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Not Learning from Failure — The Greatest Failure of All
Lauren Eskreis-Winkler & Ayelet Fishbach
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Our society celebrates failure as a teachable moment. Yet across five experiments (N = 1,549), failure had the opposite effect: it undermined learning. Participants in these studies completed several binary-choice questions that provided them the opportunity to learn professional, academic or social content. Each question had two answer choices. After each question, participants received correct (success) or incorrect (failure) feedback. Because each question had only two possible answers, participants who received success and failure feedback were both able to determine the correct answer. Yet a follow-up testing phase revealed that participants learned less from failure than success (Study 1). This effect replicated across linguistic and social domains — even when learning from failure was less cognitively taxing and when learning was highly incentivized (Study 2). Those who failed also remembered fewer task details (Study 3). Why do people learn less from failure? Failure is ego-threatening, which causes people to tune out. Indeed, ego-threat mediated (Study 4) and moderated (Study 5) the effect on learning. Participants learned less from their own failures compared to their own successes, yet they learned just as much from others’ failures as others’ successes. Thus, when the ego concerns are muted, people tune in and learn from failure.
Why are narcissistic people cold? A cognitive account emphasizing the perceived momentousness of successes and failures
William Hart, Gregory Tortoriello & Kyle Richardson
Personality and Individual Differences, forthcoming
Abstract:
It seems generally accepted that people with elevated narcissism levels (“narcissistic people,” for short) are interpersonally colder. Most often, this coldness has been presumed to originate from “dark” mechanisms or deficiencies. We departed from these focal explanations; instead, we tested whether “narcissistic coldness,” defined here as the narcissistic tendency to feel less happy for successful others and less concern for unsuccessful others, could follow from an apparently innocent process. Specifically, we proposed that narcissistic people anticipate that success and failure is generally less momentous and (a) assume others are less affected by most success and failure and (b) often feel less happy for successful others and less concerned for unsuccessful others. Findings across three studies were consistent with these propositions. Narcissistic people anticipated that both the self and others will be less reactive to successes and failures (Studies 1–3); moreover, although narcissistic people indicated less warmth toward successful and unsuccessful others, these relations were eliminated after controlling for narcissistic people's assumptions that other people are less reactive to success and failure (Study 3). Hence, narcissistic coldness could, in part, have its origin in what we believe is reasonable disagreement about the momentous nature of events.
The evolution of the endowment effect
Justin Bruner, Frank Calegari & Toby Handfield
Evolution and Human Behavior, forthcoming
Abstract:
People often value an item more when they own it than when it is available for purchase, and consequently are relatively reluctant to trade. This is the “endowment effect”, which has been widely documented in human populations and also in some non-human species. This paper develops a simple model in which it is adaptive to have a bias against trade, potentially explaining the basis of the endowment effect. The bias against trade arises from the strategic nature of trade in a moderately competitive environment: the interest of a potential trading partner in making the exchange is evidence that the decision maker already has the more valuable object. The model predicts that an endowment effect is promoted by large uncertainty about the fitness value of items, and also by conditions in which there are on average small gains to be had from trade. Because the model employs a simple bounded rationality heuristic for trade, it explains how the endowment effect could arise in species that lack theory of mind and related strategic reasoning abilities. The model also suggests an explanation for why endowment effects are so rarely observed in biological markets that exist between species. Because the trading classes have very different fitness functions, there is negligible competition across those classes. Consequently, there are substantial mutual gains to trade, so our model predicts there is unlikely to be adaptive pressure for an endowment effect.
When silver is gold: Forecasting the potential creativity of initial ideas
Justin Berg
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, September 2019, Pages 96-117
Abstract:
Past research on idea evaluation has focused on how individuals evaluate the creativity of finalized ideas. But idea evaluation is also important early in the creative process, when individuals must forecast the potential creativity of rough initial ideas as they decide which to develop. Using five experiments, this paper examines individuals’ accuracy in forecasting the potential creativity of their initial ideas. Participants ranked the potential creativity of their initial ideas before developing them into final ideas. Results suggest that participants tended to under-rank their highest-potential idea. The initial idea that participants thought was their second best tended to actually be their best idea in the end. Broadly, the results suggest that creators exhibit myopia when forecasting the potential creativity of their initial ideas, leading them to overlook their most promising initial ideas. However, forecasting at a higher (more abstract) construal level helped participants identify their best initial idea.
Perceiving attitude change: How qualitative shifts augment change perception
Christopher Bechler, Zakary Tormala & Derek Rucker
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, May 2019, Pages 160-175
Abstract:
Attitude change and persuasion are among the most studied topics in social psychology. Surprisingly, though, as a field we have virtually zero insight into perceived attitude change — that is, how people assess the magnitude of a shift in someone's attitude or opinion. The current research provides an initial investigation of this issue. Across 6 primary experiments and a series of supplemental studies (total N = 2880), we find consistent support for a qualitative change hypothesis, whereby qualitative attitude change (change of valence; e.g., from negative to positive) is perceived as greater than otherwise equivalent non-qualitative attitude change (change within valence; e.g., from negative to less negative or from positive to more positive). This effect is mediated by ease of processing: Qualitative attitude change is easier for people to detect and understand than non-qualitative attitude change, and this ease amplifies the degree of perceived change. We examine downstream consequences of this effect and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical implications.
