Good thinking
The Cynical Genius Illusion: Exploring and Debunking Lay Beliefs About Cynicism and Competence
Olga Stavrova & Daniel Ehlebracht
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
Cynicism refers to a negative appraisal of human nature — a belief that self-interest is the ultimate motive guiding human behavior. We explored laypersons’ beliefs about cynicism and competence and to what extent these beliefs correspond to reality. Four studies showed that laypeople tend to believe in cynical individuals’ cognitive superiority. A further three studies based on the data of about 200,000 individuals from 30 countries debunked these lay beliefs as illusionary by revealing that cynical (vs. less cynical) individuals generally do worse on cognitive ability and academic competency tasks. Cross-cultural analyses showed that competent individuals held contingent attitudes and endorsed cynicism only if it was warranted in a given sociocultural environment. Less competent individuals embraced cynicism unconditionally, suggesting that — at low levels of competence — holding a cynical worldview might represent an adaptive default strategy to avoid the potential costs of falling prey to others’ cunning.
Silence is golden: The effect of verbalization on group performance
Ut Na SIo, Kenneth Kotovsky & Jonathan Cagan
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, June 2018, Pages 939-944
Abstract:
Contrary to the popular belief that collaboration brings better problem solutions, empirical studies have revealed that interacting groups often performed worse than noninteracting “nominal” groups. Past studies mainly examined how overhearing others’ ideas impacts group performance. This study investigated the impact of another essential but overlooked group communicative process — verbalizing ideas to others — on group performance. Participants (N = 156) solved 20 verbal puzzles either alone quietly, alone thinking-aloud, or in verbalizing pairs. Participants in the same working-alone condition were randomly paired to form nominal pairs and their pooled performance was treated as nominal group performance. Relative to the quiet nominal group, the performance of the thinking-aloud nominal and interacting groups were impaired to similar extents. These two groups also demonstrated a similar limited capacity to expand the search scope. The equivalency of the interacting and thinking-aloud nominal group results suggest that verbalization is a key factor in groups’ inferior performance.
Motivated Errors
Christine Exley & Judd Kessler
Harvard Working Paper, May 2018
Abstract:
Behavioral biases that cause errors in decision making are often blamed on cognitive limitations. We show that biases can also arise, or be exacerbated, because agents are motivated to make errors. In three experiments involving nearly 3200 participants, agents motivated to be selfish make simple computational errors and respond to the salience of information known to them, and agents motivated to believe they are high ability update on entirely uninformative signals. When we remove self-serving motives, agents appear completely (or much more) rational. Biases due to motivated errors survive standard debiasing interventions including providing experience, ensuring attention, and simplifying decisions.
Collective Narcissism: Americans Exaggerate the Role of Their Home State in Appraising U.S. History
Adam Putnam et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Collective narcissism — a phenomenon in which individuals show excessively high regard for their own group — is ubiquitous in studies of small groups. We examined how Americans from the 50 U.S. states (N = 2,898) remembered U.S. history by asking them, “In terms of percentage, what do you think was your home state’s contribution to the history of the United States?” The mean state estimates ranged from 9% (Iowa) to 41% (Virginia), with the total contribution for all states equaling 907%, indicating strong collective narcissism. In comparison, ratings provided by nonresidents for states were much lower (but still high). Surprisingly, asking people questions about U.S. history before they made their judgment did not lower estimates. We argue that this ethnocentric bias is due to ego protection, selective memory retrieval processes involving the availability heuristic, and poor statistical reasoning. This study shows that biases that influence individual remembering also influence collective remembering.
