Doing unto others
Kantian optimization: A microfoundation for cooperative behavior
John Roemer
Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and Walrasian equilibrium). I here postulate a cooperative kind of optimizing behavior, called Kantian. It is shown that in simple economic models, when there are negative externalities (such as congestion effects from use of a commonly owned resource) or positive externalities (such as a social ethos reflected in individuals’ preferences), Kantian equilibria dominate Nash-Walras equilibria in terms of efficiency. While economists schooled in Nash equilibrium may view the Kantian behavior as utopian, there is some -- perhaps much -- evidence that it exists. If cultures evolve through group selection, the hypothesis that Kantian behavior is more prevalent than we may think is supported by the efficiency results here demonstrated.
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Why didn’t slaves revolt more often during the Middle Passage?
Andrew Marcum & David Skarbek
Rationality and Society, May 2014, Pages 236-262
Abstract:
Given the substantial suffering of enslavement, why didn’t more slaves revolt during the Middle Passage of the Atlantic slave trade? We argue that the collective action problem was an important impediment to revolt. Revolts nearly always resulted in slave casualties, and crews tortured and killed conspirators. Overthrowing the crew benefited all of the slaves, so each slave had an incentive to free ride on others’ efforts to secure freedom. Using a rational choice framework, we argue that slaves could more effectively overcome the collective action problem when there were fewer slaves aboard, when there were fewer male slaves, and when the slaves were more homogenous. Data on slave voyages from 1750 to 1775 and archival and historical documents support these claims.
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Peter Leeson
Rationality and Society, May 2014, Pages 141-169
Abstract:
This article uses rational choice theory to analyze oracles: media for divining answers to questions about the unknown. I develop a simple theory of oracles with rational agents. My theory explains oracles as institutional solutions to “low-grade” interpersonal conflicts — petty grievances and frustrations resulting from perceptions or feelings of personal offense — that government is unable to resolve. Oracles secure correlated equilibrium in situations where, without them, individuals would be stuck in a suboptimal world of simple mixed-strategy equilibrium. By randomizing strategies about how to behave in situations of low-grade conflict and coordinating individuals’ choices across that randomization, oracles resolve low-grade conflict efficiently. To investigate my theory I consider a society of persons who rely exclusively on oracles to decide how to behave in situations of low-grade conflict: the Azande of Africa. Using the equivalent of a “Magic 8 Ball” to resolve such conflict improves Zande welfare.
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The Effects of Extra-Somatic Weapons on the Evolution of Human Cooperation towards Non-Kin
Tim Phillips, Jiawei Li & Graham Kendall
PLoS ONE, May 2014
Abstract:
Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin is a major evolutionary puzzle, as is ‘strong reciprocity’ where no present or future rewards accrue to the co-operator/altruist. Here, we test the hypothesis that the development of extra-somatic weapons could have influenced the evolution of human cooperative behaviour, thus providing a new explanation for these two puzzles. Widespread weapons use could have made disputes within hominin groups far more lethal and also equalized power between individuals. In such a cultural niche non-cooperators might well have become involved in such lethal disputes at a higher frequency than cooperators, thereby increasing the relative fitness of genes associated with cooperative behaviour. We employ two versions of the evolutionary Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) model – one where weapons use is simulated and one where it is not. We then measured the performance of 25 IPD strategies to evaluate the effects of weapons use on them. We found that cooperative strategies performed significantly better, and non-cooperative strategies significantly worse, under simulated weapons use. Importantly, the performance of an ‘Always Cooperate’ IPD strategy, equivalent to that of ‘strong reciprocity’, improved significantly more than that of all other cooperative strategies. We conclude that the development of extra-somatic weapons throws new light on the evolution of human altruistic and cooperative behaviour, and particularly ‘strong reciprocity’. The notion that distinctively human altruism and cooperation could have been an adaptive trait in a past environment that is no longer evident in the modern world provides a novel addition to theory that seeks to account for this major evolutionary puzzle.
