Feels Right
Dirty Liberals! Reminders of Physical Cleanliness Influence Moral and Political Attitudes
Erik Helzer & David Pizarro
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Many moral codes place a special emphasis on bodily purity, and manipulations that directly target bodily purity have been shown to influence a variety of moral judgments. Across two studies, we demonstrated that reminders of physical purity influence specific moral judgments regarding behaviors in the sexual domain as well as broad political attitudes. In Study 1, individuals in a public setting who were given a reminder of physical cleansing reported being more politically conservative than did individuals who were not given such a reminder. In Study 2, individuals reminded of physical cleansing in the laboratory demonstrated harsher moral judgments toward violations of sexual purity and were more likely to report being politically conservative than control participants. Together, these experiments provide further evidence of a deep link between physical purity and moral judgment, and they offer preliminary evidence that manipulations of physical purity can influence general (and putatively stable) political attitudes.
------------------------
Linking Genetics and Political Attitudes: Reconceptualizing Political Ideology
Kevin Smith et al.
Political Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this paper, we trace the route by which genetics could ultimately connect to issue attitudes and suggest that central to this connection are chronic dispositional preferences for mass-scale social rules, order, and conduct - what we label political ideology. The need to resolve bedrock social dilemmas concerning such matters as leadership style, protection from outgroups, and the degree to which norms of conduct are malleable, is present in any large-scale social unit at any time. This universality is important in that it leaves open the possibility that genetics could influence stances on issues of the day. Here, we measure orientation to these bedrock principles in two ways-a survey of conscious, self-reported positions and an implicit association test (IAT) of latent orientations toward fixed or flexible rules of social conduct. In an initial test, both measures were predictive of stances on issues of the day as well as of ideological self-labeling, thereby suggesting that the heritability of specific issue attitudes could be the result of the heritability of general orientations toward bedrock principles of mass-scale group life.
------------------------
Striving for the Moral Self: The Effects of Recalling Past Moral Actions on Future Moral Behavior
Jennifer Jordan, Elizabeth Mullen & Keith Murnighan
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, forthcoming
Abstract:
People's desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one's own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities (Study 1), reported stronger prosocial intentions (Study 2), and showed less cheating (Study 3) than people who recalled their moral behavior. These compensatory effects were related to the moral magnitude of the recalled event, but they did not emerge when people recalled their own positive or negative nonmoral behavior (Study 2) or others' (im)moral behavior (Study 3). Thus, the authors extend self-completion theory to the moral domain and use it to integrate the research on moral cleansing (remunerative moral strivings) and moral licensing (relaxed moral strivings).
------------------------
The "ick" factor, anticipated regret, and willingness to become an organ donor
Ronan O'Carroll et al.
Health Psychology, March 2011, Pages 236-245
Objective: This research tested the role of traditional rational-cognitive factors and emotional barriers to posthumous organ donation. An example of an emotional barrier is the "ick" factor, a basic disgust reaction to the idea of organ donation. We also tested the potential role of manipulating anticipated regret to increase intention to donate in people who are not yet registered organ donors.
Design: In three experiments involving 621 members of the United Kingdom general public, participants were invited to complete questionnaire measures tapping potential emotional affective attitude barriers such as the "ick" factor, the desire to retain bodily integrity after death, and medical mistrust. Registered posthumous organ donors were compared with nondonors. In Experiments 2 and 3, nondonors were then allocated to a simple anticipated regret manipulation versus a control condition, and the impact on intention to donate was tested.
Main Outcome Measures: Self-reported emotional barriers and intention to donate in the future.
Results: Traditional rational-cognitive factors such as knowledge, attitude, and subjective norm failed to distinguish donors from nondonors. However, in all three experiments, nondonors scored significantly higher than donors on the emotional "ick" factor and bodily integrity scales. A simple anticipated regret manipulation led to a significant increase in intention to register as an organ donor in future.
Conclusions: Negative affective attitudes are thus crucial barriers to people registering as organ donors. A simple anticipated regret manipulation has the potential to significantly increase organ donation rates.