A ratings pattern heuristic in judgments of expertise: When being right looks wrong
Gerri Spassova, Mauricio Palmeira & Eduardo Andrade
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, July 2018, Pages 26-47
Abstract:
We propose a “ratings pattern heuristic” in judgments of expertise — that is, people’s tendency to undervalue critics who assign the same rating to multiple options, overlooking diagnostic information which would clearly justify the uniform ratings. The heuristic is driven by a strong association between discrimination and expertise and a focus on summary ratings. People “punish” uniform (vs. varied) raters even when (a) uniform ratings are acknowledgedly more likely (studies 1a and 1b), (b) the uniform rater’s past performance is superior (studies 2 and 3), and (c) the uniform rater also reports varied sub-ratings (study 4a), unless participants are prompted to assess the sub-ratings prior to choosing a critic (studies 4b and 5). Study 6 reveals that critics are less aware than judges of the impact of the pattern of their ratings on others’ perceptions.
Do smart people have better intuitions?
Valerie Thompson et al.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, July 2018, Pages 945-961
Abstract:
There is much evidence that high-capacity reasoners perform better on a variety of reasoning tasks (Stanovich, 1999), a phenomenon that is normally attributed to differences in either the efficacy or the probability of deliberate (Type II) engagement (Evans, 2007). In contrast, we hypothesized that intuitive (Type I) processes may differentiate high- and low-capacity reasoners. To test this hypothesis, reasoners were given a reasoning task modeled on the logic of the Stroop Task, in which they had to ignore one dimension of a problem when instructed to give an answer based on the other dimension (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011). Specifically, in Experiment 1, 112 reasoners were asked to give judgments consistent with beliefs or validity for 2 different types of deductive reasoning problems. In Experiment 2, 224 reasoners gave judgments consistent with beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) or statistics (i.e., base-rates) on a base rate task; half responded under a strict deadline. For all 3 problem types and regardless of the deadline, high-capacity reasoners performed better for logic/statistics than did belief judgments when the 2 conflicted, whereas the reverse was true for low-capacity reasoners. In other words, for high-capacity reasoners, statistical information interfered with their ability to make belief-based judgments, suggesting that, for them, probabilities may be more intuitive than stereotypes. Thus, at least part of the accuracy–capacity relationship observed in reasoning may be because of intuitive (Type I) processes.
The Effect of Perceived Similarity on Sequential Risk-Taking
Elizabeth Webb & Suzanne Shu
Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine how perceived similarity between sequential risks affects individuals' risk-taking intentions. Specifically, in six studies we find that in sequential choice settings individuals exhibit significant positive state dependence in risk-taking preferences, such that they are more likely to take a risk when it is similar to a previously taken risk than when it is dissimilar. For example, if an individual has previously taken a health/safety risk, that individual is more likely to take a second health/safety risk than a second risk that is in the financial domain. Since similarity between risks is malleable and can be determined by situational and contextual variables, we show that we can change subsequent risk-taking intentions in a predictable manner by manipulating similarity through framing. Finally, we establish that increased feelings of self-efficacy and self-signaling through the prior risk-taking experience drive state dependent risk-taking preferences. We further show that the effect of similarity on preferences is not moderated by the outcome received in the prior risk and holds controlling for individual-level and domain-specific heterogeneity. Taken together, our results demonstrate that the similarity structures that exist between risks have a significant effect on risk-taking preferences in dynamic choice settings.
The loss‐bet paradox: Actuaries, accountants, and other numerate people rate numerically inferior gambles as superior
Ellen Peters, M.G. Fennema & Kevin Tiede
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, forthcoming
Abstract:
Psychologists have convincingly demonstrated that preferences are not always stable and, instead, are often “constructed” based on information available in the judgment or decision context. In 4 studies with experts (accountants and actuaries in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) and a diverse lay population (Studies 3 and 4), the evidence was consistent with the highly numerate being more likely than the less numerate to construct their preferences by rating a numerically inferior bet as superior (i.e., the bets effect). Thus, the effect generalizes beyond a college student sample, and preference construction differs by numeracy. Contrary to prior thinking about preference construction, however, high expertise and high ability (rather than low) consistently related to the paradoxical phenomenon. Results across studies including Study 3's experimental modifications of the task supported the hypothesized number comparison process (and not a lack of expertise with monetary outcomes and probabilities or numeracy‐related differences in attention to numbers) as the effect's underlying cause. The bets effect was not attenuated by Study 4's instructions to think about what would be purchased with bet winnings. Task results combined with free‐response coding supported the notion that highly numerate participants have a systematic and persistent inclination for doing simple and complex number operations that drive their judgments (even after controlling for nonnumeric intelligence). Implications for 3 types of dual‐process theories are discussed. The results were inconsistent with default‐interventionist theories, consistent or unclear with respect to fuzzy trace theory, and consistent with interactive theories.
