Getting Involved
All the World's a Stage: US Presidential Narcissism and International Conflict
John Harden
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do leaders matter? What do leaders want? Grandiose narcissism provides a pathway to understanding how personality can impact a leader's preference formation and foreign policy behavior. More narcissistic leaders will focus their efforts on maintaining their inflated self-image by selecting how they will fight on the world stage and who they will fight against. While most leaders will divert attention to easier won battles, more narcissistic leaders will prefer to fight against high-status states by themselves. This article introduces a new measure of US' presidential narcissism, and finds support for the argument that more narcissistic US presidents prefer unilaterally initiating Great Power disputes using data from 1897-2008. A brief review of Theodore Roosevelt's handling of the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903 is used as a plausibility probe of the theory's causal mechanisms.
Presidential use of diversionary drone force and public support
Scott Boddery & Graig Klein
Research & Politics, May 2021
Abstract:
During times of domestic turmoil, the use of force abroad becomes an appealing strategy to US presidents in hopes of diverting attention away from internal conditions and toward a foreign policy success. Weaponized drone technology presents a low cost and potentially high-reward option to embattled presidents. While generally covert operations, drone strikes are frequently reported in the media, making them a viable diversionary tool. To gauge whether drone strikes are in fact capable of diverting the public's attention, we surveyed 1198 Americans and find that a successful drone strike increases presidential approval despite a weak and sagging economy, and the impact of diversionary drone use is significantly greater than that which accompanies traditional diversionary methods.
The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge
Eugene Gholz & Harvey Sapolsky
Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
American security policy discussions commonly warn that the United States is falling behind technologically, especially vis-à-vis China. However, the U.S. military remains at the cutting edge because of its well-developed defense innovation system. No nation (or combination) comes close to U.S. investment in defense R&D. Unmatched political concerns about avoiding casualties, inherent rivalry among participants in the U.S. defense innovation system, and traditional American openness to immigration and new ideas drive the investment. The overly alarmist warnings come from a thriving threat assessment system that continually searches for potential military dangers and technological challenges. The warnings feed the defense innovation system.
Ripple: An Investigation of the World's Most Advanced High-Yield Thermonuclear Weapon Design
Jon Grams
Journal of Cold War Studies, Spring 2021, Pages 133-161
Abstract:
In 1962 the United States conducted its final atmospheric nuclear test series, Operation Dominic. The devices tested were designed and built by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) and the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (LRL). During the test series, LRL conducted four tests of a radically new design called the Ripple concept. Tests of the Ripple concept demonstrated performance characteristics that eclipse those of all nuclear weapons designed before or since. For numerous reasons discussed in the article, the Ripple concept was not pursued, but the technology it pioneered has been in continual development -- for peaceful purposes -- to this day. Until now, very little has been known about these tests and the concept behind them. This article, the result of a multiyear investigation, sheds light on the Ripple program for the first time, allowing for a largely complete account. Included are the origins of the concept and its designer, the technical characteristics, the significant role played by the geopolitical context, the test series in detail, and the cancellation and legacy of the program.
Opening up Military Innovation: Causal Effects of 'Bottom-Up' Reforms to U.S. Defense Research
Sabrina Howell et al.
NBER Working Paper, April 2021
Abstract:
When investing in research and development (R&D), institutions must decide whether to take a top-down approach - soliciting a particular technology - or a bottom-up approach in which innovators suggest ideas. This paper examines a reform to the U.S. Air Force Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program that transitioned from "Conventional topics," which solicit specific technologies, to "Open topics," which invite firms to suggest any new technology that may be useful to the Air Force. The reform seeks to address challenges facing military R&D, in particular a less innovative defense industrial base. We show that the Open program attracts new entrants, defined as younger firms and those without previous defense SBIR awards. In a regression discontinuity design that offers the first causal evaluation of a defense R&D program, we show that winning an Open award increases future venture capital investment, non-SBIR defense contracting, and patenting. Conventional awards have no effect on these outcomes but do increase the chances of future defense SBIR contracts, fostering incumbency. The bottom-up approach appears to be a mechanism behind Open's success. For example, winning has a positive effect on innovation even in less specific Conventional topics. The results suggest that government (and perhaps private sector) innovation could benefit from more bottom-up, decentralized approaches that reduce barriers to entry, minimize lock-in advantages for incumbents, and attract a wider range of new entrants.
Military Experience and Elite Decision-Making: Self-Selection, Socialization, and the Vietnam Draft Lottery
Danielle Lupton
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars across international relations (IR) debate the role military experience plays in elite decision-making. I argue there are two critical problems with this debate. First, it fails to adequately consider the underlying mechanisms linking military service to elite policy preferences. Second, it narrowly focuses on the use of force and largely ignores other ways in which military experience may shape elite behavior. I employ vulnerability to the Vietnam draft lottery to disentangle the impact of two key mechanisms linking military service to elite preferences: self-selection and socialization. I compare the foreign and defense policy roll call votes of Members of Congress (MCs) in the House of Representatives across the 94th-113th Congresses who were eligible for the draft and served in the military to those who were eligible for the draft but did not serve. I find significant differences in the roll call voting behavior between these groups, particularly on issues associated with arming and defense budget restrictions, as well as broader oversight of the military. These effects are heightened for MCs who served on active duty, in the military longer, and in combat, providing strong support for socialization effects. My study carries implications for civil-military relations, elite decision-making, and the study of leaders in IR.
