Good to Know
Social status and unethical behavior: Two replications of the field studies in Piff et al. (2012)
Minah Jung et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, forthcoming
Abstract:
Prominent social psychologists and major media outlets have put forward the notion that people of high socioeconomic status (SES) are more selfish and behave more unethically than people of low SES. In contrast, other research in economics and sociology has hypothesized and found a positive relationship between SES and prosocial and ethical behavior. We review the empirical evidence for these contradictory findings and conduct two direct, well-powered, and preregistered replications of the field studies by Piff and colleagues (2012) to test the relationship between SES and unethical/selfish behavior. Unlike the original findings, we find no evidence of a positive relationship between SES and unethical/selfish behavior in the two field replication studies.
The sound of swearing: Are there universal patterns in profanity?
Shiri Lev-Ari & Ryan McKay
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do swear words sound the way they do? Swear words are often thought to have sounds that render them especially fit for purpose, facilitating the expression of emotion and attitude. To date, however, there has been no systematic cross-linguistic investigation of phonetic patterns in profanity. In an initial, pilot study we explored statistical regularities in the sounds of swear words across a range of typologically distant languages. The best candidate for a cross-linguistic phonemic pattern in profanity was the absence of approximants (sonorous sounds like l, r, w and y). In Study 1, native speakers of various languages (Arabic, Chinese, Finnish, French, German, Spanish; N = 215) judged foreign words less likely to be swear words if they contained an approximant. In Study 2 we found that sanitized versions of English swear words -- like darn instead of damn -- contain significantly more approximants than the original swear words. Our findings reveal that not all sounds are equally suitable for profanity, and demonstrate that sound symbolism -- wherein certain sounds are intrinsically associated with certain meanings -- is more pervasive than has previously been appreciated, extending beyond denoting single concepts to serving pragmatic functions.
Deviancy Aversion and Social Norms
Anton Gollwitzer et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
We propose that deviancy aversion -- people's domain-general discomfort toward the distortion of patterns (repeated forms or models) -- contributes to the strength and prevalence of social norms in society. Five studies (N = 2,390) supported this hypothesis. In Study 1, individuals' deviancy aversion, for instance, their aversion toward broken patterns of simple geometric shapes, predicted negative affect toward norm violations (affect), greater self-reported norm following (behavior), and judging norms as more valuable (belief). Supporting generalizability, deviancy aversion additionally predicted greater conformity on accuracy-orientated estimation tasks (Study 2), adherence to physical distancing norms during COVID-19 (Study 3), and increased following of fairness norms (Study 4). Finally, experimentally heightening deviancy aversion increased participants' negative affect toward norm violations and self-reported norm behavior, but did not convincingly heighten belief-based norm judgments (Study 5). We conclude that a human sensitivity to pattern distortion functions as a low-level affective process that promotes and maintains social norms in society.
The role of metadehumanization in explaining sacred conflict
Starlett Hartley, Asteya Percaya & Katrina Fincher
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, December 2022, Pages 1958-1982
Abstract:
Four studies examine the social cognitive mechanisms through which sacred values produce social schisms, focusing on the role of metadehumanization. Using hypothetical scenarios, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that violators of sacred values feel dehumanized by value holders and reciprocate this dehumanization. Using real sacred values, Studies 3 and 4 show similar effects. Study 3 further controls for the effects of mere disagreement and finds participants felt more dehumanized when family members disagreed with them in discussions of sacred values compared to preferences. Study 4 examined the sacralization of mask-wearing during the COVID-19 pandemic, finding that the inflammatory effect of sacralization on hostility was in part explained by metadehumanization, leading to greater reciprocal dehumanization, thus fueling conflict. In conclusion, results suggest metadehumanization may underlie the often explosive nature of sacred conflict.
Giving-by-proxy triggers subsequent charitable behavior
Samantha Kassirer, Jillian Jordan & Maryam Kouchaki
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
How can we foster habits of charitable giving? Here, we investigate the potential power of giving-by-proxy experiences, drawing inspiration from a growing trend in marketing and corporate social responsibility contexts in which organizations make charitable donations on behalf of employees or consumers. We create laboratory models of giving-by-proxy in workplace (Studies 1a-3) and consumer (Study 4) contexts. We then investigate how giving-by-proxy experiences (with varying amounts of autonomy) influence subsequent charitable behavior. Across five preregistered studies (N = 3255), we provide evidence that (i) giving-by-proxy experiences (that mirror those that typically occur in both workplace and consumer contexts) trigger increases in subsequent charitable behavior, (ii) this process is mediated by participants taking "charitable credit" for their behavior, and (iii) manipulating the amount of autonomy involved in the giving-by-proxy experience does not moderate these effects. Results highlight potential societal impacts of giving-by-proxy policies and campaigns.
On the Highway to Hell: Slippery Slope Perceptions in Judgments of Moral Character
Rajen Anderson, Benjamin Ruisch & David Pizarro
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt.
