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Communicating With the Crowd: Speakers Use Abstract Messages When Addressing Larger Audiences
Priyanka Joshi & Cheryl Wakslak
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Audience characteristics often shape communicators' message framing. Drawing from construal level theory, we suggest that when speaking to many individuals, communicators frame messages in terms of superordinate characteristics that focus attention on the essence of the message. On the other hand, when communicating with a single individual, communicators increasingly describe events and actions in terms of their concrete details. Using different communication tasks and measures of construal, we show that speakers communicating with many individuals, compared with 1 person, describe events more abstractly (Study 1), describe themselves as more trait-like (Study 2), and use more desirability-related persuasive messages (Study 3). Furthermore, speakers' motivation to communicate with their audience moderates their tendency to frame messages based on audience size (Studies 3 and 4). This audience-size abstraction effect is eliminated when a large audience is described as homogeneous, suggesting that people use abstract construal strategically in order to connect across a disparate group of individuals (Study 5). Finally, we show that participants' experienced fluency in communication is influenced by the match between message abstraction and audience size (Study 6).
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Alex Rutherford et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 16 April 2013, Pages 6281-6286
Abstract:
The Internet and social media have enabled the mobilization of large crowds to achieve time-critical feats, ranging from mapping crises in real time, to organizing mass rallies, to conducting search-and-rescue operations over large geographies. Despite significant success, selection bias may lead to inflated expectations of the efficacy of social mobilization for these tasks. What are the limits of social mobilization, and how reliable is it in operating at these limits? We build on recent results on the spatiotemporal structure of social and information networks to elucidate the constraints they pose on social mobilization. We use the DARPA Network Challenge as our working scenario, in which social media were used to locate 10 balloons across the United States. We conduct high-resolution simulations for referral-based crowdsourcing and obtain a statistical characterization of the population recruited, geography covered, and time to completion. Our results demonstrate that the outcome is plausible without the presence of mass media but lies at the limit of what time-critical social mobilization can achieve. Success relies critically on highly connected individuals willing to mobilize people in distant locations, overcoming the local trapping of diffusion in highly dense areas. However, even under these highly favorable conditions, the risk of unsuccessful search remains significant. These findings have implications for the design of better incentive schemes for social mobilization. They also call for caution in estimating the reliability of this capability.
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Trash talk in a competitive setting: Impact on self-efficacy and affect
Ben Conmy et al.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The effects of trash talk and competition outcome on self-efficacy and affect were examined in 40 MaddenTM NFL 08 football video game players randomly assigned to two conditions: silence talk, where they played the first game in complete silence; and the second trash talking. Measures of self-efficacy, positive affect (PA), and negative affect (NA) were administered. Results revealed that players enforced to be silent in the first game instantaneously exhibited lower self-efficacy, lower PA, and higher NA than players permitted to talk in Game 1. However, players subsequently instructed to remain silent in the second game showed markedly decreased self-efficacy compared to players permitted to talk in Game 2. Results are interpreted in light of the social-cognitive-motivational theory.
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Evidence for utilitarian motives in emotion regulation
Maya Tamir, Brett Ford & Margaret Gilliam
Cognition & Emotion, Spring 2013, Pages 483-491
Abstract:
This investigation demonstrates that emotion regulation can be driven by considerations of utility per se. We show that as participants prepared for a negotiation, those who were motivated to confront (vs. collaborate with) another person believed that anger would be more useful to them. However, only participants who were motivated to confront another and expected to receive a monetary reward for their performance (i.e., high utility), were motivated to increase their anger in preparation for the negotiation. Participants who were motivated to confront another but did not expect their performance to be rewarded (i.e., low utility), did not try to increase their anger, even though they expected anger to be useful in the negotiation. Such patterns demonstrate that people are motivated to experience even unpleasant emotions to maximise utility.
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Repeating "Yes" in a First Request and Compliance with a Later Request: The Four Walls Technique
Nicolas Guéguen et al.
Social Behavior and Personality, March 2013, Pages 199-202
Abstract:
The commitment/consistency principle for compliance implies that people act in ways consistent with their previous behavior. Cialdini and Sagarin (2005) have stated that, according to this principle, asking individuals questions to which they would be expected to say "yes" could be associated with achieving greater compliance with a subsequent request. However, this procedure, referred to as the four walls technique, has never been tested experimentally. In this study, we conducted an experiment in which participants were first asked to answer several questions that required "yes" or "no" responses. Then, the participants were asked to comply with an additional request. It was found that saying "yes" several times beforehand is associated with greater compliance with a subsequent request than is saying "no" beforehand or when no first request was made.
