Greater Goods
Generalized morality culturally evolves as an adaptive heuristic in large social networks
Joshua Conrad Jackson et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do people assume that a generous person should also be honest? Why do we even use words like "moral" and "immoral"? We explore these questions with a new model of how people perceive moral character. We propose that people vary in the extent to which they perceive moral character as "localized" (varying along many contextually embedded dimensions) versus "generalized" (varying along a single dimension from morally bad to morally good). This variation might be partly the product of cultural evolutionary adaptations to different kinds of social networks. As networks grow larger, perceptions of generalized morality are increasingly valuable for predicting cooperation during partner selection, especially in novel contexts. Our studies show that social network size correlates with perceptions of generalized morality in United States and international samples (Study 1) and that East African hunter-gatherers with greater exposure outside their local region perceive morality as more generalized compared to those who have remained in their local region (Study 2). We support the adaptive value of generalized morality in large and unfamiliar social networks with an agent-based model (Study 3), and in experiments where we manipulate partner unfamiliarity (Study 4). Our final study shows that perceptions of morality have become more generalized over the last 200 years of English-language history, which suggests that it may be coevolving with rising social complexity and anonymity in the English-speaking world (Study 5). We discuss the implications of this theory for the cultural evolution of political systems, religion, and taxonomical theories of morality.
Are People Generous When the Financial Stakes Are High?
Ryan Dwyer et al.
Psychological Science, September 2023, Pages 999-1006
Abstract:
How generous are people when making consequential financial decisions in the real world? We took advantage of a rare opportunity to examine generosity among a diverse sample of adults who received a gift of U.S. $10,000 from a pair of wealthy donors, with nearly no strings attached. Two-hundred participants were drawn from three low-income countries (Indonesia, Brazil, and Kenya) and four high-income countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as part of a preregistered study. On average, participants spent over $6,400 on purchases that benefited others, including nearly $1,700 on donations to charity, suggesting that humans exhibit remarkable generosity even when the stakes are high. To address whether generosity was driven by reputational concerns, we asked half the participants to share their spending decisions publicly on Twitter, whereas the other half were asked to keep their spending private. Generous spending was similar between the groups, in contrast to our preregistered hypothesis that enhancing reputational concerns would increase generosity.
The Fear of Personal Death and the Willingness to Commit to Organ Donation
Tehila Kogut, Andrea Pittarello & Paul Slovic
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In three studies, with samples from different countries (the United States and Israel) and religions (Christians and Jews), we found that individual levels of fear of death significantly predicted lower willingness to register as organ donors (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, after being asked about their organ donation status (i.e., whether they are registered as donors), fear of death significantly increased among unregistered people. This did not occur among registered people, who had already faced the decision to become donors in the past (Study 2). Finally, providing non-registered (non-religious) people with a defense strategy to manage their fear of death increased their willingness to sign an organ donation commitment, partially by increasing their feelings of hopefulness. The implications of these findings for increasing organ donation registration are discussed.
Pathogens or promiscuity? Testing two accounts of the relation between disgust sensitivity and binding moral values
Michael Donner et al.
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
A recurrent observation in the field of moral psychology is that disgust sensitivity is associated with greater moralization of the binding (and particularly sanctity) moral domains. It is generally assumed that these effects are the result of disgust's role as an emotion that motivates pathogen avoidance (i.e., the pathogen avoidance account), yet alternative disgust-based accounts of moralization, namely those grounded in sexual avoidance (i.e., the promiscuity avoidance account), might also explain these observations. Across two studies (total N = 2,718), involving 10 diverse samples (from Australia, the United States, and Brazil), we found that after controlling for the shared variance of pathogen and sexual disgust, only measures of sexual disgust exhibited a positive (and strong) association with the binding moral foundations. These results argue against the pathogen avoidance account of disgust-binding effects and instead support the promiscuity avoidance account. Above all, this work highlights the utility of delineating the dimensionality of disgust to better characterize the different disgust-based motives underlying moral cognition.
Age-Related Differences in Moral Judgment: The Role of Probability Judgments
Francesco Margoni et al.
Cognitive Science, September 2023
Abstract:
Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age-related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults' increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents' omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution.
A nervous wait: Instagram's sensitive-content screens cause anticipatory anxiety but do not mitigate reactions to negative content
Melanie Takarangi, Victoria Bridgland & Erin Simister
Cognition and Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Online platforms like Instagram cover potentially distressing imagery with a sensitive-content screen (blurred imagery plus a content warning). Previous research suggests people typically choose to "uncover" and view screened content. In three studies, we investigated whether the presence of screens mitigates the negative emotional impact of viewing content. In Study 1, participants viewed positive and neutral images, and screens (with an option to view the negative images beneath) for a 5-minute period. In Study 2, half the participants saw a grey mask in place of the typical sensitive-content screen. In addition, each image appeared for a fixed period (5 s) and participants had no option to uncover it. Study 3 was like Study 2 except half the participants saw negative images preceded by a sensitive-content screen and half saw negative images without screens. Overall, participants reported a significant increase in state anxiety and negative affect from pre-to post task when they were exposed to sensitive-content screens, whether or not they were also exposed to the negative imagery beneath. Our data suggest sensitive-content screens cause negative responses -- state anxiety and negative affect -- that do not translate to an emotional benefit when people view negative content.
An Assimilative Effect of Stimulus Co-Occurrence on Evaluation Despite Contrasting Relational Information
Yahel Nudler, Tal Moran & Yoav Bar Anan
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
The co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus with affective stimuli typically causes the neutral stimulus's evaluation to shift toward the affective stimuli's valence. Does that assimilative effect occur even when one knows the co-occurrence is due to an opposition relation between the stimuli (e.g., Batman stops crime)? Previous evidence tentatively supported that possibility, based on results compatible with an assimilative effect obscured by a larger contrast effect of the opposition relation (e.g., people like Batman less than expected, perhaps due to his co-occurrence with crime). We report three experiments (N = 802) in which participants preferred stimuli that stopped positive events over stimuli that stopped negative events -- an assimilative effect of co-occurrence, unobscured by a contrast effect, despite comprehending the opposition relation and its evaluative implications. Our findings suggest that the assimilative effect of co-occurrence is potentially ubiquitous, not limited only to co-occurrence due to relations that suggest valence similarity.