The roles of information deficits and identity threat in the prevalence of misperceptions
Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why do so many Americans hold misperceptions? We examine two factors that contribute to the prevalence of these beliefs. First, presenting correct information should reduce misperceptions, especially if provided in a clear and compelling format. We therefore test the effect of graphical information, which may be especially effective in facilitating belief updating about changes in quantities over time. In some cases, though, people may reject information because it threatens their worldview or self-concept – a mechanism that can be revealed by affirming individuals’ self-worth, which could make them more willing to acknowledge uncomfortable facts. We test both mechanisms jointly. In three experiments, we find that providing information in graphical form reduces misperceptions. A third study shows that this effect is greater than for equivalent textual information. Our findings for self-affirmation are more equivocal. We find limited evidence that self-affirmation can help diminish misperceptions when no other information is provided, but it does not consistently increase willingness to accept corrective information as previous research in social psychology would suggest. These results suggest that misperceptions are caused by a lack of information as well as psychological threat, but that these factors may interact in ways that are not yet well understood.
Regulatory Focus and Conspiratorial Perceptions: The Importance of Personal Control
Jennifer Whitson et al.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
We examine when and why people subscribe to conspiratorial beliefs, suggesting that promotion focus reduces conspiratorial perceptions by activating a sense of personal control. Study 1 established that individuals primed with promotion focus are less likely to perceive conspiracies than those in a baseline condition. However, individuals primed with prevention focus and those in a baseline condition did not differ in their levels of conspiratorial beliefs. Study 2 demonstrated that soldiers higher in promotion focus were less likely to endorse conspiracy theories because of their heightened sense of control; this relationship did not emerge for soldiers higher in prevention focus. Study 3 found that conspiratorial beliefs increased when individuals primed with promotion focus recalled personal control loss, whereas those primed with prevention focus were unaffected by personal control loss. Using measures and manipulations of regulatory focus and personal control, we establish when and why promotion focus reduces conspiracy theories.
The role of “Prominent Numbers” in open numerical judgment: Strained decision makers choose from a limited set of accessible numbers
Benjamin Converse & Patrick Dennis
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, July 2018, Pages 94-107
Abstract:
Numerate adults can represent an infinite array of integers. When a judgment requires them to “pick a number,” how do they select one to represent the abstract signal in mind? Drawing from research on the cognitive psychology of number representation, we conjecture that judges who operate primarily in decimal systems simplify by initially selecting from a set of chronically accessible “Prominent Numbers” defined as the powers of ten, their doubles, and their halves [… 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200…]; then, when willing and able, refining from there. A sample of 3 billion stock trades reveals that traders’ decisions reflect Prominent-Number clustering (Study 1) and a “natural experiment” reveals more clustering in rushed trading conditions (Study 2). Three sets of subsequent studies provide evidence consistent with an accessibility-based account of Prominent-Number usage: Experiments show that judges rely more on Prominent Numbers when they are induced to rush rather than take their time (Studies 3a and 3b), and when they are under high versus low cognitive load (Studies 4a, 4b, and 4c); and a final correlational study shows that Prominent-Number clustering is more apparent for judgments that require judges to scan a wider range of plausible values (Study 5). This work underscores the need to differentiate between Round Numbers and Prominent Numbers, and between representational properties of graininess and accessibility, in numerical judgment.
Remembrance of inferences past: Amortization in human hypothesis generation
Ishita Dasgupta et al.