Making molehills out of mountains: Removing moral meaning from prior immoral actions
Chelsea Helion et al.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, forthcoming
Abstract:
At some point in their lives, most people have told a lie, intentionally hurt someone else, or acted selfishly at the expense of another. Despite knowledge of their moral failings, individuals are often able to maintain the belief that they are moral people. This research explores one mechanism by which this paradoxical process occurs: the tendency to represent one's past immoral behaviors in concrete or mechanistic terms, thus stripping the action of its moral implications. Across five studies, we document this basic pattern and provide evidence that this process impacts evaluations of an act's moral wrongness. We further demonstrate an extension of this effect, such that when an apology describes an immoral behavior using mechanistic terms, it is viewed as less sincere and less forgivable, likely because including low-level or concrete language in an apology fails to communicate the belief that one's actions were morally wrong.
Does hoodwinking others pay? The psychological and relational consequences of undetected negotiator deception
Alex Van Zant, Jessica Kennedy & Laura Kray
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Lies often go undetected, and we know little about the psychological and relational consequences of successfully deceiving others. While the evidence to date indicates that undetected dishonesty induces positive affect in independent decision contexts, we propose that it may elicit guilt and undermine satisfaction in negotiations despite facilitating better deals for deceivers. Across four studies, we find support for a deceiver's guilt account, whereby dishonesty triggers guilt and lessens negotiators' satisfaction with the bargaining experience. This pattern is robust to several factors, including the size of negotiators' incentives and individual differences in negotiators' moral character. It holds for both lies issued of negotiators' own volition and in compliance with others' orders. Large incentives also exacerbated dishonesty-induced guilt. Further, dissatisfaction stemming from dishonesty-induced guilt had downstream relational consequences. Despite going undetected, dishonesty in a focal negotiation reduced deceivers' likelihood of choosing to interact again with the same counterpart and adversely impacted their satisfaction in future negotiations with that counterpart.
The restart effect in social dilemmas shows humans are self-interested not altruistic
Maxwell Burton-Chellew
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 6 December 2022
Abstract:
Do economic games show evidence of altruistic or self-interested motivations in humans? A huge body of empirical work has found contrasting results. While many participants routinely make costly decisions that benefit strangers, consistent with the hypothesis that humans exhibit a biologically novel form of altruism (or "prosociality"), many participants also typically learn to pay fewer costs with experience, consistent with self-interested individuals adapting to an unfamiliar environment. Key to resolving this debate is explaining the famous "restart effect," a puzzling enigma whereby failing cooperation in public goods games can be briefly rescued by a surprise restart. Here we replicate this canonical result, often taken as evidence of uniquely human altruism, and show that it 1) disappears when cooperation is invisible, meaning individuals can no longer affect the behavior of their groupmates, consistent with strategically motivated, self-interested, cooperation; and 2) still occurs even when individuals are knowingly grouped with computer players programmed to replicate human decisions, consistent with confusion. These results show that the restart effect can be explained by a mixture of self-interest and irrational beliefs about the game's payoffs, and not altruism. Consequently, our results suggest that public goods games have often been measuring self-interested but confused behaviors and reject the idea that conventional theories of evolution cannot explain the results of economic games.
Support for freedom of speech and concern for political correctness: The effects of trait emotional intelligence and cognitive ability
Louise Drieghe et al.
Journal of Individual Differences, forthcoming
Abstract:
Freedom of speech and political correctness are recurrent and contentious topics in contemporary society. The present study (N = 300 North-American adults) aimed to advance empirical knowledge on these issues by investigating how cognitive ability and trait emotional intelligence predict individuals' support for freedom of speech and concern for political correctness, considering empathy and intellectual humility as mediating variables. We demonstrate that both trait emotional intelligence and cognitive ability uniquely predict less concern for political correctness and more support for freedom of speech. Mediation through empathy slightly suppressed the effects of cognitive ability and emotional intelligence on concern for political correctness, whereas intellectual humility no longer served as a mediating variable in the overall path analysis. Possible mechanisms, implications, and avenues for future research are discussed.
No differences in memory performance for instances of historical victimization and historical perpetration: Evidence from five large-scale experiments
Fiona Kazarovytska & Roland Imhoff
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In their pursuit of a moral ingroup identity, groups tend to flatter and deceive themselves, leading to predictable biases in their collective memory. Specifically, such memory biases are expected in the form of worse memory for morally problematic acts of historical perpetration. In five high-powered recall and recognition experiments (N = 3,424) using between- (Studies 1-4) and within-subjects designs (Study 5) as well as historically accurate (all studies), randomly sampled (Studies 3-4) stimulus material in three contexts (Germany, the UK, the U.S.), we tested whether individual memories of collective events can be distorted not only in a way that attenuates ingroup-threatening perpetration information but also in a way that highlights morally affirming victimhood information. Deviating from expectations, none of our studies revealed significant differences in memory performance depending on the ingroup's role as victim or perpetrator. Instead, equivalence testing (Studies 4-5) even rejected the presence of the minimal effect size we defined to support the proposed memory bias. We discuss the implications of this absence of individual memory distortions for the formation of social representations of history.