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Decision accuracy in complex environments is often maximized by small group sizes
Albert Kao & Iain Couzin
Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 7 June 2014
Abstract:
Individuals in groups, whether composed of humans or other animal species, often make important decisions collectively, including avoiding predators, selecting a direction in which to migrate and electing political leaders. Theoretical and empirical work suggests that collective decisions can be more accurate than individual decisions, a phenomenon known as the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In these previous studies, it has been assumed that individuals make independent estimates based on a single environmental cue. In the real world, however, most cues exhibit some spatial and temporal correlation, and consequently, the sensory information that near neighbours detect will also be, to some degree, correlated. Furthermore, it may be rare for an environment to contain only a single informative cue, with multiple cues being the norm. We demonstrate, using two simple models, that taking this natural complexity into account considerably alters the relationship between group size and decision-making accuracy. In only a minority of environments do we observe the typical wisdom of crowds phenomenon (whereby collective accuracy increases monotonically with group size). When the wisdom of crowds is not observed, we find that a finite, and often small, group size maximizes decision accuracy. We reveal that, counterintuitively, it is the noise inherent in these small groups that enhances their accuracy, allowing individuals in such groups to avoid the detrimental effects of correlated information while exploiting the benefits of collective decision-making. Our results demonstrate that the conventional view of the wisdom of crowds may not be informative in complex and realistic environments, and that being in small groups can maximize decision accuracy across many contexts.
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Edward Orehek et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Humans are motivated by a quest for significance that is threatened by the inevitability of death. However, individuals with interdependent self-construals, self-representations that reflect embeddedness with and connection to others, are able to extend themselves through time and space through their linkage to a larger social group. The present set of 5 experiments tested the hypotheses that individuals primed with an interdependent self-construal would fear death less and would be more willing to face harm for the sake of the group than individuals with an independent self-construal, that is, self-representations that reflect autonomy and independence from others (“I have self-control”). The results show that interdependent self-construals, compared to independent self-construals, attenuate death anxiety, reduce the avoidance of death, increase the approach to death-related stimuli, induce a greater willingness to become a martyr, and induce a greater willingness to sacrifice the self for other members of important groups.
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Does Intuition Cause Cooperation?
Peter Verkoeijen & Samantha Bouwmeester
PLoS ONE, May 2014
Abstract:
Recently, researchers claimed that people are intuitively inclined to cooperate with reflection causing them to behave selfishly. Empirical support for this claim came from experiments using a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 showing that people contributed more money to a common project when they had to decide quickly (i.e., a decision based on intuition) than when they were instructed to reflect and decide slowly. This intuitive-cooperation effect is of high scientific and practical importance because it argues against a central assumption of traditional economic and evolutionary models. The first experiment of present study was set up to examine the generality of the intuitive-cooperation effect and to further validate the experimental task producing the effect. In Experiment 1, we investigated Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers' contributions to a 4-player public goods game with a marginal return of 0.5 while we manipulated the knowledge about the other players' contribution to the public goods game (contribution known vs. contribution unknown), the identity of the other players (humans vs. computers randomly generating contributions) and the time constraint (time pressure/intuition vs. forced delay/reflection). However, the results of Experiment 1 failed to reveal an intuitive-cooperation effect. Furthermore, four subsequent direct replications attempts with AMT workers (Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c and Experiment 3, which was conducted with naïve/inexperienced participants) also failed to demonstrate intuitive-cooperation effects. Taken together, the results of the present study could not corroborate the idea that people are intuitively cooperative, hence suggesting that the theoretical relationship between intuition and cooperation should be further scrutinized.
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How Options Disappear: Causality and Emergence in Grassroots Activist Groups
Kathleen Blee
American Journal of Sociology, November 2013, Pages 655-681
Abstract:
This study advances recent theorizing on causality and emergence by analyzing how new activist groups create a collective sense of plausible tactics. A comparative ethnographic approach is used to observe shifts in the discussions of four fledgling activist groups. In each group, implicit discursive rules, often set off by minor comments and events, authorize some options and silence others. Although such rules emerge without deliberation or explicit decision making, they shape the group’s sense of possibility into the future. This study contributes both a new understanding of the role of contingency in collective activism and a method for using ethnographic observation to locate subtle causal mechanisms in social life.
