Insecure
Presidential Personality: Not Just a Nuisance
Maryann Gallagher & Susan Allen
Foreign Policy Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
Few systematic studies of US uses of force treat the inherent attributes of presidents as the key causal factors; nonetheless, the fact that individual leaders matter is evident to the public, the media, and foreign policymakers in other countries. This study advances the development of First Image explanations of conflict by empirically investigating the relationship between presidential personality and the variation surrounding foreign policy decision making. The importance of this type of variance has been understudied in international relations, and the consistency of leaders' policy decisions has important strategic implications for interstate conflict. Relying on Big Five measures of US presidents' personality traits, we find that leaders who have a high tendency toward Excitement Seeking are more likely to use force to carry out their foreign policy objectives, while those who are more Open to Action exhibit a greater variance around their foreign policy decision making. In sum, the personality traits of individual leaders influence not only the choices they make, but the consistency of their choices, which has important consequences for US foreign policy.
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Iran and the Nuclear Threshold: Where is the Line?
Jacques Hymans & Matthew Gratias
Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2013, Pages 13-38
Abstract:
This article clarifies and evaluates the intellectual underpinnings of the respective military red lines that Western leaders have drawn against Iran's developing nuclear program: (1) the red line of "no Iranian nuclear weapon" - the stance that has been embraced by President Barack Obama - and (2) the red line of "no Iranian nuclear weapons capability" - the stance that has been embraced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many prominent American Iran hawks. We contend that the key intellectual divide between these stances is that the Netanyahu view implicitly assumes that a "significant quantity" (SQ) of highly enriched uranium is essentially equivalent to a bomb because an explosive nuclear test is technically unnecessary, whereas the Obama view implicitly assumes that if and when Iran gets to the point of being technically and psychologically ready to assemble a nuclear weapons arsenal, it will conduct a test. We show through theoretical and empirical analysis that the likelihood that Iran will choose an "Israeli-style" policy of creating an arsenal of untested but operational nuclear bombs is very low. Therefore, Obama's red line is more intellectually defensible than Netanyahu's.
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Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution
Uri Bar-Joseph
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
The surprising 'Arab Spring' raises the question as to what would enable national intelligence to provide high quality warnings prior to the eruption of popular revolutions. This article uses new sources of evidence to trace and explain Israel's success in comparison to US failure at correctly estimating the course of the Iranian Revolution in 1977-79. In explaining this variance, the article shows that it was mainly the result of the intimate acquaintance of Israel's representatives in Iran with the local language, history and culture, as well as the ability to communicate with locals - tools which the Americans completely lacked.
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Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From Propaganda Output
Megan Smith & James Igoe Walsh
Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 2013, Pages 311-327
Abstract:
The United States has used unmanned, aerial vehicles - drones - to launch attacks on militants associated with Al Qaeda and other violent groups based in Pakistan. The goal is to degrade the target's capacity to undertake political and violent action. We assess the effectiveness of drone strikes in achieving this goal, measuring degradation as the capacity of Al Qaeda to generate and disseminate propaganda. Propaganda is a key output of many terrorist organizations and a long-standing priority for Al Qaeda. Unlike other potential measures of terrorist group activity and capacity, propaganda output can be observed and measured. If drone strikes have degraded Al Qaeda, their occurrence should be correlated with a reduction in the organization's propaganda output. The analysis presented here finds little evidence that this is the case. Drone strikes have not impaired Al Qaeda's ability to generate propaganda.
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Investigating diplomatic transformations
Nicholas Wheeler
International Affairs, March 2013, Pages 477-496
Abstract:
This article investigates the role that diplomacy - especially at the highest levels - can play in transforming adversarial relationships. Building on Martin Wight's exploration of these issues, in particular the question of how two adversaries can convince each other that they are serious negotiating partners, the article contends that achieving a significant de-escalation of a conflict depends upon the growth of trust. In contrast to Wight's limited conception of what diplomacy could achieve in terms of ending conflicts, the argument made here is that particular types of communicative encounters between diplomats, and especially leaders, can build a level of trust at the interpersonal level which can lead policy-makers to make conciliatory frame-breaking moves. To make good on this claim, the article employs a case-study of the summitry between US President Ronald Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev. The key contention here is that the face-to-face encounters between Reagan and Gorbachev promoted a level of trust between them that made possible the fundamental de-escalation of the Cold War that took place in the second half of the 1980s. Rival explanations focusing on nuclear weapons and Soviet economic decline are analysed, but while these were enabling conditions in the transformation of relations, the article argues that it is necessary to recognize the critical role that interpersonal trust between US and Soviet leaders played in achieving this diplomatic transformation.
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Unpacking the Connection Between Terror and Islam
Justin Conrad & Daniel Milton
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, April 2013, Pages 315-336
Abstract:
Are countries with large Muslim populations more likely to experience or produce transnational terrorist attacks than countries with fewer Muslims? And if there is a difference, is it attributable to the influence of Islam, or to the economic, social, and political conditions that are common in predominantly Muslim countries? Analyzing all transnational terrorist attacks between 1973 and 2002, this study uses decomposition analysis to identify the relative contributions of the observable and behavioral characteristics of a state on the amount of terrorism that it experiences and produces. The results suggest that Muslim states do not systematically produce more terrorism than non-Muslim states once state repression, human rights abuses, and discrimination against minorities are taken into account.