Cognition, September 2018, Pages 67-81
Abstract:
Bayesian models of cognition assume that people compute probability distributions over hypotheses. However, the required computations are frequently intractable or prohibitively expensive. Since people often encounter many closely related distributions, selective reuse of computations (amortized inference) is a computationally efficient use of the brain’s limited resources. We present three experiments that provide evidence for amortization in human probabilistic reasoning. When sequentially answering two related queries about natural scenes, participants’ responses to the second query systematically depend on the structure of the first query. This influence is sensitive to the content of the queries, only appearing when the queries are related. Using a cognitive load manipulation, we find evidence that people amortize summary statistics of previous inferences, rather than storing the entire distribution. These findings support the view that the brain trades off accuracy and computational cost, to make efficient use of its limited cognitive resources to approximate probabilistic inference.
Bad News Has Wings: Dread Risk Mediates Social Amplification in Risk Communication
Robert Jagiello & Thomas Hills
Risk Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
Social diffusion of information amplifies risk through processes of birth, death, and distortion of message content. Dread risk — involving uncontrollable, fatal, involuntary, and catastrophic outcomes (e.g., terrorist attacks and nuclear accidents) — may be particularly susceptible to amplification because of the psychological biases inherent in dread risk avoidance. To test this, initially balanced information about high or low dread topics was given to a set of individuals who then communicated this information through diffusion chains, each person passing a message to the next. A subset of these chains were also re-exposed to the original information. We measured prior knowledge, perceived risk before and after transmission, and, at each link, number of positive and negative statements. Results showed that the more a message was transmitted the more negative statements it contained. This was highest for the high dread topic. Increased perceived risk and production of negative messages was closely related to the amount of negative information that was received, with domain knowledge mitigating this effect. Re-exposure to the initial information was ineffectual in reducing bias, demonstrating the enhanced danger of socially transmitted information.
Extreme malleability of preferences: Absolute preference sign changes under uncertainty
Joachim Vosgerau & Eyal Peer
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, forthcoming
Abstract:
Malleability of preferences is a central tenet of behavioral decision theory. How malleable preferences really are, however, is a topic of debate. Do preference reversals imply preference construction? We argue that to claim preferences are construed, a demonstration of more extreme preference malleability than simple preference reversals is required: absolute preference sign changes within participants. If respondents value a prospect positively in 1 condition but negatively in a different condition, preferences cannot be considered stable. Such absolute preference sign changes are possible under uncertainty. In 2 incentive‐compatible experiments, we found participants were willing to pay to take part in a gamble and also demanded to be compensated to take part in a subsequent gamble with identical outcomes and probabilities. Such absolute preference sign changes within participants led to simultaneous risk aversion and risk seeking for the same risky prospect, suggesting that, at least in the domain of risky decisions, consumers' preferences are indeed malleable and construed.
Thinking of oneself as an object of observation reduces reliance on metacognitive information
Tom Noah, Yaacov Schul & Ruth Mayo
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, July 2018, Pages 1023-1042
Abstract:
This research explores the consequences of two states of mind on judgment: a subjective state, looking at the world from one’s own eyes, and an objective state, in which one thinks of oneself from the imagined perspective of an external observer. In six experiments, we show that judgments people make while they are in a subjective state of mind are more influenced by metacognitive experience compared with judgments people make when they are in an objective state of mind. This is demonstrated in Experiments 1–3, using two different manipulations for the two states of mind and two different fluency tasks. Experiment 4 explores the underlying mechanism and demonstrates that an objective state does not lessen the metacognitive experience itself; rather, it affects the reliance on this experience as a relevant source of information. Finally, in Experiments 5 and 6 we investigate implications of our hypothesis for doing experimental research in psychology. We find that taking part in a laboratory experiment resembles the experimental condition of an objective state of mind, as participants rely less on their metacognition compared with conditions aimed to restore the subjective state of mind within the lab setting. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings regarding social influences on judgments and decisions in psychology labs and in the real world.