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Vanessa Mertins & Wolfgang Hoffeld
Managerial and Decision Economics, forthcoming
Abstract:
The tendency to underestimate others' relative performance compared with one's own is widespread among individuals in all work environments. We examine the relationship between, and the driving forces behind, individual overconfidence and voluntary cooperation in team production. Our experimental data suggest an indirect and gender-specific link: overconfident men hold more optimistic beliefs about coworkers' cooperativeness than men who lack confidence and are accordingly significantly more cooperative, whereas overconfidence, beliefs, and cooperativeness are not correlated in women.
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Eamonn Ferguson et al.
PLoS ONE, May 2014
Abstract:
Evolutionary accounts have difficulty explaining why people cooperate with anonymous strangers they will never meet. Recently models, focusing on emotional processing, have been proposed as a potential explanation, with attention focusing on a dual systems approach based on system 1 (fast, intuitive, automatic, effortless, and emotional) and system 2 (slow, reflective, effortful, proactive and unemotional). Evidence shows that when cooperation is salient, people are fast (system 1) to cooperate, but with longer delays (system 2) they show greed. This is interpreted within the framework of the social heuristic hypothesis (SHH), whereby people overgeneralize potentially advantageous intuitively learnt and internalization social norms to ‘atypical’ situations. We extend this to explore intuitive reactions to unfairness by integrating the SHH with the ‘fast to forgive, slow to anger’ (FFSA) heuristic. This suggests that it is advantageous to be prosocial when facing uncertainty. We propose that whether or not someone intuitively shows prosociality (cooperation) or retaliation is moderated by the degree (certainty) of unfairness. People should intuitively cooperate when facing mild levels of unfairness (fast to forgive) but when given longer to decide about another's mild level of unfairness should retaliate (slow to anger). However, when facing severe levels of unfairness, the intuitive response is always retaliation. We test this using a series of one-shot ultimatum games and manipulate level of offer unfairness (50:50 60:40, 70:30, 80:20, 90:10) and enforced time delays prior to responding (1s, 2s, 8s, 15s). We also measure decision times to make responses after the time delays. The results show that when facing mildly unfair offers (60:40) people are fast (intuitive) to cooperate but with longer delays reject these mildly unfair offers: ‘fast to forgive, and slow to retaliate’. However, for severely unfair offers (90:10) the intuitive and fast response is to always reject.
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Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect than expectation of reward
David Dunning et al.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Trust is essential for a secure and flourishing social life, but many economic and philosophical approaches argue that rational people should never extend it, in particular to strangers they will never encounter again. Emerging data on the trust game, a laboratory economic exchange, suggests that people trust strangers excessively (i.e., far more than their tolerance for risk and cynical views of their peers should allow). What produces this puzzling “excess” of trust? We argue that people trust due to a norm mandating that they show respect for the other person’s character, presuming the other person has sufficient integrity and goodwill even if they do not believe it privately. Six studies provided converging evidence that decisions to trust follow the logic of norms. Trusting others is what people think they should do, and the emotions associated with fulfilling a social duty or responsibility (e.g., guilt, anxiety) account for at least a significant proportion of the excessive trust observed. Regarding the specific norm in play, trust rates collapse when respect for the other person’s character is eliminated as an issue.
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Elevation and mentoring: An experimental assessment of causal relations
Andrew Thomson et al.
Journal of Positive Psychology, forthcoming
Abstract:
Mentoring is a prosocial behavior in which an experienced person guides someone with less experience. Elevation refers to the responses elicited when a person witnesses others upholding the highest standards of moral virtue. Three experimental studies bring these two domains together. For all three studies, participants were randomly assigned to either read a story of someone exhibiting moral excellence or to a control condition. Participants in the elevation condition reported feeling more elevated, more positive attitudes toward mentoring, less negative attitudes toward mentoring, greater intentions to become a mentor (Study 1); an increased proclivity to gather information about becoming a mentor (Study 2a); and, an increased tendency to engage in mentoring directly via submitting advice to students (Study 2b). In their totality, the current studies link another prosocial outcome with elevation and demonstrate a condition under which individuals are more likely to be motivated to become a mentor.