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The Myth of "Traditional" Sovereignty
Luke Glanville
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
The conventional story of sovereignty told in the discipline of International Relations (IR) tells us that there is a "traditional" or "Westphalian" meaning of sovereignty that has prevailed since the seventeenth century and that accords states the right to govern themselves free from outside interference. In recent years, the tale goes, this meaning has been challenged for the first time by notions of conditional and responsible sovereignty. This article argues that the supposed "traditional" meaning of sovereignty is not as foundational and timeless as is often assumed. Rather than a right of non-intervention, it was the right to wage (just) war that was first conceived by political theorists to be the external corollary of the internal supremacy of the sovereign. This included the right of war to punish tyranny and rescue the oppressed. This article examines the initial absence and then the gradual emergence of the "traditional" meaning of sovereignty, arguing that it was only firmly established by international society for the first time in the twentieth century. It concludes by considering some of the implications of this revised story of sovereignty for the study of IR.
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How the United States Helped Iran Build a Laser Enrichment Laboratory
Anton Khlopkov
Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2013, Pages 39-62
Abstract:
In the spring of 1975, Iran became one of the first states to begin comprehensive research into using lasers for uranium isotope separation. As part of that research, the government sought the expertise of Jeff Eerkens, a leading American specialist in the field. This investigative article tells the story of their relationship: how it began, how it developed, and how it ended, drawing extensively from the authors' personal interviews with Eerkens as well as numerous publications and other interviews.
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Enduring Resilience: How Oil Markets Handle Disruptions
Eugene Gholz & Daryl Press
Security Studies, Winter 2013, Pages 139-147
Abstract:
Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated claims of energy vulnerability distort U.S. national security policy.
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Disarming Libya? A reassessment after the Arab Spring
Nathan Busch & Joseph Pilat
International Affairs, March 2013, Pages 451-475
Abstract:
In 2011, several months after a popular revolt overturned the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Libya's new National Transitional Council announced the discovery of what was later confirmed to be an undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons. This was a startling announcement to many observers, since Libya had publicly renounced its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in 2003 and had apparently dismantled the programmes soon after. Although the Libyan case had repeatedly been referred to as a positive 'model' for nonproliferation - an instance where a country had voluntarily and peacefully rolled back its WMD programs - this recent discovery forces us to wonder whether the Libyan 'model' really was as successful as initially described. This article examines the successes, challenges and lessons that can be learned from the Libyan case of WMD renunciation and verification. As one model of cooperative verification, the Libyan case highlights not only the opportunities afforded by monitoring and verification regimes, but also some of the difficulties that any such regime will encounter in real-world circumstances, however positive.
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The Business of Piracy in Somalia
Sarah Percy & Anja Shortland
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article argues that understanding why Somali piracy has resisted control efforts requires understanding that it is a criminal business rather than a conventional international security problem. We statistically model Somali piracy and draw two conclusions: first, piracy increases with economic stability, and second, naval interdiction efforts are stabilising but not significantly reducing piracy. We argue that these conclusions are not surprising if piracy is understood as an organised crime. Our argument has four components. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem, and naval control mechanisms are not deterring pirates. Second, improving Somalia's anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy: our statistical analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organised criminal activity, and like other organised crime groups, will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behaviour.
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"How to Fight Savage Tribes": The Global War on Terror in Historical Perspective
Erik Ringmar
Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 2013, Pages 264-283
Abstract:
The Bush administration's "Global War on Terror" has, by both defenders and critics, been characterized as unique. However, as this article shows, there is a long tradition, both in the United States and in Europe, of fighting wars against "savage tribes" - against enemies who fail to make a distinction between soldiers and civilians, and who use terror as a weapon. The problem of how to fight such groups was much discussed in the legal literature of the nineteenth century. This is a discussion from which it is possible to learn contemporary lessons.
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Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Won't Work
Andrew Futter & Benjamin Zala
Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2013, Pages 107-122
Abstract:
The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional "prompt global strike" program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.
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How and why the Cold War became a long peace: Some statistical insights
John Vasquez & Choong-Nam Kang
Cooperation and Conflict, March 2013, Pages 28-50
Abstract:
A data-based analysis of how and why the long peace of the Cold War occurred. The analysis tests a proposition originally suggested by Senese and Vasquez (2008) that alliance polarization played an important role in producing the long peace, because in the 1816-1945 and post-Cold War periods, both sides having outside alliances was positively associated with the escalation of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) to war and in the Cold War it was negatively related. New hypotheses are derived to test this claim. Tests of two hypotheses support the claim that alliance polarization played a key role in the long peace, even when controlling for the presence of nuclear weapons.
