Followed
How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent
Jennifer Pan & Alexandra Siegel
American Political Science Review, February 2020, Pages 109-125
Abstract:
Saudi Arabia has imprisoned and tortured activists, religious leaders, and journalists for voicing dissent online. This reflects a growing worldwide trend in the use of physical repression to censor online speech. In this paper, we systematically examine the consequences of imprisoning well-known Saudis for online dissent by analyzing over 300 million tweets as well as detailed Google search data from 2010 to 2017 using automated text analysis and crowd-sourced human evaluation of content. We find that repression deterred imprisoned Saudis from continuing to dissent online. However, it did not suppress dissent overall. Twitter followers of the imprisoned Saudis engaged in more online dissent, including criticizing the ruling family and calling for regime change. Repression drew public attention to arrested Saudis and their causes, and other prominent figures in Saudi Arabia were not deterred by the repression of their peers and continued to dissent online.
Endogenous Democracy: Causal Evidence from the Potato Productivity Shock in the Old World
Joan Barceló & Guillermo Rosas
Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming
Abstract:
Despite a high cross-country correlation between development and democracy, it is difficult to gauge the impact of economic development on the probability that autocracies will transition to democracy because of endogeneity, especially due to reverse causation and omitted variable bias. Hence, whether development causes democracy remains a contested issue. We exploit exogeneity in the regional variation of potato cultivation along with the timing of the introduction of potatoes to the Old World (i.e., a potato productivity shock) to identify a causal effect of urbanization, a proxy for economic development, on democratization. Our results, which hold under sensitivity analyses that question the validity of the exclusion restriction, present new evidence of the existence of a causal effect of economic development on democracy.
The Political Legacy of Violence During China's Cultural Revolution
Yuhua Wang
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Autocrats use repression to deter opposition. Are they successful in the long run? The author argues that state repression can have long-lasting alienating effects on citizens’ political attitudes and coercive effects on their political behavior. The article evaluates this proposition by studying the long-term effects of state terror during China's Cultural Revolution. It shows that individuals who grew up in localities that were exposed to more state-sponsored violence in the late 1960s are less trusting of national political leaders and more critical of the country's political system today. These anti-regime attitudes are more likely to be passed down to the younger generation if family members discuss politics frequently than if they do not. Yet while state repression has created anti-regime attitudes, it has decreased citizens’ contentious behavior. These findings highlight the dilemma that authoritarian rulers face when they seek to consolidate their rule through repression.
When Conflicts Do Not Overspill: The Case of Jordan
Petter Nesser & Henrik Gråtrud
Perspectives on Politics, forthcoming
Abstract:
How can vulnerable states adjacent to countries embroiled in civil war avoid conflict contagion? Jordan has all the classic attributes highlighted in the literature as creating vulnerabilities susceptible to spillover. It adjoins Syria and Iraq where jihadists have operated freely. It has a weak economy, refugees pouring in from adjacent conflicts and is home to hundreds — if not thousands — of jihadists. Moreover, jihadists consider the Jordanian regime to be traitors — who conspire with the enemies of Islam — and they want to replace it with an Islamic state. However, as we show, very few jihadist attacks have happened in Jordan. We test three hypotheses for the limited spillover. Our analysis suggests a state policy that we dub “calibrated repression” is the most significant explanation. This means that Jordan protects against spillover by repressing jihadist attempts at infiltrating the kingdom and clamping down on local terrorist cells linked to the Islamic State while keeping other domestic jihadist elements in check through co-optation. The regime restrains the use of force against less acute threats and displays some leniency towards radicals when the situation allows. Our findings speak to the broader literature on spillover and offer insights into the understudied topic of mechanisms limiting spillover in high-risk environments.
Social Media and Xenophobia: Evidence from Russia
Leonardo Bursztyn et al.
NBER Working Paper, December 2019
Abstract:
We study the causal effect of social media on ethnic hate crimes and xenophobic attitudes in Russia using quasi-exogenous variation in social media penetration across cities. Higher penetration of social media led to more ethnic hate crimes, but only in cities with a high pre-existing level of nationalist sentiment. Consistent with a mechanism of coordination of crimes, the effects are stronger for crimes with multiple perpetrators. We implement a national survey experiment and show that social media persuaded young and low-educated individuals to hold more xenophobic attitudes, but did not increase respondents' openness to expressing these views. Our results are consistent with a simple model of social learning where penetration of social networks increases individuals' propensity to meet like-minded people.
Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa
Inken von Borzyskowski & Patrick Kuhn
Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming
Abstract:
A considerable literature examines the effect of voter information on candidate strategies and voter–politician interactions in the developing world. The voter information literature argues that information can improve accountability because more informed voters are harder to woo with traditional campaign tools, such as ethnic appeals and vote-buying. However, this literature has largely ignored the reaction of political candidates and thus may reach conclusions that are overly optimistic regarding the impact of information on electoral accountability. We argue that voter information can increase electoral violence in developing countries where politicians face fewer institutional constraints on their campaign tactics. When violence is used as a campaign strategy, more informed electorates are more at risk because they are harder to sway through alternative campaign techniques. Using data from 35 African countries, we show that respondents receiving their news predominantly from newspapers are a good proxy for informed voters because they differ in terms of their political attitudes from respondents consuming no news or receiving it via other channels. Combining the geo-coded survey data with pre-electoral violence event data, we find a robust positive association between newspaper readership and fear of and exposure to campaign violence. This finding contributes to the micro-foundations of election violence and adds a cautionary note for voter information programs.
Origins of Early Democracy
Ali Ahmed & David Stasavage
American Political Science Review, forthcoming
Abstract:
The idea that rulers must seek consent before making policy is key to democracy. We suggest that this practice evolved independently in a large fraction of human societies where executives ruled jointly with councils. We argue that council governance was more likely to emerge when information asymmetries made it harder for rulers to extract revenue, and we illustrate this with a theoretical model. Giving the population a role in governance became one means of overcoming the information problem. We test this hypothesis by examining the correlation between localized variation in agricultural suitability and the presence of council governance in the Standard Cross Cultural Sample. As a further step, we suggest that executives facing substantial information asymmetries could also have an alternative route for resource extraction — develop a bureaucracy to measure variation in productivity. Further empirical results suggest that rule by bureaucracy could substitute for shared rule with a council.
War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide
Ferdinand Eibl, Steffen Hertog & Dan Slater
British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. The authors offer a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While this argument was initially developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches in the coup and civil–military literatures. In support of the argument, quantitative tests confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization more likely not simply in a single region, but more generally.
Fridays of Revolution: Focal Days and Mass Protest in Egypt and Tunisia
Neil Ketchley & Christopher Barrie
Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Focal days of protest are increasingly common to episodes of revolutionary mobilization. This paper explores the significance of focal days in patterning sustained protest in Egypt and Tunisia from 2011 to 2012. In Egypt, resource-poor activists exploited the confluence of worshippers on Fridays to mobilize mass transitory protest. This reliance on ritualized action hindered cross-sectoral coordination and meant mass protest often failed to inflict a direct economic cost. In Tunisia, there was no focal day of protest, in large part due to the coordinating hand of trade unions. In consequence, mass protest was more likely to span multiple sites, sectors, and tactics. These results suggest that oppositions can sustain mass mobilization even absent organizational capacity, but a reliance on a focal day limits the potential of protest over a political transition. Supplementary analyses point to the applicability of our findings to a number of other Arab Spring countries.
When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders
Kristin Bakke, Neil Mitchell & Hannah Smidt
International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming
Abstract:
Research suggests that civil society mobilization together with the ratification of human rights treaties put pressure on governments to improve their human rights practices. An unexplored theoretical implication is that pressure provokes counterpressure. Instead of improving treaty compliance, some governments will have an interest in demobilizing civil society to silence their critics. Yet we do not know how and to what extent this incentive shapes governments’ policies and practices regarding civil society organizations. In this article we argue and show — using a new global database of government-sponsored restrictions on civil society organizations — that when governments have committed to human rights treaties and, at the same time, continue to commit severe human rights abuses, they impose restrictions on civil society groups to avoid monitoring and mitigate the international costs of abuses.
Hunger to Violence: Explaining the Violent Escalation of Nonviolent Demonstrations
Daniel Gustafson
Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming
Abstract:
Under what conditions do nonviolent demonstrations escalate to violence? I answer this question using a novel theory of individual impatience in protests that begin peacefully. Rather than considering protest groups as unitary actors, I present a theory of collective action in which a group’s decision over whether or not to engage in anti-government violence is the product of individual preferences. Individuals involved in a nonviolent demonstration use the immediacy of their needs and the sustainability of collective action to decide whether or not to initiate violence against the state. Specifically, I hypothesize that the likelihood of violent escalation will increase when the food price increases and unemployment rate is high or when the event is spontaneous. Analysis of a Bayesian multilevel model of 2,405 nonviolent demonstrations from 1991 to 2017 in Africa and Latin America supports my expectations.