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Psychological “gel” to bind individuals’ goal pursuit: Gratitude facilitates goal contagion
Lile Jia, Eddie Tong & Li Neng Lee
Emotion, forthcoming
Abstract:
Past research demonstrates that gratitude affects individuals’ self-regulation of behavior primarily through engendering a prosocial tendency. Based on theories proposing that gratitude plays an unique role in fostering communal relationship (e.g., Algoe, 2012), we propose that gratitude can have an incidental effect in facilitating goal contagion: automatically inferring and adopting the goal implied by a social other’s behavior. This hypothesis is supported in 3 studies. In Study 1, after being exposed to the behaviors of a social target that implied either a cooperative or a competitive goal, individuals adopted the respective goal and behaved accordingly in a Resource Dilemma Task. This occurred, however, only when they were feeling gratitude and not when they were feeling joy or a neutral mood. In Study 2, after being exposed to a social target’s behavior that implied the goal to make money, people feeling gratitude, as compared to those feeling pride or a neutral mood, strove for a future opportunity to earn money. Study 3 further demonstrated that individuals’ goal striving behavior was mediated by a heightened level of goal activation. Finally, it was found that gratitude facilitated goal contagion only when the social target was a member of participants’ own social group. Through this mechanism, gratitude, thus, seems to bind one’s self-regulation with those of social others. Theoretical and practical implications of this new perspective are discussed.
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Ego depletion decreases trust in economic decision making
Sarah Ainsworth et al.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, September 2014, Pages 40–49
Abstract:
Three experiments tested the effects of ego depletion on economic decision making. Participants completed a task either requiring self-control or not. Then participants learned about the trust game, in which senders are given an initial allocation of $10 to split between themselves and another person, the receiver. The receiver receives triple the amount given and can send any, all, or none of the tripled money back to the sender. Participants were assigned the role of the sender and decided how to split the initial allocation. Giving less money, and therefore not trusting the receiver, is the safe, less risky response. Participants who had exerted self-control and were depleted gave the receiver less money than those in the non-depletion condition (Experiment 1). This effect was replicated and moderated in two additional experiments. Depletion again led to lower amounts given (less trust), but primarily among participants who were told they would never meet the receiver (Experiment 2) or who were given no information about how similar they were to the receiver (Experiment 3). Amounts given did not differ for depleted and non-depleted participants who either expected to meet the receiver (Experiment 2) or were led to believe that they were very similar to the receiver (Experiment 3). Decreased trust among depleted participants was strongest among neurotics. These results imply that self-control facilitates behavioral trust, especially when no other cues signal decreased social risk in trusting, such as if an actual or possible relationship with the receiver were suggested.
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Amy Bilderbeck et al.
Psychological Science, forthcoming
Abstract:
How do people sustain resources for the benefit of individuals and communities and avoid the tragedy of the commons, in which shared resources become exhausted? In the present study, we examined the role of serotonin activity and social norms in the management of depletable resources. Healthy adults, alongside social partners, completed a multiplayer resource-dilemma game in which they repeatedly harvested from a partially replenishable monetary resource. Dietary tryptophan depletion, leading to reduced serotonin activity, was associated with aggressive harvesting strategies and disrupted use of the social norms given by distributions of other players’ harvests. Tryptophan-depleted participants more frequently exhausted the resource completely and also accumulated fewer rewards than participants who were not tryptophan depleted. Our findings show that rank-based social comparisons are crucial to the management of depletable resources, and that serotonin mediates responses to social norms.
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Laura Gonzalez & Yuliya Komarova Loureiro
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper examines the effects of lender and borrower personal characteristics (perceived attractiveness, age and gender) on online peer-to-peer lending decisions. The extant research in finance, marketing, and psychology provides substantial support for the “beauty premium” effect, where ceteris paribus, more (as opposed to less) attractive individuals are favored (e.g., Ravina 2012). Our results qualify these findings, suggesting that (1) when perceived age is a clear signal of competence (college-age signals low competence, while middle age signals significant competence), attractiveness has no effect on loan success; (2) when lender and borrower are of the same gender, attractiveness may actually hurt one’s chances to secure a loan (we observe “beauty is beastly” effect), and (3) loan success is sensitive to the relative age and attractiveness of lenders and borrowers.