------------------------
Overreaction to Fearsome Risks
Cass Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser
Environmental and Resource Economics, March 2011, Pages 435-449
Abstract:
When risks threaten, cognitive mechanisms bias people toward action or inaction. Fearsome risks are highly available. The availability bias tells us that this leads people to overestimate their frequency. Therefore, they also overreact to curtail the likelihood or consequences of such risks. More generally, fear can paralyze efforts to think clearly about risks. We draw on a range of environmental risks to show the following: (1) Fear leads us to neglect probability of occurrence; (2) As fearsome environmental risks are usually imposed by others (as externalities), indignation stirs excess reaction; (3) We often misperceive or miscalculate such risks. Two experiments demonstrate probability neglect when fearsome risks arise: (a) willingness-to-pay to eliminate the cancer risk from arsenic in water (described in vivid terms) did not vary despite a 10-fold variation in risk; (b) the willingness-to-accept price for a painful but non dangerous electric shock did not vary between a 1 and 100% chance. Possible explanations relate to the role of the amygdala in impairing cognitive brain function. Government and the law, both made by mortals and both responding to public pressures, similarly neglect probabilities for fearsome risks. Examples relating to shark attacks, Love Canal, alar and terrorism are discussed.
------------------------
Keeping One's Options Open: The Detrimental Consequences of Decision Reversibility
Lottie Bullens, Frenk van Harreveld & Jens Förster
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
People generally prefer to have the opportunity to revise their decisions. Surprisingly however, research has shown that keeping ones options open yields lower satisfaction with the decision outcome (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Two studies aimed to gain more insight into the detrimental consequences of decision reversibility and the cognitive processes underlying decision reversibility. Building upon literature on goal fulfillment we hypothesized and found in a first experiment that as long as decisions are still open to change, accessibility of decision-related constructs is increased compared to neutral constructs. A second experiment demonstrated that decision reversibility undermines working memory capacity. Moreover participants experienced higher regret after having made a reversible decision, an effect that was mediated by decreased working memory capacity. The study set implies that reversible decisions yield lower working memory capacity because people continue to think about the, still relevant, choice options. In the end this might increase dissatisfaction with the decision and regret.
------------------------
An eye-like painting enhances the expectation of a good reputation
Ryo Oda, Yuki Niwa, Atsushi Honma & Kai Hiraishi
Evolution and Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
The presence of subtle cues of being watched has been reported to make people behave altruistically, even when they are anonymous. Individual selection theory predicts that generosity in the presence of eyes is based on the providers' expectation of a future reward. On the other hand, as we are living in quite a large society in which altruistic punishment is effective, the eyes could elicit fear of punishment. However, no previous study has investigated whether people are concerned with their reputation when subtle social cues are present. We conducted the dictator game in the presence of, or without, a painting of stylized eyes. The participants were then asked to complete a post-experimental questionnaire designed to investigate what they were thinking when they decided the amount of money to offer the recipient and how they perceived the experimental situation. Participants in the eye condition allocated more money to the recipient than did those in the control condition. This effect was not mediated by fear of punishment but by the expectation of a reward. Moreover, the results suggested that the participants expected their actions would enhance their reputation in the eyes of a third party.
------------------------
When Left Is "Right": Motor Fluency Shapes Abstract Concepts
Daniel Casasanto & Evangelia Chrysikou
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Right- and left-handers implicitly associate positive ideas like "goodness" and "honesty" more strongly with their dominant side of space, the side on which they can act more fluently, and negative ideas more strongly with their nondominant side. Here we show that right-handers' tendency to associate "good" with "right" and "bad" with "left" can be reversed as a result of both long- and short-term changes in motor fluency. Among patients who were right-handed prior to unilateral stroke, those with disabled left hands associated "good" with "right," but those with disabled right hands associated "good" with "left," as natural left-handers do. A similar pattern was found in healthy right-handers whose right or left hand was temporarily handicapped in the laboratory. Even a few minutes of acting more fluently with the left hand can change right-handers' implicit associations between space and emotional valence, causing a reversal of their usual judgments. Motor experience plays a causal role in shaping abstract thought.
------------------------
A Case for Limiting the Reach of Institutional Review Boards
Richard Hessler, D.J. Donnell-Watson & John Galliher
American Sociologist, March 2011, Pages 145-152
Abstract:
Institutional review boards (IRBs) governing social and behavioral research seem to systematically exceed the guidelines established by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. We examine a clandestine study of prostitution and another of employment discrimination and conclude that IRBs, more concerned about being sued than they are about protecting research subjects, get in the way of science and cause ethical problems as a consequence. We discuss the ethical principles involved and call for a suspension of all IRB review in the social and behavioral sciences.
