Formative State
Early-Adulthood Economic Experiences and the Formation of Democratic Support
Suthan Krishnarajan, Jonathan Doucette & David Andersen
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Do economic experiences early in life affect regime support later in life? Effects of recent economic performance on regime support are extensively studied, but lasting effects of individual-level economic experiences across the lifespan remain unexplored. We argue that in democracies and autocracies alike, economic experiences in early adulthood (that is, age eighteen to twenty-eight) are wired into people's memories and become important cues for their democratic support later in life. Having lived in a well-performing economy in a democracy increases democratic support throughout most of people's lives, whereas having lived in a well-performing economy in an autocracy decreases democratic support throughout most of people's lives. Using extensive survey data on support for democracy covering ninety-seven countries from 1994 to 2015, we find support for these propositions, demonstrating that economic experiences in early adulthood, conditional on the regime in place at the time, have strong, robust and lasting effects on democratic support.
Normalization of Censorship: Evidence from China
Tony Zirui Yang
Washington University in Saint Louis Working Paper, November 2021
Abstract:
Previous research claims that public awareness of censorship will lead to backlash against the regime. However, surveys consistently find that Chinese citizens are apathetic toward or even supportive of government censorship. To explain this puzzle, I argue that citizens are subject to a process of normalization. Specifically, individuals become desensitized to censorship when the range of censored content expands beyond politically threatening topics like government criticism and collective action to other seemingly harmless non-political issues. Using a dataset of 15,872 censored articles on WeChat and two original survey experiments in China, I show that (1) a majority of censored articles are unrelated to politically threatening topics, and (2) respondents exposed to the censorship of non-political content display less backlash toward the regime and its censorship apparatus. My findings highlight how normalization of repressive policies contributes to authoritarian control.
#DictatorErdogan: How Social Media Bans Trigger Backlash
Andrew Cesare Miller
Political Communication, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can authorities effectively shut down widely used social media platforms? This article theorizes that banning social media platforms with existing user bases triggers the psychological mechanism of reactance. Reactance motivates citizens to circumvent bans and ultimately results in intensified criticism of the censoring authorities on banned platforms. Reactance dynamics in response to social media bans are particularly relevant in countries with hybrid regimes – that is, regimes with both democratic and autocratic characteristics. Authorities in these countries generally allow widespread adoption of social media platforms. At the same time, they engage in temporary platform bans, usually to limit antiregime discourse at crucial political junctures such as elections. This combination of large user bases and temporary bans creates a “reactance equilibrium” in which there is high demand among citizens to access the restricted platforms. Unlike with censorship of traditional media such as television and print news outlets, the costs for citizens to circumvent social media bans are relatively low, which allows citizens to act on their reactance states. Drawing on a dataset of 15 million geolocated tweets, this article presents evidence of a censorship backlash to Turkey’s March 2014 Twitter ban, which is considered among the first attempts to block a widely adopted social media platform. A synthetic control model and descriptive statistics reveal widespread circumvention of the ban. Furthermore, sentiment analysis shows that, in the wake of the ban, Twitter discourse became increasingly negative, especially toward the ban’s main progenitor then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Suspecting Foul Play When It Is Objectively There: The Association of Political Orientation With General and Partisan Conspiracy Beliefs as a Function of Corruption Levels
Sinan Alper & Roland Imhoff
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Recent research has showed that people with right-wing political orientations and political extremists are more likely to harbor conspiracy beliefs. Utilizing a multisite data set (23 countries, N > 20,000), we show that corruption moderates how political orientation predicts conspiracy beliefs. We found that (1) the difference between left- and right-wingers in terms of adopting a conspiracy mind-set is attenuated in countries with high corruption; and (2) left-wingers are more likely to believe left-wing conspiracy theories, and right-wingers are more likely to believe right-wing conspiracy theories in high corruption countries. Including quadratic effects of political orientation yielded the same results. We argue that this is because corruption increases perceived plausibility of conspiracies, and everyone across the political spectrum becomes similarly likely to adopt a conspiracy mentality. This heightened suspicion, however, is reflected on partisan conspiracy theories differently for left- and right-wingers, depending on their different understandings of outgroup.
