Hanging on to power
Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks
Pippa Norris
Journal of Democracy, forthcoming
Abstract:
The predominantly sunny end-of-history optimism about democratic progress, evident in the late-1980s and early-1990s following the fall of the Berlin Wall, has turned rapidly into a more pessimistic zeitgeist. What helps us to understand whether we have reached an inflection point - and whether even long-established European and American democracies are in danger of backsliding? This essay draws on Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation which theorizes that consolidation occurs when three conditions are met: Culturally, the overwhelming majority of people believe that democracy is the best form of government, so that any further reforms reflect these values and principles. Constitutionally, all the major actors and organs of the state reflect democratic norms and practices. Behaviorally, no significant groups actively seek to overthrow the regime or secede from the state. Evidence throws new light on the contemporary state of each of Linz and Stepan's conditions in Western democracies. Culturally the data suggests that, when compared with their parents and grandparents, Millennials in Anglo-American democracies express weaker support for democratic values, but this is not a consistent pattern across Western democracies and post-industrial societies. It is also a life-cycle rather than a generational effect. Constitutionally, trends from estimates by Freedom House and related indicators provide no evidence that the quality of institutions protecting political rights and civil liberties deteriorated across Western democracies from 1972 to end-2016. Most losses occurred under hybrid regimes. Behaviorally, the most serious contemporary threats to Western liberal democracies arise from twin forces that each, in different ways, seek to undermine the regime: sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears.
Roots of Autocracy
Oded Galor & Marc Klemp
NBER Working Paper, March 2017
Abstract:
Exploiting a novel geo-referenced data set of population diversity across ethnic groups, this research advances the hypothesis and empirically establishes that variation in population diversity across human societies, as determined in the course of the exodus of human from Africa tens of thousands of years ago, contributed to the differential formation of pre-colonial autocratic institutions within ethnic groups and the emergence of autocratic institutions across countries. Diversity has amplified the importance of institutions in mitigating the adverse effects of non-cohesiveness on productivity, while contributing to the scope for domination, leading to the formation of institutions of the autocratic type.
Information from Abroad: Foreign Media, Selective Exposure and Political Support in China
Haifeng Huang & Yao-Yuan Yeh
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
What kind of content do citizens in a developing and authoritarian country like to acquire from Western free media? What are the effects of their potentially selective exposure? In a survey experiment involving 1,200 Chinese internet users from diverse socio-demographic backgrounds, this study finds that Chinese citizens with higher pro-Western orientations and lower regime evaluations are more inclined to read content that is positive about foreign countries or negative about China. More importantly, reading relatively positive foreign media content about foreign countries can improve rather than worsen the domestic evaluations of citizens who self-select such content. The article argues that this is because reputable Western media outlets' reports are generally more realistic than overly rosy information about foreign socio-economic conditions that popularly circulates in China. Consequently, foreign media may have a corrective function and enhance regime stability in an authoritarian country by making regime critics less critical. The article also introduces a new variant of the patient preference trial design that integrates self-selection and random assignment of treatments in a way that is useful for studying information effects.
Landowners and Democracy: The Social Origins of Democracy Reconsidered
Michael Albertus
World Politics, April 2017, Pages 233-276
Abstract:
Are large landowners, especially those engaged in labor-dependent agriculture, detrimental to democratization and the subsequent survival of democracy? This assumption is at the heart of both canonical and recent influential work on regime transition and durability. Using an original panel data set on the extent of labor-dependent agriculture in countries across the world since 1930, the author finds that labor-dependent agriculture was indeed historically bad for democratic stability and stunted the extension of suffrage, parliamentary independence, and free and fair elections. However, the negative influence of labor-dependent agriculture on democracy started to turn positive around the time of democracy's third wave. The dual threats of land reform and costly domestic insurgencies in that period - often with more potent consequences under dictators - plausibly prompted landowners to push for democracy with strong horizontal constraints and favorable institutions that could protect their property more reliably over the long term than could dictatorship. The shift in support for democracy by labor-dependent landowners is a major untold story of democracy's third wave and helps explain the persistent democratic deficit in many new democracies.
Canaries in a coal-mine? What the killings of journalists tell us about future repression
Anita Gohdes & Sabine Carey
Journal of Peace Research, March 2017, Pages 157-174
Abstract:
An independent press that is free from government censorship is regarded as instrumental to ensuring human rights protection. Yet governments across the globe often target journalists when their reports seem to offend them or contradict their policies. Can the government's infringements of the rights of journalists tell us anything about its wider human rights agenda? The killing of a journalist is a sign of deteriorating respect for human rights. If a government orders the killing of a journalist, it is willing to use extreme measures to eliminate the threat posed by the uncontrolled flow of information. If non-state actors murder journalists, it reflects insecurity, which can lead to a backlash by the government, again triggering state-sponsored repression. To test the argument whether the killing of journalists is a precursor to increasing repression, we introduce a new global dataset on killings of journalists between 2002 and 2013 that uses three different sources that track such events across the world. The new data show that mostly local journalists are targeted and that in most cases the perpetrators remain unconfirmed. Particularly in countries with limited repression, human rights conditions are likely to deteriorate in the two years following the killing of a journalist. When journalists are killed, human rights conditions are unlikely to improve where standard models of human rights would expect an improvement. Our research underlines the importance of taking the treatment of journalists seriously, not only because failure to do so endangers their lives and limits our understanding of events on the ground, but also because their physical safety is an important precursor of more repression in the future.
Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?
Dag Arne Christensen & Jacob Aars
Terrorism and Political Violence, forthcoming
Abstract:
Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens' fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens' fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.
