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Finding meaning in the clouds: Illusory pattern perception predicts receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit
Alexander Walker et al.
Judgment and Decision Making, March 2019, Pages 109-119
Abstract:
Previous research has demonstrated a link between illusory pattern perception and various irrational beliefs. On this basis, we hypothesized that participants who displayed greater degrees of illusory pattern perception would also be more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. We find support for this prediction across three experiments (N = 627) and four distinct measures of pattern perception. We further demonstrate that this observed relation is restricted to illusory pattern perception, with participants displaying greater endorsement of non-illusory patterns being no more likely to rate pseudo-profound bullshit statements as profound. Additionally, this relation is not a product of a general proclivity to rate all statements as profound and is not accounted for by individual differences in analytic thinking. Overall, we demonstrate that individuals with a tendency to go beyond the available data such that they uncritically endorse patterns where no patterns exist are also more likely to create and endorse false-meaning in meaningless pseudo-profound statements. These findings are discussed in the context of a proposed framework that views individuals’ receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit as, in part, an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise adaptive process: that of pattern perception.
An examination of the potential lingering effects of smartphone use on cognition
Peter Frost et al.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Smartphones might offer an extension of our own cognitive abilities, potentially preventing practice of certain forms of cognition. Our first study established that heavier usage of smartphones was negatively correlated with social problem solving and delayed gratification, as well as positively correlated with some aspects of critical thinking. Studies 2 and 3 involved experiments where participants were assigned to either a lower or higher smartphone usage group. In both experiments, higher usage of smartphones led only to a diminished ability to interpret and analyze the deeper meaning of information. However, Study 3 showed that, after a 4‐week interval, the difference in the ability to interpret and analyze meaning between lower and higher phone usage groups was no longer evident. The findings of this study suggest that, even in the rare cases where smartphones might alter cognition, this effect is likely transitory.
Naltrexone alters responses to social and physical warmth: Implications for social bonding
Tristen Inagaki, Laura Hazlett & Carmen Andreescu
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Socially warm experiences, when one feels connected to others, have been linked with physical warmth. Opioids, hypothesized to support social bonding with close others and, separately, physical warmth, may underlie both experiences. In order to test this hypothesis, 80 participants were randomly assigned to the opioid antagonist, naltrexone or placebo before neural and emotional responses to social and physical warmth were collected. Social and physical warmth led to similar increases in ventral striatum (VS) and middle-insula (MI) activity. Further, feelings of social connection were positively related to neural activity to social warmth. However, naltrexone (vs placebo) disrupted these effects by (a) reducing VS and MI activity to social and physical warmth, (b) erasing the subjective experience-brain association to social warmth and (c) disrupting the neural overlap between social and physical warmth. Results provide additional support for the theory that social and physical warmth share neurobiological, opioid receptor dependent mechanisms and suggest multiple routes by which social connections may be maintained.
A Social Analgesic? Acetaminophen (Paracetamol) Reduces Positive Empathy
Dominik Mischkowski, Jennifer Crocker & Baldwin Way
Frontiers in Psychology, March 2019
Abstract:
Acetaminophen - a potent physical painkiller that also reduces empathy for other people’s suffering - blunts physical and social pain by reducing activation in brain areas (i.e. anterior insula and anterior cingulate) thought to be related to emotional awareness and motivation. Some neuroimaging research on positive empathy (i.e., the perception and sharing of positive affect in other people) suggests that the experience of positive empathy also recruits these paralimbic cortical brain areas. We thus hypothesized that acetaminophen may also impair affective processes related to the experience of positive empathy. We tested this hypothesis in a double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment. Specifically, we administered 1,000 mg acetaminophen or a placebo and measured effects on different measures of positive empathy while participants read scenarios about the uplifting experiences of other people. Results showed that acetaminophen reduced personal pleasure and other-directed empathic feelings in response to these scenarios. In contrast, effects on perceived positivity of the described experiences or perceived pleasure in scenario protagonists were not significant. These findings suggest that (1) acetaminophen reduces affective reactivity to other people’s positive experiences and (2) the experience of physical pain and positive empathy may have a more similar neurochemical basis than previously assumed. Because the experience of positive empathy is related to prosocial behavior, our findings also raise questions about the societal impact of excessive acetaminophen consumption.
Where Does Time Go When You Blink?
Shany Grossman et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Retinal input is frequently lost because of eye blinks, yet humans rarely notice these gaps in visual input. Although previous studies focused on the perceptual and neural correlates of diminished awareness to blinks, the impact of these correlates on the perceived time of concurrent events is unknown. Here, we investigated whether the subjective sense of time is altered by spontaneous blinks. We found that participants (N = 22) significantly underestimated the duration of a visual stimulus when a spontaneous blink occurred during stimulus presentation and that this underestimation was correlated with the blink duration of individual participants. Importantly, the effect was not present when durations of an auditory stimulus were judged (N = 23). The results point to a link between spontaneous blinks, previously demonstrated to induce activity suppression in the visual cortex, and a compression of subjective time. They suggest that ongoing encoding within modality-specific sensory cortices, independent of conscious awareness, informs the subjective sense of time.