Is Terrorism Really a Weapon of the Weak? Debunking the Conventional Wisdom
Virginia Page Fortna
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
That terrorism is a “weapon of the weak” is such deeply held conventional wisdom it has become almost a cliché. “Weak” means many different things in the literature, however, and little rigorous empirical research has tested the contention that weaker groups, however conceived, are more likely to employ terrorism. This article explores prominent weapon of the weak arguments to develop testable hypotheses about group strength and the prevalence of terrorism. Using measures of deliberately indiscriminate attacks on civilians by rebel groups in civil conflicts, as well as multiple measures of rebel strength, it examines systematically whether weaker groups are more likely to employ terrorism. I find surprisingly little empirical support for the conventional wisdom. There is no clear or consistent evidence that deliberately indiscriminate terrorism is a weapon of the weak rather than the strong.
The deep roots of rebellion
Gaia Narciso & Battista Severgnini
Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the triggers of rebellion and documents the historical roots of conflict using a unique dataset at the individual level. Drawing on evidence from the Famine (1845–1850) and its effect on the Irish Revolution (1916–1921), we show how negative shocks can explain social unrest in the long run. These findings are confirmed by the analysis of surnames, which enables the study of socio-cultural persistence over time. The instrumental variable analysis based on the wind direction that determined the spread of the potato blight that caused the Famine provides further evidence in support of the legacy of rebellion.
I’ll Be Back? Exiled Leaders and Political Instability
Daniel Krcmaric & Abel Escribà-Folch
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Exile is often considered a useful political solution that can coax violent or unpopular leaders out of power. But these “golden parachutes” may come with a price. Specifically, do exiled leaders increase instability back in their home countries? In this paper, we outline the mechanisms through which exiled rulers can destabilize their home state’s politics and ultimately increase conflict. We present two types of evidence to support the argument. The first is a cross-national analysis that uses our original Leaders in Exile dataset to examine how exiled leaders shape the likelihood of civil conflicts, coups, and protests. The second is a cross-leader analysis designed to minimize inferential concerns by comparing cases where leaders escape into exile with cases where leaders are killed. In both tests, we find that exiled leaders are linked to political instability in their home countries.
Crowd Cohesion and Protest Outcome
Lisa Mueller
American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Amidst an unprecedented swell in global protest, scholars and activists wrestle with the question of why protests succeed or fail. I explore a new answer: more cohesive crowds, where protesters agree on their demands, are more likely to win concessions than less cohesive crowds. Drawing on psychology and linguistics, I theorize that cohesive demands are more comprehensible and thus persuasive. I test this theory with a multimethod approach. First, I use cross-national data from 97 protests to estimate the relationship between crowd cohesion and subsequent concessions, applying natural language processing to measure cohesion in participants’ self-reported motivations. Second, a survey experiment in South Africa tests the causal effects of crowd cohesion and assesses comprehensibility of demands as the mechanism driving concessions. Third, case studies of two British protests demonstrate the theory in real-world settings. My findings suggest that activists can improve their odds of success by coordinating around a common goal.
War and the rise of parliaments
Leandro De Magalhaes & Francesco Giovannoni
European Economic Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
We study European political institutions between 1350 and 1700 AD. Our model links (i) the calling of parliament and (ii) the transition to Rule by Parliament with the risks associated with wars and battles, and with the underlying economic relationship between monarchs and the commercial elites. We compile a dataset for England, Castile, France, and Portugal that includes yearly parliamentary activity, battles, war years, and measures of economic activity. In support of the model, parliaments are more likely to be called when (a) the country suffers a territorial defeat; and (b) agriculture output is relatively low. The causal relation between a territorial defeat and parliament being called is supported by an event-study comparing the impact of defeat relative to a win. We find evidence of a short-term (one year) impact, but no long-term effects. Transition to Rule by Parliament require specific goldilocks parameters according to the model (moderate military strength and moderate alignment between monarch and the commercial elites) and are only feasible during a window of opportunity, i.e., while a sitting monarch is facing an existential threat.
Precolonial and Colonial Origins of Inclusive Peace
Julian Wucherpfennig & Lars-Erik Cederman
Journal of Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
In a recent contribution to this journal, Richard McAlexander seeks to reanalyze Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman’s “Who Inherits the State?” which instruments the effect of ethnic group inclusion on civil conflict by exploiting differences in colonial governance between the French and British empires. McAlexander proposes a research design that replaces the between-colony dimension of Wucherpfennig et al.’s comparison with a continuous measure of indirect rule that varies between British colonies. We show that McAlexander’s study hardly poses a viable reanalysis because his approach is compromised by problems of ecological inference and posttreatment confounding, leading to biased inference by design. We propose a more informative reanalysis, indicating that British colonialism built on suitable customary institutions, unlike the French empire. Although tentative, our analytical extension lends support to Wucherpfennig et al.’s original findings, most importantly that inclusion reduces the risk of postcolonial civil conflict.