------------------------
Peter Dauvergne & Kate Neville
Environmental Politics, March 2011, Pages 192-209
Abstract:
Activists use emotional language and images - what Greenpeace co-founder Bob Hunter coined 'mindbombs' - to convince people that some actions are wrong, morally and environmentally. For instance, for over 50 years anti-sealing activists have employed mindbombs to transform seal pups into babies and seal hunters into barbarians. Although 'image politics' contributed to the decline of the Canadian sealing industry in the 1980s, its effectiveness has been - and continues to be - rocky, particularly as pro-sealing voices counter with competing claims of cultural rights, traditional livelihoods and sustainable use. Drawing on Tilly and Tarrow's 'cycles of contention' framework, this article argues that controlling and predicting the global uptake of messaging is becoming harder as activists operate in an increasingly crowded discursive landscape, as campaigners and counter-campaigners articulate scientific and moral frames that resonate differently across changing social and cultural contexts, and in light of globalising markets, transnational networks and changing media.
------------------------
The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions
Nicholas Scurich & Richard John
Law and Human Behavior, April 2011, Pages 83-91
Abstract:
Despite a proliferation of actuarial risk assessment instruments, empirical research on the communication of violence risk is scant and there is virtually no research on the consumption of actuarial risk assessment. Using a 2 × 3 Latin Square factorial design, this experiment tested whether decision-makers are sensitive to varying levels of risk expressed probabilistically and whether the framing of actuarial risk probabilities is consequential for commitment decisions. Consistent with research on attribute framing, in which describing an attribute in terms of its complement leads to different conclusions, this experiment found that the way actuarial risk estimates are framed leads to disparate commitment decisions. For example, risk framed as 26% probability of violence generally led decision-makers to authorize commitment, whereas the same risk framed in the complement, a 74% probability of no violence, generally led decision-makers to release. This result was most pronounced for moderate risk levels. Implications for the risk communication format debate, forensic practice and research are discussed.
------------------------
Assessing small non-zero perceptions of chance: The case of H1N1 (swine) flu risks
Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Andrew Parker & Jürgen Maurer
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, April 2011, Pages 145-159
Abstract:
Feelings of invulnerability, seen in judgments of 0% risk, can reflect misunderstandings of risk and risk behaviors, suggesting increased need for risk communication. However, judgments of 0% risk may be given by individuals who feel invulnerable, and by individuals who are rounding from small non-zero probabilities. We examined the effect of allowing participants to give more precise responses in the 0-1% range on the validity of reported probability judgments. Participants assessed probabilities for getting H1N1 influenza and dying from it conditional on infection, using a 0-100% visual linear scale. Those responding in the 0-1% range received a follow-up question with more options in that range. This two-step procedure reduced the use of 0% and increased the resolution of responses in the 0-1% range. Moreover, revised probability responses improved predictions of attitudes and self-reported behaviors. Hence, our two-step procedure allows for more precise and more valid measurement of perceived invulnerability.
------------------------
Frames, decisions, and cardiac-autonomic control
Stefan Sutterlin et al.
Social Neuroscience, April 2011, Pages 169-177
Abstract:
The "framing effect" (FE) describes the phenomenon whereby human choices are susceptible to the way they are presented rather than objective information. The present study extends common decision-making paradigms with frame variation by including inhibitory control, operationalized as vagally mediated heart rate variability (HRV) at rest and motor response inhibition during a stop-signal task (SST). We hypothesized that inhibitory control is inversely associated with susceptibility to framing effects. Forty adult volunteers performed a risky-choice framing task in which identical information about wins and losses was presented using loss or gain frames. As predicted, there was an inverse association between HRV and framing effects, accounting for 23% of the variance in framing effects. Inhibitory control as indexed by performance in the SST was not associated with framing effects. These results are discussed in terms of the role of inhibitory processes (as indicated by vagal activity) for decision-making processes.
------------------------
The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment
Guy Kahane et al.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems.
------------------------
Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior
Shaul Shalvi et al.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, forthcoming
Abstract:
Employing a die-under-cup paradigm, we study the extent to which people lie when it is transparently clear they cannot be caught. We asked participants to report the outcome of a private die roll and gain money according to their reports. Results suggest that the degree of lying depends on the extent to which self-justifications are available. Specifically, when people are allowed to roll the die three times to ensure its legitimacy, but only the first roll is supposed to "count," we find evidence that the highest outcome of the three rolls is reported. Eliminating the ability to observe more than one roll reduces lying. Additional results suggest that observing desired counterfactuals, in the form of additional rolls not meant to determine pay, attenuates the degree to which people perceive lies as unethical. People seem to derive value from self-justifications allowing them to lie for money while feeling honest.