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Nicolas Guéguen et al.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, January 2013, Pages 116-137
Abstract:
The "evoking freedom" technique is a verbal compliance procedure that solicits someone to comply with a request by simply telling them they are free to accept or to refuse the request. The measure of the efficiency of this technique on compliance with large samples and the evaluation of its influence on various requests was tested in the first set of experiments. This technique was found to be efficient in increasing the number of people who agreed to give money to a requester, the number of smokers who agreed to give a cigarette, passersby who agreed to respond to a survey, and homeowners who agreed to buy pancakes. In the second set of experiments in which the mode of interaction between the requester and the person solicited was tested, the "evoking freedom" technique was found to be associated with greater compliance with a request addressed by mail and through face-to-face, phone-to-phone, or computer-mediated interaction. The third set of experiments tested the effect of semantic variations of the "evoking freedom" technique and the weight of the repetition of the semantic evocation of freedom. These later experiments that used various phrases evoking the freedom to comply were found to be associated with greater compliance. Moreover, a double evocation of freedom was associated with even greater compliance than a single evocation. The importance of this technique for commitment communication is discussed.
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How activating cognitive content shapes trust: A subliminal priming study
Ann-Christin Posten, Axel Ockenfels & Thomas Mussweiler
Journal of Economic Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The activation of cognitive contents plays a prominent role in social psychological research. Yet, so far this has received little attention in economics. In our research we connect a standard social psychological manipulation to activate cognitive content (a trust vs. distrust priming manipulation) to a classic paradigm from economics (a trust game). Our findings demonstrate that subliminally activating the concept of trust (vs. distrust) leads participants to judge a series of strangers as more (vs. less) trustworthy. Moreover, our research shows for the first time that such a subliminal priming manipulation shapes the subsequent sending behavior in a fictitious version of a standard economic trust game. This suggests that psychological priming techniques allow new insights into what determines beliefs in economic games.
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Aaron Halfaker et al.
American Behavioral Scientist, May 2013, Pages 664-688
Abstract:
Open collaboration systems, such as Wikipedia, need to maintain a pool of volunteer contributors to remain relevant. Wikipedia was created through a tremendous number of contributions by millions of contributors. However, recent research has shown that the number of active contributors in Wikipedia has been declining steadily for years and suggests that a sharp decline in the retention of newcomers is the cause. This article presents data that show how several changes the Wikipedia community made to manage quality and consistency in the face of a massive growth in participation have ironically crippled the very growth they were designed to manage. Specifically, the restrictiveness of the encyclopedia's primary quality control mechanism and the algorithmic tools used to reject contributions are implicated as key causes of decreased newcomer retention. Furthermore, the community's formal mechanisms for norm articulation are shown to have calcified against changes - especially changes proposed by newer editors.
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Benjamin Tabak et al.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Variations in the gene that encodes the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) have been associated with many aspects of social cognition as well as several prosocial behaviors. However, potential associations of OXTR variants with reactions to betrayals of trust while cooperating for mutual benefit have not yet been explored. We examined how variation in 10 SNPs on OXTR were associated with behavior and emotional reactions following a betrayal of trust in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. After correction for multiple testing, one haplotype (C-rs9840864, T-rs2268494) was significantly associated with faster retaliation post-betrayal - an association that appeared to be due to this haplotype's intermediate effect of exacerbating people's anger after they had been betrayed. Furthermore, one haplotype (A-rs237887, C-rs2268490) was associated with higher levels of post-betrayal satisfaction, and a third haplotype (G-rs237887, C-rs2268490) was associated with lower levels of post-betrayal satisfaction.
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Generous economic investments after basolateral amygdala damage
Jack van Honk et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 12 February 2013, Pages 2506-2510
Abstract:
Contemporary economic models hold that instrumental and impulsive behaviors underlie human social decision making. The amygdala is assumed to be involved in social-economic behavior, but its role in human behavior is poorly understood. Rodent research suggests that the basolateral amygdala (BLA) subserves instrumental behaviors and regulates the central-medial amygdala, which subserves impulsive behaviors. The human amygdala, however, typically is investigated as a single unit. If these rodent data could be translated to humans, selective dysfunction of the human BLA might constrain instrumental social-economic decisions and result in more impulsive social-economic choice behavior. Here we show that humans with selective BLA damage and a functional central-medial amygdala invest nearly 100% more money in unfamiliar others in a trust game than do healthy controls. We furthermore show that this generosity is not caused by risk-taking deviations in nonsocial contexts. Moreover, these BLA-damaged subjects do not expect higher returns or perceive people as more trustworthy, implying that their generous investments are not instrumental in nature. These findings suggest that the human BLA is essential for instrumental behaviors in social-economic interactions.
