Inside Rule
Is there really a dictator's dilemma? Information and repression in autocracy
Scott Gehlbach et al.
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In his seminal work on the political economy of dictatorship, Ronald Wintrobe posited the existence of a "dictator's dilemma," in which repression leaves an autocrat less secure by reducing information about discontent. We explore the nature and resolution of this dilemma with a formalization that builds on recent work in the political economy of nondemocracy. When the regime is sufficiently repressive, and the dictator's popularity correspondingly unclear to opposition as well as autocrat, the ruler faces two unattractive options: He can mobilize the repressive apparatus, even though there may be no threat to his rule, or he can refrain from mobilizing, even though the danger may be real. Semicompetitive elections can ease the dilemma through the controlled revelation of discontent. Paradoxically, the manipulation of information through such non-repressive means can allow for more rather than less repression.
State Employment as a Strategy of Autocratic Control in China
Jaya Wen
Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper presents evidence that autocrats use state-owned firms to prevent unrest via employment provision, a role that helps explain these low-productivity firms' favorable treatment and persistence across settings. I use variation in a regional conflict in Xinjiang to establish that Chinese state firms respond to threats of ethnic unrest by hiring minority men. Concurrently, wages rise and private employment falls among this group. These patterns are consistent with a theoretical framework of government-subsidized, pacification-motivated state employment, and I use the framework to quantify the implicit subsidy that state firms receive for hiring male minorities.
Why Was the American Revolution a War? A Rationalist Interpretation
David Lake
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper poses a rationalist account of the American Revolution that locates the turn to war in problems of credible commitment on both sides of the Atlantic. On the one hand, Britain could not commit credibly to restrain its authority, especially once the political equipoise that had prevailed before the Seven Years War was broken. To render a new colonial bargain credible required tying the hands of Parliament, but any form of colonial representation would have severely disrupted politics in Britain in a period of political change and conflict. On the other hand, Americans could not credibly commit to follow rules set in London, especially those restricting trade and Westward expansion. Neither settlers nor elites had an incentive to comply with imperial edicts and, more importantly, the colonies lacked any means to enforce any potential agreement.
The Emergence of Democratic Constitutions: Comparing the Modern World to Ancient Greece
Andrew Hanssen & Robert Fleck
Clemson University Working Paper, November 2024
Abstract:
Democracy has flourished twice in human history: first in ancient Greece and then, more than two millennia later, in the modern world. Although the historical record regarding most Greek poleis (city-states) is scant, there nevertheless exists sufficient information to categorize the constitutions of nearly 200 of the more than 1000 poleis that once existed. Using similar data from the modern world, we compare two centuries of ancient data to two centuries of modern data. In both eras, democracy grew in prevalence because, over many decades, transitions to democracy were sufficiently frequent to offset "backsliding" away from democracy. Thus, democracy eventually became the most common form of constitution in both ancient Greece and the modern world. Democracy appears to have expanded more rapidly among Greek poleis than among modern countries; however, we observe that after reaching 50 percent, the proportion of Greek democracies declined, rose again to half of all states, declined again, and rose to half again. The modern world just recently reached the 50 percent threshold, and whether it follows the Greek pattern remains to be seen.
Imperial Legal Politics after the Age of Empires: How the Russian Judiciary Adjudicates Commercial Disputes in Crimea
Egor Lazarev & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy
Perspectives on Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
What is the role of law in imperial state-building projects? We study this question of historical significance with an empirical focus on Russian arbitrazh (commercial) courts in Crimea. We document the increase in the number of disputes that involve the Russian state and strong pro-government favoritism in court decisions. We also find that arbitrazh courts are used as a check on local political elites. At the same time, our analysis establishes favoritism toward local businesses in disputes with Russian businesses. Most importantly, we highlight that this stick-and-carrot legal politics is not only imposed from above: Local judges who defected to Russia act more favorably than outsider judges appointed from Russia toward the Russian state and businesses, plausibly because local judges want to signal their loyalty. The implication is that imperial legal domination emerges not only through directives from the metropole but also through the everyday contributions of local imperial intermediaries.
Colonial Mapmaking, Ethnic Identity, and Traditional Authority in Africa
Christian Houle & Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz
British Journal of Political Science, February 2025
Abstract:
One common explanation for ethnicized politics and limited national identification in Africa lies with colonial boundaries. Europeans frequently divided ethnic groups as they divvied territory in the nineteenth century; this might have long-run repercussions, as individuals prioritize ties with coethnics in neighboring states rather than with non-coethnic co-nationals. Contra these expectations, we argue that divided groups should have weaker attachments to their ethnicity than non-divided groups will, because partition particularly disrupted pre-existing traditional institutions of governance and exchange within these groups. We argue that partition weakened traditional authorities and, consequently, ethnic identities through three mechanisms: (1) administrative shifts that reduced traditional authorities' power; (2) limitations on leaders' capacity to raise revenues; and (3) exacerbating intra-group divisions among co-ethnics living on different sides of the borders. We test this using georeferenced data from rounds 3-6 of the Afrobarometer and find support for our argument. These results are robust to different measures of the extent to which an ethnic group was split and various considerations of ethnic groups' local and national demographic and political power. Our findings have important implications for studies of the legacies of colonialism and identity politics in Africa today.
Weapons of the Weak: Technological Change, Guerrilla Firepower, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes
Costantino Pischedda, Mauro Gilli & Andrea Gilli
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
What explains counterinsurgency outcomes? Existing scholarship points to characteristics and strategies of incumbents and insurgents but neglects the role of insurgents' weapons. Some studies discuss the effects of the firepower of insurgents relative to incumbents. Focusing on relative firepower, however, is problematic given the asymmetric nature of guerrilla warfare, with insurgents eschewing decisive engagements where incumbents would bring to bear their material superiority. We turn the spotlight, instead, on guerrilla firepower, i.e., insurgents' absolute ability to inflict casualties on incumbents using small arms in hit-and-run attacks. We argue that technological innovations dating to the mid-19th century sowed the seeds for cumulative increases in lethality of insurgents' small arms -- the standard tools of guerrilla warfare -- over the following 150 years, enhancing tactical effectiveness of hit-and-run attacks and thus insurgents' prospects of strategic success. Statistical analysis of novel data on guerrilla firepower in counterinsurgency campaigns from 1800 to 2005 corroborates our argument.
How Does Shaming Human Rights Violators Abroad Shape Attitudes at Home?
Lotem Bassan-Nygate
British Journal of Political Science, February 2025
Abstract:
Does shaming human rights violators shape attitudes at home? A growing literature studies the effect of shaming on public attitudes in the target state, but far less is known about its effect in countries initiating the criticism -- that is the shamers. In this article, I theorize that when governments shame human rights violators they shape both government approval and human rights attitudes at home. Utilizing two US-based survey experiments, I demonstrate that by shaming foreign countries, governments can improve their image at home and virtue signal their dedication to human rights. At the same time, shaming can modestly shape tolerance towards certain domestic human rights violations. I consider the generalizability of my results through comprehensive supplementary analyses, where experimental insights are corroborated with cross-national observational data. Overall, my findings can provide valuable insight into governments' incentives to engage in foreign criticism.