Getting Votes
Democracy by Deterrence: Norms, Constitutions, and Electoral Tilting
Gretchen Helmke, Mary Kroeger & Jack Paine
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In contemporary democracies, backsliding typically occurs through legal machinations. Self-enforcing democracy requires that political parties refrain from exploiting legal opportunities to tilt electoral rules. Using a formal model, we argue that informal norms of mutual forbearance and formal constitutional rules are fundamentally intertwined via a logic of deterrence. By circumscribing how far each party can legally bend the rules, legal bounds create reversion points if mutual forbearance collapses. If legal bounds are symmetric between parties, they deter electoral tilting by making credible each party's threat to punish transgressions by the other. If legal bounds become sufficiently asymmetric, however, the foundations for forbearance crumble. Asymmetries emerge when some groups (a) are more vulnerable than others to legally permissible electoral distortions and (b) favored and disfavored groups sort heavily into parties. We apply this mechanism to explain gerrymandering and voting rights in the United States in the post-Civil Rights era.
Endorsements from Republican Politicians Can Increase Confidence in U.S. Elections
Katherine Clayton & Robb Willer
Stanford Working Paper, December 2021
Abstract:
Since the 2020 U.S. presidential election, perceptions of the validity of the outcome and broader trust in the American electoral process have reached historically low levels among Republicans. While this trend has potentially harmful consequences for democratic stability, there is little research on how beliefs that an election was fair-and trust in the electoral process more generally-can be restored. In a preregistered survey experiment (n = 2101), we find that viewing real messages from Republican politicians defending the legitimacy of the 2020 election increased faith in the election's outcome and in the broader electoral process among Republican voters, compared to either a neutral control condition or to comparable messages from Democratic politicians. These effects are statistically mediated by shifts in voters' perceptions of elite Republican opinion about the 2020 election, highlighting a potentially useful intervention for efforts to restore faith in elections going forward. Notably, exposure to messages from Republican politicians affirming the election's legitimacy did not significantly decrease support for the Republican Party, suggesting that Republican politicians who endorse the 2020 election results might not face backlash from voters.
The Effect of Electoral Inversions on Democratic Legitimacy: Evidence from the United States
John Carey et al.
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
When a party or candidate loses the popular vote but still wins the election, do voters view the winner as legitimate? This scenario, known as an electoral inversion, describes the winners of two of the last six presidential elections in the United States. We report results from two experiments testing the effect of inversions on democratic legitimacy in the US context. Our results indicate that inversions significantly decrease the perceived legitimacy of winning candidates. Strikingly, this effect does not vary with the margin by which the winner loses the popular vote, nor by whether the candidate benefiting from the inversion is a co-partisan. The effect is driven by Democrats, who punish inversions regardless of candidate partisanship; few effects are observed among Republicans. These results suggest that the experience of inversions increases sensitivity to such outcomes among supporters of the losing party.
Do Redistricting Commissions Avoid Partisan Gerrymanders?
Robin Best et al.
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
As attempts to combat partisan gerrymandering transition from proposals to the Supreme Court to state-based districting commissions, it is time to ask two questions. First, how well did commissions in the 2010 round of redistricting perform as neutral decision makers? We answer that question with applications to each of the three independent commissions (AZ, CA, and WA) and four other commission forms (IA, NJ, NY, and VA) in place for post-2010. We take as the neutrality criterion the idea that a commission would produce a district plan that comports with a partisan outcome that could be expected from a set of approximately 10,000 computer generated plans adhering to minimalist constraints of contiguity, compactness, and equal populations. Our results indicate three of seven commissions produced suspect results that redounded to the benefit of one party or the other: pro- Democrat in Arizona; pro-Republican in New Jersey and Virginia.
Reverse mortgages and aircraft parts: The arcane referendum and the limits of citizen competence
Joseph Francesco Cozza, Zachary Elkins & Alexander Hudson
Electoral Studies, December 2021
Abstract:
Whether from a sincere belief in the ability of the body politic to arrive at optimal decisions, or in an instrumental attempt to generate legitimacy for policy choices, a large number of jurisdictions use the referendum to settle political questions. This practice relies on assumptions about voter interest and competence that merit empirical testing. We conduct a series of survey experiments that leverage variation in wording from a set of arcane ballot provisions from elections in Texas. We find that (1) voters are largely confused about the meaning of such ballot provisions; (2) efforts to improve the wording of such provisions and educate voters has minimal impact on their comprehension; (3) voters are easily persuaded to change their vote when given the chance; and (4) voters rely heavily on default answers (especially "yes") in casting their votes. On the whole, the evidence suggests that narrow referendum questions that lack clear ideological or informational cues overwhelm the limits of citizen competence, and are thus likely to result in unstable and unreliable decisions.
The Effect of Television Advertising in United States Elections
John Sides, Lynn Vavreck & Christopher Warshaw
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We provide a comprehensive assessment of the influence of television advertising on United States election outcomes from 2000-2018. We expand on previous research by including presidential, Senate, House, gubernatorial, Attorney General, and state Treasurer elections and using both difference-in-differences and border-discontinuity research designs to help identify the causal effect of advertising. We find that televised broadcast campaign advertising matters up and down the ballot, but it has much larger effects in down-ballot elections than in presidential elections. Using survey and voter registration data from multiple election cycles, we also show that the primary mechanism for ad effects is persuasion, not the mobilization of partisans. Our results have implications for the study of campaigns and elections as well as voter decision making and information processing.