------------------------
Rimma Teper, Michael Inzlicht & Elizabeth Page-Gould
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Can people accurately predict how they will act in a moral dilemma? Our research suggests that in some situations, they cannot, and that emotions play a pivotal role in this dissociation between behavior and forecasting. In the current experiment, individuals in a moral action condition cheated significantly less on a math task than participants in a forecasting condition predicted they themselves would cheat. Furthermore, we found that participants in the action condition displayed significantly more physiological arousal, as measured by preejection period, skin conductance response (SCR), and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), and that the underestimation effect was mediated by SCR and RSA together. This research suggests that the affective arousal present during real-life moral dilemmas may not be fully engaged during moral forecasting, and that this may account for the moral forecasting errors that individuals make. This research has the potential to inform past work in the field of moral psychology, which has largely ignored actual behavior.
------------------------
Regrets of the Typical American: Findings From a Nationally Representative Sample
Mike Morrison & Neal Roese
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
In this study of regret among a representative sample of Americans, the authors examined hypotheses derived from regret regulation theory, which asserts that regrets motivate a range of ameliorative cognitive consequences. Using a random-digit telephone survey, respondents reported a salient regret, then answered questions about that regret. Results showed inaction regrets lasted longer than action regrets, and that greater loss severity corresponded to more inaction regrets. Regrets more often focused on nonfixable than fixable situations. Women more than men reported love rather than work regrets and, overall, regrets more often focused on romance than on other life domains. Objective life circumstances (referenced by demographic variables) predicted regret in patterns consistent with regret regulation theory. These results complement laboratory findings while suggesting new refinements to existing theory.
------------------------
"Princess Alice is watching you": Children's belief in an invisible person inhibits cheating
Jared Piazza, Jesse Bering & Gordon Ingram
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Two child groups (5-6 and 8-9 years of age) participated in a challenging rule-following task while they were (a) told that they were in the presence of a watchful invisible person ("Princess Alice"), (b) observed by a real adult, or (c) unsupervised. Children were covertly videotaped performing the task in the experimenter's absence. Older children had an easier time at following the rules but engaged in equal levels of purposeful cheating as the younger children. Importantly, children's expressed belief in the invisible person significantly determined their cheating latency, and this was true even after controlling for individual differences in temperament. When "skeptical" children were omitted from the analysis, the inhibitory effects of being told about Princess Alice were equivalent to having a real adult present. Furthermore, skeptical children cheated only after having first behaviorally disconfirmed the "presence" of Princess Alice. The findings suggest that children's belief in a watchful invisible person tends to deter cheating.
------------------------
Liane Young, Jonathan Scholz & Rebecca Saxe
Social Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent's intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information.
------------------------
Kristof Dhont et al.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming
Abstract:
The present study investigates patterns of event-related brain potentials following the presentation of attitudinal stimuli among political moderates (N = 12) and anarchists (N = 11). We used a modified oddball paradigm to investigate the evaluative inconsistency effect elicited by stimuli embedded in a sequence of contextual stimuli with an opposite valence. Increased late positive potentials (LPPs) of extreme political attitudes were observed. Moreover, this LPP enhancement was larger among anarchists than among moderates, indicating that an extreme political attitude of a moderate differs from an extreme political attitude of an anarchist. The discussion elaborates on the meaning of attitude extremity for moderates and extremists.
------------------------
Amygdala involvement in self-blame regret
Antoinette Nicolle et al.
Social Neuroscience, April 2011, Pages 178-189
Abstract:
Regret-related brain activity is dependent on free choice, but it is unclear whether this activity is a function of more subtle differences in the degree of responsibility a decision-maker exerts over a regrettable outcome. In this experiment, we show that trial-by-trial subjective ratings of regret depend on a higher subjective sense of responsibility, as well as being dependent on objective responsibility. Using fMRI we show an enhanced amygdala response to regret-related outcomes when these outcomes are associated with high, as compared to low, responsibility. This enhanced response was maximal in participants who showed a greater level of enhancement in their subjective ratings of regret engendered by an objective increase in responsibility. Orbitofrontal and cingulate cortex showed opposite effects, with an enhanced response for regret-related outcomes when participants were not objectively responsible. The findings indicate that the way the brain processes regret-related outcomes depends on both objective and subjective aspects of responsibility, highlighting the critical importance of the amygdala.