The Golden Hello and Political Transitions
Toke Aidt, Facundo Albornoz & Martin Gassebner
Journal of Comparative Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
Racing to the Bottom or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China
Denise van der Kamp, Peter Lorentzen & Daniel Mattingly
World Development, July 2017, Pages 164-176
Abstract:
China's decentralization has been praised for promoting inter-jurisdictional competition that incentivizes local officials to promote economic development. The downside of decentralization is that it enables these same local authorities to slow or block implementation of centrally mandated governance reforms, especially when these may negatively affect local development goals. We suggest that China's fiscal system and promotion system have created mismatched incentives that encourage cash-strapped local authorities to disregard central governance reforms. Specifically, we show that cities with weaker revenue bases were slower to implement new, centrally mandated environmental transparency regulations. Additional evidence points to a bifurcation in development strategies. In fiscally strong cities, increased foreign investment leads to greater compliance. In fiscally weak cities, foreign investment is associated with decreased disclosure, suggesting they aim to promote local development by becoming pollution havens. Similarly, high levels of pollution induce fiscally strong cities to increase pollution disclosures while the opposite holds in fiscally weak cities. These findings imply that mismatched decentralization policies can undermine other important governance reforms, even ones that might be expected to be complementary to decentralizing initiatives.
Enemies within: Interactions between Terrorists and Democracies
Casey Crisman-Cox
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
I examine how the chief executive's political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. In particular, I contribute to the literature on terrorism within democracies by arguing that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim as well as results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut deals with domestic terrorist groups. These trends suggest that domestic terrorist groups attack during right-wing governance to build their reputation and reduce violence during left-wing governance to appear moderate and get a deal. These results contribute to literatures on differences between left and right parties, how political institutions affect terrorism, and differences between domestic and transnational terrorism.
Financing rebellion: Using piracy to explain and predict conflict intensity in Africa and Southeast Asia
Ursula Daxecker & Brandon Prins
Journal of Peace Research, March 2017, Pages 215-230
Abstract:
A prominent explanation of the resource-conflict relationship suggests that natural resources finance rebellion by permitting rebel leaders the opportunity to purchase weapons, fighters, and local support. The bunkering of oil in the Niger Delta by quasi-criminal syndicates is an example of how the black-market selling of stolen oil may help finance anti-state groups. More systematic assessments have also shown that the risk and duration of conflict increases in the proximity of oil and diamond deposits. Yet despite the emphasis on rebel resource extraction in these arguments, empirical assessments rely almost exclusively on latent resource availability rather than actual resource extraction. Focusing on maritime piracy, this article argues that piracy is a funding strategy neglected in current research. Anecdotal evidence connects piracy in the Greater Gulf of Aden to arms trafficking, the drug trade, and human slavery. The revenue from attacks may find its way to Al-Shabaab. In Nigeria, increasing attacks against oil transports may signal an effort by insurgents to use the profits from piracy as an additional revenue stream to fund their campaign against the Nigerian government. The article hypothesizes that piracy incidents, that is, actual acts of looting, increase the intensity of civil conflict. Using inferential statistics and predictive assessments, our evidence from conflicts in coastal African and Southeast Asian states from 1993 to 2010 shows that maritime piracy increases conflict intensity, and that the inclusion of dynamic factors helps improve the predictive performance of empirical models of conflict events in in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts.
Electoral Effects of Biased Media: Russian Television in Ukraine
Leonid Peisakhin & Arturas Rozenas
NYU Working Paper, February 2017
Abstract:
We use plausibly exogenous variation in the availability of Russian analog television signal in Ukraine to study how a media source with a conspicuous political agenda impacts political behavior and attitudes. Using highly granular election data and an original survey we estimate that Russian television substantially increased average electoral support for parties and candidates with a 'pro-Russian' agenda in the 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections. We show that this effect is attributable to persuasion rather than differential mobilization. The effectiveness of biased media varied in a politically consequential way: its impact was largest on voters with strong pro-Russian priors but was less effective, and to some degree even counter-effective, in persuading those with strong pro-Western priors. Our finding suggests that exposing an already polarized society to a biased media source can result in even deeper polarization.
Rethinking Coup Risk: Rural Coalitions and Coup-Proofing in Sub-Saharan Africa
Beth Rabinowitz & Paul Jargowsky
Armed Forces & Society, forthcoming
Abstract:
Military interventions continue to be prevalent in Africa. In the 21st century alone, 14 coups have been successfully staged. Whereas most studies of coup risk examine how militaries are organized or what structural conditions are associated with coups, we take a novel approach. We explore how coalition politics relate to coup risk. It has long been observed that regimes try to hold power by buying off urban consumers. We argue that focusing on urban consumers actually makes regimes more prone to military intervention. Instead, leaders who ally with established rural elites are more effective at thwarting coups. To test our hypothesis, we develop a unique data set of rural political strategies, coding regimes in 44 sub-Saharan countries from 1960 to 2000. Using a continuous-time Cox proportional hazards regression model, we find a robust correlation between policies supportive of rural elites and lower coup risk.
Financial Liberalization: Stable Autocracies and Constrained Democracies
Amy Pond
Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do autocratic rulers liberalize financial markets? This article shows how autocrats use financial liberalization for two distinct purposes. First, autocrats may use liberalization to bolster the economy, making revolution less attractive to the political opposition and stabilizing the autocracy. Second, when stabilization of the autocracy is too costly, autocrats may use liberalization to make assets more mobile. Mobility provides elite asset owners with external investment options, which limit redistribution. When redistribution is the main fear associated with democratization, the mobility associated with liberalization makes direct control of political institutions through dictatorship unnecessary. Thus, autocrats use liberalization to stimulate the economy and stabilize their rule or to reduce redistribution in anticipation of democratization. Suharto's policies in Indonesia and Pinochet's policies in Chile illustrate these two objectives of financial liberalization.