Executive Numbers
Quadrophobia: Strategic Rounding of EPS Data
Nadya Malenko, Joseph Grundfest & Yao Shen
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
Managers' incentives to round up reported EPS cause under-representation of the number four in the first post-decimal digit of EPS, or "quadrophobia." We develop a novel measure of aggressive financial reporting practices based on a firm's history of quadrophobia. Quadrophobia is pervasive, persistent, and successfully predicts future restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and class action litigation. It is more pronounced when executive compensation is more closely tied to the stock price and when the firm anticipates violating debt covenants. Quadrophobia is especially strong when rounding-up EPS allows firms to meet analyst expectations, and investors seem not to see through this behavior.
Trust in Financial Markets: Evidence from Reactions to Earnings News
Chishen Wei & Lei Zhang
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper studies the effect of trust on the perceived credibility of earnings news. Using earnings response coefficients, we find that firms located in low-trust regions of the United States experience significantly lower stock price reactions to earnings news. Additional tests indicate that managers can counterbalance investors' dependence on trust by employing reputable auditors or signaling the quality of their earnings using dividends to improve the perceived credibility of their financial reports. Overall, our findings suggest that trust affects the pricing of earnings news in capital markets.
Indirect Insider Trading
Brad Goldie et al.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Indirect trades through these accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider's own account. They are also more likely to be made by 'opportunistic' insiders who make non-routine trades, or who trade profitably before earnings announcements, or have a short investment horizon. These trades contain more predictive information about earnings surprises and large price changes, and they tend to be made by insiders at firms with high information asymmetry. Insiders also make fewer indirect trades following periods of intense regulatory scrutiny.
What do outside CEOs really do? Evidence from plant-level data
John (Jianqiu) Bai & Anahit Mkrtchyan
Journal of Financial Economics, January 2023, Pages 27-48
Abstract:
Using rich plant-level data, we analyze the relative performance of firms with inside and outside CEOs. We show that firms with outside CEOs achieve greater productivity improvements compared to firms with inside CEOs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the relation is stronger in well-performing, rather than poorly performing, firms. Although part of the productivity growth differential comes from divesting low-performing, peripheral, low-tech, and unionized plants, most productivity improvements arise from streamlining continuing plants. Here, productivity is increased by consolidating products, changing the composition of investments toward newer capital, shifting to more capital-intensive production, adopting structured management practices, and improving labor productivity.
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Miguel Anton et al.
NBER Working Paper, December 2022
Abstract:
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with more common ownership.
The Market for Corporate Control as a Limit to Short Arbitrage
Costanza Meneghetti, Ryan Williams & Steven Chong Xiao
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
We hypothesize that corporate takeover markets create significant constraints for short sellers. Both short sellers and corporate bidders often target firms with declining economic prospects. Yet, a target firm's stock price generally increases upon a takeover announcement, resulting in losses for short sellers. Therefore, short sellers should require higher rates of return when takeover likelihood is higher. Consistent with this prediction, the return predictability of monthly short interest increases with industry-level takeover probability and decreases as takeover defenses are implemented. Our results suggest that efficient takeover markets create trading frictions for short sellers and can therefore inhibit overall market efficiency.
When Do Boards of Directors Contribute to Shareholder Value in Firms Targeted for Acquisition? A Group Information-Processing Perspective
Stevo Pavićević, Jerayr (John) Haleblian & Thomas Keil
Organization Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
We draw on group information-processing theory to investigate how target boards of directors may contribute to target value capture during the private negotiations phase in acquisitions. We view target boards as information-processing groups and private negotiations as information-processing tasks. We argue that target board meeting frequency is associated with increased processing -- gathering, sharing, and analyzing -- of acquisition-related information, which improves target bargaining and, ultimately, target value capture. We further posit that this value-enhancing effect of target board meeting frequency is more pronounced when target board composition improves the ability of target boards to process acquisition-related information. Finally, we expect that meeting frequency is more consequential for target bargaining and value capture when acquisition complexity imposes high information-processing demands on the target boards during private negotiations. Empirical evidence from a sample of acquisitions of publicly listed firms in the United States offers support for our group information-processing perspective on board contribution to shareholder value in firms targeted for acquisition.
Bringing Innovation to Fruition: Insights from New Trademarks
Lucile Faurel et al.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming
Abstract:
We build a novel comprehensive dataset of new product trademarks as an output measure of product development innovation. We show that risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation motivate this type of innovation and that this innovation improves firm performance. Using an exogenous shock to executive compensation, we find that reductions in stock option compensation cause reductions in new product development. We also find that firms undertaking new product development experience increases in future cash flow from operations and return on assets. These findings suggest the importance of product development innovation to firms and new trademarks as a novel innovation measure.
Do Tax-Based Proprietary Costs Discourage Public Listing?
Benjamin Yost
Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
This study investigates whether tax-based proprietary costs associated with being a public firm (i.e., costs resulting from increased visibility to the tax authority) discourage public listing. I exploit the introduction of a mandatory disclosure requirement (FIN 48) which generated a signal to the government regarding the uncertainty of public firms' tax positions, allowing for more carefully targeted audits. I hypothesize and find evidence of an increased propensity to go private by public, tax aggressive firms following the enactment of the disclosure rule but prior to its adoption. Cross-sectionally, the effect is stronger among firms that are more sensitive to tax-based proprietary costs. Moreover, IPOs by tax aggressive firms exhibit a relative decline after FIN 48, consistent with the disclosure requirement deterring private, tax aggressive firms from going public. Overall, my findings suggest that mandatory disclosure rules imposing tax-based proprietary costs may discourage some firms from operating as public entities.
Spillover effects in managerial compensation
Robert Kieschnick & Wenyun Shi
Journal of Empirical Finance, January 2023, Pages 62-73
Abstract:
Prior evidence on how executive compensation influences managerial incentives to take risks in shareholder's interest ignores potential spillover effects, even though there is evidence that compensation in one firm affects the compensation in other firms. We address this issue in a way that considers a broader view of corporate networks. Specifically, we examine the effects of a tax law change that induced a change in the vega of CEO compensation. We find that this change is associated with a larger increase in the vegas of directly affected CEOs than would be estimated without considering spillover effects. Moreover, we find evidence for the diffusion of these changes to other firms within their industry. Further, this diffusion is greater the more affected firms within an industry. And finally, we find that these changes are associated with increases in the asset volatility of both treated and untreated firms.