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More Trusting, Less Trust? An Investigation of Early E-Commerce in China
Hongbin Cai et al.
NBER Working Paper, April 2013
Abstract:
Trust is vital for market development, but how can trust be enhanced in a marketplace? A common view is that more trusting may help to build trust, especially in less developed economies. In this paper, we argue that more trusting may lead to less trust. We set up a rational expectation model in which a marketplace uses buyer protection to promote buyer trusting. Our results show that buyer protection may reduce trust in equilibrium and even hinder market expansion because it triggers differential entry between honest and strategic sellers and may induce more cheating from strategic sellers. Using a large transaction-level data set from the early years of Eachnet.com (an eBay equivalent in China), we find evidence that is consistent with the model predictions. Stronger buyer protection leads to less favorable evaluation of seller behavior and is associated with slower market expansion. These findings suggest that a trust-promoting policy aiming at buyer trusting may not be effective if it is not accompanied by additional incentives to improve seller trustworthiness.
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Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information
Peter Kriss, Rosemarie Nagel & Roberto Weber
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of dishonesty.
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Competition over Personal Resources Favors Contribution to Shared Resources in Human Groups
Jessica Barker, Pat Barclay & Kern Reeve
PLoS ONE, March 2013
Abstract:
Members of social groups face a trade-off between investing selfish effort for themselves and investing cooperative effort to produce a shared group resource. Many group resources are shared equitably: they may be intrinsically non-excludable public goods, such as vigilance against predators, or so large that there is little cost to sharing, such as cooperatively hunted big game. However, group members' personal resources, such as food hunted individually, may be monopolizable. In such cases, an individual may benefit by investing effort in taking others' personal resources, and in defending one's own resources against others. We use a game theoretic "tug-of-war" model to predict that when such competition over personal resources is possible, players will contribute more towards a group resource, and also obtain higher payoffs from doing so. We test and find support for these predictions in two laboratory economic games with humans, comparing people's investment decisions in games with and without the options to compete over personal resources or invest in a group resource. Our results help explain why people cooperatively contribute to group resources, suggest how a tragedy of the commons may be avoided, and highlight unifying features in the evolution of cooperation and competition in human and non-human societies.
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There's no "I" in team: Effects of cooperative video games on cooperative behavior
Tobias Greitemeyer & Christopher Cox
European Journal of Social Psychology, April 2013, Pages 224-228
Abstract:
The present research tests the idea that playing a team-player video game in which players work together as teammates and assist each other in achieving a common goal increases cooperative behavior toward a new partner. In fact, relative to a single-player mode, cooperatively playing a video game increased cooperation in a mixed-motive decision dilemma task. Because the players were exposed to the same video game content in both experimental conditions, the effect on cooperative behavior can only be accounted for by the different way the game was played. Mediation analyses revealed that cooperative team play promoted feelings of cohesion, which activated trust (i.e., the expectation of reciprocal cooperation), which in turn increased cooperative behavior.
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Disclosing Advisor's Interests Neither Hurts Nor Helps
Huseyn Ismayilov & Jan Potters
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
We set up an experiment to study whether disclosure of the advisor's interests can foster truthfulness and trust. We measure how advisors expect decisionmakers to react to their advice in order to distinguish between strategic and moral reactions to disclosure by advisors. Results indicate that advisors do not expect decision makers to react drastically to disclosure. Also, advisors do not find deceiving morally more acceptable with disclosure than with no disclosure. Overall, disclosure neither hurts nor helps; deceptive advice and mistrust are equally frequent with as without disclosure.
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Julie Novakova & Jaroslav Flegr
PLoS ONE, April 2013
Background: The aim of this study was to determine whether people respond differently to low and high stakes in Dictator and Ultimatum Games. We assumed that if we raised the stakes high enough, we would observe more self-orientated behavior because fairness would become too costly, in spite of a possible risk of a higher punishment.