Combining Probability Forecasts: 60% and 60% Is 60%, but Likely and Likely Is Very Likely
Robert Mislavsky & Celia Gaertig
Johns Hopkins University Working Paper, September 2019
Abstract:
How do we combine others’ probability forecasts? Prior research has shown that when advisors provide numeric probability forecasts, people typically average them (i.e., they move closer to the average advisor’s forecast). However, what if the advisors say that an event is “likely” or “probable?” In 7 studies (N = 6,732), we find that people “count” verbal probabilities (i.e., they move closer to certainty than any individual advisor’s forecast). For example, when the advisors both say an event is “likely,” participants will say that it is “very likely.” This effect occurs for both probabilities above and below 50%, for hypothetical scenarios and real events, and when presenting the others’ forecasts simultaneously or sequentially. We also show that this combination strategy carries over to subsequent consumer decisions that rely on advisors’ likelihood judgments. We find inconsistent evidence on whether people are using a counting strategy because they believe that a verbal forecast from an additional advisor provides more new information than a numerical forecast from an additional advisor. We also discuss and rule out several other candidate mechanisms for our effect.
Is One Study as Good as Three? College Graduates Seem to Think So, Even if They Took Statistics Classes
Burt Thompson et al.
Psychology Learning & Teaching, forthcoming
Abstract:
When people interpret the outcome of a research study, do they consider other relevant information such as prior research? In the current study, 251 college graduates read a single brief fictitious news article. The article summarized the findings of a study that found positive results for a new drug. Three versions of the article varied the amount and type of previous research: (a) two prior studies that found the drug did not work, (b) no prior studies of the drug, or (c) two prior studies that found the drug had a positive effect. After reading the article, participants estimated the probability the drug is effective. Average estimates were similar for the three articles, even for participants who reported more statistics experience. Overall, just 4% of participants appeared to use prior research to make probability estimates — most seemed to focus on the latest study, while ignoring or discounting prior studies. Implications for statistics education and reporting are discussed.
Assessing Theoretical Conclusions With Blinded Inference to Investigate a Potential Inference Crisis
Jeffrey Starns et al.
Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Scientific advances across a range of disciplines hinge on the ability to make inferences about unobservable theoretical entities on the basis of empirical data patterns. Accurate inferences rely on both discovering valid, replicable data patterns and accurately interpreting those patterns in terms of their implications for theoretical constructs. The replication crisis in science has led to widespread efforts to improve the reliability of research findings, but comparatively little attention has been devoted to the validity of inferences based on those findings. Using an example from cognitive psychology, we demonstrate a blinded-inference paradigm for assessing the quality of theoretical inferences from data. Our results reveal substantial variability in experts’ judgments on the very same data, hinting at a possible inference crisis.
Dissecting Dispositionality: Distance Increases Stability of Attribution
Anita Körner, Sophie Moritz & Roland Deutsch
Social Psychological and Personality Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
Causes of behavior are often classified as either dispositional (e.g., personality) or situational (e.g., circumstances). However, the disposition–situation dichotomy confounds locus (internal vs. external) and stability (unstable vs. stable) of attribution, rendering it unclear whether locus or stability drives changes in dispositionality. In the present research, we examine the dispositional shift — that is, psychologically distant (vs. near) events are attributed to dispositional (vs. situational) causes. Using construal level theory, we hypothesize that the dispositional shift is caused by a change in stability (but not necessarily locus) of attribution. Two experiments support this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, distant (vs. near) future events were attributed to more stable causes. In Experiment 2, actions by a socially distant person (vs. oneself) were also attributed to more stable (but also more internal) causes. Thus, important psychological manipulations, here psychological distance, can influence causal dimensions selectively, supporting the independence of stability and locus of attribution.
“Mind full or mindful” – can mere cognitive busyness lead to compliance similar to an emotional seesaw?
Magdalena Kaczmarek & Melanie Steffens
Social Influence, forthcoming
Abstract:
The emotional seesaw phenomenon (ESP) is a social-influence technique in which a person experiences a certain emotion, where the external stimulus that evoked the emotion suddenly disappears. Large effects on compliance and impaired cognitive functioning were reported after ESPs. The present research (total N = 163) tests a generalization of this phenomenon: whether mere cognitive busyness leads to similar effects by provoking an inner focus. Two experiments closely modeled after previous ESP experiments supported this reasoning: a simple expectancy violation (Experiment 1) and cognitive load (Experiment 2) caused a comparable pattern of results as the ESP. Experiment 3 demonstrated that also the ESP fostered an inner focus and consequently compliant behavior. We discuss mechanisms underlying social-influence techniques.
Precluding rare outcomes by predicting their absence
Eric Schoon et al.
PLoS ONE, October 2019
Abstract:
Forecasting extremely rare events is a pressing problem, but efforts to model such outcomes are often limited by the presence of multiple causes within classes of events, insufficient observations of the outcome to assess fit, and biased estimates due to insufficient observations of the outcome. We introduce a novel approach for analyzing rare event data that addresses these challenges by turning attention to the conditions under which rare outcomes do not occur. We detail how configurational methods can be used to identify conditions or sets of conditions that would preclude the occurrence of a rare outcome. Results from Monte Carlo experiments show that our approach can be used to systematically preclude up to 78.6% of observations, and application to ground-truth data coupled with a bootstrap inferential test illustrates how our approach can also yield novel substantive insights that are obscured by standard statistical analyses.