Leadership contest
Examining a Most Likely Case for Strong Campaign Effects: Hitler’s Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party, 1927–1933
Peter Selb & Simon Munzert
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Hitler’s rise to power amidst an unprecedented propaganda campaign initiated scholarly interest in campaign effects. To the surprise of many, empirical studies often found minimal effects. The predominant focus of early work was on U.S. elections, though. Nazi propaganda as the archetypal and, in many ways, most likely case for strong effects has rarely been studied. We collect extensive data about Hitler’s speeches and gauge their impact on voter support at five national elections preceding the dictatorship. We use a semi-parametric difference-in-differences approach to estimate effects in the face of potential confounding due to the deliberate scheduling of events. Our findings suggest that Hitler’s speeches, while rationally targeted, had a negligible impact on the Nazis’ electoral fortunes. Only the 1932 presidential runoff, an election preceded by an extraordinarily short, intense and one-sided campaign, yielded positive effects. This study questions the importance of charismatic leaders for the success of populist movements.
State of the world 2017: Autocratization and exclusion?
Anna Lührmann et al.
Democratization, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article presents evidence of a global trend of autocratization. The most visible feature of democracy – elections – remains strong and is even improving in some places. Autocratization mainly affects non-electoral aspects of democracy such as media freedom, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, yet these in turn threaten to undermine the meaningfulness of elections. While the majority of the world’s population lives under democratic rule, 2.5 billion people were subjected to autocratization in 2017. Last year, democratic qualities were in decline in 24 countries across the world, many of which are populous such as India and the United States. This article also presents evidence testifying that men and wealthy groups tend to have a strong hold on political power in countries where 86% of the world population reside. Further, we show that political exclusion based on socio-economic status in particular is becoming increasingly severe. For instance, the wealthy have gained significantly more power in countries home to 1.9 billion of the world’s population over the past decade.
Informational Autocrats
Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman
University of California Working Paper, July 2018
Abstract:
In recent decades, dictatorships based on mass repression have largely given way to a new model based on the manipulation of information. Instead of terrorizing citizens into submission, "informational autocrats" artificially boost their popularity by convincing the public they are competent. To do so, they use propaganda and silence informed members of the elite by co-optation or censorship. Using several sources -- including a newly created dataset of authoritarian control techniques -- we document a range of trends in recent autocracies that fit the theory: a decline in violence, efforts to conceal state repression, rejection of official ideologies, imitation of democracy, a perceptions gap between masses and elite, and the adoption by leaders of a rhetoric of performance rather than one aimed at inspiring fear.
The Hayek–Friedman hypothesis on the press: Is there an association between economic freedom and press freedom?
Christian Bjørnskov
Journal of Institutional Economics, August 2018, Pages 617-638
Abstract:
The Hayek–Friedman hypothesis states that economic freedom is causally associated with stable democracy. I test a particular element of the hypothesis focusing on press freedom, which is arguably a necessary component of any democratic polity. Combining the Freedom House index of press freedom and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom yields a large annual panel dataset between 1993 and 2011. Estimates show that improvements in economic freedom are associated with subsequent improvements of press freedom. The overall association is mainly driven by changes in market openness.
Escape from Europe: A Calculus of Consent Model of the Origins of Liberal Institutions in the North American Colonies
Vlad Tarko & Kyle O'Donnell
Constitutional Political Economy, forthcoming
Abstract:
The migration out of Europe and the establishment of North American colonies presents us with a great puzzle: Why did the colonists establish democratic forms of governance? Considering that early democratic colonies appeared even before philosophical works such as those of Locke and Montesquieu were written, it is difficult to make the case that ideology was the driving factor. We show that the calculus of consent model proposed by Buchanan & Tullock (1962) offers a simple but subtle solution to this puzzle. Because migrants formed homogeneous communities, and because, thanks to the large geographical expanse, the inter-jurisdictional externalities were small, the efficient level of consensus within each colony was much greater than in Europe, and the scope of efficient centralized decision-making was much smaller. Hence, a structure of decentralized democratic communities emerged as the efficient outcome. We explain why the calculus of consent is particularly well suited to understand the institutional effects of mass migration, develop three calculus of consent theorems about how the equilibrium decision rules are affected by changes in the underlining costs, and show how these theorems can be used to make pattern predictions about changes in democracy, federalism and economic freedom. We apply the model to explain the differences between Britain and North American colonies. and show that the model also provides useful insight about the differences between colonies, in particular between New England and Chesapeake colonies. In conclusion we briefly discuss the fact that the calculus also provides a quick explanation for the institutional evolution in United States and Europe, in particular for the growth of government.
Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India
Aditya Dasgupta
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can technological change contribute to political turnover? Influential theories suggest that technological change represents a form of creative destruction that can weaken incumbents and strengthen outsiders, leading to political turnover. This paper investigates a large-scale historical natural experiment: the impact of the green revolution on single-party dominance in India. Drawing on a theoretical framework based on models of contests, this paper argues that high-yielding variety (HYV) crops strengthened the incentives and capacity of a politically excluded group, in this case agricultural producers, to seek greater political representation. Exploiting the timing of the introduction of HYV crops, together with district-level variation in suitability for the new crop technology, instrumental variables analyses show that the green revolution played a pivotal role in the rise of agrarian opposition parties and decline of single-party dominance. The findings support theories linking technological change to political turnover, with important implications for the political economy of democratization.
Economic Integration and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation
Giacomo Magistretti & Marco Tabellini
Harvard Working Paper, May 2017
Abstract:
We study whether economic integration fosters the process of democratization and the channels through which this might happen. Our analysis is based on a large panel dataset of countries between 1950 and 2014. We instrument actual trade with predicted trade constructed by estimating a time-varying gravity equation similar to Feyrer (2009). We find that economic integration has a positive effect on democracy, driven by trade with democratic partners and stronger for countries with lower initial levels of economic and institutional development. These results are consistent with a learning/cultural exchange process whereby economic integration promotes the spread of democracy from more to less democratic countries. We corroborate this interpretation by providing evidence against alternative mechanisms, such as income effects, human capital accumulation, and trade-induced changes in inequality.
The case for courts: Resolving information problems in authoritarian regimes
Jacqueline Sievert
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
Authoritarian regimes are not known for adopting independent courts, yet the frequency of states empowering their judiciaries has steadily increased. In 1961 only 9% of autocracies had a partially or fully independent court, but by 1987 more than one-third of authoritarian states had reformed their judiciaries. Initiating judicial reform is risky for a regime that seeks to maintain its authority over its populace, including risks to their preferred policy positions and judgments that run contrary to the preferences of the regime. Given these risks, why do authoritarian leaders often relinquish authority to independent courts? This article argues regime leaders will choose to empower at least nominally independent courts in order to resolve information problems that lead to bargaining failures and civil war. This project uses propensity score matching to account for the complex relationship between institutional arrangement and civil war, and finds that states that adopt an independent court reduce their risk of civil war between 54% and 75% when compared to states that are equally likely to have adopted an independent court, but did not. These results suggest that leaders seeking to reduce uncertainty when bargaining with potential oppositions groups have strong incentives to implement independent judiciaries, and improve our understanding of how and why authoritarian leaders choose to delegate authority to independent judicial institutions.
Does Violent Secessionism Work?
Ryan Griffiths & Louis Wasser
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent research suggests that the strategic use of violence may increase a group’s chance of gaining independence. We investigate this topic using comprehensive data on all secessionist movements between 1900 and 2006 and an original data set on the institutional and extrainstitutional methods that secessionists have used from 1946 to 2011. Our analysis yields several important findings. First, strategy depends on context. Not all secessionist movements are the same, and many have legal and/or institutional routes to independence that shape the methods that they employ. Second, no secessionist movement challenging a contiguous state has won its sovereignty without using institutional methods, either exclusively or in combination with extrainstitutional methods. Finally, we identify four successful combinations of secessionist methods and discuss how these movements develop in relation to their strategic setting. Overall, we find no evidence that violence helps a secessionist movement to gain independence.
Economic Foundations of the Territorial State System
Avidit Acharya & Alexander Lee
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The contemporary world is organized into a system of territorial states in which rulers exercise authority inside clearly defined boundaries and recognize the authority of other rulers outside those boundaries. We develop a model to explain how the major economic and military developments in Europe starting in the fifteenth century contributed to the development of this system. Our model rationalizes the system as an economic cartel in which self‐interested and forward‐looking rulers maintain high tax revenues by reducing competition in the “market for governance.”
The Foreign Policy Rhetoric of Populism: Chávez, Oil, and Anti-imperialism
Iñaki Sagarzazu & Cameron Thies
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Populists are often identified based on their behavior, but the discursive element of their identities is also a frequently observed characteristic of this type of leader. We examine the determinants of populist foreign policy rhetoric in the case of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. We argue that a leftist populist leader such as Chávez will focus on anti-imperialist themes, and we consider two mechanisms that may indicate the conditions under which he will use them: diversion, which would typically be expected from a populist, and capacity. We use time-series analysis of rhetorical data scraped from the entire corpus of Aló Presidente — Chávez’s weekly television series — to test our hypotheses. The evidence supports the capacity mechanism, that Chávez is emboldened to use anti-imperialist rhetoric when the price of oil is high. His rhetoric, thus, matches his resources and ability to provide domestic and international goods to support his own identity as a protector and savior of the common people from domestic and global elites engaged in the imperialistic enterprise.