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Managing the Uranium-233 Stockpile of the United States
Robert Alvarez
Science & Global Security, Spring 2013, Pages 53-69
Abstract:
The United States produced about 2 tons of uranium-233, a weapons-useable fissile material, as part of its military and civilian nuclear program. Of that, 1.55 tons was separated at costs estimated to be between $5.5 and $11 billion. Of the 1.55 tons, approximately 96 kg of uranium-233 may be unaccounted for. There are also varying site-specific estimates suggesting that material control and accountability of the U.S. uranium-233 inventory needs to be more stringent. About 428 kg of uranium-233 is stored at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), in Tennessee at Building 3019, a 69-year-old structure which DOE describes as the "oldest operating nuclear facility in the World" and one that does not meet current safeguards and security requirements. Currently, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) goal for disposition of the 428 kg is 2018, more than 20 years after significant environmental, safety, and security vulnerabilities were first officially acknowledged. To meet this goal, DOE plans to waive its own waste acceptance criteria to allow direct shallow land disposal of a large portion of the uranium-233 by August 2014. Granting a disposal waiver sets a bad precedent for international safeguards and standards for the disposal of reprocessed wastes containing high concentrations of fissile materials.
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Errol Henderson & Reşat Bayer
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine the extent to which wealth, democracy, and/or relative military capabilities contribute to victory in interstate war. Examining contingency tables, we find that states with greater military capabilities are more likely to win their wars whether they are wealthier or democratic, and democratic states perform marginally better than wealthier states in war. Probit analyses indicate that although each of the variables has a robust and positive impact on war victory, relative capabilities has the strongest substantive impact, followed by wealth, then democracy. Hazard analyses reveal that states with greater military capabilities fight shorter wars than either democracies or wealthier states, and controlling for capabilities and wealth, the relationship between democracy and war duration is not significant, which challenges the view that democracies have a unique propensity to fight shorter wars. We also find that the democratic victory phenomenon is not universal, but is contingent on the placement of a single country, Israel, in the Western or non-Western democracy category. In sum, our analyses indicate that although each of the three factors contributes to war victory, relative military capability is the most powerful, consistent, and robust predictor to victory in interstate war.
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War and the Reelection Motive: Examining the Effect of Term Limits
Sean Zeigler, Jan Pierskalla & Sandeep Mazumder
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
This article investigates the relationship between term limits and international conflict. Theories of political survival and diversionary war both imply term limits should play a role in international relations, whereas "permanent referendum theory," largely motivated by work in American politics, suggests otherwise. Drawing on these theories, we formulate and test competing hypotheses regarding term limits and international crises. Using dyadic militarized interstate disputes data and information on forty-eight democracies with term limits, we uncover strong evidence to support the claim that leaders reaching final terms in office are more likely to initiate conflict than those still subject to reelection. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of conflict initiation is significantly higher during times of recession, but only in the absence of binding term limits. While binding electoral terms and economic downturns are both independently associated with increased levels of conflict initiation, in concert their conditional effects actually counteract each other.
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Amnon Cavari
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Spring 2013, Pages 1-22
Abstract:
Examining American attitudes toward Israel, this article demonstrates that religious beliefs and elite polarization both play a significant role in predicting public opinion about foreign policy. It is argued that the growing gap in partisan support for Israel is explained by two related transformations in the American political parties: the emergence of new religious cleavages and the polarization of the political parties. Using a time series of public attitudes toward Israel since 1967, it is revealed that the partisan support is strongly explained by religious preferences, that these religious preferences have aligned with partisan identification in the 1990s, and that the polarization between Democratic and Republican elites in recent years has further distanced the attitudes of Republican and Democratic identifiers.
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The Road to Hell? Third-Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities
Andrew Kydd & Scott Straus
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Preventing large-scale atrocities has emerged as an important policy goal of the post-Cold War period. However, a debate exists about the effects of creating an international institution to prevent atrocities. Advocates of intervention argue that a credible threat to intervene should deter perpetrators and stop atrocities when deterrence fails. Critics argue that third-party intervention, by strengthening weak minority groups and lowering the cost of war, encourages rebellions and so makes war and atrocities more likely. We develop a model of intervention to analyze this debate. The model shows that the negative effects of intervention highlighted by critics can be mitigated if the third party is relatively neutral and if alternative costs are imposed on decision makers. We conclude that with appropriate institutional design, the net impact of stronger third-party commitments to end atrocities will be to lower the expected level of atrocities.
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Fit and Feasible: Why Democratizing States Form, not Join, International Organizations
Paul Poast & Johannes Urpelainen
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Does democratization make states join existing international organizations (IOs)? Previous research suggests that democratization increases a state's propensity to join IOs capable of assisting in the distribution of public goods and establishing credibility for domestic reforms. We argue that this is not the case. Instead, recent democratization has a strong effect on a state's propensity to form new IOs. Since democratizing states face different governance problems than established democracies, existing IOs may not be a good "fit." Additionally, established democracies might hesitate to allow democratizing states membership in the most lucrative existing IOs, thereby making immediate accession to such IOs not "feasible." Quantitative analysis shows that democratization has a strong and consistently positive effect on the probability of forming a new IO, but not on the probability of joining an existing IO. The findings suggest that international cooperation theorists should begin to analyze forming new and joining existing IOs as alternative strategies that states can use to achieve their policy goals.