The (minimal) persuasive advantage of political video over text
Chloe Wittenberg et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 23 November 2021
Abstract:
Concerns about video-based political persuasion are prevalent in both popular and academic circles, predicated on the assumption that video is more compelling than text. To date, however, this assumption remains largely untested in the political domain. Here, we provide such a test. We begin by drawing a theoretical distinction between two dimensions for which video might be more efficacious than text: 1) one's belief that a depicted event actually occurred and 2) the extent to which one's attitudes and behavior are changed. We test this model across two high-powered survey experiments varying exposure to politically persuasive messaging (total n = 7,609 Americans; 26,584 observations). Respondents were shown a selection of persuasive messages drawn from a diverse sample of 72 clips. For each message, they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a short video, a detailed transcript of the video, or a control condition. Overall, we find that individuals are more likely to believe an event occurred when it is presented in video versus textual form, but the impact on attitudes and behavioral intentions is much smaller. Importantly, for both dimensions, these effects are highly stable across messages and respondent subgroups. Moreover, when it comes to attitudes and engagement, the difference between the video and text conditions is comparable to, if not smaller than, the difference between the text and control conditions. Taken together, these results call into question widely held assumptions about the unique persuasive power of political video over text.
Finding DORI: Using Item Response Theory to Measure Difficulty of Registration in the U.S. and Its Impact on Voters
Joshua Jansa, Matthew Motta & Rebekah Herrick
American Politics Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do states differ in how difficult they make voter registration, and what effect does this have on voters? We propose and validate a new Difficulty of Registration Index (DORI) calculated via an item response theory (IRT) model of five key dimensions of registration (automaticity, portability, deadline, mode, and preregistration) for each state from 2004 to 2020. Since 2004, most states eased registration processes, with Democratic statehouses in racially diverse and young states leading the way. Using CCES data, we find that DORI is associated with increased probability that voters experience problems registering and failing to turnout (in both self-reported and validated turnout data). These effects are pronounced for young voters. This study holds lessons for how restrictive registration procedures can change the shape of the electorate and make it harder to achieve political equality.
Does President Trump's Outrageous Behavior Work?: Results from Two Randomized-Controlled Trials
Chandler James
Presidential Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Politicians are increasingly relying on outrage to engage the public. President Donald Trump used outrage to fuel his unlikely 2016 presidential victory and 2020 reelection effort. Was Trump's outrageous behavior a boon to his political fortunes or political malpractice? I draw on research in political psychology, populism, and presidential appeals to examine President Trump's outrageous behavior and its effect on the public. Using a series of original experiments, I find support for my expectation that Trump's outrageous behavior is a politically advantageous public relations strategy. My results show that Trump's outrageous behavior increases his support among self-identified Independents. However, contrary to popular conception, the results do not support claims that racial resentment or affinity for populism makes individuals more amenable to Trump's outrageous behavior.
Is There an Ideological Asymmetry in the Incumbency Effect? Evidence From U.S. Congressional Elections
Davide Morisi et al.
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
The electoral advantage that incumbent legislators enjoy over challengers in the U.S. Congress has been investigated extensively in political science. Very few studies, however, have considered the role of individual differences when it comes to incumbency preferences among voters. Based on theory and research in political psychology, we hypothesized that political conservatives would exhibit stronger preferences than liberals for incumbents over challengers from the same party. Extensive analyses based on more than 150,000 voters from seven election cycles in the United States from 2006 to 2018 support this hypothesis. A significant effect of conservatism on incumbency preferences was observed in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, and it was not attributable to Republican Party identification. This ideological asymmetry is consistent with system justification theory and prior research linking conservatism to risk aversion and status quo bias. Practical implications and directions for future research are discussed.
Strategic Behavior in State Multimember Districts: Does Fielding One Candidate offer a Notable Advantage?
Julia Marin Hellwege & Ed Gerrish
Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
In several U.S. states, legislative districts for the lower chamber are structured as multi-member districts (MMD) electing two or more individuals. Ten states use MMDs, the most common form is a district that elects two candidates (employed in AZ, ND, NJ, SD). Sometimes, parties in these states field only strong one candidate in districts where they have a registration disadvantage, believing this "single shot" strategy improves the election odds. Our research casts doubt on this tactic. It finds that lone Democrats in a pooled sample of three states see a noted disadvantage by widening the electoral gap by 3.3 percentage points on average, meaning that parties are better off running two candidates regardless of their relative quality. However, this effect varies within states. Republicans do not experience a disadvantage, though fewer Democratic-leaning states employ this election method. This research has practical implications for party strategy in MMD states.
The concreteness of social knowledge and the quality of democratic choice
Kai Ou & Scott Tyson
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
Democracy relies on citizens who are politically knowledgeable and engaged. However, when a voter gains political knowledge regarding important issues, through television, town halls, or social media, she also learns that there are many other politically knowledgeable voters, highlighting the importance of social knowledge in political participation. Will a voter with concrete - as opposed to hypothetical - knowledge about other voters' political knowledge have an increased incentive to participate? Or instead, will concrete social knowledge about other voters actually inhibit participation? In this article, we develop a novel experimental design that focuses on whether concrete knowledge about other voters' political knowledge influences political participation. Our main result shows that concrete social knowledge decreases individual voters' willingness to vote, and thereby reduces the probability democracy chooses the majority preferred alternative, i.e. the quality of democratic choice.
Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators' Election Outcomes and Behavior
Abby Wood & Christian Grose
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and behavior? Institutions that encourage transparency, such as campaign finance disclosure, influence mass and elite behavior. Campaign finance transparency provides information to voters during legislative campaigns about the character of candidates, and this information affects voter and legislator behavior. The US Federal Election Commission conducted random audits of 10% of US House members in the 1970s. This FEC program is the only randomized experiment a US agency has conducted on federal legislators and their electorates. We find that audited legislators were more likely to retire and faced more competitive reelections relative to the control group, an effect that is amplified among incumbents whose audits revealed campaign finance violations. Further, campaign finance scandals are associated with lower incumbent vote shares and approval and more negative advertisements in the 2000s.