Weapons of peace: Providing alternative means for social change reduces political violence
Birga Schumpe et al.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present research demonstrates how support for political violence can be reduced by providing peaceful alternatives to produce social change. In Study 1, participants watched a video documenting the activities of a violent activist group, and then either watched a video of a peaceful activist group supporting the same cause or a control video. Participants that watched the peaceful activist group reported less support for the violent activist group than participants in the control condition. Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1 by testing the underlying psychological mechanism. In line with goal systems theory, providing participants with a peaceful alternative to produce social change (vs. no alternative) reduced the perceived instrumentality of the violent group to further the ideological cause, leading to lower support for the violent group. Implications for anti‐violence campaigns are discussed.
Shocks to military support and subsequent assassinations in Ancient Rome
Cornelius Christian & Liam Elbourne
Economics Letters, October 2018, Pages 79-82
Abstract:
A dictator relies on his military’s support; shocks to this support can threaten his rule. Motivated by this, we find that lower rainfall, along the north-eastern Roman Empire, predicts more assassinations of Roman emperors. Our proposed mechanism is as follows: lower precipitation increases the probability that Roman troops, who relied on local food supplies, starve. This pushes soldiers to mutiny, hence weakening the emperor’s support, and increasing the probability he is assassinated.
Mobilizing Opposition Voters Under Electoral Authoritarianism: A Field Experiment in Russia
Leonid Peisakhin, Arturas Rozenas & Sergey Sanovich
NYU Working Paper, July 2018
Abstract:
Under electoral authoritarianism, the opposition's victory at the polls often precipitates regime change. Yet, opposition parties persistently find it very difficult to mobilize their supporters. In this study, we examine the effectiveness of information campaigns administered as part of a cluster randomized experiment by an opposition candidate in Russia's 2016 parliamentary election. In a Moscow electoral district, the campaign distributed 240,000 fliers to 75% of the district's households. The treatments primed the closeness of the election in that district and, separately, sought to shame opposition supporters into voting. Outcomes were measured at precinct level. We find that the information campaigns failed to increase turnout or support for the candidate and her party. This finding casts doubt on the ability of opposition campaigns to mobilize voters via informational interventions in electoral autocracies.
From ballot-boxes to barracks: Votes, institutions, and post-election coups
Arturas Rozenas & Sean Zeigler
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
The military often intervenes in politics shortly after elections. This might be because election results reveal information about the ease with which a coup can succeed. Would-be coup perpetrators use this information to infer whether the incumbent can be removed from office without provoking popular unrest. We argue that the informational content of elections depends on the electoral rules that translate votes into outcomes. In electoral systems that incentivize strategic voting, election returns are less informative about the distribution of political support than in electoral systems that incentivize sincere voting. An extensive battery of statistical tests shows that vote-shares of election winners do not predict coup attempts in plurality systems, which encourage strategic voting, but they do predict coup attempts in non-plurality electoral systems, which do not encourage strategic voting. Thus, incumbents who have performed well in elections face a lower risk of coup attempts, but only in institutional environments where voting results are highly informative about the distribution of political support. We apply this logic to illuminate the decisions of the military to intervene into politics during the famous failed 1936 coup in Spain and the successful 1973 coup in Chile.
Drivers of Tolerance in Post-Arab Spring Egypt: Religious, Economic, or Government Endorsements?
Mazen Hassan & Marwa Shalaby
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Previous work on political tolerance has overwhelmingly focused on established democracies. Consequently, our knowledge continues to be limited with regard to the drivers of tolerance in less democratic transitional and nondemocratic settings. In this paper, we examine what could best promote tolerance of least-favored political groups in such contexts. We use a survey experiment in Egypt to test competing theories through exposing respondents to different primes, emphasizing the importance of tolerance on the basis of religious, economic, or government endorsements. Respondents were then asked questions to gauge their tolerance levels toward their least-favored group. We control for the level of trust in government, religiosity, interpersonal trust, contact, and political knowledge. Our data show soaring levels of intolerance among Egyptians. However, we found evidence that priming respondents with the economic benefits of having a tolerant society is the most effective way to promote tolerant attitudes, especially among those with lower levels of education and younger age groups. Additionally, our analysis demonstrated that respondents’ level of trust in government has a strong effect on tolerance attitudes.
Legislative Gender Diversity and the Resolution of Civil Conflict
Rebecca Best, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield & Reed Wood
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Policy makers and scholars have shown increased interest in gendered approaches to peacemaking, even as evidence of women’s impact on peace processes has remained unclear. In this paper, we explore the influence of gender diversity among decision-making elites on the outcome of ongoing civil conflicts. Specifically, we argue that increased female representation within the national legislature increases the likelihood that a conflict terminates in a negotiated settlement. However, the impact of legislative female representation on conflict termination is conditioned by the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, suggesting that gender diversity exerts a greater impact in states with more authoritative legislatures. We evaluate our hypotheses using data on the manner of conflict termination and the proportion of women in national legislatures between 1945 and 2009. Our results show support for the central argument, suggesting that increasing female representation within legislative bodies increases the likelihood of war termination via negotiated settlement.