Attitudes toward the Use of Force: Instrumental Imperatives, Moral Principles, and International Law
Janina Dill & Livia Schubiger
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
What informs ordinary citizens' attitudes toward the use of force? Previous research identifies several key concerns in public opinion toward war, but does not directly evaluate the relative importance of these considerations. We articulate three distinct logics of war support - moral, legal, and instrumental - and use an experimental survey with 3,000 U.S. respondents to test how ordinary citizens make trade-offs among multiple competing imperatives relevant for decision making in war. Our design is the first to isolate to what extent substantive legal demands, instrumental military imperatives, and specific moral principles are reflected in respondents' preferences. Although all logics have some resonance, we find that respondents' preferences are remarkably consistent with several core demands of international law even though respondents are not told that the legality of the use of force is at stake. Only the imperative to minimize U.S. military casualties overwhelms both legal and moral demands.
Decision-Making in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises: Presidential Leadership and Outcomes
Jonathan Keller, Yi Edward Yang & Patrick James
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scholars of foreign policy decision-making have argued that international interactions ultimately are grounded in people acting singly or in groups. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent many of these crucial foreign policy decision-making theories from being rigorously tested and systematically compared with theories from alternative perspectives. A promising approach to remedying this deficiency is the addition of decision-making variables to existing, large-N data sets. In this study, we coded a series of foreign policy decision-making variables for all U.S. cases in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set, and examined how these decision-making variables compared with structural factors in shaping crisis outcomes. The results reveal that when controlling for structural factors such as conflict setting and power discrepancy, foreign policy decision-making variables related to leaders' traits, advisory structure, and the political context shaped the severity and centrality of violence employed by the United States. We conclude that including decision-making variables alongside structural variables will enhance the quality of data analysis in the areas of conflict studies and foreign policy analysis.
Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors
Jack Levy & William Mulligan
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
Why did the July 1914 crisis -- but not crises in 1905, 1908-9, 1911, and 1912-13 -- escalate to great-power war despite occurring under similar international and domestic conditions? Explanations based on underlying and slowly changing structural, social, or cultural variables cannot answer this question. Examining three Balkan crises of 1912-13 and the July Crisis, we refine realist explanations based on power, alliances, and reputational interests by incorporating the impact of changing power distributions and alliances in the Balkans on the great-power security system. A more complete answer to the why-1914-but-not-before question, however, requires the incorporation of Franz Ferdinand's assassination, which went beyond a pretext for war. It eliminated the most powerful and effective proponent for peace in Vienna and fundamentally changed the nature of the decision-making process in Austria-Hungary. Counterfactually, we argue that a hypothetical crisis with Franz Ferdinand present would probably have ended differently.
Pax Petrolica? Rethinking the Oil-Interstate War Linkage
Hye Ryeon Jang & Benjamin Smith
Security Studies, forthcoming
Abstract:
In the last decade resource curse scholars have argued widely that oil-rich countries are more likely to initiate armed disputes with their neighbors. In this essay, we argue that the evidence points toward oil peace, not conflict, as a function of both domestic and international factors. We draw on analyses of our own dataset and two from past studies to show that the data is more supportive of petro-peace than of petro-aggression. We also demonstrate that the Iran-Iraq War is singularly responsible for what was believed to have been a radical-petro-aggression effect globally. We conclude that, to the extent that evidence suggests a trend, it is more likely for a Pax Petrolica.
The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion
Risa Kitagawa & Jonathan Chu
World Politics, July 2021, Pages 441-481
Abstract:
Apology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions - manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism - and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.
U.S. Patronage, State Capacity, and Civil Conflict
Matthew DiGiuseppe & Patrick Shea
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Leaders need resources to satisfy key constituents and stave off internal and external challenges. To secure these resources, states can develop their own extractive capacity to generate revenue. Alternatively, states may seek support from major powers to help subsidize their costs. In this study, we focus on how state capacity and external support are not always alternatives to each other. Instead, we argue that external support - particularly from the United States - can build state capacity. We focus on how U.S. support leads to property rights, which subsequently builds extractive capacity. We then argue that states with more capacity are better able to either alleviate rebels' grievances or deter rebels from mounting a military challenge. We use mediation analysis to test these expectations with a dataset on capacity, U.S. support, and civil conflict from 1970 - 2012. We find empirical support for the role of property rights and capacity as mediating factors between U.S. support and civil conflict. Our results have implications for international explanations of civil conflict and the role of U.S. patronage in capacity development.
The Rise and Persistence of Illegal Crops: Evidence from a Naive Policy Announcement
Mounu Prem, Juan Vargas & Daniel Mejía
Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Policies based on prohibition and repression to fight the war on drugs have largely failed in a variety of contexts. However, incentive-based policies may also fail and have unintended negative consequences if policymakers do not properly anticipate behavioral reactions. This is an particularly important concern in the case of policies announced prior to their implementation. In this paper, we show that a naive and untimely policy announcement generated an unprecedented escalation in cocaine production in Colombia, offsetting almost 20 years and billions of dollars of U.S.-backed efforts to stop drug production and cartel action.