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Who’s bringing the donuts: The role of affective patterns in group decision making
Kyle Emich
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, July 2014, Pages 122–132
Abstract:
Two studies examined how intragroup affective patterns influence groups’ pervasive tendency to ignore the unique expertise of their members. Using a hidden profile task, Study 1 provided evidence that groups with at least one member experiencing positive affect shared more unique information than groups composed entirely of members experiencing neutral affect. This occurred because group members experiencing positive affect were more likely to initiate unique information sharing, as well as information seeking. Study 2 built upon this base by showing that confidence mediates the relationship between positive affect and the initiation of unique information sharing. Additionally, Study 2 investigated the role of negative affect in group decision making and how negative and positive affect concurrently influence decision making when groups are composed of members experiencing each. The results are discussed in terms of the role affect plays in influencing group behavior and the resultant importance of investigating specific affective patterns.
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Natural and Strategic Generosity as Signals of Trustworthiness
Diego Gambetta & Wojtek Przepiorka
PLoS ONE, May 2014
Abstract:
We exploit the fact that generosity and trustworthiness are highly correlated and the former can thus be a sign of the latter. Subjects decide between a generous and a mean split in a dictator game. Some of them are informed from the start that afterwards they will participate in a trust game and that their choice in the dictator game may matter; others are not informed in advance. In the trust game, before trusters decide whether or not to trust, some trustees can reveal (or conceal) only their true choice in the dictator game, while others can say to trusters, truthfully or otherwise, what they chose. We find that a generous choice made naturally by uninformed trustees and reliably revealed is more effective in persuading trusters to trust than a generous choice that could be strategic or a lie. Moreover, we find that, when they can, mean subjects lie and go on to be untrustworthy.
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Homophily and the Speed of Social Mobilization: The Effect of Acquired and Ascribed Traits
Jeff Alstott, Stuart Madnick & Chander Velu
PLoS ONE, April 2014
Abstract:
Large-scale mobilization of individuals across social networks is becoming increasingly prevalent in society. However, little is known about what affects the speed of social mobilization. Here we use a framed field experiment to identify and measure properties of individuals and their relationships that predict mobilization speed. We ran a global social mobilization contest and recorded personal traits of the participants and those they recruited. We studied the effects of ascribed traits (gender, age) and acquired traits (geography, and information source) on the speed of mobilization. We found that homophily, a preference for interacting with other individuals with similar traits, had a mixed role in social mobilization. Homophily was present for acquired traits, in which mobilization speed was faster when the recuiter and recruit had the same trait compared to different traits. In contrast, we did not find support for homophily for the ascribed traits. Instead, those traits had other, non-homophily effects: Females mobilized other females faster than males mobilized other males. Younger recruiters mobilized others faster, and older recruits mobilized slower. Recruits also mobilized faster when they first heard about the contest directly from the contest organization, and decreased in speed when hearing from less personal source types (e.g. family vs. media). These findings show that social mobilization includes dynamics that are unlike other, more passive forms of social activity propagation. These findings suggest relevant factors for engineering social mobilization tasks for increased speed.
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Sanctions as honest signals – The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions
Sarah Schoenmakers et al.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7 September 2014, Pages 36–46
Abstract:
In many species, mutual cooperation is stabilized by forms of policing and peer punishment: if cheaters are punished, there is a strong selective pressure to cooperate. Most human societies have complemented, and sometimes even replaced, such peer punishment mechanisms with pool punishment, where punishment is outsourced to central institutions such as the police. Even before free-riding occurs, such institutions require investments, which could serve as costly signals. Here, we show with a game theoretical model that this signaling effect in turn can be crucial for the evolution of punishment institutions: In the absence of such signals, pool punishment is only stable with second-order punishment and can only evolve when individuals have the freedom not to take part in any interaction. With such signals, individuals can opportunistically adjust their behavior, which promotes the evolution of stable pool punishment even in situations where no one can stand aside. Thus, the human propensity to react opportunistically to credible punishment threats is often sufficient to establish stable punishment institutions and to maintain high levels of cooperation.