Methods: A questionnaire was completed by a sample of 524 university students of biology. A mixed linear model was used to test the relation between the amount at stake (CZK 20, 200, 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000, i.e., approximately $1-$10,000) and the shares, as well as the subjects' gender and the design of the study (single vs. multiple games for different amounts).
Results: We have discovered a significant relationship between the amount at stake and the minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum Game and the proposed shares in both Ultimatum and Dictator Games (p = 0.001, p<0.001, p = 0.0034). The difference between playing a single game or more games with several amounts at stake did not influence the relation between the stakes and the offered and minimum acceptable shares. Women proved significantly more generous than men in their offers in the Dictator Game (p = 0.007).
Conclusion: Our results suggest that people's behavior in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games depends on the amount at stake. The players tended to lower their relative proposed shares, as well as their relative minimum acceptable offers. We propose that the Responders' sense of equity and fair play depends on the stakes because of the costs of maintaining fairness. However, our results also suggest that the price of fairness is very high and that it is very difficult, probably even impossible, to buy the transition of Homo sociologicus into Homo economicus.
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The Development of Trust and Altruism During Childhood
Anthony Evans, Ursula Athenstaedt & Joachim Krueger
Journal of Economic Psychology, June 2013, Pages 82-95
Abstract:
Knowing when to trust is an essential skill, but little is known about its cognitive development. No previous studies have examined the development of trust while controlling for age differences in altruism. We hypothesized that older children are more likely to trust, and that this age-related increase is not due to an increase in altruism. In two experiments, we compared the choices of kindergarten (4-5 years) and elementary school (9-10 years) children in economic games. Age was positively related to both trust and altruism, but more strongly to the former. The age difference in trust was robust when we controlled for partner age and the ability to delay gratification. We further hypothesized that older children are more attuned to the probability of reciprocity. Indeed, older children were more sensitive to changes in the game's structure and the trustee's characteristics, suggesting that they are not only more trusting, but more discerning in their decisions of when to trust.
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Intelligence and Bribing Behavior in a One-Shot Game
Philip Shaw, William Vásquez & Mark LeClair
Journal of Socio-Economics, June 2013, Pages 91-96
Abstract:
We investigate the relationship between intelligence and bribing behavior in a simple one-shot game of corruption. We find a robust relationship between intelligence and the probability of bribing in which a higher intelligence quotient (IQ) leads to a lower probability of bribing in the game. This result holds after controlling for other determinants such as gender, attitude towards corruption, and perceptions of corruption. By revealing the gender of the matched player, we also show that gender perceptions of corruption are strong determinants of bribery.
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Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: A volunteer's dilemma
Wojtek Przepiorka & Andreas Diekmann
Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 22 May 2013
Abstract:
Social control and the enforcement of social norms glue a society together. It has been shown theoretically and empirically that informal punishment of wrongdoers fosters cooperation in human groups. Most of this research has focused on voluntary and uncoordinated punishment carried out by individual group members. However, as punishment is costly, it is an open question as to why humans engage in the punishment of wrongdoers even in one-time-only encounters. While evolved punitive preferences have been advocated as proximate explanations for such behaviour, the strategic nature of the punishment situation has remained underexplored. It has been suggested to conceive of the punishment situation as a volunteer's dilemma (VOD), where only one individual's action is necessary and sufficient to punish the wrongdoer. Here, we show experimentally that implementing the punishment situation as a VOD sustains cooperation in an environment where punishers and non-punishers coexist. Moreover, we show that punishment-cost heterogeneity allows individuals to tacitly agree on only the strongest group member carrying out the punishment, thereby increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of social norm enforcement. Our results corroborate that costly peer punishment can be explained without assuming punitive preferences and show that centralized sanctioning institutions can emerge from arbitrary individual differences.
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Mareike Hoffmann, Thomas Lauer & Bettina Rockenbach
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, forthcoming
Abstract:
According to the Greek philosopher Plato "[...] if anyone at all is to have the privilege of lying the rulers of the State [...] may be allowed to lie for the public good" (The Royal Lie). To investigate whether The Royal Lie may foster cooperation in public goods provision we experimentally study centralized manipulations of contribution feedback. We find that a uniform feedback exaggeration does not increase cooperation and is disapproved once it is disclosed. An individual exaggeration, however, that gives nobody the feeling of being a sucker sustains cooperation on a high level.